LET THERE BE

ENLIGHTENMENT

The Religious and Mystical Sources of Rationality

Edited by

ANTON M. MATYTSIN & DAN EDELSTEIN

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Edited by Anton M. Matytsin and Dan Edelstein

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ANTON M. MATYTSIN AND DAN EDELSTEIN

Introduction

Faith in the "Age of Reason"

When inscribing *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (1932) to a friend, Carl Becker famously commented: "This certainly isn't history. I hope it's philosophy, because if it's not, it's probably moonshine:—or would you say the distinction is over subtle?"[1] While it is the final quip that makes his aphorism memorable, the uncertainty expressed in the first part was likely genuine. To suggest, in 1932, that "there is more of Christian philosophy in the writings of the *Philosophes* than has yet been dreamt of in our histories" was a dizzying proposition.[2]

The Age of Voltaire was the Age of Reason, not Faith, and Becker had dared to suggest that these two poles were not oppositely charged. Until then, few scholars had called into question the rhetoric of the philosophes and the narratives they related about their own place in history. Seeking to break with the past, the philosophes had claimed to live in an enlightened age in which the progress of modern science combined with a methodological application of the *esprit philosophique* to bring mankind to an unprecedented apex of intellectual achievement.[3] Overcoming centuries of ignorance and superstition, they believed humanity was finally freeing itself from the shackles of political despotism and religious fanaticism. If they did have progenitors, they claimed, it was the seventeenth-century natural philosophers who had contributed to the broader progress of the human mind. As J. B. Shank observed, the philosophes "defined Enlightenment by constructing a highly politicized history of modern science as an act of self-justification."[4]

Becker's great achievement was to call the philosophes' bluff. His own argument—that "the *Philosophes* demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials"[5]—may not persuade many today. But it opened up a new way of thinking about the Enlightenment that others have exploited in promising and persuasive ways. Becker's student, the great R. R. Palmer, followed in his master's footsteps with *Catholics and Unbelievers in 18th-Century France* (1939). Where Becker had airily surveyed thirteenth- and

eighteenth-century thought, Palmer stayed closer to the ground, tracking specific arguments about God, reason, and nature from neo-scholastic works into the texts of the philosophes. His conclusion—that the God of Voltaire was not that dissimilar from the God of the Jesuits—was more specific than Becker's and has accordingly aged better.

Other scholars have pursued this line of inquiry further, to the point that, today, it would be naive to argue that the philosophes and their allies cut a clear break with the past. Even their most subversive arguments about organized religion owed much to the orthodox Catholic culture out of which they emerged and in which Voltaire, Diderot, and other philosophes matured. As Alan Charles Kors has shown in his *Atheism in France*, vol. 1: *The Orthodox Sources of Disbelief, 1650–1729* (1990), and the more recent *Naturalism and Unbelief in France, 1650–1729* (2016) and *Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650–1729* (2016), even the arguments against the existence of God and against the immortality of the human soul could be traced back to the debates of Catholic learned culture that "generated its own philosophical antithesis."[6] His analysis shows that atheism emerged as a philosophical alternative not from a tradition of "free thought" and clandestine literature but from "deeply learned Christian culture." Operating in a dynamic atmosphere of scholastic disputations—a setting in which students were trained to devise counterarguments and objections to any and all philosophical propositions—seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers engaged in "debates that generated the components of atheistic thought."[7] Thus, as Kors demonstrates, "[a]theism, as a concept, was not underground but, as a set of ideas, was part of the very mental furniture of the Christian learned world."[8] Kors's thesis about origins of religious unbelief thus offers a dramatic challenge to any view of the Enlightenment that seeks to draw sharp divisions between the radical and orthodox perspectives in philosophical and theological questions.

Recent scholarship has done much to further bridge the seemingly wide gap between faith and reason, between the *religionnaires* and the philosophes, showing that it was not nearly as wide as Paul Hazard, Peter Gay, and others had painted it.[9] Historians have begun to notice that the fiery rhetoric of the religious debates from both the philosophes and the Christian apologists might have exaggerated the prevalence of religious belief.[10] For example, Jonathan Sheehan's *The Enlightenment Bible* (2005) has challenged Gay's thesis about the Enlightenment's hostility to religion by looking beyond France and examining the complex role of religion in the Enlightenment in England and Germany. Sheehan has demonstrated how eighteenth-century Protestant scholars in Germany and England adapted the Bible to the new demands of the modern world and transformed it

into "*the* repository of Western heritage." He explores how the development of new scholarly tools used for the translation of scripture into vernacular languages helped to create what he terms "the Enlightenment Bible."[11] Sheehan's analysis also serves as a useful reminder that the origins of the Enlightenment's stress on the independent use of one's own reason could be traced back to the Reformation and the emphasis on the individual engagement with scripture.

Sheehan likewise argues that, while "the Enlightenment has traditionally been read as the very cradle of the secular world," scholars can offer more nuanced and compelling histories of secularization by questioning "implicit and explicit understandings of religion" and thus "put pressure on the slippery and often misleading notion of secularization." In describing what he calls the "difficult marriage" between Enlightenment and religion, Sheehan calls for a more careful attention to how the concept of "religion" has changed over time. Such an approach can offer a more nuanced account of the dialectical interaction between faith and reason and demonstrate how both changed during the eighteenth century. Sheehan also argues that a focus on the different media in which ideas circulated in the Enlightenment would "clarify the question of secularization," making it not just "shorthand for the inevitable . . . slide of the pre-modern religious past into the modern secular future." Such an approach would offer "an account of how religion was made modern."[12]

The close relationship between faith and reason existed in multiple denominations, as David Sorkin's *The Religious Enlightenment* (2008) has demonstrated. Sorkin focuses on the individual details of the myriad ways in which reason and religion interacted in diverse rational and confessional contexts. His examination of not only Protestant and Catholic intellectuals but also Jewish thinkers shows that the "religious Enlightenment was not confined to any one denomination in one country or group of countries but crossed religious and national borders" and was "the first development common to Western and Central Europe's religions." Continuing the revisionist trend, Sorkin argues that "the Enlightenment was not only compatible with religious belief but conducive to it."[13]

Scholars have established a clear connection between Enlightenment learned culture and religion in Protestant countries, particularly Scotland, Switzerland, Prussia, and other German states where the Enlightenment was institutionalized in the universities. Given the philosophes' vociferous opposition to the Catholic Church, however, any compatibility between Catholicism and the Enlightenment had appeared problematic. Nevertheless, Palmer's and Kors's accounts have paved the way for transforming the view of Catholic learned culture. Dale Van Kley's work on Jansenism has similarly reshaped the way historians understand the

intra-Catholic conflicts of the ancien régime. Van Kley has stressed the significance of the political and religious debates between the Jansenists and the Jesuits for the "laicization" of Catholic France and the desacralization of the Bourbon monarchy. He has also noted that any notion of a waning or decline of religious belief in prerevolutionary France is problematic, while presentations of a "Manichean contest between the forces of light, learning, and liberty on the one side and those of Christian and especially Catholic obscurity on the other" neglect the fact that "Christians and would-be enlighteners turn out often to wear the same uniforms and to find themselves on both sides of all the century's major conflicts."[14]

More recently, scholars have emphasized the important presence of distinct Catholic Enlightenment movements in France, Austria, Spain, Italy, and around the world.[15] Ulrich L. Lehner's *The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement* (2016) demonstrates the important yet largely overlooked contributions of Roman Catholicism to the learned discourse, religious practices, and social and political reforms in Europe, the Americas, China, and India during the eighteenth century. Lehner details the ways in which various "Catholic Enlighteners" contributed to "progressive" and "modern" notions that were consistent and compatible with "the values modernity cherishes," arguing for the existence of a long-standing moderate reformist attitude among thinkers who sought to "reconcile Catholicism with modern culture" while using the latest philosophical and scientific advancements "to defend the essential dogmas of Catholic Christianity." In Lehner's account, the Catholic Enlighteners resembled their secular counterparts in opposing religious enthusiasm, fanaticism, and superstition, and they sought to promote toleration toward other denominations and to foster "'rational' obedience" among the faithful. They also deployed the arguments of modern science and philosophy to demonstrate the existence of God and to defend the essential doctrines of Roman Catholicism. According to Lehner, many Catholic reformers even opposed the papacy, calling for a revival of regular councils and cooperating with state reformers sometimes in "open opposition to Rome."[16]

The relationship between reason and religion was thus far more complex than any Manichaean accounts might have us believe.[17] All these reconsiderations have led historians of the Enlightenment to rethink the supposed process of secularization in the eighteenth century, challenging the accounts of Marcel Gauchet and Charles Taylor. Both have depicted secularization as a process of disenchantment by which the space that had been occupied by religion was gradually filled by other forms of human ideology.[18] For both, the growing perception of God's absence from daily life and of his distance from his creation opened the path to the increasingly autonomous individual to undertake an independent search for a new

meaning of existence. Enlightenment thinkers' appeals to general rather than particular providence to explain physical and moral phenomena thus produced what Charly Coleman has termed a "conceptual space for a self-regulating universe and a self-fashioning individual subject," which ultimately "gave rise to new ideals and institutions."[19] According to these accounts, as Coleman has noted in in his review essay, "the origins of secularization should be located within religion itself, rather than in absolute opposition to it." Secularization thus refers not to a decline of religious belief but to "a nonlinear movement originating within religion itself that effectively rendered divine referents unnecessary for ordering the human world." Alongside secularization, Coleman has also identified a complementary trend of "resacralization." Seeking to offer solutions to the problem of the hidden God, eighteenth-century philosophers and theologians had "invest[ed] temporal concepts and institutions with new meanings that approximated religion's function of legitimizing human existence," thereby making "the imperatives of the temporal sphere as binding as divine hierarchies once had been."[20]

The most recent challenge to the secularization thesis has emerged in William J. Bulman and Robert Ingram's *God in the Enlightenment* volume. The editors and contributors to this collection not only question the opposition between Enlightenment and religion but also highlight the continuities between the seemingly dramatic changes in the learned culture of eighteenth-century Europe and the transformations that occurred during the Renaissance and the Reformation. Bulman and Ingram's volume thus offers a new paradigm for understanding the complex relationship between Enlightenment and modernity, on the one hand, and religion and tradition, on the other. Seeking to move beyond the liberal, secular, and philosophical conceptions of the Enlightenment, Bulman paints a richly textured picture of "the religious Enlightenment" that appeared in different parts of Europe and "often had clerical, orthodox, and ecclesiastical dimensions."[21]

Bulman's introductory essay maintains that the Enlightenment sought to solve problems created by the Renaissance and the Reformation primarily by adapting "forms of the same technologies and commitments that were characteristic of the very developments whose disastrous side effects it sought to confront." Because the reformers' doctrine of *sola scriptura* allowed for competing interpretations of the Bible, "the Protestant cause" soon splintered into numerous "churches, sects, and factions," as the leading secular rulers sought to replace "the Roman church as the arbiter of divine truth." The result was more than one hundred years of religious violence that shredded the political and intellectual fabric of Europe. The intense conflicts about "religious error, corruption, and imposture," however, also drew on the philological, exegetical, and historical practices of Renaissance

humanism and adapted them to new needs. Along with the devastating Wars of Religion, Bulman identifies these polemics about the historical status of scripture as essential to the formation of a critical learned culture that allowed elites "to develop new platforms for social and epistemological stability and concord while largely retaining their confessional and political commitments."[22]

The debates of the Reformation thus gradually led to the formation of what Bulman terms "elite secularity," which he defines as "a state of acute awareness among elites that their own religious commitments (or lack thereof) constituted a choice among many available forms of belief (and unbelief), all of which could be held by sane (if erring and partly reasonable) people, because they were the products of complex historical forces." The learned elites thus confronted the perilous effects of confessional fanaticism, realizing that an acceptance of religious pluralism and toleration was the best way to ensure political stability and economic property. These questions about the best ways to ensure peace and an improvement of the earthly realm informed Enlightenment debates not only about the role of public religion but also about various forms of political organization and public order.[23]

Narratives of Light

The contributions to this collection acknowledge the dramatic ways in which recent scholarship has transformed the traditional view of the role of religion in Enlightenment discourses, but they also elaborate on the complex ties between faith and reason. Highlighting figures and topics often overlooked in standard genealogies of the Enlightenment, the chapters in this volume emphasize the prominent role of religious discourses in major aspects of Enlightenment thought. We also seek to examine the long-term origins of the concerns and questions that Enlightenment thinkers found to be the most pressing. Thus, rather than revisiting the celebrated breaks between the eighteenth century and the period that preceded it, we highlight the unacknowledged continuities that connect the Enlightenment to various antecedents.

While we resist the siren call of Enlightenment rhetoric and its triumphalist *post tenebras lux* narrative, we also believe that the actors' own categories and claims are the surest point of departure for analyzing this period. We do not always take these claims at face value, but even in their attempts to rewrite the past, they can be revealing about the philosophes' present. In particular, the widespread evidence of historical consciousness among eighteenth-century writers and their repeated insistence on living in an "enlightened age" (*siècle éclairé*) reveal a critical feature of their argumentation. At the heart of these rhetorical constructions was

the light metaphor, whether among French (*lumières*), English (*enlightened*), Italian (*lumi*), or German (*Aufklärung*) writers. This master metaphor is a critical point of entry for our studies, given that it also had a history of service in religious discourses. Light and its juxtaposition with, and separation from, darkness are central to the biblical narrative. The natural light, which symbolized human reason, was a God-given faculty in the context of Christian theology, or an "eternal light," as the book of Proverbs argued. With the aid of this light, humans could recognize the existence of God, their duties toward their creator, and their own relative feebleness. Furthermore, the debates of the eighteenth century were, in many fundamental ways, informed by contests of the Reformation about the sources of political, religious, and intellectual authority. It would thus be difficult, if not impossible, to understand the Enlightenment without looking further back into the past.

For this reason, we have decided to consider the Enlightenment from both a chronologically and a geographically broad perspective. We have brought together an interdisciplinary group of scholars whose research not only focuses on the intersection between religious thought and the Enlightenment but also deals with earlier periods and covers a significant part of Europe. If religion remained an important factor in the intellectual transformations of the eighteenth century, then the origins of these changes should be sought in the debates of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. The contests about the legitimate sources of religious truth had created tectonic shifts in European attitudes toward intellectual and political authorities, religious toleration, and the freedom of consciousness, among many other issues.

The tensions between faith and reason, Christianity and natural religion, and the book of Scripture and the book of Nature were essential elements of both Enlightenment and religious narratives. Many of the philosophes criticized the corruption of Christian institutions, above all the Catholic Church. They attacked the abuses of the clergy, shed light on violence and religious intolerance, and questioned the veracity of scripture. Some, like Meslier, openly denounced what they saw as an unholy alliance between priests and monarchs to keep the masses ignorant and obedient. Others, like d'Holbach and La Mettrie, proposed alternative accounts of the world's origin. Anticlericalism and religious critiques were indeed the distinguishing characteristics of the French Enlightenment. These critiques were also emphasized by the "anti-philosophes," who described a dangerous attack on religion and urged the crown to censor such dangerous ideas.[24] Such polemics have led historians to emphasize this apparent tension as a fundamental part of eighteenth-century learned culture. While there were certainly numerous atheist and deist thinkers in the eighteenth century, there were also intellectuals

whose projects continued to be informed by their faith, whether it was Catholicism, Calvinism, Anglicanism, Judaism, or another denomination. Indeed, many thought that reason and faith were not only compatible but mutually reinforcing. They believed that mankind, by learning about the created universe, would both improve its own physical conditions and comprehend more fully the nature of God.

Because the metaphor of "light-as-knowledge" was central to many self-reflexive accounts of this period, and since this metaphor originally appeared in a theological context, many of the chapters in this volume investigate its multilayered meanings and the gradual changes in signification. By focusing on the various meanings of the "light" metaphor in different national and confessional settings, this collection explores the complex and evolving relationship between faith and reason. An investigation into the complex origins of the progressive Enlightenment narratives forces revisions to the supposed opposition between reason and religion in eighteenth-century thought and exposes significant continuities with earlier intellectual traditions. Such a geographically and chronologically broad analysis reveals that the metaphor of "light," the progressive narrative of the gradual "enlightenment" of humankind, and the emphasis on the "independent use of one's reason" all had theological origins and ultimately emerged from the intense disputes of the Reformation. The contributors to this collection explore the extent to which the eighteenth-century thinkers were indebted to their Christian predecessors both for the actual content of their philosophical and political theories and for the very language with which they sought to differentiate themselves from their precursors.

Francis Bacon's Lighthouse

Above all other texts, Voltaire's *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire" to the *Encyclopédie* (1751) offered the essential expressions of the philosophes' perception of their own historical period and their intellectual mission. These texts also provided the clearest articulations of the narrative of progress and identified the philosophical origins of the century of lights. Both identified Francis Bacon as the figure who provided the initial spark to the so-called philosophical revolution. Voltaire praised Bacon as the "father of experimental philosophy" and identified the *New Organon* (1620) as "the Scaffold with which the new Philosophy was rais'd."[25] D'Alembert, in turn, noted that Bacon "ought to be placed at the head of these illustrious personages" who had "prepared from afar the light which gradually, by imperceptible degrees, would illuminate the world."[26]

Bacon's powerful rhetorical challenge to Aristotelian philosophy and his call for a methodological reform in natural philosophy certainly made him an obvious choice for the position of original torchbearer for the century of lights. The onetime lord chancellor played a crucial part in articulating metaphors that would gain as much popularity as his promotion of the experimental method. Throughout his texts, particularly in his *New Atlantis* (1627), Bacon deployed the "light-as-knowledge" metaphor. In describing the division of labor in Solomon's House, the head of the college described "lamps" that "direct[ed] new experiments of a higher light, more penetrating into nature than the former." Similarly, it was the "merchants of light" who brought new information about recent discoveries from all over the world.[27]

Although Bacon himself did not engage in experimental philosophy, his appeal was to abandon what he saw as a servile reliance on the authority of the ancients and to pursue new knowledge of and command over nature through observation and experiment. In throwing down the gauntlet to ancient philosophy and in comparing the intellectual infancy of the ancients with the relative maturity of the moderns, Bacon provided the basic outline of the narrative of the progress of the human mind. While this account would become almost a commonplace by the middle of the eighteenth century, such a turn of events was far from evident in 1605, when Bacon penned the *Advancement of Learning*. It was in this text that Bacon first expressed a seemingly optimistic view about how the "proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences," echoing the prophet Daniel, who "speaking of the latter times foretelleth: *Plurimi pertansibunt, et multiplex erit scientia*: as if the openness and through-passage of the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages."[28] Bacon quoted or paraphrased the passage from Daniel 12:4 in numerous works, and it also appeared on the frontispiece to the *Great instauration* (1620): "Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia" (Many shall go to and fro and knowledge shall be increased).

It was an interesting choice of a biblical passage, because Daniel 12:4 was commonly interpreted to refer to millenarian prophecies.[29] In Howard Hotson's definition, "Millenarianism, strictly defined, is the expectation that the vision described in the twentieth chapter of the book of Revelation of a thousand-year period in which Satan is bound and the saints reign is a prophecy which will be fulfilled literally on earth and in the future."[30] Many of Bacon's contemporaries and near contemporaries, including Richard Baxter and Isaac Newton, believed that they lived in an age of "an approaching millennium or earthly paradise" as "foretold

Frontispiece to the *Instauratio magna* (1620)

in the Scriptural prophecies."[31] Margaret Jacob has explained the compatibility between millenarian beliefs and the "new mechanical philosophy," showing how the English latitudinarians accepted "the new science because it articulated an ordered, providentially governed patter." They believed that "Providential action in the historical process . . . would culminate in the creation of an earthly paradise."[32]

More recently, Mordechai Feingold has argued that Bacon's religious language concealed a "profoundly secular" vision of the world and surreptitiously called for the separation of natural philosophy and theology. Feingold sees Bacon's interpretation of Daniel 12:4 as a "daring" and radical revision of Catholic and reformed theologies, according to which the increase of knowledge referred to the rapid mul-

tiplication of speculative scriptural interpretations. Instead, Bacon interpreted the passage as referring to an increase in natural knowledge. According to Feingold, "Bacon essentially severed the connection" between the "advancement of learning" and the "unsealing of prophecies." Consequently, Feingold argues for the emergence of "secular Baconianism" that advocated for the improvement of "the earthly future state" and articulated a vision of secular progress by the end of the seventeenth century.[33] While Feingold insists on a purely secular reading of Bacon, his description of Bacon's view of the progress of knowledge is not incompatible with the visions of the earthly paradise that Jacob has emphasized. Both visions call for an improvement of the earthly realm through the acquisition and deployment of natural knowledge.

The frontispiece to Bacon's posthumously published *Sylva Sylvarum, or A Natural History in Ten Centuries* (1626) was also full of religious imagery. The sun that emanates the rays in the engraving contains two cherubim and the four Hebrew letters (YHWH) that represent the name of God. The sun emanates rays of light, the longest of which divides the Latin inscription from Genesis 1:4, "Et vidit Deus lucem / quod esset bona" (And God saw the light, that it was good). This ray then touches the globe on which the phrase "Mundus Intellectualis" is inscribed.[34]

It would be difficult not to admit that Enlightenment thinkers had neglected Bacon's religious language or purposefully "recast him in their own image."[35] Voltaire, d'Alembert, and Condorcet may not have known and certainly did not discuss Bacon's religious views or Newton's interests in alchemy and in biblical prophecies. While the philosophes emphasized Bacon's contribution to the rise of modern science, Joseph de Maistre directly contradicted their accounts. He denied Bacon's influence on scientific progress and insisted that the English thinker had inaccurately portrayed the relatively advanced state of science in his own time. At the same time, he accused Bacon of providing the false light of reason as the sole guide to the philosophes who tried to remake human understanding.[36] De Maistre attacked Bacon for breaking the tie between theology and philosophy that created a prejudice against religious education and led to a decline of morality. He sought to render Bacon's darkness (*ténèbres*) visible and went so far as to accuse the lord chancellor of dissimulating his Christian beliefs and of promoting atheism and materialism.[37]

If the nature of Bacon's own views on the apocalypse remained a subject of scholarly debate, his pioneering role in the narrative of the Enlightenment appeared undeniable to both the philosophes and their enemies. The progressive vision of Enlightenment thinkers may well owe something to the millenarian tradition that



Frontispiece to the *Sylva Sylvarum* (1626)

pervaded seventeenth-century England. They replaced the millennium and the End Times with a utopian vision that is at the heart of the Enlightenment's optimism. While the content and the end goal changed, the linear form of the historical timeline stayed largely the same. The Garden of Eden that Enlightenment thinkers would seek to cultivate would be an earthly one.

Past and Present Narratives

This volume assembles contributions that reexamine existing assumptions about the origins and contents of Enlightenment thought. Many of the chapters build on recent scholarship on the role of religion in the Enlightenment. As we noted earlier, numerous works published in the past decade have made substantive revisions to the agonistic relationship between faith and reason in the Enlightenment.

It now seems difficult to discuss the Enlightenment without including substantive accounts of religious thought in this period. Whereas these latest works often focus on the ways in which the rationalist trends of eighteenth-century thought affected theological interpretations and religious practices, the essays in this volume explore the ways that religious beliefs, motivations, and assumptions informed a wide spectrum of ideas and intellectual practices.

Some of the chapters also engage with scholarship that has made a crucial distinction between contemporaneous and contemporary definitions of the Enlightenment.[38] In so doing, this volume not only challenges anachronistic attempts to impose ideological meanings retrospectively on "the Enlightenment" but also critically engages the wide range of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century narratives. It analyzes the various ways in which thinkers of this period understood their own place in history, with respect to previous centuries; how they thought about the nature and purposes of intellectual activity; and how they perceived their role in shaping the future of their learned cultures.

We do this while offering a chronologically and geographically broad overview. Some contributions look back into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and analyze the long-term intellectual origins and evolution of political theories, philosophical notions, and theological doctrines in the late early-modern period. Following J. G. A. Pocock's call for a more expansive vision of a plurality of Enlightenments,[39] essays in this collection analyze milieus and groups not commonly associated with "the Enlightenment," including Bohemian Reformers, Dutch Quakers, Paduan Aristotelians, and Jesuit theologians. While we do not advocate the division of eighteenth-century learned culture into "micro-Enlightenments," we seek to determine the essential similarities and differences between various intellectual contexts.

The contributions are divided into three parts: *Lux* addresses the metaphorical and physical manifestations of light and Enlightenment in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century discourses; *Veritas* focuses on the philosophical debates of the period, dealing with issues of epistemology and political theory; and *Tenebrae* examines alternative genealogies of the Enlightenment's emphasis on rationality and toleration, paying particular attention to religious and mystical discourses in different confessional settings.

Lux

Howard Hotson's opening chapter examines the great Moravian educational theorist Jan Amos Comenius, whose texts are replete with analogies between the transmission of light in optics and the transmission of knowledge in education.

In his *Via Lucis* (*The Way of Light*), Comenius offered an account of the whole of human history conceived as the gradual spread of communication. His unfinished masterpiece, the *Consultatio catholica de rerum humanarum emendatione*, gives the most extensive account produced during the entire seventeenth century of both a dawning age of enlightenment and the means of obtaining it. Although Comenius is rarely considered to be a precursor of the *siècle des Lumières*, Hotson explains why the mystical enlightenment remains essential to our understanding of the intellectual origins of the century of lights.

Anton Matytsin studies the incarnations of the light metaphor in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France, where it underwent rapid mutations and polemical contestations. While the figurative meanings of *lumière(s)* assumed new secular connotations in this period, it remained a deeply disputed term. The irreligious philosophes and a variety of Christian thinkers all claimed to be the champions of the "true" light. The disputes over what constituted this *lumière veritable* also informed attempts to define the place of the eighteenth century in the history of human intellectual development. By exploring the transition from the conception of the natural light as a cognitive faculty to the metaphorical sense of natural lights as the total sum of human knowledge, accumulated over time, Matytsin explains how the contested use of the light metaphor contributed to competing narratives about the Age of Enlightenment. The disputes also reveal the religious origins of the emphasis on the independent use of one's reason and also of the progressive narrative of the Enlightenment, showing how both can be traced back to the debates of the Reformation.

Céline Spector looks at a different aspect of the "light-as-knowledge" metaphor. She investigates how the *siècle des Lumières* became a new historiographical category. She argues that the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns was a turning point and that, among the Ancients, Longepierre and the abbé Dubos formulated new accounts of the achievements and shortcomings of *l'esprit philosophique*. By exploring the metaphor of a *tribunal de l'opinion* that was supposed to judge artistic merits, this essay suggests that the Enlightenment was a category invented as a way to defend sensibility against the exclusive claims of science and philosophical reason.

Darrin McMahon shifts us from metaphors of light to physical efforts to illuminate Old Regime Paris, the first city in Europe (and indeed the world) to receive extensive public lighting. Initiated by Jean-Baptiste de Colbert under Louis XIV in 1667, and overseen by the police, the effort was expanded in succeeding decades and throughout the eighteenth century, driving technological innovation and cultural reflection on the unprecedented conquest of the night. McMahon

analyzes the political and administrative process of erecting a large-scale lighting network based on the use of lanterns, as well as the innovative social practices that ensued. He shows how the effort to illuminate Paris ultimately mirrored the effort to enlighten it, engendering both enthusiasm and resistance.

Veritas

Jo Van Cauter begins the second section by detailing Spinoza's relations with the Friends and Dutch Collegiants. He examines the role of Quaker thought by engaging in a close reading of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and demonstrates the striking resemblance between Spinoza's interpretation of true piety and the religious lifestyle advocated by the "Children of the Light." Van Cauter reveals why Quakerism, and Quakerism alone, could have provided Spinoza with perhaps the most ideal test case for determining his own views on the specific relationship between religious freedom and state authority.

Philippe Buc looks at the medieval theological origins of Hobbes's political philosophy. He focuses on how the coercive state Hobbes envisaged was a continuum with medieval formulas that not only related the pair light-darkness to compulsion and force and but also expressed themselves in the revolutionary offspring of the Enlightenment.

Matthew Gaetano's chapter examines how seventeenth- and eighteenth-century followers of the medieval scholastics responded to some of the charges against the scholastic tradition. These Thomists and Scotists maintained that they had an illuminating power within their souls that could make reality manifest to them. Nonetheless, genuine scientific knowledge was difficult to attain—almost impossible without the support of great teachers. The common philosophical vocabulary and shared principles provided by Aristotle and his commentators could therefore be a light of unity—*lumen unitivum*—to aid students in the pursuit of truth.

Dan Edelstein likewise traces the unexpected place of Aristotle in the French Enlightenment. He shows that Aristotle remained surprisingly popular throughout the eighteenth century: his *Poetics* remained the Bible of classical aesthetic norms; his *Politics*, *Ethics*, and *Rhetoric* were repeatedly translated into French, taught in the *collèges*, and generally admired; only his *Physics* and *Metaphysics* attracted criticism. Edelstein argues that the perceived anti-Aristotelianism of the Enlightenment was in fact a fading legacy of the Scientific Revolution and that, in moral, political, and aesthetic spheres, the Enlightenment was far more Aristotelian than usually supposed.

Tenebrae

Our final section opens with William Bulman's chapter on the sacerdotalist secularism in the Anglican Enlightenment. Bulman demonstrates how the famously rational Christianity of the sceptered isle was not the result of a belated embrace of the new philosophy and the tenets of tolerationism by a reactionary faith but, rather, was the invention of men who sought to outfit sacerdotalism for a secular age before the radical Enlightenment had even begun. His chapter describes Enlightened advocations of priestly power by Anglican clerics from the English Civil War to the American Revolution.

Jeffrey Burson's examination of the alternate genealogies of Enlightenment culture offers a series of individual snapshots of the ways in which various writers and movements associated with eighteenth-century culture used metaphors of light to construct alternate genealogies of enlightenment. Each of the snapshots (of the Jesuit, Freemasonic, anti-philosophe, and Enlightenment materialist genealogies of light) defined the source and origins of the century of "lights" differently, but each of them was mutually entangled in ways that suggest the need to broaden and deepen present definitions of eighteenth-century culture. What unites these sections is the complex, constructive entanglement of various perspectives concerning what it means to discover and disseminate light. Above all else, the nearly universal but conflicting genealogies of light dynamically intersect and collectively constitute the culture of the long "century of lights."

Charly Coleman's contribution departs from the traditional rationalist account of eighteenth-century learned culture and explores the mystical sides of Enlightenment thought. While the ideal of wakefulness, sociability, and self-control prevailed among mainstream representatives of the Enlightenment, who adamantly distinguished themselves from victims of imagination, enthusiasm, and other altered states, Coleman argues that Denis Diderot emerged as an unlikely advocate of the dream state and other such experiences during which consciousness was mitigated, if not suspended altogether. Diderot appropriated the taboo rhetoric of mysticism to question the self's powers of volition and rationality. His musings on psychology, aesthetics, and metaphysics culminated in *Le rêve d'Alembert*, a work that attempted to make a science of the self's mutability in an ever-shifting physical world. Once situated in a broader cultural field extending from the quietism of François de Fénelon to the Illuminism of Louis-Claude Saint-Martin, Diderot's interventions reveal a religiously inspired, antiindividualist conception of personhood that figured not only along the margins of the philosophe movement but also in the work of one of its central figures.

James Schmidt's contribution concludes the volume with an examination of the "Counter-Enlightenment" in the English and German contexts. Taking the English anti-Jacobins and Johann Georg Hamann as its point of departure, Schmidt traces the ways in which friends and enemies of the movement that we have come to call "the Enlightenment" drew on a common stock of images to defend radically different accounts of the relationship between faith and reason. By analyzing a variety of largely neglected nineteenth-century German texts, Schmidt casts new light on the history of the concept of "counter-enlightenment" itself, which turns out to have initially been employed by defenders of a "true enlightenment" grounded on religious doctrines to designate those thinkers who we associate with the Enlightenment.

NOTES

1. Quoted. in Peter Gay, "Carl Becker's Heavenly City," *Political Science Quarterly* 72, no. 2 (1957): 182–99.

2. Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 31.

3. Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1–2.

4. J. B. Shank, *The Newton Wars and the Beginnings of the French Enlightenment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 35. For another account of "heroic science," see Margaret Jacob, "The Truth of Newton's Science and the Truth of Science's History: Heroic Science and Its Eighteenth-Century Formulation," in *Rethinking the Scientific Revolution*, ed. Margaret J. Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 315–32.

5. Becker, *The Heavenly City*, 31.

6. Alan Charles Kors, *Naturalism and Unbelief in France, 1650–1729* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 2. See also Alan Charles Kors, *Atheism in France*, vol. 1: *The Orthodox Sources of Disbelief, 1650–1729* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), and Alan Charles Kors, *Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650–1729* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

7. Kors, *Atheism in France*, 4.

8. Kors, *Naturalism and Unbelief in France*, 2.

9. Paul Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européene* (Paris: Biovin, 1935); Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 1: *The Rise of Modern Paganism* (New York: Knopf, 1966); Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 2: *The Science of Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1969); Margaret Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981); Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Philipp Blom, *A Wicked Company: The Forgotten Radicalism of the European Enlightenment* (New York: Basic

Books, 2010); Jonathan I. Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750–1790* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011); Jonathan I. Israel, *Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French Revolution from* The Rights of Man *to Robespierre* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

10. S. J. Barnett asserts that, while the philosophes constructed a powerful image of themselves as the avant-garde proponents of religious toleration, their Catholic opponents created an "antichristian bogey that did not have any substantial reality." S. J. Barnett, *The Enlightenment and Religion: The Myths of Modernity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 4–5.

11. Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 259 (quotation), xi–xiii.

12. Jonathan Sheehan, "Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay," *American Historical Review* 108, no. 4 (2003): 1061–80; quotations on 1063–64, 1072, 1076–77.

13. David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 5, 3.

14. Dale K. Van Kley, "Christianity as Casualty and Chrysalis of Modernity: The Problem of Dechristianization in the French Revolution," *American Historical Review* 108, no. 4 (2003): 1081–1104, quotations on 1092 and 1085. For more on Van Kley's account of the debates between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, see Dale K. Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). See also Dale K. Van Kley, "Conclusion: The Varieties of Enlightened Experience," in *God in the Enlightenment*, ed. William J. Bulman and Robert G. Ingram (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 278–316.

15. Jeffrey D. Burson, *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Ulrich L. Lehner, *Enlightened Monks: The German Benedictines, 1740–1803* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jeffrey D. Burson and Ulrich L. Lehner, eds., *Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe: A Transnational History* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014); Ulrich L. Lehner, *The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

16. Lehner, *The Catholic Enlightenment*, 2, 7, 10.

17. For more on the relationship between reason and religion in the eighteenth century, see Dale K. Van Kley and James Bradley, eds., *Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); William J. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and Its Empire, 1648–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); William J. Bulman and Robert G. Ingram, eds., *God in the Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). For excellent reviews of the recent historiography, see Charly Coleman, "Resacralizing the World: The Fate of Secularization in Enlightenment Historiography," *Journal of Modern History* 82, no. 2 (2010): 368–96; Simon Grote, "Review Essay: Religion and Enlightenment," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 75, no. 1 (2014): 137–60.

18. Marcel Gauchet, *Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, trans. Oscart Burge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

19. Coleman, "Resacralizing the World," 372–73.

20. Ibid., 369, 372–73, 394, 391. See also Charly Coleman, *The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-Individualist History of the French Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), and Charly Coleman, "Religion," in *The Cambridge Companion to the French Enlightenment*, ed. Daniel Brewer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 105–21.

21. William J. Bulman, "Introduction: Enlightenment for the Culture Wars," in *God in the Enlightenment*, ed. William J. Bulman and Robert G. Ingram (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–41 (quotation on 8).

22. Ibid., 15–18.

23. Ibid., 18–19. For more on the concept of "elite secularity," see Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, xiii–xiv, 9–10.

24. The opponents of the philosophes did not use the term *anti-philosophes* to describe themselves as a group, but the term existed since the eighteenth century, first appearing in Louis-Mayeul Chaudon's *Dictionnaire anti-philosophique* in 1767. Contemporary scholars have used the term to describe the broad spectrum of authors who explicitly opposed the philosophes in the eighteenth century. Darrin McMahon coined the term "anti-*philosophe* discourse" to describe Christian writers who saw the philosophes as an organized sect bent on the destruction of all religion. See Darrin M. McMahon, *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 32–33. We use this term rather than the more popular "Counter-Enlightenment," because the thinkers in this category did not oppose every idea that historians associate with "the Enlightenment" but rather targeted the philosophes and their opposition to organized religion. For more on religious apologetics, see Anton M. Matytsin, "Reason and Utility in French Religious Apologetics," in *God in the Enlightenment*, ed. William J. Bulman and Robert G. Ingram (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 63–82.

25. Voltaire, *Letters Concerning the English Nation* (London: Davis, 1733), 87–88.

26. Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire des éditeurs," in *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonnée des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, 28 vols. (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton & Durand, 1751–72), 1:i–xlv (quotation on xxiv).

27. Francis Bacon, *The New Atlantis*, in *Francisci Baconi Baronis de Verulamio, Vicecomitis Sancti Albani, Magni Angliae Cancellarii, opera omnia, quatuor voluminibus comprehensa*, 4 vols. (London: Knapton, Knaplock, Walthoe, Midwinter, Gosling, Mears, Innys, Wotton, Brown & Osbrone, 1730), 3:257.

28. Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*, ed. William Aldis Wright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), 98.

29. For more on Bacon and Daniel, see Stephen A. McKnight, *The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon's Thought* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1984); Charles Whitney, *Francis Bacon and Modernity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986); Steven Matthews, *Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); Mordechai Feingold, "'And Knowledge Shall Be Increased': Millenarianism and the Advancement of Learning," *Seventeenth Century* 28, no. 4 (2013): 363–93.

30. Howard Hotson, "The Historiographical Origins of Calvinist Millenarianism," in *Protestant History and Identity in Sixteenth-Century Europe*, ed. Bruce Gordon, 2 vols. (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996), 2:160.

31. Margaret C. Jacob, "Millenarianism and Science in the Late Seventeenth Century," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37, no. 2 (1976): 335–41. For more on millenarianism in seventeenth-century England, see Katherine R. Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain: 1530–1645* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin, eds., *Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture*, vol. 3: *The Millenarian Turn: Millenarian Contexts of Science, Politics, and Everyday Anglo-American Life in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Dordrecht: Springer Science, 2001).

32. Jacob, "Millenarianism and Science in the Late Seventeenth Century," 340–41.

33. Feingold, "'And Knowledge Shall Be Increased,'" 365, 364, 385–86.

34. For a more detailed interpretation of the *Sylva Sylvarum*'s frontispiece, see Margery Corbett and R. W. Lightbrown, *The Comely Frontispiece: The Emblematic Title-Page in England, 1550–1660* (London: Henley, 1979), 184–89.

35. Matthews, *Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon*, vii.

36. Joseph de Maistre, *Examen de la philosophe de Bacon*, 2 vols. (Paris: Poussielge-Rusand, 1836), 1:3–5, 9.

37. Ibid., 2:254, 267, 307, 316, 338.

38. See, e.g., Schmidt, "Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-Jacobins, British Hegelians, and the *Oxford English Dictionary*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 64, no. 3 (2003): 421–43; Jonathan Clark, "Predestination and Progress: Or, Did the Enlightenment Fail?," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003): 559–89; Daniel Brewer, *The Enlightenment Past: Reconstructing Eighteenth-Century French Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); J. G. A. Pocock, "Historiography and Enlightenment: A View of Their History," *Modern Intellectual History* 5, no. 1 (2008): 83–96; Edelstein, *The Enlightenment*, 13–18, 116–18.

39. J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*, vol. 1: *The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–10.

Part One. *Lux*

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HOWARD HOTSON

Via Lucis in tenebras

Comenius as Prophet of the Age of Light

A discussion of Jan Amos Comenius is not the normal starting point for a volume of essays on "the Enlightenment." In his homeland, to be sure, he is a perennial icon, whose portrait has adorned banknotes in the First Czechoslovak Republic of the interwar years, in postwar Czechoslovakia, and in the current Czech Republic. This status was won the hard way: Comenius was the paradigmatic figure of a tormented generation evicted from its homeland in 1628 after the failure of the Bohemian Revolt. The last bishop of the Czech Unity of Brethren, and thus an important witness to the ancient tradition of Czech Protestantism, he is also regarded as a utopian visionary, an educational theorist and practitioner of the highest rank, a pioneer of Czech vernacular literature, and thus a touchstone for many aspects of Czech history and identity.

Further afield, however, his range of association narrows dramatically: in the wider world, he is known primarily as a pedagogical reformer whose name became a byword for educational innovation during the past half century. The European Union's program for promoting transnational cooperation among schools and colleges is simply entitled "Comenius";[1] and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has given Comenius's name to the medal it bestows on "those educators who have made a significant contribution to the development or renewal of education."[2] But the history of pedagogy and education remains unjustifiably marginal to the field of intellectual history; and within English-language historiography, Comenius remains little known and poorly understood: there is scarcely any introductory literature in English that one can recommend with confidence to an undergraduate seeking a balanced assessment of the man and his work.[3]

Comenius's relationship to the Enlightenment, moreover, is paradoxical in the extreme. From 1641 onward, he argued passionately and at great length that European civilization was on the eve of an unprecedented "age of light," brought about in no small part by the invention of print, the European voyages of discovery, the reformation of secular and divine learning, and new means of understanding

the natural world. Within his writings on education and reform, "light" is far more than a metaphor: it is a metaphysic, permeating his understanding of knowledge, learning, the past, his present moment, the future, and indeed human history as a whole. Yet, far from being acknowledged as one of the Enlightenment's precursors, Comenius became one of the figures the philosophes most loved to hate, thanks largely to the portrait penned by Pierre Bayle. The reason for his banishment is clear: Comenius did not disguise the fact that his expectations were grounded not merely in technological and philosophical progress but also in more mystical forms of enlightenment, including prophecy, both canonical and enthusiastic.

The Moravian's paradoxical fate therefore offers a revealing case study of the way in which the Enlightenment canon was constructed by embracing some figures and ostracizing others; and this process suggests a fourfold agenda for this chapter. The first two tasks are to sketch the nature of Comenius's expectations for the future and to ground them in the writings on pedagogical and related reforms for which he is most famous. The third is to outline the reasons why he was banished so completely from the canon of forerunners of the Enlightenment. The concluding task is to recapture some of the ways in which Comenius's unique case can be related to older and broader traditions that might constitute mystical roots of the Enlightenment.

For understanding Comenius's expectations, the obvious point of departure is the first clear articulation of his expectations in a work entitled *Via Lucis* (*The Way of Light*).[4] For further detail, we can turn to his later reworking of this material in a treatise on *Panaugia* (*Universal Light*). For understanding his banishment, the natural focus shifts to another work: the *Lux in tenebris* (*Light in Darkness*), which revealed the most controversial basis of his expectations. Taking these three works together, the final section charts the route of Comenius's *Via Lucis in tenebras*–that is, the path by which this prophet of a dawning age of light was cast into outer darkness during the *siècle des Lumières*.

Via Lucis: Plotting a Path to the Age of Light

The *Via Lucis* takes its title from an account of the trajectory of human history, from beginning to end, conceived as the gradual dawning of increasingly powerful forms of communication.[5] In keeping with his profound biblicism, Comenius paced off the narrative in seven stages. No sooner, in fact, were the original six days of creation complete than a process of re-creation began that transported the newly created human family along the seven stages of this *Way of Light*, which Comenius believed was about to reach its destination during his own lifetime.

The first step on this path of enlightenment, as Comenius narrates it, followed immediately after Adam's creation. As Genesis 2:19 records, "Out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them. And whatever Adam called each living creature, that was its name." This episode, Comenius observes, grounded all empirical knowledge in "autopsy, that is, the immediate and accurate inspection of particular things by Adam in his solitary condition, in which he perceived the nature of all the animals and gave appropriate names to them."

"But for Adam," the biblical passage continues, "there was not found a helper comparable to him." The provision of such a companion in the creation of Eve then immediately provoked the second stage in the *Way of Light*—namely "speech between them, by which each, questioning the other and replying to questions, was able to effect a fuller advance towards wisdom."

"When mankind was increased in number," Comenius continues, a third stage was required—"namely, the holding of public assemblies where many people can be taught all the best things together." During the ensuing age of the patriarchs, public and private speech were the only modes of communication needed to pass on the sum total of human knowledge between parents and children, who could absorb orally transmitted knowledge during lifetimes that spanned many centuries. But "after the Flood the span of human life was lessened," and "writing was invented by which persons who were separated from each other in time or in place could teach each other." Moreover, "by the same invention even the dead could teach the living for ever."

This fourth stage lasted for thousands of years; however, in the relatively recent past, progress down the *Via Lucis* suddenly accelerated. For "when the latest age, the age of light, was approaching, it pleased God to provide for men a marvellous device for multiplying the number of books infinitely with amazing speed—the device, namely, of printing. . . . By it . . . a way of communication has been opened to us with all the epochs of the past, and all the nobler minds of earlier years have been made tributaries to our own."

This was quickly followed by "the sixth way of spreading the Light throughout the human race"–namely, "the Art of Navigation, also discovered in these late days. By it communications have been opened up between men scattered through the various continents of the earth and the islands of the ocean, and hitherto cut off from each other and ignorant of each other."

Already it should be clear that Comenius's scheme was something quite extraordinary. The *Via Lucis* offered an understanding of the whole sweep of sacred

history patterned on the six days of creation and therefore indirectly grounded in the text of scripture. Yet this path of sacred progress skipped almost without mention over all the great watersheds of orthodox Christian theology. The first and greatest disaster in human history—original sin, the ejection from Eden, and the curse of mortality—was passed over almost without comment. The second and third disasters—the contraction of the human life span and the universal Deluge—merely prompted a new communications revolution: the invention of writing. Even more astonishingly, the incarnation, crucifixion, death, and resurrection of the Savior of mankind were passed over in silence, midway through the lengthy fourth stage of the pathway toward universal light. Moreover, in striking contrast to the Pauline, Augustinian, and Protestant emphasis on the utter helplessness of fallen creatures to contribute to their own redemption, in this account of sacred history the role of redeemer was played by human ingenuity in developing increasingly sophisticated technologies of communication. The printing press, to be sure, was described as a gift from God to men, but this only serves to remind the reader of the absence from this narration of the revelation of either Law or Gospel. Although profoundly religious, like all of Comenius's writings, this scheme was also deeply unorthodox and strangely secular, centered on works of man rather than acts of God.

The advent of print in the fifth stage and the voyages of discovery in the sixth, however, did not themselves inaugurate an age of light. Instead, they helped touch off an era of religious war of unprecedented ferocity, of which Comenius and his confessional community were one of the principal victims. The Czech Reformation had preceded the German one by a century, but such was the animosity unleashed by Luther, Calvin, and Trent that this ancient tradition was evicted en masse from the Czech lands after the crushing of the Bohemian Revolt in 1620. As the last bishop of the Moravian Unity of Brethren, which was scattered by this disaster, Comenius could not have been more painfully aware of the dislocation and suffering caused by the greatest conflict of the post-Reformation period, the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), still underway when this work was written in the winter of 1641–42.

Building toward the seventh and final stage of the *Way of Light*, Comenius alluded to this distracted condition in adopting a far darker and explicitly apocalyptic tone: "To nothing less than [its] consummation the face of the world now seems to look, for the world is turning itself wholly to what we must call a new birth or reincarnation. God, in pouring the deluge of his just anger upon the heaped-up wickedness of men and overthrowing nation after nation, is by an universal ruin preparing the way for an universal change of all things."[6]

This provides the preamble to the culminating seventh stage of the *Via Lucis*, which Comenius describes as follows:

> Now that communication between one age and another has been opened by printing and between one people and another by the art of navigation, the next stage must surely be the gathering and confluence out of all the lights which have been hitherto revealed of one great light for the common uses of mankind. Imagine that whatever of true and good has at any time and in any place been conceived, sought, found, granted by God and possessed by man in detail and as it were in private, in this, that and the other age, in this, that and the other people, tongue, family or household—imagine that the whole of that is now offered in its fullness to the whole world. What only a few people, endowed with minds of unusual acuteness, once attained, henceforth all people may make their own, for the mysteries of the world are now revealed to all and set in the light. . . . In word, we are entering upon the fullest highway of light.

The retrospective survey of the past and the brief allusion to the distracted present merely prepare for this prophetic vision of the near future. In this, too, Comenius is exceptional. Although elsewhere he cites countless biblical passages in support of his vision, none are presented here. Instead, his vision is based on a mere technical inference, almost a mathematical calculation, a straightforward extrapolation of past developments to sketch out the shape of a future trajectory. When the capacities to communicate with all times (afforded by writing in script and print) and with all places (afforded by transoceanic navigation) are added together, the sum must be universal communication, which must give rise to a dawning age of learning the likes of which the world has never seen. The golden age prophesied here is neither a messianic kingdom nor a reign of the saints on earth: it is an age of universal knowledge and wisdom gathered from every age and people and disseminated to every human being.

Moreover, having stressed the importance of human agency in the earlier stages of the *Via Lucis*, Comenius does not simply sit back passively and wait for direct divine intervention to inaugurate this culminating age of light. Instead, he devotes five of the remaining chapters of his work to describing the four prerequisites necessary for the propagation of "universal light."[7] First, "Our whole hope of restoring the world to better ends hangs upon the instruction of the young," while they are still relatively uncorrupted and susceptible to benign formative influences. This requires "the opening of *universal schools* in every part of the world," in which "all young people, even the children of needy parents and orphans, notwithstanding their disabilities, may be educated." These schools

must be established "upon a better system than we have hitherto had." At the core of these schools, second, must be a graduated system of *universal books*, beginning with manuals for the instruction of children in the home and proceeding through a graduated series to three encyclopedic compendia: the first one, *pansophia*, containing "the very marrow of eternal truths" and general principles, needed to make men wise; a second, *panhistoria*, containing information on all particular things of natural and civil history, needed to make men knowledgeable; and the third, *pandogmatica*, surveying "the various theories or opinions which have been help about things," needed to make mean learned. Third, in order to collect these books and manage these schools, a *universal college* is needed, with chapters scattered throughout the world, but bound together into a collegiate society by sacred laws designed to foster universal communication. Finally, in order to foster this universal communication, a *universal language* will ultimately be needed, "made impartially for all men," easier, more pleasant, richer, more copious, and more perfect than any other because it is bound to the natures of things and thus "an antidote to confusion of thought." The *Via Lucis* therefore culminated with a process in which the wisdom of the ages would be collected together in a single great repository, and then repackaged and disseminated in a variety of forms accessible to each according to his or her ability and need.

This vision is often described as utopian,[8] but the application of this term to Comenius is misleading. As originally coined by Thomas More, the term *utopia* alludes to a "good place" (*eutopia*) that exists "nowhere" (*utopia*). In this strict sense, a utopia is a purely imaginary construction that serves as a foil or mirror in which to contemplate our own world.[9] More concretely, Comenius's *Via Lucis* was not an imaginary city of the kind composed by the three seventeenth-century utopians whose works influenced him: the *Christianopolis* of Johann Valentin Andreae,[10] the *Città del Sole* of Tommaso Campanella,[11] and the *New Atlantis* of Francis Bacon. More than merely imagining a better order of society, the *Via Lucis* provided a roadmap that would lead to such a place and situated it not in some inaccessible or imaginary world but in our own world in the near future.

The *Collegium Lucis* and the Royal Society

Comenius did not merely draft a program of action: he and his associates took active steps to implement it. Indeed, while writing the *Via Lucis* in England during the winter of 1641–42, he was involved in strenuous efforts to realize three of his four desiderata. He had spent the past decade developing pedagogical methods for the "universal books," which would provide the core curriculum for his "universal schools." Upon obtaining a manuscript copy of the first sketch of these

pansophic plans, Samuel Hartlib immediately rushed the work into print and invited its author to London to fulfill the third main desideratum: the establishment of a "universal college."[12] England, Hartlib urged, would be the place to establish "a college such as the industrious Bacon desired, dedicated to all the studies of the world."[13] In responding to a similar invitation in February 1641, Comenius likewise foresaw the establishment in London of a "College of Light" consisting "of six or seven men who have Universal Learning at heart."[14] Upon arriving in London in the autumn of 1641, Comenius was presented with evidence that he had been "summoned by command of Parliament" itself for this very purpose.[15] Leading figures in London stepped forward with offers to help bankroll his endeavors, even suggesting that the income of Chelsea College (a defunct Jacobean establishment) might be used to maintain his "collegium lucis." But "one unhappy day" in November 1641 frustrated these plans, when news arrived of the massacre in Ireland which touched off a new phase of the civil wars already raging in Scotland. With these tantalizing prospects dashed, Comenius devoted the winter to providing his potential patrons with "summary information touching my project" in "a tract entitled *Via Lucis*."[16] The *Via Lucis* was no daydream: it was written to record an interlocking set of aspirations that had very recently appeared almost within reach, in the hope that changing circumstances might allow their later realization.

By the time the *Via Lucis* was published in 1668, circumstances had changed dramatically. Comenius had come to believe that his vision was once again in the process of accomplishment, and he signaled this belief by dedicating the work "Illuminati Seculi Phosphoris"—that is, "To the Torch Bearers of an Enlightened Age, Members of the Royal Society of London."[17] A close reading of the text of this dedication, set within the circumstances in which it was written, reveals that Comenius regarded the Royal Society as fulfilling, at least in part, three of his four requisites for ushering in the age of light.

In the first place, the opening words of his dedication portray the Royal Society as the outcome of the plans, hatched with his English friends a quarter century earlier, for founding a universal college in London: "It is not unfitting that a book entitled *The Way of Light* should be sent to you, who are the ministers of Light, ... since the work was conceived in that country where the territory offered to us for the search for Light and Truth has passed into your keeping, according to that Word of Christ (applicable in its proper sense to this occasion): Others have laboured and you have entered into their labours. Pray, accept what may be to your purpose, so that these studies may come back to the source from which they sprang."[18]

The meaning of this somewhat allusive passage becomes clear when situated within Comenius's conception of the relevant sequence of events. In September 1641, mere months before the outbreak of the civil wars that toppled the English monarchy, Comenius had been invited to London by a group of senior figures intending to found a college of light. In October 1660, mere months after the monarchy was restored, an analogous institution had been founded in London and subsequently provided with a royal charter. Moreover, in October 1667 the estates and buildings sustaining Chelsea College—formerly proposed for Comenius's college, were given by Charles II to the Royal Society. This transfer, the most substantial royal benefaction the society ever received, was announced in Thomas Sprat's famous *History* published later that year.[19] After leaving England, Comenius had not forgotten his connection with Chelsea: in 1646 he had written to Hartlib, inquiring whether it might still provide the means of realizing the College of Light described in the eighteenth chapter of the *Via Lucis*; and he recalled this plan again in his autobiographical apologia of 1669.[20] News of the king's benefaction in 1667 may well have prompted Comenius to draw the obvious inference: the Royal Society of London was the fulfillment, immediately after the Restoration, of the plan to establish a universal college in London, funded by the endowments of Chelsea College, immediately before the outbreak of war. As Comenius explained in the dedication, "The political commotions which overtook the country" after his arrival in 1641 "prevented the schemes" which had begun "to be discussed under official authority" "from being realized." But "now that halcyon days are returned, I mean, now that the upheavals of civil war are subsiding . . . something has been achieved and that in a glorious manner . . . by the splendid establishment of the Royal Society in London."[21] In the opening words of the dedication, "The territory offered to [Comenius] for the search for Light and Truth" in 1641 had been snatched away from him; but as soon as the *status quo ante bellum* had been restored, that territory "had passed into the keeping" of the Royal Society. Before the conflict, he and his friends had labored. After the conflict, others had entered into the fruits of their labors. In the *Via Lucis*, the Royal Society should therefore recognize "the source from which they sprang."

The key purpose of the "universal college," in Comenius's mind, was to compile a set of "universal books"; and this second desideratum was also in process of realization. In dedicating the work to the Royal Society, Comenius argued that "those who shall examine the researches which you have already published and [those described in] our own *Way of Light* will grant that your illustrious undertaking is itself the most admirable part of those wishes which are expressed here

in Chapter XVI, paragraph 12 etc."[22] The passage in question is the lengthiest discussion within the *Via Lucis* of the *Panhistorica*, that is, the second of the three universal books to be compiled by the universal college. The remit of the *Panhistoria* was very broad: it was to be devoted to narrating "the particular course of things," in nature and art, ethics, politics, and religion; but its primary task was "gathering together the history of Nature with the utmost fidelity and accuracy," precisely as the society had begun to do.[23]

Ideally, these universal books should be written in a universal language, easy to learn, accessible to everyone in all parts of the world, and perfectly matching words to things. This too was a prominent early aspiration of the Royal Society, as the events surrounding the dedication of the *Via Lucis* suggest. On 7 May 1668, Comenius dispatched four copies of the newly printed book to London with the briefest of covering notes, asking Henry Oldenburg to distribute them to the society, its president, Viscount Brouncker, and its other secretary, John Wilkins, while keeping the last copy for himself. On 5 June, Oldenburg replied, thanking Comenius for his kind words, and noting that the "extremely arduous" task that he had undertaken was supported by "certain good men" and required a commerce for which England was particularly well suited. In closing, he promised to send to Comenius a recently published "volume, dedicated to the Royal Society, exhibiting a specimen of the construction of a universal language, according to the design you propose in your *Via Lucis*, Chapter 19, Section 21," where Comenius had called for "a new language . . . adapted to the exact and perfect representation of things."[24] The 454-page folio volume in question was John Wilkins's *An Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language* (London, 1668), the culmination—under the patronage of the Royal Society—of a continuous tradition of artificial-language planning that sprouted in England from Baconian seeds planted and avidly cultivated by the Hartlib circle in the years around Comenius's visit.[25]

Panaugia or Universal Light: Enlightenment and Revelation

From the mid-1950s onward, much ink has been spilled debating the influence of the *Via Lucis* on Wilkins's *Essay* in particular and on the pursuit of artificial language in seventeenth-century England more generally.[26] But the crucial point is a broader one. As the most thorough study of this subject has recently concluded, John Wilkins's *Essay* was the culmination of a continuous sequence of strenuous efforts that "began primarily, but not exclusively, within the orbit of Samuel Hartlib, and spread to the Oxford philosophy club in the 1650s, before being sustained by the early Royal Society after the Restoration of Charles II. . . . Just

as Comenius's *Via Lucis* is an expression of the millenarian ideals driving the earliest language planners, so Wilkins's *Essay* embodies the hopes of a moderate successor generation."[27]

During the 1960s and 70s, Comenius's claim to paternity of the Royal Society gave rise to a broader historiographical conflict as well. One side was led by Hugh Trevor-Roper, Regius Professor of History at Oxford, who poured scorn on the idea that "the philosophers of the Puritan Revolution," Hartlib, Dury, and Comenius, had any meaningful part in the great English scientific achievements of the Restoration period.[28] The other culminated in the work of Christopher Hill and especially Charles Webster, who marshaled a huge volume of evidence that the circle of Samuel Hartlib played a vital role in preparing the groundwork on which the Royal Society was founded.[29]

This historiographical controversy obviously has a bearing on Comenius's claim to be regarded as a prophet of the Enlightenment. But it has tended to distract attention from the precise purposes expressed in Comenius's dedication. Comenius did not, in fact, claim a role for himself as founder of the Royal Society: after all, during his brief sojourn in London, no universal college was in fact founded. His strongest claim is to have pointed out the need for such a college, outlined an agenda for it, and sought to establish something like it a quarter century earlier. Comenius also believed that the society founded immediately after the Restoration was the result of aspirations that he had helped to kindle immediately before the outbreak of civil war. But his primary purpose in dedicating the *Via Lucis* to the Royal Society was not to stress the *similarities* of both designs (which he took to be self-evident). Instead, the bulk of the dedication stressed the *divergence* of the two institutions, that is, the distance that had opened up between the society's narrow pursuit of an experimental natural philosophy and what Oldenburg (who was an avid correspondent of Hartlib and would later become John Dury's son-in-law) recognized as Comenius's more "ambitious" plans for universal reformation.[30]

In order to develop this point with full clarity, Comenius updated his dedicatees on the progress of his own work during the past quarter century. After leaving England, he wrote in the opening letter, he "never forgot that beautiful dream," recounted in the *Via Lucis*, which began to take shape there, never surrendered his hope that God would bring it about, and never "lost my constant desire to serve God's good purpose in this matter." Warmly encouraged by his English friends, "these devout plans were in course of time carried to fulfilment in the achievement of my sevenfold work."[31] What follows is an outline (in slightly veiled language) of the structure of the culminating fruit of his life's work: the *Consultatio*

catholica de rerum humanarum emendatio (General consultation on the reform of human affairs).[32]

Like the *Via Lucis*, the *Consultatio* was divided into seven parts. In keeping with the "catholic" dimension of the work, each section bore the prefix "pan-," indicating the universality of the enterprise. At the heart of the work were four books outlining in more detail the four requisites sketched out for the first time in London: *Pansophia* (universal wisdom) fulfilled the need for universal books; *Pampaedia* (universal education) outlined the method to be employed in universal schools; *Panglottia* laid out the principles of the "universal language"; and *Panorthosia* (universal reform) revisited the plans for a "college of light" alongside other universal institutions for establishing and preserving ecclesiastical and political harmony. These four core books were prefaced by a fifth section entitled *Panaugia* (universal light). Finally, the entire series was bracketed by an introduction and conclusion: the *Consultatio* opened with a *Panegersia* (universal awakening), addressed "to the leading lights of Europe, its scholars, churchmen and statesmen"; and the work closed with a *Pannuthesia* (universal exhortation) outlining the incentives for undertaking the work and the consequences of failing to act.

Despite the claim that he had carried this work "to fulfilment," the *Consultatio* remained incomplete; but by 1668 its structure had reached it final form, and its publication was well underway. The first two parts, the *Panegersia* and *Panaugia*, had appeared in Amsterdam in 1656.[33] The last part, the *Panorthosia*, had followed one year later.[34] The *Pannuthesia* was published posthumously in 1681,[35] and the *Pampaedia*, although remaining in manuscript, was also substantially complete.[36] The monumental task of completing the tripartite *Pansophia* surpassed the author's powers, and without it the *Panglottia* likewise remained incomplete. These missing pieces notwithstanding, the *Consultatio catholica* deserves to be recognized as the most voluminous, comprehensive, and systematic work penned by a single individual in the seventeenth century outlining a program of activity designed to inaugurate a coming age of light.

A proper understanding of the divergence of the early Royal Society from Comenius's "college of light" requires closer attention to the second section of the *Consultatio*. This section, the *Panaugia*, expounded in general terms the means of "enlightening men's minds with a Universal Light" in a manner deriving from the *Via Lucis*. Comenius's concept of "enlightenment" is far too rich for adequate discussion here. Such a discussion would need to begin by showing how his plans for the propagation of internal, intellectual light are developed by analogy (or, rather, in "harmony") with the behavior of external, natural light described in the science of optics.[37] It would then need to trace the terminology he employs

and the conceptions underlying it back to its namesake, the *Panaugia* published many years earlier by the Croatian philosopher, Francesco Patrizzi of Cherso.[38] Digging deeper still, it would need to root this terminology in Patrizzi's Neoplatonic metaphysics of light,[39] which helped germinate a metaphysical dimension linking light and knowledge in Comenius's thought as well.[40] In the present context, however, the indispensable section of the *Panaugia* is its discussion, summarized in the dedication of the *Via Lucis*, of the "three lamps of God or foundations of light."[41]

The triads that structure Comenian pansophia were founded on a conception of humankind as created in the image and likeness of God.[42] To this Comenius joined the classic conception, deriving ultimately from Augustine, that associated the three persons of the Christian Godhead with *posse*, *nosse*, and *velle*—the properties of power, knowledge, and will.[43] In man, these three virtues correspond to the Aristotelian faculties of intellect, will, and operation. Because all the faculties of the human mind have lost their original perfection, the ultimate purpose of universal reformation was to restore the image of God to this triad of human faculties. Repairing the three faculties of intellect, will, and operation required the reintegration of the three universal principles (ideas, instincts, and faculties) on which they were based, in order to refashion the three disciplines needed to restore the faculties to health: philosophy or learning, religion or ethics, and politics or technology.[44] "The objective environment in which the human race must live is also threefold, consisting of the *world* full of things, the *people* who inhabit it, and *God* who presides over both."[45] These three domains constituted the three objects of study and the three sources of intellectual light: the image of God as imprinted on His creatures (the natural world below us), on the human mind (the world within and around us), and on the Word of God itself (scripture).[46] To these corresponded, in turn, three ways of apprehending the intellectual light radiating from these three worlds: "*Sense* governs our relationship especially with objects, *reason* governs that with men, and *faith* governs that with God."[47] To these three domains also applied three basic intellectual methods: the *analytical method* for resolving the objects exposed to our senses into their components; the *synthetic method* for looking into our minds with their inborn ideas, instincts, and faculties; and the *syncritic method* for contemplating divine matters, which can be understood only through comparison with other things.[48] Universal light would result from scrutinizing the three sources of "light" (the world, mankind, and God) with these three "eyes" (of sense, reason, and faith), with the assistance of the three kinds of method (analysis, synthesis, and syncrisis). Universal harmony would result from bringing these three into concord with one another.[49] Ultimately,

the resulting enlightenment must be institutionalized in three institutions: schools, states, and churches. In the *Panorthosia*, which culminates the *Consultatio*, universal institutions were proposed for each of these domains: the universal bond of learning would be established by a College of Light (derived from the plans sketched in the *Via Lucis*); the universal bond of politics, by a Court of Peace; and the universal bond of religion, by an Ecumenical Consistory.[50] From the intimate details of his pedagogy to the grandiose plans for a new world order, everything in Comenius's *Consultatio catholica* was therefore designed to bring about the instauration of the image of God in man and, in doing so, to inaugurate the age of light foreseen for the first time in the *Via Lucis*.

A sketch of this tripartite scheme was included within the dedicatory letter of the *Via Lucis* in 1668 in order to clarify the dedication's "double purpose." The first purpose was to praise the Royal Society as something of great historical significance: rigorous empirical examination of the natural world was needed to lay "the foundations on which a true and perfect Pansophia can be built."[51] The second and larger purpose, however, was to argue that this first step was insufficient unless followed by the other two. If divorced from the other sources of knowledge and modes of knowing, empirical investigation of the natural world would remain radically incomplete. As the body of the work explained, the natural particulars collected in the *Panhistorica* must be combined with the survey of human learning in the *Pandogmatica* and viewed in the light of revelation in order to produce true wisdom in the *Pansophia*.[52] As the dedication reformulated this key point at considerable length, true wisdom could result only from bringing empirical knowledge of the natural world into harmony with rational knowledge of the human mind and revealed knowledge of the divine purposes.[53] For Comenius, the Baconian instauration of man's dominion over nature was just one part of a broader instauration of the image of divine perfection to each of the human faculties.[54] The basic message of the dedication is therefore also double: an exhortation tinged with a reproof. The empirical researches of the Royal Society were excellent as far as they went, but they did not go far enough. "By all this costly labour of yours," Comenius warned, "you are merely bringing to your hand the elements of divine wisdom, only laying the foundations from which you may someday take up human wisdom to its highest point."[55] Rather than claiming paternity for the Royal Society, Comenius's primary intention was to recall the fledgling society to the broader and higher vision that he had shared with the Hartlibians a quarter century earlier.

Comenius was right to acknowledge the differences as well as the similarities between his proposal and its realization. The Royal Society, although emerging

from roots similar to his own aspirations, had deliberately decoupled the reform of natural philosophy from the even more daunting goal of universal reform. Individual fellows, to be sure, remained profoundly religious. To a degree occluded by the Enlightenment, many renowned early members—notably Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton—continued to regard their scientific investigations as serving higher moral and spiritual ends, while others mixed natural philosophy with religion and revelation in a wide variety of ways.[56] But in England the new political conditions required a new religious settlement. Official programs of radical reformation were unwelcome in the newly pacified circumstances of the Restoration.

For Comenius, by contrast, no restoration had taken place. His native country had not returned to its *status quo ante bellum*. His people had not been restored to their homeland. Indeed, after 1656, as we shall see, their plight was even more desperate than before. In precisely the years in which the Royal Society negotiated a new religious settlement to retain the cultural space to pursue a radical transformation of natural philosophy decoupled from social, political, ecclesiastical, and theological reform, Comenius redoubled the religious dimensions of his vision, a vision rooted not merely in scripture but in prophecy, and not merely in scriptural prophecy but in the visions of popular prophets.

The *Seculum Illuminatum* and the Millennium

Canonical prophecy had, to be sure, informed the universal reform agenda from the outset, for Comenius even more explicitly than for his English friends. Nowhere in his entire corpus of writings is this more evident than in the twentieth chapter of the *Via Lucis*, which discusses "the condition of the world which we may hope will result from the arrangements" outlined in previous chapters. As in the parallel discussion in the penultimate chapter of the *Panorthosia*, this vision was pieced together from the innumerable prophecies of the Old and New Testament depicting the messianic kingdom.[57] But in the *Via Lucis*, this set of prophecies culminates with the vision of Satan "bound with a great chain and shut up in the depths of his own darkness, so that he may no more be able to lead the peoples astray, for the whole of those thousand years of the last age (Rev. xx)." Just as Satan has held the world in bondage in the chains of gross ignorance and false science, the light and truth forged in the universal institutions described previously will be "made into chains to fetter him . . . in the abyss of his own darkness."[58]

The six stages of the *Via Lucis* therefore culminated in a seventh age of universal light, which is simultaneously "the Sabbath of the Church . . . in which, after the unceasing toil and disaster of six thousand years, it will be granted to her

to rest, before the eighth age of Blessed Eternity shall sound its coming." This, Comenius continued, is what was meant by the saying in 2 Peter 3:8, "that with the Lord one day is a thousand years and a thousand years as one day." Just as the work of making the creatures was fulfilled in six days, and the seventh was added as a day of rest, he declared, "the work of making the Church would go forward for six thousand years, and that the seventh thousand would be added as an age of rest and contemplation, of blessing and joy."[59] The work then closed with a lengthy set of "Prayers to the Father of Lights for the final illumination of the Human Race."[60]

Unlike the parallel passage in the *Panorthosia*, the culmination of the *Via Lucis* is therefore fully millenarian—perfectly encapsulating the atmosphere of the Hartlibian reformers in England in the autumn of 1641, but radically different in character from the spirit of the early Royal Society a quarter century later. The heavenly city of this seventeenth-century philosopher was no mere analogy or derivation.[61] The age of enlightenment prophesied in the *Via Lucis* is explicitly identified with the thousand years of Satan's bondage in Revelations 20:1–10, and this fact gives Comenius's oeuvre a unique status in the millenarian and utopian literature of the early modern period. Viewed as a philosophical utopia, as we have seen, the *Via Lucis* was unique in its dynamism, in its teleology, in the relentless energy propelling it toward the fulfillment of its ambitious plans in the near future, and in the unshakable confidence of its author that these plans will be fulfilled, despite the desperate conditions in which he found himself. Viewed as biblical millenarianism, on the other hand, the *Via Lucis* was unique in the detailed program of activity it proposes for reaching this seventh state—a program based on far more than biblical exegesis and subsequently developed in unparalleled detail in the *Consultatio catholica*. Nowhere else in the philosophical or theological literature of early modern Europe were the utopian and millenarian impulses so completely fused.[62]

This fusion was accomplished, in turn, by Comenius's willingness to resolve the even deeper tension between divine and human agency. Although the power of the chain that will bind Satan ultimately derives from the "omnipotence of God," Comenius was equally emphatic about the necessity of human agency in moving the human family through the seven stages of the Way of Light. "Lastly," he wrote in concluding the key chapter, "we must recall that whatever was achieved" in the first six stages of this journey—from Adam's naming of the creatures and the first words spoken between man and woman to the voyages of discovery and the invention of printing—"was accompanied and promoted by the desire and the labour of men." They are mistaken, he insisted, who claim that "it is no business

of ours to try" to bring about the seventh state, and who argue instead "that we should rather await miraculous aid from heaven." Instead, we must "put our trust in the goodness of God, who does not despise the humblest alliances."[63] The assiduous labor of an international college of learned men will be needed to forge the links of empirical, rational, and revealed knowledge into the unbreakable chain of pansophia. The collaboration of a still larger company of "scholars, churchmen, and statesmen" will be required to build the institutions needed to refashion European civilization on the basis of this wisdom. And if the whole plan depends on the reeducation of the human race, then generations of professors, schoolmasters, teachers, and parents will need to execute this program of universal education thereafter in perpetuity. The millennium of Comenius will be brought about, therefore, not by a supernatural intervention in ordinary terrestrial affairs but by God's blessing on human agency.

It was not without cause that Comenius's pansophic projects were repeatedly suspected of Pelagianism.[64] In combatting Pelagius, Augustine of Hippo had denied that human volition played any role whatsoever in salvation. After Luther had made this notion the foundation of his theology, mainstream Protestant theologians agreed that the human will is so completely vitiated by sin that it could contribute nothing whatsoever to its own redemption. Salvation, instead, comes from grace alone, that is, as a completely unmerited gift of God. The pacifism of apocalyptic expectation after Augustine is the eschatological corollary of this soteriological principle. Christ alone can redeem the fallen world, and he will intervene suddenly and miraculously, when the world is drowning in sin and his Coming is least expected. Conversely, the extraordinarily activism of Comenius's utopian millenarianism or millenarian utopia is made possible by his belief that, in realizing His purposes, God works in harmony with the human will.[65]

Comenius, then, was a bold theologian, willing to break a theological consensus on the salvation both of the individual sinner and of the entire fallen world established by Augustine and reinvigorated by Luther.[66] The explanation of this boldness can be found in the desperate circumstances in which he lived. Only the belief that he was working to realize a divine plan could sustain a lifetime of practical efforts by a lifelong refugee in a period of almost unprecedented disruption. "When the fire of war was spreading" across Europe, he wrote to the Royal Society, "I had no greater comfort than I found in the ancient promises of God concerning the supreme and final Light, that it should in the end put darkness to flight. And if any human aid were needed for this, I thought that it could only come from the better instruction of the young."[67] Applied to the pedagogical sphere, this sense of an active pursuit of divine purposes proved extremely fertile. Applied

to the political domain, it would open Comenius to devastating charges of being a political agitator of the worst kind.

Lux in tenebris: Enlightenment and Popular Prophecy

Comenius's expectation of a dawning age of light remained explicitly apocalyptic in character because, for his people, there had been no restoration. His faith in the coming age of peace and enlightenment entailed, conversely, that his people *would* someday be restored to their homeland. Herein lay a difficulty, the resolution of which, more than anything else, prompted the catastrophic collapse of the Moravian's reputation once the Enlightenment had actually dawned. His millenarian expectations were supported not only by Revelations, chapter 20, but by myriad messianic prophecies contained in the Old and New Testaments;[68] but in none of these passages was mention made of the plight of the Czech refugees. In order to sustain his faith in their eventual restoration, he needed another set of predictions; and this led to a deep fascination with popular prophecies that was eventually transformed into a tenacious faith in their validity.

In seeking to understand his homeland in the light of noncanonical prophecy, Comenius built on premises sanctioned by centuries of imperial authority. Ever since the coronation of Charlemagne on Christmas Day of the year 800, central Europe had been governed by an institution that regarded itself as the continuation of the Roman Empire, the last of the four great world empires, which, according to Daniel 2, 7, and 8, was destined to endure until the end of time. Its eschatological mission was to provide a second pillar, alongside the papacy, supporting the entire edifice of Christendom and protecting it from antichristian enemies. Implicit within this self-conception was the expectation that the final great reformation of the church must be coupled with an equally profound reformation of the empire. Although originally framed in terms of even older extracanonical prophecies regarding a "Last World Emperor" and an "Angelic Pope," this expectation of a *reformatio mundi* survived the Hussite and Lutheran Reformations: it was central to Luther's conception of his place in space and time; it was inserted by Melanchthon into the Wittenberg curriculum; Johann Sleidan's chronical *De quatuor imperiis summis* (1556) broadcast it across the Protestant world; and within the empire it remained a common framework for universal history into the seventeenth century.[69] Placed against this backdrop, the aspiration of Comenius for a universal reformation can be regarded as merely the most recent and general manifestation of a centuries-old central European tradition, rooted in the unique self-conception of the Holy Roman Empire, in which the spiritual reformation of the church was incomplete without the secular reformation of state and society.

Although rooted in canonical prophecy, this tradition was constantly renewed from the Middle Ages onward by a multitude of other prognostications. Some, based on history, chronology, astrology, and numerology as well as scriptural exegesis, were learned or semilearned in character.[70] Others were genuinely "popular"—the ecstatic visions of unlearned or even illiterate men and women.[71] The long-delayed outbreak of full-scale confessional war in Comenius's Bohemian homeland in 1618 provoked a huge upsurge of interest in these prophecies and the recycling of them for propagandistic purposes.[72] Three clusters would prove particularly fascinating to Comenius. One, swirling around Friedrich IV of the Palatinate, "the third Friedrich," helped inspire the visions of an illiterate Silesian artisan, Christoph Kotter, from 1616 onward. Another, surrounding the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, "the Lion of the North," featured in the trances of the young Bohemian noblewoman, Christina Poniatowska, provoking agitated discussion within the exile community in Leszno from 1628 onward. After 1638, a former minister of the Unity of Brethren in Moravia, Mikuláš Drábik (Drabicius), added prophecies regarding the prince of Transylvania, "the King of the East," which expanded to feature supporting roles by Turks and Tartars in the destruction of the Habsburgs.[73]

For Comenius, these prophecies proved attractive at several levels. Individually, they held out the hope of a quick restoration of his exiled people to their homeland. Collectively, they appeared to harmonize with one another, prognosticating the same set of events from three complementary vantage points. The harmony of this corpus also seemed to herald the reconciliation of the three nations, confessions, and *Stände* subject to the Bohemian crown: Kotter was a Lutheran artisan from Silesia, Poniatowska was a Reformed noblewoman from Bohemia, and Drábik was a minister of the Unity of Brethren from Moravia.[74] On a completely different level, these visions also had implications for Comenius's evolving tripartite epistemology. To the external light of sense experience and the inner light of reason, Comenius had added "the third faculty of the soul, . . . the special faculty for learning mysterious things which sense and reason cannot interpret, . . . things beyond the sphere of our senses and reasoning power."[75] Did the visions of these three prophets herald the spread of a different kind of enlightenment? Might the coming age of light not see a more widespread development of this third power of the soul as well as the other two?[76]

Most compelling of all, however, was the direct application of these visions to the concrete circumstances of Comenius and his people. After leaving England in 1642, Comenius devoted himself to serving a series of militant rulers whom he thought could restore his exiled people to their homeland in Bohemia and

Moravia by force of arms. Initially, he worked to overhaul the educational system of Sweden, a major protagonist in the second half of the Thirty Years' War.[77] When the Peace of Westphalia failed to accomplish this restoration, he transferred his services to another geographically marginal and educationally backward country, the still militantly anti-Habsburg principality of Transylvania, which bordered his birthplace in southeastern Moravia.[78] When the Transylvanian campaigns ended in disaster in 1654, he returned to Leszno.[79] Two years later, after the armies of Sweden had invaded Poland at the start of the Second Northern War, Comenius reluctantly wrote a panegyric in honor of the new Swedish king, Karl Gustav, once again suggesting that he might be the instrument of divine plans that included the restoration of Protestantism to the Bohemian lands. But in perhaps the greatest disaster of Comenius's troubled career, this panegyric backfired horribly when the local Polish population, infuriated by the treason of the exiles in their midst, burned their community in Leszno to the ground.[80]

Salvaging only his most precious pansophic and prophetic manuscripts, Comenius transferred via Silesia, Brandenburg, and Hamburg to Amsterdam, where he made the fateful decision to publish both sets of writings. The first installment of the *Consultatio catholica*—the *Panaugia*—appeared in 1656. The following year saw the publication of the Moravian's complete pedagogical writings, the *Opera didactica omnia*, in some six hundred folio pages.[81] The same year witnessed the appearance of the most ill-fated publication of Comenius's long career, under the weighty title:

> *Light in darkness, that is, the gift of prophecy with which God has enriched, consoled and shown singular favour to the evangelical church (in the Kingdom of Bohemia and the provinces belonging to it) at the time of its terrible persecution and ultimate dissipation on account of the Gospel, containing divine revelations concerning the state of the church in the world at the present time and in the near future, which were revealed to Christoph Kotter from Silesia, Christina Poniatowska from Bohemia and Mikulas Drábik from Moravia between the years 1616 and 1656. Faithfully translated from the vernacular into Latin, to the glory of God, the consolation of the afflicted, and to serve as a salutary lesson to others, brought to light in obedience to a prophecy of my own, in the year in which salvation approaches, 1657.*[82]

L'accomplissement des propheties: Bayle's Assault on Comenius

The title *Lux in tenebris* was intended to signify more than the revelation of divine secrets in desperate circumstances. It also reflected Comenius's cautious strategy of publication. Threatened by Drábik with divine punishment if he failed to

publish these revelations, but fearing a polemical backlash if he did, Comenius decided to print the works for private circulation to public figures, including many of the crowned heads of Europe. Alarmed even by this limited circulation, Habsburg authorities attempted to suppress the work; and as a result, the first edition, printed in 1657, is extremely rare today.

Yet despite its scarcity, the work soon attracted criticism, initially from close to home. The first polemical assault was motivated not by generalized skepticism but by bitter differences of national perspective. The assailant, the Franeker professor Nicholas Arnoldi, was a former pupil of Comenius in Leszno, a native Pole who (like most of his countrymen) deeply resented the Moravian's support for the invading Swedes.[83] A few years later, a second attack followed from Samuel Desmarets or Maresius, a professor in Groningen who had previously taught from Comenius's textbooks and welcomed him on his return to the Netherlands. Alarmed by the upsurge of millenarianism in the dissenting circles in the Dutch Republic, Maresius participated in a theological disputation directed against the chiliasm of Serrarius, Comenius, and de Labbadie. Foolishly, Comenius chose to reply, triggering a pamphlet war that produced by far the most damaging treatise ever directed at him.[84]

Even so, the damage done to his reputation by these Latin theological works would have been limited but for a concatenation of events that took place far away and over a decade after Comenius's death in 1670. The first of these events was the siege of Vienna by the Turks in 1683, which momentarily made Drábik's prophecies the talk of Europe. The second, two years later, was the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which triggered a dramatic upsurge in millenarianism among the French Reformed community. These two developments, one coming hot on the heels of the other, placed Comenius posthumously in the crosshairs of the most lethal polemicist of the age: the philosopher of Rotterdam, Pierre Bayle.

Unlike the rest of Protestant Europe, French Calvinism had appeared virtually immune to millenarianism before the Revocation.[85] But the fate of the Huguenot diaspora after 1685 closely paralleled that of the Czech Protestant exiles after 1628, and so did the Huguenots' response to it. Almost overnight, their leaders not only sought comfort in the tradition of millenarian expectation enriched by the crises of previous decades but began to indulge a fascination with popular prophecy as well. More particularly, the leader of the Huguenot *réfuge* in Holland, the Rotterdam theologian Pierre Jurieu, reworked the prophetic framework first elaborated nearly sixty years earlier by the pioneering English millenarian Joseph Mede in the first and most remarkable major work of the Huguenot millenarian tradition.[86] When Jurieu's forecasts appeared to be fulfilled in the unexpected

overthrow of the Catholic King James II of England and the crowning of William of Orange on 21 April 1689, Jurieu's work became a best seller, its author was celebrated as a prophet, and the credibility of his prophecy of the complete overthrow of the papacy between 1710 and 1715 was immeasurably enhanced.

What sealed Comenius's fate, however, was the inclusion in Jurieu's book of what Bayle would later call "great encomiums on that prophetical triumvirate" published in the *Lux in tenebris*: Christoph Kotter, Christina Poniatowska, and Mikuláš Drábik. The most prominent of these passages is found in the preface itself, which provides striking independent testimony regarding the features of these prophecies that also beguiled Comenius. Jurieu claimed to have

> found in the prophecies of Kotter, Christina, and Drabicius, published by Comenius, something great and surprizing. Kotter, who is the first of these three prophets, is great and lofty; the images of his visions are as noble and majestic as those of the ancient prophets. They are also admirably well connected: they are all of a piece, and there is no inconsistency in them. It is inconceivable how a mere artisan could have imagined such great things without the assistance of God. The two years of Christina's prophecy are, in my opinion, a sequence of miracles, as great as have happened since the Apostles, nor do we find anything in the life of the greatest prophets that is more miraculous than the adventures of this maid. Drabicius also has his sublimity, but there is much more obscurity and difficulty in him. These three prophets conspire in foretelling the fall of the antichristian empire, as what must very soon come to pass.[87]

This application of millenarian prophecy in general, and of popular prophecies in particular, to contemporary political events opened up a dangerous divide within the Huguenot *réfuge* of the 1690s. On one side, Jurieu led a belligerent party actively promoting rebellion against Louis XIV and instigating with the most inflammatory kind of apocalyptic propaganda an assault by Protestant princes on Catholic France.[88] On the other, pacifists such as Bayle believed that the Huguenots' best chance of restitution to their homeland lay in remaining obedient to the king who had afflicted them. As Mara van der Lugt's recent study has shown, "Bayle's concern over Jurieu's political attitudes left a profound mark on various articles in the *Dictionnaire*, which analyse how fanaticism is related to religious violence and intolerance." For this reason, "Jurieu's fanaticism in particular, and the related concepts of zeal, religious imagination, prophetism, and apocalypticism constitute pivotal themes in the Dictionnaire." Van der Lugt's proof text for this thesis is none other than Bayle's article on Comenius, cross-referenced to the others on Drábik and Kotter. Although posing as a disinterested work of critical

scholarship, the primary purpose of these articles was to provide "a vital part of Bayle's analysis of fanaticism, and of his typecasting of Jurieu as a fanatic."[89] Caught in the cross fire of fratricidal conflict within the Huguenot *réfuge*, Comenius's reputation suffered devastating damage.

The article on Comenius in the editions of 1697 and 1702 (the last in which Bayle was personally involved) ran to nearly four full folio pages (five pages in the English translation). This space was divided roughly equally between the text and footnotes, with the latter far more densely printed in two columns.[90] Nearly half of the main text was devoted to a fairly neutral account of Comenius's long and turbulent life, digested from the material prefixed to his *Opera didactica omnia*. The second half consisted of a disjointed collection of brief observations on Comenius and his work, backed by massive footnotes.

Bayle's assessment began by sweeping aside Comenius's educational achievements with a single sentence. The *Opera didactica omnia*, he wrote, "is a folio volume divided into four parts which have cost many sleepless nights to its author and a lot of money to others, and from which the republic of letters gains no benefit: I do not even believe that there is anything practically useful in the ideas of this author."[91] By way of justification, Bayle merely cited the paragraph-long *bons mots* of a famously cantankerous French physician, Samuel Sorbière, who had inspected in Holland an early set of Comenius's pansophical manuscripts (which would make up only a small portion of the *Opera didactica omnia*) in the spring of 1642.[92] Yet this brief judgment is nevertheless revealing. Bayle measured the value of Comenian pedagogy with reference to its potential benefit not to the *res publica* as a whole but to the *république des lettres*. While his generation still coveted universal learning, Bayle evidently had no interest in universal education. One of the greatest educational thinkers of all time was therefore brushed aside by quoting a secondhand judgment of an early draft.

The deeper reason for this dismissive judgment is revealed within the immediately following passage: "The reform of the schools was not his principal preoccupation: he was even more enamored of prophecies, of revolutions, of the destruction of the antichrist, of the millennium, and of similar tidbits of dangerous fanaticism: I say dangerous, not only in relation to orthodoxy, but also in relation to princes and states."[93] The second half of the text was devoted primarily to a far more detailed account of the content, distribution, and reception of the *Lux in tenebris* than that afforded to his pedagogical work. This was complemented by miscellaneous observations, rumors, and insinuations about the Moravian's life and character, backed up by massive footnotes marshaling the arsenal of ammunition compiled by Arnoldi and Maresius. "One cannot praise our Maresius

too highly for his vigour against the enthusiasts," Bayle wrote in a lengthy article devoted to him, "and against those who proclaim great Revolutions."[94]

Not content merely to disregard the more attractive features of Comenius's work, Bayle set out to leave no aspect of his life and writing untarnished. In his own day, he asserted, citing Maresius, Comenius "was described as a swindler [*un escroc*] . . . who made excellent use of his status as a religious refugee and of the pompous ideas of his method of teaching . . . to empty the purses of pious folk," especially the chief patron of his final years in Holland, Laurentius de Geer.[95] Note D added, on the authority of Arnoldi, that Comenius had abandoned his flock in miserable conditions in Poland to "reap a golden harvest" from gullible merchants in Amsterdam.[96] Another note (F) quoted Maresius's depiction of Comenius as a Neapolitan con artist: "con l'arte e l'inganno / io vivo mezzo l'anno / con l'inganno e l'arte / io vivo l'altra parte." "I acknowledge him as a man of outstanding talent and highly inventive," Maresius had quipped: "This age has not produced anyone more expert in mystical sleight-of-hand, nor one more fertile in dreaming up trichotomies." Comenius "was accused," Bayle added in note G (again on the Groningen professor's authority), "of excessive pride, . . . as is usual with all those visionaries who boast an immediate Intercourse with the Deity." He could not bear to hear his "puerile trash, his fanatical and enthusiastic dreams called into question." He lacked all constancy in religion, having sought at one time to make peace with the Socinians, at another to reconcile Catholics and Protestants, at a third to pacify the English and the Dutch. "Some people have been surprised that he lived so long, and that the chagrin of having succeeded so little in his predictions did not shorten his life."[97] "In the end," Bayle concluded (willfully misrepresenting Comenius's *Unum necessarium* of 1668), "he acknowledged the futility of his work, and of all the trouble he had made for himself since Providence had made him leave his country."[98] But his "principal failing" is expressed in the words of Maresius: "Sed praesertim est Comenius Fanaticus, Visionarius, & Enthusiasta in folio" (note G). Other fanatics wrote lunatic pamphlets; but Comenius alone had staked a huge learned reputation on his visions, and for this reason above all he needed to be cut down to size. In case the relevance of all this to his polemic against Jurieu was insufficiently evident, the entry on Comenius concluded with an otherwise superfluous reference to Bayle's anonymous little book entitled *Janua Coelorum Reserata* (*The Gate of Heaven Unlocked*), a title chosen because there is no title "to which the Ear is more used than to that of *Janua Linguarum Reserata* (*The Gate of Languages Unlocked*)," one of Comenius's most famous textbooks. The accompanying note (N), nearly a full folio column in length, revealed that this is a polemical pamphlet directed against Jurieu.[99]

Bayle concluded the article on Comenius by noting that "the articles *Drabicius* and *Kotterus* contain various things, which may serve as a supplement to this one"; and following these cross-references clarifies the author's purposes still further.[100] In the former, Bayle patiently mined a rich vein of historical information that could be used to discredit Drábik (and, by extension, Comenius and Jurieu). Lacking similar material on Kotter, he undergirded a scant forty lines of text with some one thousand lines of notes, devoted almost exclusively to polemicizing directly against Jurieu, who is mentioned by name twenty-nine times. Here Bayle came closest to making his ulterior motive explicit: "What I have said of Comenius," he wrote (in note H of the article on Kotter), "I say also of a famous theologian of Rotterdam" (where Jurieu was pastor). The inverse formulation would be equally accurate: the demolition of Comenius's reputation was undertaken as a means of destroying Jurieu.[101]

If the article on Comenius is read, as the author intended, together with the cross-referenced articles on Drábik and Kotter, the conclusion is unavoidable. In total, perhaps twenty thousand words of the *Dictionnaire* were devoted to discussing *Lux in tenebris*.[102] Only a few hundred were granted to all the rest of Comenius's works combined. Clearly, the philosopher of Rotterdam had no interest in providing a balanced assessment of the Moravian pedagogue and pansophist's life and work. For a man so eager to expose imposture in others, Bayle could not claim to have acted entirely in good faith. His portrait of Comenius did not record the dispassionate consensus of the republic of letters: it was shaped by a very personal polemic at the heart of his own confessional community.

Via lucis in tenebras: The Eclipse of Mystical Enlightenment in the *Siècle des Lumières*

The demolition of Comenius's reputation during the Age of Light was therefore, to no small degree, collateral damage radiating out from the polemical war between Bayle and Jurieu. But this damage was not confined to Comenius, Drábik, and Kotter. Comenius's greatest historical significance is arguably as a leading representative of a far broader tradition of thinkers who used historical imagination, mystical intuition, and prophetic language to conceive a coming age of enlightenment and to help bring it into being;[103] and many of these also came within the blast radius of Bayle's conflict with Jurieu.

The intellectual ferment of the Dutch golden age was created in no small measure by the congregation of dissidents displaced by the confessional forces of the era. Among the arrivals were Jews and Marranos from Spain and Portugal, Protestants from the southern Netherlands fleeing the Duke of Alva, Huguenots

dislodged by waves of persecution in France, dissenters from England and Scotland, refugees from the Palatinate, exiles from Bohemia and Moravia, and Socinians evicted from Poland, while internal exiles included the Arminians, expelled from the Dutch Reformed church. Comenius's letters and his unfinished treatise, the *Clamores Eliae*, show that he inhabited a world populated very largely by these outcasts: "heretics, mystics, visionaries, chiliasts, radical reformers," proto-Pietists, *Chretiens sans église*. Their names are too numerous to list, their lives and thought too tortuous to recount here; but representative figures in contact with Comenius include Antoinette Bourignon, Friedrich Breckling, Ludwig Giffitheil, Christian Hoburg, Jean de Labadie, Ludwig Meyer, Johann Moriaen, Joachim Polemann, Johann Rothe, Petrus Serrarius, and Daniel Zwicker.[104]

Despite their innumerable differences, many of these figures had much in common. Antipapal in theology, they carried their anticlericalism into an assault on the churches and confessions descending from Luther and Calvin, into an individualistic renunciation of Mauerkirchen, and into a protopietistic emphasis on the interiority of the true Christian life, which often shaded off into spiritualism and Quietism. Anti-Aristotelian in philosophy, they were also fundamentally dissatisfied with the philosophy of the schools, yearned for something better, and were willing to take increasing intellectual risks in pursuit of it. Deeply disillusioned with the world created by the reformations and religious wars of the previous century, they strained every faculty in divining hopes for a better future and envisaging the form that that future might take.

Given their criticism of existing institutions, another of the attributes they shared was naturally the hatred directed at them by the orthodox theologians of all main confessions who had hounded them from homelands across Europe. After transferring to the relatively safe haven of the Dutch Republic, this antipathy was complemented by the wrath of the guardians of the Dutch Reformed Church, to which was eventually added the passions aroused in Pierre Bayle by his conflict with Jurieu. Just as Bayle gleaned material from Maresius with which to demolish the reputation of Comenius, he likewise drew on a long line of orthodox theologians of all confessions—Catholic and Lutheran as well as Calvinist—for ammunition with which to render contemptible all those who used spiritualism, mysticism, or enthusiasm to challenge the hegemony of established churches and states, and millenarianism to fortify their conceptions of an alternative world order.

To anyone familiar with their obscure names, the frequency with which the millenarians of the previous century feature in the first volume of the *Dictionnaire* is a source of astonishment. As well as "Comenius," "Cotterus" (cross-referenced to "Kotterus"), and "Drabicius," one encounters Johann Heinrich Alsted, the

Anabaptists, Giorgio Biandrata, Martin Cellarius-Borrhaus, Antoinette Bourignon, Jacopo Brocardo, Hugh Broughton, and John Dury, as well as the Patristic chiliast Cerinthus and the exponent of the Daniel's four monarchies, Johann Charion.[105] Although space prohibits a proper investigation of these here, the testimony of experts suggests that Bayle's handling of them is far from generous. Half a century ago, Elisabeth Labrousse noted Bayle's "fundamental antipathy for spiritualism" (*antipathie foncière pour l'illuminisme*).[106] More recently, Ruth Whelan has observed that Bayle seems totally "insensitive to the severity of the punishments" inflicted on radical reformers.[107] John Christian Laursen concurs: "A substantial portion of the *Dictionary* is dedicated to savage and often unfair attacks on certain kinds of religion," unmitigated by any reservations about the barbarism visited on the likes of Girolamo Savonarola (tortured and burned at the stake in Florence in 1498), Balthasar Hubmeyer (tortured and burned alive in Vienna in 1528), Simon Morin (burned at the stake in Paris in 1663), and Quirinus Kuhlmann (tortured and burned alive in Moscow as late as 1689). "The Bayle of the Dictionary," Laursen concludes, "was arguably one of the most influential writers in developing mainstream Enlightenment and modern attitudes toward millenarians and other inspired religious groups."[108]

In relation to these dissenters, Bayle's intellectual standpoint is deeply conservative. His achievement is to translate the judgments of generations of orthodox theologians into a critical language appropriate to the *siècle des Lumières*. His effectiveness in doing so was enhanced by the presentation of the *Dictionnaire* as a dispassionate exercise in historical criticism, in which the *république des lettres* collaborated in purging from the historical records errors committed by earlier compilators like Louis Morèri. This pretense of objectivity enhanced the confidence with which subsequent scholars deployed his polemical masterpiece as a reliable work of reference and thereby lengthened the shadow cast over the reputation of Comenius and this host of fellow dissidents. First published in two folio volumes in Rotterdam 1697, by 1820 the *Dictionnaire* had passed through a dozen reprints, as well as translations into English and German.[109]

Unsurprisingly, his views of millenarians and spiritualists still resonated a century later. It is clearly audible, for instance, in Johann Christoph Adelung's sprawling *Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit* (*History of Human Stupidity*), which eventually ran to seven volumes. As Wouter J. Hanegraaff has noted, Adelung—librarian to the elector of Saxony in Dresden—identified "stupidity" not just with credulity or a lack of intelligence but with a skein of interwoven traditions including Neoplatonism, mysticism, and millenarianism: "Adelung's cabinet of fools included Nicolas Flamel ('an alchemist'), Sebastian Franck ('an enthusiast'), Giordano

Bruno ('a bold blasphemer'), Tommaso Campanella ('a philosophical enthusiast'), Guillaume Postel ('a chiliast'), Paracelsus (a kabbalist and charlatan), . . . Michael Sendivogius ('another adept'), Jan Amos Comenius ('an enthusiast [Schwärmer]'), . . . Johannes Baptista van Helmont ('a theosophical physician'), Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont ('a pantheist'), Jacob Böhme ('a theosopher'), and many others."[110] In the aftermath of events in France, Adelung added an eighth volume in 1799 entitled *A Gallery of New Prophets, Apocalyptic Dreamers, Spirit Seers, and Preachers of Revolution*.[111]

Not until the end of the nineteenth century were reassessments of these judgments provoked by a variety of stimuli. Romanticism and new waves of critical German scholarship shaped the fresh perspective of figures like Wilhelm Scherer. "Under the piquant title of a *History of Human Folly*," he wrote in the first volume on the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biography* in 1875, "Adelung disparaged men and women more justly numbered amongst the noblest phenomena of the human race."[112] Around the same time, fresh attention within Czech scholarship was provoked by the two hundredth anniversary of Comenius's death in 1870 and the three hundredth anniversary of his birth in 1892. During these years, the spread of universal primary education provoked the rediscovery of his significance within the English-speaking world. The first major biography of the Moravian sage in English appeared in 1881, the year after the Elementary Education Act introduced compulsory attendance for British children between the ages of five and ten. By 1904 it had been reprinted a dozen times on both sides of the Atlantic,[113] along with multiple translations of Comenius's major pedagogical writings.[114] Appreciation of his pansophic work was delayed still further. The manuscript of the unfinished *Consultatio catholica* was not discovered until the 1930s, buried in the library of the Franckesche Stiftungen in Halle. The complete text received its *editio princeps* in Prague as recently as 1966. The first volume of a critical, annotated edition of the text appeared from the Czech Academy of Sciences only in 2014.

The reputation of Comenius has still not recovered completely from the one-sided judgment of Pierre Bayle, and the same holds for the broader company of which he was a part. It is thanks in no small part to the philosopher of Rotterdam that the myriad alternative reformations fermenting in the Germanic world during the long seventeenth century still remain to be discovered and situated as a link between some of the most potent aspirations of medieval, Renaissance, and post-Reformation Europe and those of what has become known as "the Enlightenment." But the prospects for a more evenhanded reassessment are now excellent, and this reassessment may help to reshape the broader field. However misguided the detailed forecasts of the *Lux in tenebris* may have been, Comenius was right that

change would come soon: in fact, it was underway within a few years of his arrival in Holland, not least in the circle of the Collegiants, who evolved rapidly from chaotic unorthodoxy into the seedbed of Spinozism and new strands of radical Enlightenment.[115]

NOTES

The author would like to help Vladimír Urbánek for many valuable comments on an early version of this chapter.

1. Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-programme/doc84_en.htm and the corresponding British site at http://www.britishcouncil.org/comenius.htm.

2. See http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/areas-of-action/international-conference-on-education-ice/comenius-medal.html.

3. The standard biography remains Milada Blekastad's massive work, *Comenius: Versuch eines Umrisses von Leben, Werk und Schicksal des Jan Amos Komenský* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget and Prague: Academia, 1969). The ongoing critical edition of his writings is *Dílo Jana Amose Komenského / J. A. Comenii Opera Omnia* (Prague: Academia, 1969–), hereafter *DJAK*. The website of the Deutsche Comenius-Gesellschaft (http://deutsche-comenius-gesellschaft.de) has a valuable bibliography of primary and secondary literature, updated regularly in its journal, the *Comenius-Jahrbuch* (Sankt Augustin). The journal *Acta Comeniana: International Review of Comenius Studies and Early Modern Intellectual History*, edited by the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, publishes excellent specialist work in English, French, and German.

4. Jan Amos Comenius, *Via Lucis vestigata et vestiganda* (Amsterdam: Conrad, 1668). Critical edition by Julie Nováková: *DJAK*, xiv, 279–385. English translation by E. T. Campagnac, *The Way of Light* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1938). Valuable commentary is also available in *Der Weg des Lichts*, introduced, translated, and annotated by Uwe Voigt (Hamburg: Meiner, 1997).

5. Jan Amos Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chap. 13, §§ 1–10 (*DJAK*, xiv, 326–29; *Way of Light*, 101–19).

6. This passage reflects the tenor of the prophecies of Kotter, Poniatowska, and especially Drábik, which had already captured Comenius's imagination before his trip to England.

7. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chaps. xv–xix (*DJAK*, xiv, 337–56); quoting *Way of Light*, 163, 164, 166, 163, 146, 183, resp.

8. More notably in Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982), 309–31.

9. Lyman Tower Sargent, *Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

10. Johann Valentin Andreae, *Rei publicae Christianopolitanae descriptio* (1619), in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann et al., 20 vols. (Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 1994–), vol. 14 (forthcoming 2017); *Christianopolis*, introduced and

translated by Edward H. Thompson (Dordrecht and London: Springer, 1999). The leading biography is Martin Brecht, *Johann Valentin Andreae, 1586–1654. Eine Biographie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2008). See also Richard van Dülmen, "Johann Amos Comenius und Johann Valentin Andreae: Ihre persönliche Verbindung und ihr Reformanliegen," *Bohemia-Jahrbuch* 9 (1968): 73–87.

11. Tommaso Campanella, *La Città del Sole* (1602): innumerable Italian editions; translated by Daniel John Donno, *The City of the Sun: A Poetical Dialogue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); John M. Headley, *Tommaso Campanella and the Transformation of the World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Jaromír Červenka, "Die Weltenschichten bei Campanella und Comenius," *Acta Comeniana* 4/1 (28/1) (1979): 117–57; Matteo Raffaelli, *Macht, Weisheit, Liebe: Campanella und Comenius als Vordenker einer friedvoll globalisierten Weltgemeinschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009).

12. *Conatuum Comenianorum Praeludia ex Bibliotheca S. H.* (Oxford, 1637); rev. version reprinted as *Pansophiae prodromus* (London, 1639): *DJAK*, xv/2, 11–53; translated by Hartlib as *A Reformation of Schooles* (London, 1642; facs. repr., Menston: Scolar Press, 1969). For bibliographical detail, see *DJAK*, xv/2, 404–5, and pls. 4–12. On the origins of this text, cf. *DJAK*, xv/2, 9, 60; Comenius, *Reformation of Schooles*, 65; Comenius, *Continuatio admonitionis fraternae . . . ad S. Maresium* (Amsterdam, 1669), §§ 47–48.

13. Extract of a lost letter from Hartlib (London) to Comenius (Leszno), late 1637, quoted in Comenius, *Continuatio admonitionis fraternae*, § 48; facs. repr. with English trans. in *Comenius' självbiografi / Comenius about Himself* (Stockholm, 1975), 150, 233; translated in Robert Fitzgibbon Young, *Comenius in England* (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), 36 (quoted). Cf. Bacon, *New Atlantis*, in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 7 vols. (London: Longman et al., 1857–61), 3:156–66.

14. Comenius (Leszno) to Hartlib (London), 17 Feb. 1641: "Nempè ut fundetur Londini Collegium, virorum sex septemve, quibus Eruditio Universalis cordi sit, quique eo nomine cum Eruditis totius orbis commercia colant"; Sheffield University Library, Hartlib Papers, bundle 7/84/2B; transcription in *The Hartlib Papers* (2nd ed., 2 CD-ROMs, Sheffield, 2002), now available at https://www.hrionline.ac.uk/hartlib/ (hereafter HP). This directly anticipates Comenius's *Via Lucis*, chap. xviii, which likewise invokes Bacon.

15. In November 1640 John Gauden, chaplain to the Earl of Warwick, had preached a parliamentary sermon by appointment in which he urged Parliament to invite Comenius from Poland and John Dury from Denmark to England "to see and weigh their noble and excellent designes: to give them all publike aid and encouragement to goe on and perfect so happy works which tend so much to the advancing of truth and peace." Comenius, *Continuatio admonitionis fraternae*, § 51 (*Comenius' självbiografi*, 153, 235; Young, *Comenius in England*, 39–40). The printed version of the sermon noted also that the mutual friend of both Comenius and Dury, Samuel Hartlib, could provide "a fair easy and safe way of addresse to them both"; John Gauden, *The Love of Truth and Peace* (London, 1641), 40–41.

16. Comenius, *Continuatio admonitionis fraternae*, §§ 52–54 (*Comenius' självbiografi*, 153–55, 235–36; Young, *Comenius in England*, 41–44, quotation on 44).

17. Cf. Comenius's description of Bacon's *Instauratio magna* many years earlier as "lucidissimum exorientis novi seculi Phosphorum," in *Physicae ad lumen divinum reformatae synopsis* (1633), Praefatio (dated 30 Sept. 1632), § 5 (*DJAK*, xii, 76). The difference in these two phrases might suggest that the new age that was merely dawning (*exoriens*) in

1632 had dawned by 1668. By the latter date, the society's spokesmen had begun using very Comenian language in describing, for instance, the "universal light which seems to overspread this age"; Thomas Sprat, *History of the Royal Society* (London, 1667), 81.

18. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, dedication, § 1 (*DJAK*, xiv, 285; *Way of Light*, 3).

19. Sprat, *History of the Royal Society*, 434.

20. Comenius to Hartlib, 25 May 1646, HP 7/73/4A; Dagmar Čapková and Marie Kyralová, "Unpublished Letters of J. A. Comenius (Komenský)," *Acta Comeniana*, n.s. 6 (1985): 171–77; Comenius, *Continuatio admonitionis fraternae* (1669), § 54 (*Comenius' självbiografi*, 154, 236; Young, *Comenius in England*, 43). Hartlib and Dury proposed other uses for Chelsea College between 1647 and 1653; see Charles Webster, *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform, 1626–1660* (London: Duckworth, 1975; Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002), 71, 221, 223.

21. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, dedication, §§ 3, 13 (*DJAK*, xiv, 285, 287; *Way of Light*, 5, 10–11).

22. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, dedication, § 14 (*DJAK*, xiv, 287); adapting *Way of Light*, 12.

23. The *Panhistorica* is discussed in *Via Lucis*, chap. xvi, §§ 4, 6, 12–16 (*DJAK*, xiv, 340, 342–43; *Way of Light*, 146, 151–54, quotation on 152). Cf. Dagmar Capková, "The Idea of Panhistoria in the Development of Comenius's Work toward Consultatio," *Acta Comeniana* 26 (1970): 49–72.

24. A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, eds. and trans., *The Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg*, 13 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965–86), 6:388–89, 449–51 (letters 856 and 879). The letter and books were presented to the society on 28 May; Thomas Birch, *The History of the Royal Society*, 4 vols. (London: Millar, 1756–57), 2:286–87.

25. See most recently Rhodri Lewis, *Language, Mind and Nature: Artificial Languages in England from Bacon to Locke* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), which emphasizes its Hartlibian beginnings and flowering under the patronage of the Royal Society. For the tradition more generally, cf. also Paolo Rossi, *Clavis universalis: Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1960; rev. ed. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983, 2006); translated by Stephan Clucas as *Logic and the Art of Memory: The Quest for a Universal Language* (London: Continuum, 2000); James Knowlson, *Universal Language Schemes in England and France, 1600–1800* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); Mary M. Slaughter, *Universal Languages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Jaap Maat, *Philosophical Languages in the Seventeenth Century: Dalgarno, Wilkins, Leibniz* (Dordrecht and Boston: Springer, 2004).

26. See, e.g., Benjamin De Mott, "Comenius and the Real Character in England," *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 70 (1955): 1068–81; Benjamin De Mott, "The Sources and Development of John Wilkins' Philosophical Language," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 57 (1958): 1–12; Vivian Salmon, "Language-Planning in Seventeenth-Century England: Its Context and Aims," in *In Memory of J. R. Firth*, ed. C. E. Bazell et al. (London: Longmans, 1966), 370–97. While noting this literature, Lewis finds very little evidence "that the unpublished *Via Lucis* had *any* influence on the English language planners"; *Language, Mind and Nature*, 47.

27. Lewis, *Language, Mind and Nature*, conclusion, 225, 229.

28. H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Three Foreigners and the Philosophy of the English Revolution," *Encounter* 14 (1960): 3–20; republished in expanded form as "Three Foreigners: The

Philosophers of the Puritan Revolution," in *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change* (1967; 3rd ed., London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), 237–93. See also his introduction to Margery Purver, *The Royal Society: Concept and Creation* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).

29. Christopher Hill, *The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); reissued as *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution—Revisited* (Oxford, 1997); Webster, *Great Instauration*.

30. Philip Beeley, "A Philosophical Apprenticeship: Leibniz's Correspondence with the Secretary of the Royal Society, Henry Oldenburg," in *Leibniz and His Correspondents*, ed. Paul Lodge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47–73.

31. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, dedication, §§ 4–12 (*DJAK*, xiv, 285–87; quoting *Way of Light*, 5–6).

32. Comenius, *De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica*, ed. Jaromir Červenka and V. T. Miškovskà, 2 vols. (Prague: Academia Scientiarum Bohemoslovacae, 1966) (hereafter *Consultatio*). For leading editions of the individual parts, see the following notes.

33. Comenius, *Panegersia* (Amsterdam, 1656, 1662), ed. A. H. Franke (Halle/Saale, 1702, 1720); in *Consultatio*, i, 17–119; German translations from 1811; *Panegersia or Universal Awakening*, trans. A. M. O. Dobbie (Shipston-on-Stour: Drinkwater, 1990); critical ed. *DJAK*, xix/1, 91–183. Comenius, *Panaugia, hoc est lucis universalis via* (Amsterdam, 1656, 1662); in *Consultatio*, i, 120–245; repr. with intro. by Dimitrij Tschižewskij (Munich: Frank, 1970); *Panaugia or Universal Light*, trans. A. M. O. Dobbie (Shipston-on-Stour: Drinkwater, 1987); German translation by Franz Hofmann (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002); critical ed. *DJAK*, xix/1, 187–310.

34. Comenius, *Panorthosia* (Amsterdam, 1657); *Consultatio*, ii, 205–378; Czech translation by J. Hendrichs (Všenaprava, 1950); English translation by A. M. O. Dobbie, 2 vols. (Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1993, 1995).

35. Comenius, *Pannuthesia sive exhortatorium universale* ([Amsterdam or Leiden?], [1681?]): only one incomplete copy has been identified. *Consultatio*, ii, 379–436; English translation by A. M. O. Dobbie (Shipston-on-Stour, 1991); German translation by Franz Hofmann (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001).

36. Comenius, *Pampaedia*; German translation by Klaus Schaller (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1958, 1963, 1967; Sankt Augustin: Academia, 1991, 2001); Latin text and German translation edited by Dmitrij Tschiewskij in collaboration with Heinrich Geissler and Klaus Schaller (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1960, rev. ed., 1965); unannotated Latin text: *Consultatio*, ii, 1–145; subsequent translations into Italian (1968, 1993), Polish (1973), Romanian (1977), English (1986), Hungarian (1992), Korean (2008).

37. Five successive chapters of the *Via Lucis*, chaps. viii–xii (*DJAK*, xiv, 310–26; *Way of Light*, 51–100) are devoted to discussing analogies between physical and intellectual light, providing material reworked in the *Panaugia*, chaps. i, x–xii; *DJAK*, xix/1, 191–92, 229–62; Dobbie translation, 3–4, 48–78.

38. Patrizzi's main work, *Nova de universis philosophia in qua aristotelica methodo non per motum sed per lucem et lumina ad primam causam ascenditur* (Ferrara, 1591; rev. ed. Venice, 1593; London, 1611), was divided into four books—"Panaugia," "Panarchia," "Pampsichya," and "Pancosmia"—which influenced both the form and the content of Comenius's *Consultatio*. On Patrizi, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance*

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), 110–26; Cesare Vasoli, *Francesco Patrizi da Cherso* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1989); Fred Purnell, "Francesco Patrizi," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/patrizi/. On this work, see also *Nova de universis philosophia: Materiali per un'edizione emendate*, ed. A. L. Puliafito Blevel (Florence: Olschki, 1993); Luc Deitz, "Space, Light, and Soul in Francesco Patrizzi's *Nova de universis philosophia* (1591)," in *Natural Particulars: Nature and the Disciplines in the Renaissance*, ed. Anthony T. Grafton and Nancy Siraisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); E. E. Ryan, "The 'Panaugia' of Franciscus Patricius: From the Light of Experience to the First Light," in *Francesco Patrizi filosof platonico nel crepuscolo del Rinascimento*, ed. P. Castelli (Florence: Olschki, 2002), 181–95.

39. Jaromír Červenka, "Die Panaugia: Die Vergleichung der zwei gleichnamigen Schriften von Patrizzi und Comenius," *Archiv pro bádàni o životě a dile J. A. Komenskeho* 21 (1962): 152–59; Jaromír Červenka, *Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius* (Prague: Academia, 1970), esp. 128–57, 186–92; Elisabeth von Erdmann-Pandžić, "Panaugia: zur Herkunft des Begriffs bei Patricius und Comenius," in *Slavistische Studien zum XI. Internationalen Slavistenkongreß in Preßburg/Bratislava*, ed. K. Gutschmidt et al. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1993), 113–25; Marta Fattori, "La filosofia del Rinascimento Italiano in J. A. Comenius: note su Campanella e Patrizi," in *Italia a Bohemia nella cornice del rinascimento Europeo*, ed. Sante Graciotti (Florence: Olschki, 1999), 305–31; Jan Čížek, "Filosofie Franceska Patriziho a Jana Amose Komenského ve světle jejich vrcholných" [The philosophy of Francesco Patrizi and Jan Amos Comenius in the light of their greatest works], *Studia Comeniana et Historica* 20 (2010): 21–45; Jan Čížek, "Johann Heinrich Alsted: A Mediator between Francesco Patrizi and J. A. Comenius?," *Acta Comeniana*, 26 (2012): 69–87. I am grateful to Vladimír Urbánek for help in assembling the literature in this and the following note.

40. Pavel Floss, "Komenskýs Erkenntnislehre und ein Einblick in seine Metaphysik," *Colloquia Comeniana* 2 (1969): 83–91; Dagmar Čapková, "La métaphore de la lumière dans la conception coménienne de cultura universalis," in *La visualisation des choses et la conception philosophique du monde dans l'oeuvre de Comenius. Actes du Colloque international des 18–20 mars 1992*, ed. Hana Voisine-Jechová (Paris: Presses de l'Univ. Paris-Sorbonne, 1994), 41–51.

41. Comenius, *Panaugia*, chaps. iv–x (*DJAK*, xix/1, 199–235; *Universal Light*, 11–53). Cf. the note on *DJAK*, xix/1, 296, which references similar statements in Comenius's writings, including *Via Lucis*, dedication, §§ 16–20 (*DJAK*, xiv, 288–89; *Way of Light*, 12–17).

42. Howard Hotson, "The Instauration of the Image of God in Man: Humanist Anthropology, Encyclopaedic Pedagogy, Baconianism and Universal Reform," in *The Practice of Reform in Health, Medicine, and Science, 1500–2000: Essays for Charles Webster*, ed. Margaret Pelling and Scott Mandelbrote (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 1–21; Jan Čížek, *The Conception of Man in the Works of John Amos Comenius* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016).

43. As Comenius wrote near the outset of the *Panegersia*, "All the world knows that God's outstanding virtues are *power* (with which he created and preserved the world), *wisdom* (which has enabled him to know, see, maintain, and govern it), and *goodness* (wherewith he is sanctified and dispenses justice and mercy towards all his Creation)." Comenius, *Panegersia*, chap. iv.14; cf. iv.18, ix.14 (*Consultatio*, i, cols. 31, 32, 85; *DJAK*, xix/1, 102–4, 142–43; quoting *Universal Awakening*, 12, 13, 50–51); cf. Comenius, *Pansophiae praeludium* (1637), § 64 (*DJAK*, xv/2, 36).

44. Cf. Comenius, *Panegersia*, chap. iv.13, 25; *Panorthosia*, chaps. xi–xiii (*Consultatio*, i, cols. 30, 34; ii, cols 499–526; *DJAK*, xix/1, 102, 105).

45. Comenius, *Panaugia*, chap. viii.8; cf. *Pampaedia*, chap. iii.10; *Panorthosia*, chap. x.51–52 (*Consultatio*, i, cols. 166–70; ii, cols 23, 497; *DJAK*, xix/1, 223); *Didactica magna*, chap. x.5 (*DJAK*, xv/1, 78).

46. See Comenius, *Panaugia*, chaps. v, vi, vii resp. (*Consultatio*, i, cols. 138–66; *DJAK*, xix/1, 202–21, and the note at 301, which references restatements elsewhere).

47. Comenius, *Panaugia*, chap. viii.8 (*Consultatio*, i, col. 169; *DJAK*, xix/1, 223).

48. Paraphrasing Comenius, *Panaugia*, chap. ix.12; cf. *Pampaedia*, chap. vii.16 (*Consultatio*, i, cols. 170–76; ii, cols. 89–90; *DJAK*, xix/1, 227); *Analytical Didactic*, 134–37 (*DJAK*, xv/2, 192–93). The Greek noun *synkrisis* (from *syn*, together, and *krisis*, a choosing, from *krinein*, to decide, judge) means "a comparison." In Comenius's scheme, analysis reduces composite wholes to their simplest parts, synthesis recombines these parts to understand complex entities, and syncrisis compares complex entities and their parts with one another.

49. Comenius, *Panaugia*, chap. x; *Panorthosia*, chap. xiii.12 (*Consultatio*, i, cols 177–85; ii, cols. 522–55; *DJAK*, xix/1, 229–34).

50. *Panorthosia*, chaps. xv–xviii (*Consultatio*, ii, cols. 533–59).

51. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chap. xvi.13 (*DJAK*, xiv, 342; *Way of Light*, 152).

52. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chap. xvi (*DJAK*, xiv, 339–45; *Way of Light*, 144–61).

53. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, dedication, §§ 21–32 (*DJAK*, xiv, 288–92; *Way of Light*, 18–26).

54. Hotson, "The Instauration of the Image of God in Man."

55. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, dedication, §§ 21, 24 (*DJAK*, xiv, 289, 290; *Way of Light*, 17, 19).

56. Michael Hunter, *Boyle: Between God and Science* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Rob Iliffe, *Priest of Nature: The Religious Worlds of Isaac Newton* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

57. Comenius, *Panorthosia*, chap. xxvi: "Mundi melioris imago, sive de mundi sic emendati beato statu" (*Consultatio*, ii, cols. 681–91); *Panorthosia, or Universal reform*, trans. Dobbie, 154–65.

58. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chap. xx.12–15 (*DJAK*, xiv, 359–60; *Way of Light*, 201–4, quotations 201, 202). Revelations 20 also features in the very final paragraph of the work: *Via Lucis*, chap. xxii (*DJAK*, xiv, 369; *Way of Light*, 234).

59. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chap. xx.15; *DJAK*, xiv, 360 (*Way of Light*, 204). This analogy between the seven days of creation and the seven millennia of universal history is further developed in the *Pansophia*, gradus IV, cap. X (*Consultatio*, i, cols. 667–68). See Comenius, *Weg des Lichtes*, ed. Voigt, 256–57.

60. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chap. xxii (*DJAK*, xiv, 368–69; *Way of Light*, 229–34).

61. Cf. Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1932).

62. Comenius should therefore be the crucial figure in another classic American contribution to the history of ideas: Ernest Lee Tuveson's *Millennium and Utopia: A Study of the Background to the Idea of Progress* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949; repr. New York: Harper Row, 1964; Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1972); but the work overlooks him entirely.

63. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, chap. xiii.17 (*DJAK*, xiv, 330; *Way of Light*, 113–14).

64. The Oxford vice-chancellor pointed this out prior to their first publication: Hübner (Oxford) to Hartlib, 12 June 1637; in *Korrespondence Jana Amoso Komenského*, ed. Jan [*alias* Johannes] Kvačala, 2 vols. (Prague: České akademie císaře Františka Josefa pro vědy, slovesnost a umění, 1898–1902), 1:28; cf. Blekastad, *Comenius*, 253. So did a leading lay member of Comenius's own confession: the senior of the Polish Unity of Brethren, Heroin Bryniarskis, "Annotatiuncula quædam in præludia Comeniana ad Portam Sapientiæ" (HP 7/62/1A-4B); Broniewski (Skoki) to Orminius, 5 Jan. 1639 (HP 7/62/4B–6A); both printed in G. H. Turnbull, *Hartlib, Dury and Comenius: Gleanings from Hartlib's Papers* (Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1947), 452–57. For context, cf. ibid., 348; Blekastad, *Comenius*, 257–60. Equally critical is the anonymous manuscript "In pansophiae librum annotationes" (HP 18/22/1A–6B), on which see Dagmar Čapková, "The Reception Given to the *Prodromus pansophiae* and the Methodology of Comenius," *Acta Comeniana* 7 (1987): 37–59.

65. Samuel Maresius also accused Comenius of being a synergist and condemned his views on justification: cf. Josef Smolík, "Comenius on Justification and Sanctification," *Communio viatorum* 4 (1998): 137–44, here 137; reprinted in *Justification and Sanctification in the Traditions of the Reformation*, ed. Milan Opocenský and Páraic Réamonn (Geneva: World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 1999), 123–28; Wilhelmus Rood, *Comenius and the Low Countries* (Amsterdam: Van Gendt; Prague: Academia; New York: Abner Schram, 1970), 202 (apparently referring to *Panorthosia*, chap. viii.49; *Consultatio*, ii, cols. 459–60).

66. See also Uwe Voigt's central thesis: that Comenius's understanding of history represented a synthesis of Augustinian and millenarian tendencies: cf. Voigt, *Das Geschichtsverständnis des Johann Amos Comenius in Via Lucis as creative Syntheseleistung* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), esp. 88–146, 213–18; and his introduction to Comenius, *Der Weg des Lichtes*, esp. pp. xx–xxiv.

67. Comenius, *Via Lucis*, http://www.e-rara.ch/zut/content/titleinfo/7811027?lang=enedication, §2 (*DJAK*, xiv, 285; *Way of Light*, 4).

68. See note 56 in this chapter.

69. Hannes Möhring, *Der Weltkaiser der Endzeit. Entstehung, Wandel und Wirkung ener tausendjährigen Weissagung* (Stuttagart: Thorbecke, 2000); Arno Seifert, *Der Rückzug der biblischen Prophetie von der neueren Geschichte. Studien zur Geschichte der Reichstheologie des frühneuzeitlichen deutschen Protestantismus* (Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau, 1990); E. van der Vekene, *Johann Sleidan, Bibliographie seiner gedruckten Werke* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1996); A. Kess, *Johann Sleidan and the Protestant Vision of History* (Aldershot: Ashgate 2008).

70. An enduring survey is Robin Bruce Barnes, *Prophecy and Gnosis: Apocalypticism in the Wake of the Lutheran Reformation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). For the influence of this material on Comenius's teacher, see Howard Hotson, *Paradise Postponed: Johann Heinrich Alsted and the Birth of Calvinist Millenarianism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), esp. 41–84, 134–54, 160–74. For its influence among the Czech exiles, see Vladimír Urbánek, *Eschatologie, vědění a politika: Příspěvek k dějinám myšlení pobělohorského exilu* [Eschatology, knowledge and politics: On the intellectual history of the post–White Mountain Bohemian exiles] (České Budějovice: Jihočeská univerzita, 2008).

71. The vast scale of this phenomenon has recently been documented in Jürgen Beyer, *Lay Prophets in Lutheran Europe (c. 1550–1700)* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

72. Surprisingly, this topic still awaits its historian. Existing surveys are disappointingly thin: Roland Haase, *Das Problem des Chiliasmus und der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (doctoral

dissertation, Leipzig: Gerhardt, 1933); Herbert Narbuntowicz, "Reformorthodoxe, spiritualistische, chiliastische und utopische Entwürfe einer menschlichen Gemeinschaft als Reaktion auf den Dreißigjährigen Krieg" (Inaugural-Dissertation, Freiburg im Bresigau, 1994). A good starting point is Vladimír Urbánek, "The Comet of 1618: Eschatological Expectations and Political Prognostications during the Bohemian Revolt," in *Tycho Brahe and Prague: Crossroads of European Science*, ed. John Robert Christianson, Alena Hadravová, Petr Hadrava, and Martin Šolc (Thun and Frankfurt am Main: Deutsch, 2002), 282–91. The impact of similar thinking on the genesis of Comenius's millenarianism is demonstrated in Vladimír Urbánek, "Proroctví, astrologie a chronologie v dílech exulantů Paula Felgenhauera a Šimona Partlice" [Prophecy, astrology and chronology: Works of Paul Felgenhauer and Simeon Partlicius], in *Víra nebo vlast? Exil v českých dějinách raného novověku*, ed. Michaela Hrubá (Ústí nad Labem: Albis, 2001), 156–73, and Vladimír Urbánek, "Počátky Komenského chiliasmu a chiliastická očekávání u Simeona Partlicia a Pavla Skály [The beginnings of Comenius' millenarianism and the millenarian expectations of Simeon Partlicius and Pavel Skála], in *Pojetí světa v díle Jana Amose Komenského*, ed. Aleš Prázný and Věra Schifferová (Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, 2009), 133–50.

73. Joachim Friedrichsdorf, *Umkehr: Prophetie und Bildung bei Johann Amos Comenius* (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 1995), 97–131. Most of the recent and detailed treatments are in Czech and Slovak: Pavel Heřmánek, *Jan Amos Komenský a Kristina Poniatowská: učenec a vizionářka v době třicetileté války* (Prague: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2015); Paul Kleinert, "Nikolaus Drabik," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* 71 (1898): 648–80; M. E. H. N. Mout, "Calvinoturcismus und Chiliasmus im 17. Jahrhundert," in *Chilasmus in Deutschland und England im 17. Jahrhundert* (Pietismus & Neuzeit 14), ed. Martin Brecht, Frederich de Boor, and Klaus Deppermann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1988), 72–84; Vladimír Urbánek, "Revelace Mikuláše Drabíka a válečné akce první poloviny 40. let 17. Století" [Revelations of Mikuláš Drabík and the campaigns of the first half of the 1640s], in *Morava a Brno na sklonku třicetileté války*, ed. Jan Skutil (Prague and Brno: Societas, 1995), 70–75; Libor Bernát, "Mikuláš Drábik: Visionary of Religious or Political?," *Studia Comeniana et Historica* 29 (1999): 56–81; Libor Bernát, "K eschatologickým prvkom v diele Jána Amosa Komenského a Mikuláša Drábika" [The eschatological elements in the works of John Amos Comenius and Mikuláš Drábik], *Studia Comeniana et Historica* 32 (2002): 70–76.

74. Comenius, *Lux in tenebris* (Amsterdam, 1657), Praefatio, §§ 10, 16; Blekastad, *Comenius*, 579.

75. Comenius, *Panaugia*, chap. viii.6 (*DJAK*, xix/1, 222–23; *Universal Light*, 39). Cf. the parallel passages in the *Via Lucis*, dedication, § 18 (*DJAK*, xiv, 288; *Way of Light*, 14–15), which prudently stop short of declaring Comenius's commitment to the new prophets.

76. Such concerns were by no means unusual in the seventeenth century and, indeed, in Hartlib's circle. See, e.g., *Angels of Light? Sanctity and the Discernment of Spirits in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Clare Copeland and Jan Machielsen (Leiden: Brill, 2013), esp. chaps. 6–7: Leigh T. I. Penman, "A Seventeenth-Century Prophet Confronts His Failures: Paul Felgenhauer's *Speculum Poenitentiae, Buß-Spiegel* (1625)," and R. J. Scott, "Visions, Dreams, and the Discernment of Prophetic Passions: Sense and Reason in the Writings of the Cambridge Platonists and John Beale, 1640–60."

77. Blekastad, *Comenius*, esp. 344–54, 408–28.

78. Ibid., esp. 451–53, 467–508.

79. Ibid., 516–25.

80. Ibid., 536–49.

81. Comenius, *Opera Didactica Omnia: Variis hucusque occasionibus scripta, diversisque locis edita, nunc autem non tantum in unum, ut simul sint, collecta, sed & ultimo conatu in Systema unum mechanice constructum, redacta* (Amsterdam, 1657; repr. in 3 vols., Prague: Acad. Scientiarum Bohemoslovenicae, 1957); Blekastad, *Comenius*, 564–69.

82. On the circumstances, Blekastad, *Comenius*, 578–79.

83. Arnoldi, *Discursus theologicus contra d. John. Amos Comenii praetensam Lucem in tenebris* (Franeker, 1659]); Blekastad, *Comenius*, 587; Rood, *Comenius and the Low Countries*, 169–80.

84. For further detail, see D. Nauta, *Samuel Maresius* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1935), 330–38; R. A. B. Oosterhuis, "Een 17e eeuwsche dispuut over het chiliasme tusschen J. A. Comenius en S. Maresius," *Stemmen des tijds* 20 (1931): 345–58; Blekastad, *Comenius*, 670–74; Rood, *Comenius in the Low Countries*, 198–226; Voigt, *Geschichtsverständnis des Comenius*, 101–3.

85. Claude-Gilbert Dubois, *La conception de l'histoire en France au XVIe siècle (1560–1610)* (Paris: A. G. Nizet, 1977); François Laplanche, *L'écriture, le sacré et l'histoire. Erudits et politiques protestants devant la Bible en France au XVIIème siècle* (Amsterdam: APA; Maarssen: Holland University Press, 1986); Irena Backus, *Les sept visions et la fin des temps: les commentaires genevois de l'apocalypse entre 1539 et 1584* (Geneva, Lausanne, and Neuchâtel: Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, 1997).

86. Pierre Jurieu, *L'Accomplissement des propheties ou la deliverance prochaine de l'Eglise* (Rotterdam, 1686); Harry M. Bracken, "Pierre Jurieu: The Politics of Prophecy," in *Continental Millenarians: Protestants, Catholics, Heretics*, ed. John Christian Laursen and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 85–94; Jeffrey K. Jue, *Heaven upon Earth: Joseph Mede (1586–1638) and the Legacy of Millenarianism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2006), 238–42.

87. Jurieu, *Accomplissement*, prefatory "Avis à tous les Chrêtiens," fol. *iiij^{v}–*v^{r}; quoted in Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Rotterdam: Leers, 1702), "Kotterus" (note A), vol. 2 (1730); *The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (London: Knapton, Midwinter, Brotherton, Bettesworth, Hitch, Hazard, Tonson, Innys, Manby, Osborne, Longman, Ward, Wicksteed, Meadows, Woodward, Motte, Hinchliffe, Walthoe, Symon, Cox, Ward, Browne, Birt, Bickerton, Astley, Austen, Gilliver, Lintot, Whitridge & Willock et al., 1734–38), 2:679 (quoted).

88. For a survey of the prophetic expectations aroused among both proponents and opponents of the Sun King, see Lionel Laborie, "Millenarian Portraits of Louis XIV," in *Louis XIV Outside In: Images of the Sun King beyond France, 1661–1715*, ed. Tony Claydon and Charles-Édouard Levillain (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015), 209–28.

89. Mara van der Lugt, *Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 119, 125. The first quotation from van der Lugt in the text is from the abstract of this chapter on Oxford Scholarship Online: DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769262.003.0004. See also the earlier study, F. R. J. Knetsch, "Le jugement de Bayle sur Comenius," *Bulletin de la Commission de l'histoire des Eglises Wallones* (1969–71): 83–96.

90. Bayle, "Comenius," *Dictionnaire*, 1:957–61 (*Dictionary*, 2:536–40). So perfect was this material for Bayle's polemical purposes, in fact, that a first draft of the article on Comenius was included in the prospectus for the *Dictionnaire* released by the publisher,

Reinier Leers, five years before the work itself; Pierre Bayle, *Projet et fragmens d'un dictionaire critique* (Rotterdam: Leers, 1692), 219–24.

91. Bayle, "Comenius," 958 (*Dictionary*, 2:537). Elsewhere (in note A), Bayle does remark on the success of one of Comenius's most oft-reprinted textbooks *Janua linguarum reservata*: "Quand Comenius n'auroit publié que celuy'-là, il se seroit immortalisé: c'est un livre qui a été imprimé un infinité de fois, & traduit en je ne say combine de langues" (cf. *Dictionary*, 2:536). It is noteworthy, however that this passage, which is included in the text of the *Projet et fragments* (pp. 222–23), is demoted to a footnote in the *Dictionnaire*.

92. Samuel de Sorbière, *Sorberiana, ou Bons mots, rencontres agreables, pensées judicieuses, et observations curieuses* (Paris: Veuve Mabee-Cramoisy, 1694), 61–62. Sorbiére, later known as an ardent defender of the natural philosophy of Gassendi and Hobbes, found nothing of value in the papers. Comenius, for his part, owed his skeptical attitude to Descartes partly to discussions with Sorbière; Blekastad, *Comenius*, 345.

93. Bayle, "Comenius," 958 (*Dictionary*, 2:537).

94. Bayle, "Marets, Samuel des," *Dictionnaire*, 2:2047 (*Dictionary*, 3:122). The article provided the occasion for devoting a column and a half to critiquing the philo-Semitic millenarian Petrus Serrarius (note I).

95. Bayle, "Comenius," 958–59 (*Dictionary*, 2:538).

96. Cf. note K, which recounts at length Arnoldi's charge that the Brethren in Leszno had been left destitute and defenseless because they had believed Comenius's promises of a speedy return to their homeland.

97. Bayle, "Comenius," 960 (*Dictionary*, 2:539–40).

98. Bayle, "Comenius," 959 (*Dictionary*, 2:539).

99. On the *Janua coelorum reservata*, see further van der Lugt, *Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire*, 162–65.

100. Bayle, "Comenius," 960; see also Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, 1:1066–68; 2:1730–36 (cf. *Dictionary*, 2:540, 690–93; 3:679–85). Cf. van der Lugt, *Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire*, 127–29. "Drabicius," note K, reproduced a paragraph on Drábik from Bayle's first great work, the *Pensées diverses écrites . . . à l'occasion de la Comète qui parut au mois de décembre 1680*, § 256; *Œuvres diverses de Mr. Pierre Bayle*, 5 vols. (The Hague: Husson, Johnson, Gosse, Swart, Scheurleer, Van Duren, Alberts, Le Vier & Boucquet, 1727–31; facs, repr.: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964–68), 3:155–56.

101. Cf. van der Lugt's conclusion in *Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire*, 129: "Since 'Comenius,' 'Drabicius'" and 'Kotterus' each refer back to one [an]other, they create a perfect triangle of thematically related articles . . . which, each on their own, and together more powerfully, contribute to the association of Jurieu to fanaticism and/or imposture."

102. By contrast, Kotter is not even given an entry in the *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, although he does receive one in the *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, vol. 9 (Berlin: Gruyter, 1941; repr. Augsburg: Weltbild, 2000), cols.78–81.

103. Howard Hotson, "Outsiders, Dissenters, and Competing Visions of Reform," in *The Oxford Handbook of Protestant Reformations*, ed. Ulinka Rublack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 301–28, uses Comenius's universal reform project as a vantage point for gaining fresh perspectives on unorthodoxy in the post-Reformation period.

104. Comenius, *Clamores Eliae* (*DJAK*, xxiii); Rood, *Comenius in the Low Countries*, 167, 204–8; Leszek Kołakowski, *Świadomość religijna i więź kościelna. Studia nad chrześcijaństwem bezwyznaniowym siedemnastego wieku* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo

Naukowe, 1965, 1997, 2009); translated by Anna Posner as *Chrétiens sans église: la conscience religeuse et le lien confessionnel au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969, repr. 1987).

105. Interestingly, the frequency of these figures drops noticeably in the second and third volumes.

106. Elisabeth Labrousse, *Pierre Bayle*, vol. 2: *Hétérodoxie et rigorisme* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), 582.

107. Ruth Whelan, "Les refornateurs radicaux dans la *Dictionnaire* de Bayle: analyse d'une attitude ambivalente," in *La Bible et ses raisons: diffusion et distortions du discours religieux*, ed. Gérard Gros (St. Etienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 1996), 260. Of the German Peasants' War, for instance, he writes: "They rose in several Places, and committed infinite Disorders. They were soon reduced, and great numbers put to death. Munzer, who had seduced them by his Pretences to Inspiriation, was taken, and beheaded, in the year 1525." In Switzerland, "the Magistrates were obliged to have recourse to the most severe penal Laws, to stop the Progress of *Anabaptism*. The same was necessary in several Towns of Germany, and other Places." The article on "Anabaptists" in in *Dictionary*, 1:285.

108. John Christian Laursen, "Bayle's Anti-Millenarianism," in Laursen and Popkin, *Continental Millenarians*, 95–106, (quotations from 95 and 96). Hubmaier is discussed in the article on Anabaptism, which includes a lengthy justification of the severity inflicted on them by the Swiss authorities; Bayle, "Anabaptistes" (notes B and L), in *Dictionnaire*, 1:223–33 (*Dictionary*, 1:284–90). By comparison, Drábik got off lightly: his right hand was cut off and his tongue ripped out before he was decapitated and his body burned, along with the books and manuscripts of Comenius, in Bratislava in 1671. Of Morin, Bayle dryly records that "his accomplices were condemned . . . to be galley-slaves for ever, having been first whipt by the hands of the hangman, and branded with the mark of the flower-de-luces on the right and left shoulder"; Bayle, "Morinus," *Dictionary*, 3:269–70, note E.

109. H. H. M. van Lieshout, *The Making of Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique*, trans. Lynne Richards (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 2001); Anton M. Matytsin, "The Many Lives of Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique in the Eighteenth Century," in *Libertinage et philosophie à l'époque classique (XVIe–XVIIe siècle)*, no. 14: *La pensée de Pierre Bayle* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2017), 29–45.

110. Wouter J. Hanegraaff, *Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 137.

111. Adelung, *Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit, oder Lebensbeschreibungen berühmter Schwarzkünstler, Goldmacher, Teufelsbanner, Zeichen- und Liniendeuter, Schwärmer, Wahrsager, und anderer philosophischer Unholden*, 7 pts. (Leipzig: Weygand, 1785–89), pt. 1, 196–241; *Gallerie der neuen Propheten, apokalyptischen Träumer, Geisterseher und Revolutionsprediger* (Leipzig: Weygand, 1799).

112. Wilhelm Scherer, "Adelung, Johann Christoph," *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, 1 (1875), 80–84: "unter dem picanten Titel einer Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit hat er Männer und Frauen verunglimpft, welche zu den edelsten Erscheinungen der Menschheit gehören: es sollte dem geschmackvollen und aufgeklärten Weltmanne der 80er Jahre schmeicheln, auf jene 'Schwärmer' vornehm herabblicken zu können."

113. Notably Simon Somerville Laurie, *John Amos Comenius, Bishop of the Moravians: His Life and Educational Works* (London, 1881; Cambridge 1881, 1884, 1887, 1893, 1895, 1899, 1904; Boston, 1881, 1885, 1892; Syracuse, NY, 1892, 1893); also Will Seymour Monroe, *Comenius and the Beginnings of Educational Reform* (London: W. Heinemann, 1900, 1907, 1912).

114. *The Orbis Pictus of John Amos Comenius* (Syracuse, NY: Bardeen, 1887); *Comenius' School of Infancy: An Essay on the Education of Youth during the First Six Years*, trans. W. S. Monroe (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1893, 1896, 1897); *The Great Didactic of John Amos Comenius*, translated into English and edited with biographical, historical, and critical introductions by M[aurice] W[alter] Keatinge (London: Black, [1896], 1907, 1910, 1921, 1923); Count [Franz Heinrich Hieronymus Valentin] Lützow, ed. and trans., *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart* (London: Swan Sonnenschein [1901], 1902; J. M. Dent, 1905; New York: Dutton, 1901, 1902).

115. Andrew C. Fix, *Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early Enlightenment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), notably chap. 3: "A Prophetic Light in the Darkness Shining: Collegiant Chiliasm," 57–83; Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

ANTON M. MATYTSIN

Whose Light Is It Anyway?

The Struggle for Light in the French Enlightenment

At first glance, the following passages might appear familiar to anyone acquainted with progressive narratives of the Enlightenment that associate the eighteenth century with light, reason, and progress:

> There was a time, and this time lasted for centuries, when . . . even those who distinguished themselves from the commoners by a cultivated reason . . . submitted their understanding to [the Catholic Church's] dogmas. . . . But since the last century this darkness in which men coddled themselves was, in part, dissipated; one was [now] curious to enlighten oneself.[1]

> Stupid worshipers of antiquity, philosophers have crawled for twenty centuries on the traces of the first teachers: reason, condemned to silence, let only authority speak, and nothing was enlightened in the universe; and the human mind, after having barely advanced in two thousand years on the vestiges of Aristotle, found itself as far from the truth [as it first was]. Finally there appeared in France a powerful and courageous genius who began to shake the hold of the Prince of the School. This new man told others that to be a philosopher, it was not enough to believe, one had to think. . . . This disciple of light, instead of interrogating the dead and the gods of the School consulted only clear and distinct ideas, nature, and evidence.[2]

In a game of "Whose Line Is It Anyway?," one might mistakenly attribute such praise for independent reasoning and condemnations of traditional authorities to Voltaire's *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) or to Jean Le Rond d'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire" (1751) of the *Encyclopédie*. Surprisingly, however, despite sharing Voltaire's and d'Alembert's views on the forward march of historical progress and the role of reason in improving the human condition, the authors of the passages in question opposed many of the philosophes' religious, philosophical, and political aims.

Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, who authored the first passage, was a Swiss Huguenot professor of logic and mathematics. One of the most eminent logicians of his time, Crousaz was using the light metaphor to explain what he (and many of

his contemporaries) perceived as an intellectual decline that occurred during the Middle Ages and a resurgence of learning that had taken place since the Protestant Reformation. Despite his seemingly enlightened views of philosophical progress and critiques of both Aristotelian scholasticism and Catholicism, Crousaz was a harsh critic of skepticism, deism, materialism, atheism, and other heterodox philosophies that became popular during the eighteenth century.

The second passage is from a discourse composed by Jesuit Antoine Guénard that won the prize of the Académie française in 1755 for the most eloquent answer to the question: "What is the philosophical spirit?" (*En quoi consiste l'esprit philosophique?*). Guénard's discourse, approved by the Sorbonne censors, shared the philosophes' view that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a period of great rational progress over the intellectual stagnation of preceding centuries, which had been dominated by Aristotelian scholasticism. He credited René Descartes, whom he dubbed "the disciple of light" (*disciple de la lumière*), with bringing about a dramatic improvement in human knowledge. However, while praising the innovator's rational examination of nature, Guénard also warned of potential dangers associated with applying the "torch of philosophy" beyond its appropriate limits. Reason was not supposed to encroach on the supernatural mysteries of religion.[3]

Crousaz and Guénard can hardly be described as prototypical Enlightenment thinkers. However, their uses of the light metaphor to describe the so-called Philosophical Revolution have much in common with those of their more radical adversaries. The similarities and differences in the ways that religious thinkers and irreligious philosophes spoke about "light"—the role of reason in bringing about enlightenment and progress—reveal the complex, multifaceted nature of eighteenth-century learned culture. The tensions between these rival visions of reason and progress underscore both the extent to which the Enlightenment transformed religious beliefs and practices and the degree to which enlightened views were informed by theistic and Christian perspectives.

The most influential interpretations of the Enlightenment have highlighted both the increasing separation between natural reason and supernatural faith and the process of secularization.[4] However, scholars have recently begun to pay serious attention to the persistence of religious elements in Enlightenment thought.[5] In revising purely secular depictions of the Enlightenment, this chapter builds on these reinterpretations by focusing on the metaphors of light. It shows how the competing uses of the light metaphor reveal a complex spectrum of eighteenth-century views on the proper relationship between faith and reason.

While the light metaphor was nearly ubiquitous in this period, its deployment was contested, as was the philosophes' own self-identification with the Enlightenment. Religious apologists and the defenders of the established order quickly adopted the rhetoric of their philosophe opponents to advance alternative visions of progress.[6] Multiple factions declared themselves to be defending "light" against "darkness" and to be representing "reason" against "fanaticism" and "ignorance." The metaphor was loaded with competing assumptions about the methods and goals of intellectual inquiry and about the potential for the improvement of human knowledge over time. The most divisive question for the parties fighting in favor of light, at least in the French-speaking world, concerned the appropriate role of organized religion in the maintenance of society and in the quest for knowledge about the natural world.

As a group, the philosophes denounced the privileged role of the Catholic clergy, the superstition and irrationality of faith-based claims, religious intolerance and enthusiasm, and the arbitrary power of the crown and of the nobility. The religious apologists, in turn, not only articulated a priori and a posteriori proofs of the existence of God but also made utilitarian arguments against the potential chaos, disorder, and "darkness" that would result from the abandonment of religious belief in general and especially of the Christian belief in the immortality of the soul. The defenders of religion were not villains in their own narratives, and they certainly perceived themselves to be championing true reason and enlightenment as much as the philosophes. Indeed, the secular conceptions of the light metaphor emerged from the gradual assimilation and repurposing of the religious meanings of that metaphor.[7] A closer look at the contestations of the light metaphor deepens our understanding of the complexities and varieties of Enlightenment learned culture. By examining the full spectrum of the stories that late early-modern thinkers told about themselves, we can perceive the coexistence of several competing narratives, not all of which have made it into our modern understanding of the Enlightenment.

The light metaphor underwent both polemical contestations and rapid mutations in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. While the figurative meanings of the term *lumière(s)* assumed new secular connotations in this period, it remained a deeply disputed term that retained traces of its original religious meaning. As historian Michel Delon has noted, the metaphor generated a tug of war between the irreligious philosophes and a variety of Christian thinkers, who all claimed to be the champions of the "true light."[8] Disputes over what constituted this *lumière veritable* also informed perceptions of where the eighteenth century stood in the history of human intellectual development. The ubiquity of the light

metaphor and the intense contests over it reveal a wide set of transformations in the learned culture of Enlightenment France. Jacques Roger, Michel Delon, and Céline Spector have all noted the transition from the conception of the natural light as a cognitive faculty to the metaphorical sense of natural lights as the cumulative sum of human knowledge.[9] This essay builds on their work to explain how the contested use of the light metaphor contributed to competing narratives about the Age of Enlightenment.

The light metaphor was essential to the construction of self-reflexive narratives, as eighteenth-century thinkers defined their age as an "enlightened century" (*siècle éclairé*) and the "century of lights" (*siècle des Lumières*), among other celebratory monikers. As Dan Edelstein has argued, the emergence of this self-reflexive historical narrative was the defining feature of the Enlightenment. The philosophes' account was based on their recognition that they lived in an enlightened age, in which the progress of modern science combined with a methodological application of the *esprit philosophique* to bring humankind to an unprecedented apex of intellectual achievement. Gradually overcoming centuries of darkness, ignorance, and violence, humanity finally freed itself from the shackles of political despotism and religious superstition.[10]

This is, in its most basic contours, the triumphalist story that was offered not only by Voltaire, the editors of the *Encyclopédie*, and Nicolas de Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1795) but also by more orthodox figures such as Crousaz and Guénard, whose narratives we encountered in the passages at the beginning of the chapter. As the historian J. B. Shank has argued, the philosophes "defined Enlightenment by constructing a highly politicized history of modern science as an act of self-justification." Shank brings our attention to the ways in which Voltaire and other French thinkers fashioned a new persona of the philosophe and combined it with self-serving narratives. They portrayed themselves as the intellectual and moral avant-garde of the progressive movement of humanity.[11]

Indeed, one of the most fascinating features of the intellectual history of early modern Europe and of the Enlightenment is the emergence of what might be called a modern historical consciousness. Thinkers in this period became keenly aware of the nature of historical change and developed schemas of periodization that posited distinct stages of human progress.[12] This development is apparent in the growing number of narratives in which European intellectuals of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attempted to distinguish themselves from preceding periods and to define what they saw as the unique features of the age in which they lived.[13] The eighteenth century's triumphalist narrative remains

a story that many scholars continue to tell today, inextricably linking the Enlightenment with modernity (whether to praise it for its achievements or to condemn it for its shortcomings). We have inherited these narratives, sometimes too uncritically, and allowed them to shape our own understanding of the past without distinguishing fact from myth and rhetoric from reality. Examining accounts of this period in the historical actors' own words reveals the attitudes of eighteenth-century thinkers toward their own age and exposes the ways in which they wove together this story.

The Natural Light and Private Conscience

Dictionaries from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries reveal that the metaphor of light-as-knowledge had at least two different meanings in this period. The first sense made light synonymous with intelligence and the faculty of reason. This meaning had a religious connotation, signifying "all that enlightens the soul," a notion derived from scripture and from St. Augustine's conception of an inner light, present in all people, through which God maintained contact with Adam's sinful posterity.[14] It also had a secular connotation and signified "intelligence, knowledge, and clarity of mind."[15] These secular and religious meanings were fused and inseparable in the many texts of René Descartes, who argued the "natural light" was a "faculty of knowing" that proceeded directly from God and allowed human beings to recognize clear and distinct ideas.[16] Descartes identified the "natural light" as a faculty that distinguished truth from falsity and provided the knowledge of "speculative truths," including geometric and mathematical principles.[17]

The second general sense of *lumières* in the plural form came to stand for the sum of all human knowledge, either lost or acquired with time. This second sense, developed in many significant ways out of the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, informed the narrative of historical self-consciousness and inspired debates about whether the eighteenth century was an enlightened age.[18] The development of this historical narrative also contributed to the growing polarization between the two lights of faith and reason.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thinkers with widely different religious and philosophical views debated the exact meaning of the term "natural light" (*lumière naturelle*). They deployed it in a nearly literal sense to refer to an individual's general ability to reason. In Christian theology and scholastic philosophy, the natural light was a God-given faculty that distinguished human beings from animals and allowed humanity to attain a glimpse of the divine truth.

From antiquity onward, however, philosophers disagreed about the precise nature of this faculty.[19]

One of the most significant debates in the seventeenth century arose from the difference between René Descartes's and Nicolas Malebranche's views of the soul's relationship with God and the divine mind. They articulated rival accounts of the origin of human ideas. Malebranche argued that while the senses could not provide accurate knowledge, the mind could furnish us with clear and distinct ideas through its connection with God, who was the source of all our notions.[20] He insisted that it was "God Himself, who enlightens philosophers with the knowledge that ungrateful men called natural."[21] According to Descartes, by contrast, God had placed certain innate ideas in the soul of each person and also endowed each individual with a "certain light, to discern the true from the false."[22] All human beings had equal potential to reason well, but in order to realize that potential, they had to rid themselves of "errors that might darken our natural light and render us less capable of listening to reason."[23] Descartes also wrote a dialogue entitled *La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle* (1684) that proposed to "highlight the true riches of our souls, opening to each the means to find in oneself" everything "necessary for the conduct of life" and all the knowledge that human reason was capable of attaining.[24] Thus, Malebranche stressed the soul's constant dependence on God for all of its ideas, whereas Descartes and his empiricist disciples emphasized the individual soul's relative independence.[25]

John Locke's theory of mind played an even more vital role than the empiricist branch of Cartesianism in making individual sensation and perception the basis of all philosophical judgments. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689), he denied the Cartesian notion of innate ideas. Locke explained that each person gained a unique understanding of the world through her or his own individual experience. This collection of experiences, for Locke, served as the basis of personal identity. Individuals were thus free to determine their beliefs and to pursue that which they believed would bring them happiness.[26]

After Locke, Enlightenment thinkers emphasized the importance of the independent use of one's own natural lights with respect to philosophical questions, contrasting reason to religion and received authority. The "independent" or "autonomous" use of one's natural lights was, of course, Immanuel Kant's answer to the question: "What is Enlightenment?"[27] Kant's eloquent definition of Enlightenment built on a long tradition that emphasized the importance of coming to one's own conclusions and, as the motto of the Royal Society insisted, taking no one's word for it. The philosophes' writings are filled with such proclamations.

For example, Voltaire's *Le monde comme il va* (1746), juxtaposed those who "judged well because they followed the lights of reason with those who had judged poorly because they only consulted their books."[28] In the *Lettres juives* (1736–38), the freethinking Jean-Baptiste de Boyer d'Argens used the voice of a clergyman to denounce "servile obedience" that "prohibited the liberty of thought" and "made it a crime to follow reason that seeks to enlighten us."[29] He and other philosophes perceived a tie between the absence of light and unquestioning subservience to existing authority, particularly religious authority. In *La contagion sacrée* (1768), the atheist baron d'Holbach suggested that "nations deprived of lights" were held captive by religious leaders, whose "teachings could only form ignorant, fearful, and anxious slaves."[30] The ability to exercise one's reason independently in religious and philosophical matters thus became associated with political emancipation.

While Enlightenment thinkers championed the independent and autonomous use of one's natural light in philosophical questions, the idea of allowing individuals to reach their own independent conclusions was originally formulated in the context of confessional debates about religious toleration. The Huguenot skeptic Pierre Bayle maintained, in 1686, that each individual's "natural light" was the "genuine and original rule of all interpretation of Scripture."[31] Bayle argued against the reliance on the authority of the Catholic Church, suggesting that each person had the right and the obligation to trust in one's own natural lights to determine what one believed to be a revealed truth.[32] This individual autonomy was, for Bayle, the basis of religious toleration. Coercing an individual to alter religious beliefs forced that person to violate the dictates of God-given conscience.[33] John Locke's *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689) made a similar plea to political authorities, urging that no person "ought to be compelled in matters of Religion either by Law or Force," because "Liberty of Conscience is every man's natural Right."[34] Human beings would never attain salvation, Locke reasoned, if they "were put under a necessity to quit the Light of their own Reason, and oppose the Dictates of their own Consciences."[35] Thus, it was above all in religious matters, not in questions of philosophy or politics, that the battle for individual autonomy was first fought.

Reason or Faith: False Lights and Superior Lights

Thinkers also debated the quantity and veracity of lights that supposedly enlightened mankind. In Christian theology, the "light of revelation" complemented the natural or inner light. It imparted those truths which reason was incapable of learning on its own. Since reason could not contradict revelation, numerous Catholic and Protestant thinkers tried to examine the relationship between faith and

reason. Some philosophers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz attempted to reconcile apparent tensions between the "two lights" both in his *Essais de théodicée* (1710) and in the *Discours de la confromité de la foi avec la raison* that preceded it.[36] However, other thinkers, particularly fideists, such as Michel de Montaigne, François de La Mothe Le Vayer, Blaise Pascal, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle demonstrated how rational approaches to theological questions only created confusion. Hoping to shield revealed religion from rational critiques, they explicitly called for the submission of natural reason to supernatural faith.[37]

Deist and atheist critics, on the other hand, questioned the authenticity of the light of the Christian revelation and stressed the absolute primacy of reason. Those philosophes who opposed organized religion tended to maintain that there was only a single "true" light, that of natural reason. For example, the freethinking marquis d'Argens mocked the blind submission of the "torch of reason" to revealed truths. Such a leap of faith forced one to believe uncritically things that seemed contrary to rational analysis.[38] The materialist thinker Julien Offray de La Mettrie similarly maintained that "nature and reason [were] the only stars capable of enlightening and guiding us, if we opened our soul to their lights."[39] The atheist baron d'Holbach, whose metaphysics strongly resembled La Mettrie's materialism, proposed that it was the "sole light of reason" that enabled mankind to distinguish truth from falsehood and good from evil.[40]

The irreligious philosophes juxtaposed the "true" light of reason with the "false" or "supposed" lights of religion (*lumières pretendus, trompeuses, fausses*). The atheist Jean Meslier was one of the first to suggest that the Gospels were such a false light that misguided mankind.[41] In *La contagion sacrée*, d'Holbach accused religious and political authorities of extinguishing the true lights of reason and keeping people in a state of ignorance and superstition in order to perpetuate their tyranny.[42] For d'Holbach, natural lights revealed the laws of nature, the rules of morality, and people's true interests, while religion was a "torch of a deceptive light" that was "lit by fanaticism, imposture, and tyranny."[43] Diplomat and journalist Friedrich Melchior Grimm went so far as to designate the Jesuits as the "children of darkness" (*enfants des ténébres*).[44]

However, not all philosophes were equally confident in the ability of the independent lights of one's reason to reveal the complex nature of the surrounding world. Many believed that the limitations of the human mind and the contingent nature of individual sense experience compromised one's ability to attain true and certain knowledge of absolute metaphysical truths. While David Hume and Denis Diderot were the most prominent eighteenth-century skeptics, even Voltaire's corpus is replete with reservations about the limits of rational speculation. His *Tout en*

Dieu (1769)—a work that shows great affinity for Malebranche's and Spinoza's metaphysics—concluded with a particularly powerful metaphor: "Here is all that this weak ray of light, emanating in me from the sun of minds shows me. But, knowing how fragile this ray is, I submit this weak glimmer to the superior lights that must enlighten my steps in the darkness of this world."[45] By invoking the notion of *clartés supérieures*, Voltaire seemed to gesture to some kind of supernatural faculty that surpassed the limits of human understanding.

Echoing Voltaire's view of the limits of human reason, several Christian critics insisted that the self-proclaimed philosophes were impostors who misguided mankind into darkness under the false torch of unrestrained reason. The so-called anti-philosophes did not claim to oppose reason or enlightenment but argued instead that their irreligious opponents speculated on matters about which they could not possibly be informed. Many maintained that while the natural light of reason offered a reliable knowledge of the surrounding world and revealed God's existence, it was insufficient to enlighten mankind completely. They insisted that people required a "superior light," in the form of revelation, to explain truths inaccessible to the lights of natural reason.[46]

These kinds of claims filled Christian apologetics of all confessions. The Swiss Huguenot Jacob Vernet compared an "enlightened Christian" with the philosophe, suggesting that while both could rely on the "natural light," the former could "join to his weak reason the superior lights that God gave us in his Word" and thus "see much clearer and farther" with this "double torch."[47] The Dominican Gabriel Gauchat ridiculed contemporary philosophes for practicing a "false and dark philosophy" by attempting to "judge all things by following solely [their] own lights."[48] The Catholic coeditors of *La religion vengée* (1757–63) likened the philosophes' rejection of revelation to the stubbornness of "incensed travelers," who, in the middle of the night, "refuse the glow of a torch" because they wish to be enlightened only by daylight.[49]

The light metaphor retained its religious meaning far into the eighteenth century. Historian Roland Mortier has argued that a secularization of the metaphor occurred in the 1750s and 1760s, when it became devoid of its original "religious aura."[50] However, Christian thinkers, unwilling to cede the "light" to the philosophes, deployed the term well into the 1780s. Some, like Antoine-Adrien Lamourette, a prominent voice for "Christian democracy" during the French Revolution, deemphasized the conflict between reason and faith, claiming that both were "torches that came from the center of the same [divine] light."[51] Others, like the Jesuit Augustin Barruel believed the conflict to be irreconcilable, because reason had overstepped its bounds. Barruel denounced the "supposed natural

light" (*prétendue lumière naturelle*),[52] claiming that the philosophes' light was, in actuality, "the most profound darkness,"[53] and he accused them of renouncing the "voice of nature and the lights of reason." He argued that the "lights of Revelation were the true protection against the variations and delirium of [contemporaneous] philosophy."[54]

The contours of the contests over the "true light" resemble eighteenth-century debates about the meaning of philosophe. Disputes about the precise definitions of the terms *lumière* and *philosophe* revealed a clash of assumptions about the proper relationship between faith and reason.[55] The sharpening in the accusatory language of "false lights" and mutual denunciations of imposture and of attempts to drive mankind into darkness reveal the growing polarization of French learned culture. These debates also serve as a reminder that the philosophes did not have an exclusive and uncontested claim to enlightening mankind. The philosophes and their various religious opponents all claimed to be championing the progress of humanity, although they appealed to competing visions of enlightenment.

Acquired Lights and the Age of Enlightenment

In addition to the distinction between the two lights of reason and religion, there was also a differentiation between the faculty of an individual's "natural lights" and the notion of "lights," conceived of as the accumulation of knowledge on a larger scale. As Céline Spector has noted, empiricist epistemologies drove the idea that the lights of all of humankind could be acquired and accumulated over time. John Locke and Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, among others, opposed the Cartesian notion of innate ideas (and, thus, of the natural light), suggesting that all knowledge entered the mind through the senses. This new conception of "lights" lent itself to a progressive interpretation of human knowledge, according to which mankind continuously expanded its understanding of nature. It powerfully contributed to the notion that the eighteenth century was an enlightened age.[56]

It is ironic that one of the first mentions of the *siècle éclairé* came from a critic of this expression. Charles Sorel appears to have been the first thinker to explicitly describe the historical period as an "enlightened century," though he did so sarcastically. He disputed the claim in 1671: "This century is well enlightened, for one hardly hears of anything but lights. One puts this word everywhere in place of where one used to use 'mind' or 'intelligence'; and it often happens that those who use this word apply it so badly, that one might say they see nothing at all with all of their lights."[57] Sorel appeared to point to the hollowness, the equivocal nature, and the overuse of the metaphor. His skepticism would be echoed by the abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos, who was equally unconvinced that his own century was

significantly more enlightened than preceding ones. Dubos claimed that, while the total sum of human knowledge may have increased, contemporaneous thinkers did not have "more insight, more rectitude, and more integrity" than those who lived in previous centuries.[58] He attributed the difference between the relative intellectual advancement of the moderns to chance and time rather than to any inherent intellectual superiority.[59]

The moderns, of course, embraced the notion of a *siècle éclairé* wholeheartedly. Bernard de Fontenelle, one of the most preeminent men of letters of the period, was among the first to propose, in the *De l'origine des fables* (1724) that "we were incomparably more enlightened than those whose crude minds faithfully invented fables."[60] In his *Digression sur les anciens et les modernes* (1688), he likewise ridiculed the notion that the ancients possessed "the lights destined to enlighten all other men" (*lumières destinées à éclairer tous les autres hommes*).[61] Fontenelle argued that the human mind has reached an age of maturity and "reasoned with more lights than ever."[62] The perpetual secretary of the Académie des sciences also observed the recent spread of an "almost completely new philosophical spirit, a light that hardly enlightened our ancestors."[63] An unapologetic supporter of the moderns, Fontenelle, whom Voltaire dubbed as "the most universal mind produced in the era of Louis XIV," both popularized a new conception of lights as a representation of accumulated knowledge and shaped the way in which the narrative of enlightenment developed in the 1700s.[64]

Structurally, these moderns' narratives resembled sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Protestant historiographies that portrayed the Middle Ages as a period dominated by a passive subservience to the authority of the church. As Wallace Ferguson noted, Protestant historians built on the narratives of Italian Renaissance humanists to formulate a new conception of historical periodization that sought to demonstrate that "the light of the gospel had been progressively obscured under the malign influences of the popes and their agents."[65] This negative portrayal of the Middle Ages as a period of intellectual regression would have quite a lasting effect on the subsequent views of historical periodization, including those of the eighteenth century (as seen in Crousaz's text at the beginning of this chapter). Protestant histories of medieval philosophy seemed to mirror such accounts, as Matthew Gaetano has shown in his work on the sixteenth-century Reformed theologian Lambert Daneau. Daneau offered a critical assessment of Aristotelian scholasticism, claiming that while its founder, Peter Lombard, set the wrong course by ignoring "the light of [his] own age" (i.e., scripture), those who came after blindly followed his authority. As Gaetano clearly demonstrates, this narra-

tive consequently found its way into Ephraim Chambers's *Cyclopaedia* (1728) and then Diderot and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*.[66]

Indeed, Voltaire, d'Alembert, and Condorcet, among other philosophes, embraced and repurposed these narratives in explaining the rise of modern philosophy and the gradual emergence of the human mind "from barbarism."[67] In his *Siècle de Louis XIV* (1751), Voltaire noted that "so many writers had extended the lights of the human mind" in the 1600s[68] that people "from one end of Europe to another have acquired more lights in the past century than in all the preceding ones."[69] D'Alembert likewise dubbed the 1600s as the "first century of light," and suggested that it followed centuries of "darkness," characterized by superstition and a slavish deference to authority.[70] Some, like César Chesneau Dumarsais, the author of a treatise entitled *Le philosophe* (1743) that would inspire an *Encyclopédie* article by the same name, optimistically believed that their contemporaries gained "more reason and light" with each passing day.[71] They hoped for a gradual enlightenment of the masses. For example, playwright and poet Jean-François Marmontel thought that "the light of the sciences and the arts spread in society" from philosophers and artists to the general public.[72] Some were even hopeful that organized religion would lose its hold over the minds of the people. Thus, Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger's posthumously published *Recherche sur l'origine du despotisme oriental* (1761) entertained the prospect that "established religion" was finally beginning to "die away and to go out before the lights of an enlightened century."[73] Condorcet, whose *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* offered one of the most optimistic visions for the future progress of lights, perpetuated this narrative, contrasting "ages of prejudice" to the "century of light."[74] According to him, "nature has made an indissoluble tie between the progress of lights and those of liberty, of virtue, and of the respect for the natural rights of man."[75]

The philosophes were not alone in articulating such a triumphalist view of an enlightened century that witnessed a spread of the philosophical spirit. As is apparent from the statements of Crousaz and Guénard, Protestant and Catholic thinkers shared the perception of their philosophe opponents about the enlightened nature of their present age. Indeed, some seemed to be genuinely surprised that their enlightened century continued to witness such a great proliferation of erroneous doctrines, such as atheism and materialism.[76] Conversely, not all philosophes shared an optimistic vision of the alleged progress of the human mind, and they disagreed about the extent to which their age was enlightened.

While many philosophes embraced a progressive view of history, others were decidedly less optimistic. Many grew restless with what they perceived to be the

perpetuation of darkness and ignorance and increasingly skeptical about the potential for enlightening the masses. Étienne Bonnot de Condillac's *Traité des animaux* (1755) appeared deeply pessimistic, claiming that "we are, without a doubt, very far from the enlightened century that could keep posterity from error" and that "very probably may never arrive there" because errors multiplied with every age.[77] In 1759, Denis Diderot, exasperated and worn down by the intense opposition to the *Encyclopédie*, noted that "the progress of light is limited; it hardly reaches the *faubourgs*" because "the people are too stupid, too miserable, and too busy."[78] Writing in 1756, Friedrich Melchior Grimm appeared surprised that "history has [yet] not disabused us . . . of the chimera of perfections and of ideal wisdom, which men will unfortunately never reach."[79] Nine years later, in December 1765, he wrote that while the "centuries of barbarism have passed," political authorities have surreptitiously adapted themselves to new customs and reaffirmed their power by more deceptive means. In Grimm's view, the "world was being plunged into times of darkness."[80]

Conclusion

The metaphors of light and darkness reveal the complex ways in which a variety of Enlightenment thinkers understood their own place in history and defined their own intellectual projects. Although there appears to be a sharp clash between the original religious senses of the metaphor and the later secular uses, both are essential for explaining the full spectrum of eighteenth-century thought. The emphasis on the independent use of one's reason and the progressive narrative of the Enlightenment can both be traced back to the debates of the Reformation. It was a religious legacy that the philosophes who composed the philosophical genealogy of the "century of lights" would not have been entirely comfortable with.

Our perceptions of the Enlightenment remain distorted by the period's triumphalist, teleological histories. Our narratives about the origins of modernity borrow a great deal from the philosophes' own attempts to justify their particular visions of history. Identifying with the philosophes' aspirations and secular worldviews, multiple generations of historians have intentionally or unintentionally internalized their linear narrative of philosophical progress, without looking at the more complex reality or examining all sides in the debate. Neither Voltaire, d'Alembert, the members of the *coterie holbachique*, nor the numerous religious thinkers who were engaged in these debates, however, knew which of its many participants would win the right to be the torchbearers for humanity.

NOTES

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1. Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, *Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne* (The Hague: Pierre de Hondt, 1733), preface, [1]: "Un Temps a été, & ce temps a duré des siècles, où non seulement le peuple grossier, mais de plus ceux qui se distinguoient du commun des hommes par une Raison cultivée, se comptoient dans le chemin de Ciel, parce qu'ils étoient nés & qu'ils vivoient dans une Société éxtérieure honorée du Nom de la Véritable Eglise, qu'ils soûmettoient leur Entendement à ses Dogmes, & qu'ils en observoient le Culte éxtérieur avec zèle, avec regularité. Leur négligence de la Loi Moral ne les inquiétoit point. . . . Mais dès le siècle précédent, ces ténébres dans lesquelles les hommes se tranquilisoient se sont en partie dissipées; on a été curieux de s'éclairer."

2. Antoine Guénard, *Discours qui a remporté le prix d'éloquence à l'Académie francçoise en l'année MDCCLV* (Paris: Brunet, 1755), 10–12: "Adorateurs stupides de l'Antiquité, les Philosophes ont rampé durant vingt siècles sur les traces des premiers maîtres: la raison, condamnée au silence, laissoit parler l'autorité, aussi rein ne s'éclaircissoit dans l'univers, & l'esprit humain, après s'être traîné deux mille ans sur les vestiges d'Aristote, se trouvoit encore aussi loin de la vérité. Enfin parut en France un génie puissant & hardi qui entreprit de secouer le joug du Prince de l'Ecole. Cet homme nouveau vint dire aux autres hommes que, pour être Philosophe, il ne suffisoit pas de croire, mais qu'il falloit penser. . . . Disciple de la lumière, au lieu d'interroger les morts & les dieux de l'Ecole, il ne consulta que les idées claires & distinctes, la nature & l'évidence."

3. Ibid., 31–32: "Je dirai donc aux Philosophes: ne vous agitez point contre ces mystères que la raison ne sauroit percer: attachez-vous à l'examen de ces vérités qui se laissent approcher, qui se laissent en quelque sorte toucher & manier, & qui vous répondent de toutes les autres: ces vérités sont des faits éclatans & sensibles dont la Religion s'est comme enveloppée toute entière, afin de frapper également les esprits grossiers & subtils. On livre ces faits à votre curiosité; voilà les fondements de la Religion: creusez donc autour de ces fondemens, essayez de les ébranler; descendez avec le flambeau de Philosophie jusqu'à cette pierre antique. . . . La Philosophie ne sauroit vous mener plus lois, sans vous égarer: vous entrez dans les abîmes de l'infini: elle doit ici se voiler les yeux comme le peuple, adorer sans voir, & remettre l'homme avec confiance entre les mains de la Foi."

4. For the most prominent examples, see Paul Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européene* (Paris: Biovin, 1935); Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 1: *The Rise of Modern Paganism* (New York: Knopf, 1966); Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 2: *The Science of Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1969); Margaret Jacob, *Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981); Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

5. For more recent scholarship on the role of religion in the Enlightenment, see Dale K. Van Kley and James Bradley, eds., *Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Jeffrey D. Burson, *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Charly Coleman, "Resacralizing the World: The Fate of Secularization in Enlightenment Historiography," *Journal of Modern History* 82, no. 2 (2010): 368–96; Ulrich L. Lehner, *Enlightened Monks: The German Benedictines, 1740–1803* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jeffrey D. Burson and Ulrich L. Lehner, eds., *Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe: A Transnational History* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014); Ulrich L. Lehner, *The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); William J. Bulman, introduction to *God in the Enlightenment*, ed. William J. Bulman and Robert G. Ingram (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–41.

6. For more on apologetic literature, see Alfred Desautels, *Les mémoires de trévoux et le movement des idées au XVIIIe siècle, 1701–1734* (Rome: Institutum Historicorum, 1956); R. R. Palmer, *Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cooper, 1961); Albert Monod, *De Pascal à Chateaubriand: Les défenseurs français du christianisme de 1670 à 1802* (Geneva: Slatkine, 1970); Cyril O'Keefe, *Contemporary Reactions to the Enlightenment (1728–1762): A Study of Three Critical Journals, the Jesuit Journal de Trévoux, the Jansenist Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques, and the Secular Journal des Savants* (Geneva: Slatkine, 1974); William R. Everdell, *Christian Apologetics in France, 1730–1790: The Roots of Romantic Religion* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987); Sylviane Albertan-Coppola, "L'apologétique catholique française à l'âge des Lumières," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 205, no. 2 (1988): 151–80; Maria-Christina Pitassi, ed., *Apologétique 1680–1740: sauvetage ou naufrage de la théologie?: actes du colloque tenu à Genève en juin 1990 sous les auspices de l'Institut d'histoire de la Réformation* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1991); Didier Masseau, *Les ennemis des philosophes: l'antiphilosophie au temps des lumières* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2000); Darrin M. McMahon, *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jeffrey D. Burson, "The Crystallization of Counter-Enlightenment and Philosophe Identities: Theological Controversy and Catholic Enlightenment in Pre-Revolutionary France," *Church History* 77, no. 4 (2008): 955–1002; Anton M. Matytsin, "Reason and Utility in Eighteenth-Century French Religious Apologetics," in *God in the Enlightenment*, ed. William J. Bulman and Robert G. Ingram (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 63–82.

7. Roland Mortier has argued that the increased use of the plural form of the word coincided with the metaphor becoming devoid of its original "religious aura" and being associated with the movement of "intellectual emancipation" and the "progress of the human mind." See Roland Mortier, "'Lumière et 'lumières': histoire d'une image et d'une idée au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle," in *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières: études sur le XVIIIe siècle littéraire* (Geneva: Droz, 1969), 13–59.

8. Michel Delon, "Les Lumières: travail d'une métaphore," in *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 152 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1976), 527–41.

9. Jacques Roger, "La lumière et les Lumières," *Cahiers de l'Association internationale des études françaises* 20 (1968): 167–77; Delon, "Les Lumières: travail d'une métaphore," 535–36; Céline Spector, "Les lumières avant les Lumières: tribunal de la raison et opinion publique," in *Les Lumières: un héritage et une mission. Hommage à Jean Mondot*, ed. Gilbert Merlio and Nicole Pelletier (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2012), 53–66.

10. Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 1–2.

11. J. B. Shank, *The Newton Wars and the Beginnings of the French Enlightenment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 35.

12. Frederic N. Clark, "Dividing Time: The Making of Historical Periodization in Early Modern Europe" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2014).

13. Edelstein, *The Enlightenment*, 3–6, 13–18.

14. *Dictionnaire de l'Académie françoise*, 2 vols. (Paris: Coignard, 1694), 1:669. "Il sign. aussi, Tout ce qui esclaire l'ame. Ainsi on dit, *La lumiere de la foy. la lumiere de l'Evangile. la lumiere des sciences. la lumiere de la grace. Dieu est le pere des lumieres.*"

15. Ibid. "*Lumiere*, sign. fig. Intelligence, connoissance, clarté d'esprit. *Lumiere naturelle. cet homme n'a aucune lumiere pour les sciences, pour les affaires.*"

16. René Descartes, *Les principes de la philosophie* (Paris: Le Gras and Pepigne, 1651), 21: "D'où il suit que la faculté de connoistre qu'il nous a donnée que nous appellons lumiere naturelle n'apperçoit jamais aucun objet qui ne soit vray en ce qu' elle l'apperçoit, c'est à dire en ce qu'elle connoit clairement et distinctement; pource que nous aurions sujet de croire que Dieu seroit trompeur, s'il nous l'auoit donnée telle que nous prissions le faux pour le vray lors que nous en usons bien."

17. René Descartes, *Les méditations métaphysiques de René Des-Cartes touchant la première philosophie, dans lesquelles l'existence de Dieu, & la distinction réelle entre l'âme & le corps de l'homme, sont demonstrées* (Paris: Camusat and Le Petit, 1647), 5: "Et que ie n'entens point y parler des choses qui appartiennent à la foy, ou à la conduite de la vie, mais seulement de celles qui regardent les veritez speculatives, & connues par l'aide de la seule lumiere naturelle."

18. For more on the *Querelle*, see Edelstein, *The Enlightenment*, 24–51; Joseph M. Levine, "Ancients and Moderns Reconsidered" *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 15, no. 1 (1981): 72–89; Joan DeJean, *Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Larry F. Norman, *The Shock of the Ancient: Literature and History in Early Modern France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Paddy Bullard and Alexis Tadié, eds., *Ancients and Moderns in Europe: Comparative Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment, 2016).

19. For a comprehensive study of the concepts of natural light and common sense in early modern thought, see William H. Trapnell, *The Treatment of Christian Doctrine by Philosophers of the Natural Light from Descartes to Berkeley* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1988).

20. For more on Malebranche's epistemology, see Steven Nadler, *Malebranche and Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Nicholas Jolley, "Intellect and Illumination in Malebranche," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 32 (1994): 209–24. Tad M. Schmaltz, "Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God," in *The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche*, ed. Steven Nadler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 59–86.

21. Nicolas Malebranche, *De la recherche de la vérité, où l'on traite de la nature de l'esprit de l'homme, & de l'usage qu'il en doit faire pour éviter l'erreur dans les sciences*, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Desbordes, 1688), 1:342–43: "C'est Dieu-même qui éclaire les Philosophes dans les connoissances que les hommes ingrats appellent naturelles, quoi qu'elles ne leur viennent que du Ciel: *Deus enim illis manifestavit*. C'est lui qui est proprement la lumière de l'esprit, & le Père des lumières. *Pater luminum*: c'est lui qui enseigne la science aux hommes: *Qui docet hominem scientiam*. En un mot c'est la véritable lumière qui éclaire tous ceux qui viennent en ce monde: *lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum*."

22. René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode, pour bien conduire sa raison & chercher la vérité dans les sciences* (Leiden: Maire, 1637), 28–29: "Car Dieu nous ayant donné à chascun quelque lumiere pour discerner le vrai d'avec le faux, je n'eusse pas cru me devoir contenter des opinions d'autrui un seul moment, si je ne me fusse proposé d'employer mon propre jugement à les examiner lorsqu'il seroit temps."

23. Ibid., 12: "i'apprenois a ne rien croire trop fermement de ce qui ne m'auoit esté persuadé que par l'exemple & par la coustume: Et ainsi ie me déliurois peu a peu de beaucoup d'erreurs qui peuvent offusquer nostre lumiere naturelle, & nous rendre moins capables d'entendre raison."

24. René Descartes, *Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle*, in *Œuvres de Descartes*, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 12 vols. (1897–1909), 10:489–532 (quotation on 496): "Lesquelless choses je me suis proposé d'enseigner en cet ouvrage, & de mettre en evidence les veritables richesses de nos ames, ouvrant à chacun les moyens de trouver en soys mesme, & sans rien emprunter d'autruy, toute la science qui luy est necessaire à la conduite de sa vie, & d'acquerir par appres par son estude toutes les plus curieuses connoissances, que la raison des hommes est capable de posseder." Descartes's dialogue, entitled *La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle*, circulated in manuscript and was published posthumously in Dutch in 1684 and in Latin in 1701. Leibniz had made a copy of the original French text, though this version was not published in French until 1908. For an analysis of this text, see Ernst Cassirer and Paul Schrecker, "La place de la 'Recherche de la Vérité par la lumière naturelle' dans l'œuvre de Descartes," *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* 127, nos. 5–6 (1939): 261–300.

25. For more on Cartesian empiricism and the debates between Malebranche and other disciples of Descartes, see Nicholas Jolley, *The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Thomas M. Lennon and Patricia Easton, *The Cartesian Empiricism of François Bayle* (New York: Garland, 1992); Tad M. Schmaltz, "Descartes and Malebranche on the Mind and Mind-Body Union," *Philosophical Review* 101, no. 2 (1992): 281–325; Tad M. Schmaltz, *Radical Cartesianism: The French Reception of Descartes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Roger Ariew, "Cartesian Empiricism," *Revue roumaine de philosophie* 50 (2006): 71–84; Mihnea Dobre and Tammy Nyden, eds., *Cartesian Empiricisms* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

26. For more on the importance of Locke's theory of mind to Enlightenment conceptions of autonomy, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 159–76; Peter A. Schouls, *Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and the Enlightenment* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Nicholas Wolterstorff, *John Locke and the Ethics of Belief* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Nicholas Jolley, *Toleration and Understanding in Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 57–74.

27. Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 54. The original essay was published in 1784 as "Beantwortung der Frage: *Was ist Aufklärung?*," *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (Dec. 1784): 481–94.

28. Voltaire, *Le monde comme il va*, in *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, ed. Louis Moland, 52 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1877–85), 21:1–17 (quotation on 13): "Leur jugement fut presque unanime; ils jugèrent bien, parce qu'ils suivaient les lumières de la raison, et les autres avaient opiné mal, parce qu'ils n'avaient consulté que leurs livres."

29. Jean-Baptiste de Boyer d'Argens, *Lettres juives, ou Correspondance philosophique, historique et critique entre un juif voïageur en différns etats de l'Europe et ses correspondants en divers endroits*, 2nd ed., 6 vols. (The Hague: Paupie, 1738), 2:13–14: "Mais, l'on ne peut jamais se réduire à cette Obeissance servile, qui nous range au Rang des Bêtes, en nous laissant les Passions & les Sentimens des hommes; qui nous interdit même la Liberté de penser; qui nous fait un Crime d'appercevoir la Raison, qui cherche à nous éclairer."

30. Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d'Holbach, *La contagion sacrée, ou Histoire naturelle de la superstition*, 2 vols. (London [Amsterdam], 1768), 1:63: "C'est ainsi que la Religion, jalouse de tout ce qui pouvait détourner l'attention des hommes, voulut les occuper seule; elle s'empara exclusivement de l'éducation; elle influa sur la législation; la politique lui fut subordonnée; la morale fut réglée par ses caprices; la paix des sociétés fut sans cesse troublée par les dissensions nécessaires qu'elle fit naître; la raison & l'expérience furent bannies à perpétuité; la vraie science reçut des entraves ou fut proscrite avec dédain, & les nations privées de lumières, d'énergie, d'activité, furent tenues dans l'ignorance & dans un engourdissement, dont elles ne se tirèrent que pour se battre & soutenir les futiles décisions de leurs guides religieux."

31. Pierre Bayle, *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ Contrains-les d'entrer; où l'on prouve par plusieurs raisons démonstratives qu'il n'y a rien de plus abominable que de faire des conversions par la contrainte, et où l'on réfute tous les sophismes des convertisseurs à contrainte et l'apollogie que St. Augustin a faire des persécutions*, 3 vols. (Canterbury [Amsterdam], 1686–87), 1:1: "Que la lumière naturelle, ou les principes généraux de nos connoisances, sont la règle maitrice et originale de toute interprétation de l'Ecriture en matiere de mœurs principalement."

32. Ibid., 26: "C'est donc sur ses propres lumières que chacun se détermine, s'il croit quelque chose de révélé, c'est parce que son bon sens, sa lumière naturelle et sa raison lui dictent que les preuves qu'elle est révélé sont bonnes."

33. For more on Bayle's view of religious toleration, see John Kilcullen, *Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld, Bayle, and Toleration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Sally L. Jenkinson, "Two Concepts of Tolerance: Why Bayle Is Not Locke," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 4 (1996): 302–22; Gianluca Mori, "Pierre Bayle, the Rights of Conscience, the 'Remedy' of Toleration," *Ratio Juris* 10 (1997): 45–59; John Christian Laursen, "Baylean Liberalism: Tolerance Requires Nontolerance," in *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration before the Enlightenment*, ed. John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 197–215; Michael W. Hickson, "Theodicy and Toleration in Bayle's Dictionary," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 51, no. 1 (2013): 49–73.

34. John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (London: Churchill, 1689), 48.

35. Ibid., 9. See also Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, "Toleration in Enlightenment Europe," in *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe*, ed. Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–22; John Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Richard Ashcraft, "Locke and the Problem of Toleration," in *Discourses of Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Enlightenment*, ed. Hans Erich Bödeker, Colrinda Donato, and Peter Hanns Reill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 53–72; Jolley, *Toleration and Understanding in Locke*.

36. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Essais de théodicée: sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Changuion, 1734), 1:70: "Après avoir reglé les droit de la Foi & de la Raison, d'une manière qui fait servir la Raison à la Foi, bien loin de lui être contraire, nous verrons comment elles exercent ces droits pour maintenir et pour accorder ensemble ce que la lumière naturelle & la lumière révélée nous apprennent de Dieu & de l'homme par rapport au mal." For the *Discours de la confromité de la foi avec la raison*, see 1:1–69. See also Paul Rateau, "Sur la conformité de la foi avec la raison: Leibniz contre Bayle," *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* 136, no. 4 (2011): 467–85.

37. The concept of "fideistic skepticism" appears most explicitly articulated in Richard Popkin's analysis of Michel de Montaigne's *Apologie de Raimond Sebond* in the context of the Reformation; see Popkin, *The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 47–52. For other analyses of fideism, see Terence Penelhum, "Skepticism and Fideism," in *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 287–318; Anton M. Matytsin, *The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 25–32, 94–109.

38. Argens, *Lettres juives*, 4:281: "Il faut, mon cher Isaac, qu'un savant se résolve à débiter les discours les plus ridicules, lorsqu'il veut s'éclairer du flambeau de la raison dans les choses qu'il ne croit, que parce qu'elles sont révélées."

39. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, *Anti-Seneque, ou Discours sur le bonheur*, in Julien Offray de La Mettrie, *Œuvres philosophiques*, ed. Francine Markovits, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1987), 2:235–95 (quotation on 238): "D'où l'on voit que la chaîne des vérités nécessaires au bonheur, sera plus courte que celle d'Hégésias, de Descartes, et de tant d'autres Philosophes; que pour expliquer le méchanisme du bonheur, nous ne consulterons que la nature et la raison; les seuls astres capables de nous éclairer, et de nous conduire, si nous ouvrons si bien notre ame à leurs rayons, qu'elle soit absolument fermée à tous ces miasmes empoisonnés, qui forment comme l'athmosphere du fanatisme et du préjugé."

40. Holbach, *La contagion sacrée*, 1:95: "Si en cela il consulta ses propres intérêts, il fit au genre humain une plaie profonde & incurable; celui-ci ayant une fois appris à se défier de la seule lumière que la nature lui ait donnée pour distinguer le vrai du faux, le bien du mal, l'utile de ce qui est nuisible, ne connut plus d'autre règle que l'intérêt de ses Prêtres, & se porta au crime avec ardeur toutes les fois qu'ils l'ordonnèrent."

41. Jean Meslier, *Le testament de Jean Meslier*, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: Meijer, 1864), 1:320: "Jésus-Christ disoit à ses Disciples, qu'il étoit la Lumière du monde, qui éclairoit tout homme qui vient au monde, et que celui qui le suivroit, ne marcheroit point dans les ténèbres; on ne voit cependant point d'autre lumière qui éclaire tous les hommes que celle du soleil, encore ne sauroit-elle éclairer les aveugles."

42. Holbach, *La contagion sacrée*, 1:102: "Le Prêtre & le Tyran ont la même politique, & les mêmes intérêts . . . tous deux corrompent, l'un pour régner & l'autre pour expier; tous deux se réunissent pour étouffer les lumières, pour écraser la raison & pour éteindre jusqu'au désir de la liberté dans le cœur des hommes."

43. Ibid., 2:122: "Plus nous considérerons les choses & plus nous aurons lieu de nous convaincre que la Religion fut en tout temps un flambeau dont la lumière trompeuse ne servit qu'à égarer les mortels & embraser leur séjour. Ce flambeau secoué par le fanatisme, l'imposture & la Tyrannie, ne fit qu'allumer des passions cruelles, des fureurs inextinguibles, des discordes fatales, & produire des révolutions sanglantes." See also his *Système de la nature* (1770), *Histoire critique de Jésus-Christ* (1770), and *Système sociale* (1773) for similar arguments.

44. Friedrich Melchior Grimm, *Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique*, ed. Maurice Tourneux, 16 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1877–82), 3:349 (13 Feb. 1757): "Il est naturel que les enfants des ténèbres redoutent la lumière, et qu'ils haïssent ceux qui la répandent parmi les hommes."

45. Voltaire, *Tout en Dieu, commentaire sur Malebranche*, in *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, 28:91–102 (quotation on 102): "Nous sommes aussi nécessairement bornés que le grand Être est nécessairement immense. Voilà tout ce que me montre ce faible rayon de lumière émané dans moi du soleil des esprits; mais sachant combien ce rayon est peu de chose, je soumets incontinent cette faible lueur aux clartés supérieures de ceux qui doivent éclairer mes pas dans les ténèbres de ce monde."

46. See, e.g., Daniel Le Masson des Granges, *Le philosophe moderne, ou L'incrédule condamné au tribunal de sa raison* (Paris: Despilly, 1759), 8–9: "La foi & la raison doivent concourir en matiere de Religion. Il y a dans celui qui croit deux choses très-distinctes, l'objet & le motif de la foi. Ce qu'il croit est au-dessus des lumieres humaines, & ne doit point être soumis au jugement de sa raison."

47. Jacob Vernet, *Instruction chrétienne, divisée en cinq volumes*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Geneva: Gosse, 1756), 1:111: "Outre que le Chrétien éclairé peut déjà égaler le Philosophe, en faisant usage comme lui de la lumière naturelle; il a de plus l'avantage de joindre à sa foible Raison les lumières supérieurs que Dieu nous a communiquées dans sa Parole. Avec ce double flambeau il voit bien plus clair & plus loin que celui qui n'en a qu'un." For more on Vernet, see Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment*, 67–111.

48. Gabriel Gauchat, *Lettres critiques, ou Analyse et réfutation de divers écrits modernes contre la religion*, 19 vols. (Paris: Herissant, 1755–63), 1: preface, [5–6]: "Aux yeux d'un certain monde, un Philosophe est celui qui sous le faux titre d'esprit fort, juge de tout suivant ses seules lumières, s'éleve au dessus de toute autorité en matière de foi, & ne regarde les vérités les plus consacrées que come des préjugés anciens. . . . Mais puisque certains Sçavans, qui se prétendent *les réformateurs de l'esprit humain*, ornent leurs vaines leçons, du grand nom *de la Philosophie*, par-là même ils se flétrissent ce n'est plus qu'une Philosophie fausse & ténébreuse. . . . Plaignons leurs égaremens, rappellons-les avec zéle & tendresse, & prions le Dieu de la lumière de dissiper leurs ténèbres."

49. Hubert Hayer and Jean Soret, *La religion vengée; ou Réfutation des Auteurs Impies dediée à Monsieur le Dauphin*, 21 vols. (Paris: Chaubert, Herissant, and Brunet, 1757–63), 1:15–16: "Les Incrédules rejettent tout ce qu'ils ne comprennent pas. . . . Ils en exigent même par rapport à des objets essentiellement obscurs; semblables à d'insensés voyageurs qui voudroient arriver à un terme par un chemin qui ne sçauroit y conduire, ou qui cotoyant un affreux précipice, refuseroient la lueur d'un flambeau sou prétexte qu'ils ne voudroient être éclairés que par le grand jour. Ils vont plus loin encore: ils s'efforcent de répandre des nuages sur les vérités de la Religion les plus évidentes."

50. Mortier, *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières*, 25.

51. Antoine-Adrien Lamourette, *Pensées sur la philosophie de la foi, ou Le système du christianisme entrevu dans son analogie avec les idées naturelles de l'entendement humain* (Paris: Mérigot, 1789), xix–xx. "Car la Révélation sans les Théologiens, & la Raison sans les Philosophe, sont rejetons de la même tige, & se confondent essentiellement dans leur racine. Ces deux flambeaux sont sortis du sein de la même lumière." For more on Lamourette, see Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment*, 261–309.

52. Augustin Barruel, *Les Helviennes, ou Lettres provinciales philosophiques*, 4th ed., 5 vols. (Amsterdam and Paris: Briand, Bossange, Masson & Besson, 1789–92), 2:4: "Gardez-vous, Madame, de prêter l'oreille à ces déclamations, prévenez nos compatriotes que cette prétendue lumière naturelle, qu'ils ont honorée jusqu'ici du nom de sens commun, sera toujours l'obstacle le plus à redouter pour la philosophie: 'que cette raison même, synonyme du mot *bon sens*, et vantée par tant de gens, ne mérite que peu d'estime ; que tous ceux qu'on appelle gens sensés, sont toujours fort inférieurs aux gens passionnés,' sur-tout à l'homme épris d'une noble ardeur pour la philosophie."

53. Ibid., 3:20: "Tu veux m'éclairer? Me dis-tu, et il est *nécessaire* que tu le veuilles! Eh bien, je regarde ta lumière comme les ténèbres les plus profondes; et il est *nécessaire* que tu sois pour moi le plus absurde et le plus risible des sophistes."

54. Ibid., 330: "En vain chercheriez-vous ailleurs que dans la soumission aux lumières de la révélation le vrai préservatif contre ces variations et ce délire de la philosophie."

55. For more, see Jin Lu, *Qu'est-ce qu'un philosophe? Eléments d'une enquête sur l'usage d'un mot au siècle des Lumières* (Saint-Nicolas, QC: Les Presses de l'Université de Laval, 2005); Stéphane Van Damme, *À toutes voiles vers la vérité: une autre histoire de la philosophie au temps des Lumières* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2014); Stéphane Van Damme, "Philosophe/Philosopher," in *The Cambridge Companion to the French Enlightenment*, ed. Daniel Brewer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 153–66.

56. Spector, "Les lumières avant les Lumières," and Céline Spector, "The 'Lights' before the Enlightenment: The Tribunal of Reason and Public Opinion," chapter 3 in this volume.

57. Charles Sorel, *La connoissance de bons livres* (Paris: Pralard, 1671), 409: "Ce siècle est bien éclairé, car on n'y entend parler que de lumières. On met partout ce mot aux endroits où l'on auroit mis autrefois l'esprit ou l'intelligence, et il arrive souvent que ceux qui se servent de ce mot l'appliquent si mal, qu'avec toutes leurs lumières, on peut dire qu'ils n'y voient goutte." Also quoted in Mortier, *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières*, 21; Spector, "Les lumières avant les Lumières," 53, and Spector, "The 'Lights' before the Enlightenment."

58. Jean-Baptiste Dubos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et le peinture*, 3 vols. (Paris: Mariette, 1733), 2:453–54: "Notre siecle peut être plus sçavant que les siecles illustres qui l'ont précedé; mais je nie que les esprits aïent aujourd'hui, generalement parlant, plus de pénétration, plus de droiture & plus de justesse qu'ils n'en avoient dans ces siecles-là." Also quoted in Spector, "The 'Lights' before the Enlightenment." For an analysis of Dubos's claim, see Edelstein, *The Enlightenment*, 24–28.

59. Dubos, *Réflexions critiques*, 2:480–81: "Si nous sommes plus habiles que les anciens dans quelques sciences indépendantes des découvertes fortuites que le hazard & le temps font faire, notre superiorité sur eux dans les sciences, vient de la même cause qui fait que le fils doit mourir plus riche que son père, supposé qu'ils aïent eu la même conduite, & que la fortune leur ait été favorable également. . . . M. le Marquis de l'Hôpital, M. Leibnitz

& M. Newton n'auroient point poussée la Geométrie où ils l'ont poussée, s'ils n'eussent pas trouvé cette science en état de perfection qui lui venoit d'avoir été cultivée successivement par un grand nombre d'hommes d'esprit, dont les derniers venus avoient profité des lumieres & des vûës de leurs prédecesseurs."

60. Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, *De l'origine des fables*, in *Œuvres de Fontenelle*, 8 vols. (Paris: Bastien, 1790), 5:351–72 (quotation on 368–69): "Quoique nous soyons incomparablement plus éclairés que ceux dont l'esprit grossier inventa de bonne foi les fables, nous reprenons très-aisément ce même tour d'esprit qui rendit les fables si agréables pour eux; ils s'en repaissoient parce qu'ils y croyoient, et nous nous en repaissons avec autant de plaisir sans y croire; et rien ne prouve mieux que l'imagination et la raison n'ont guère de commerce ensemble, et que les choses dont la raison est pleinement détrompée, ne perdent rien de leurs agrémens à l'égard de l'imagination."

61. Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, *Digression sur les anciens et les modernes* in *Poésies pastorales de M.D.F. Avec un Traité sur la nature de l'Eglogue, & une Digression sur les anciens & les modernes* (Lyon: Amaurry, 1688), 224–82 (quotation on 226): "Que les admirateurs des Anciens y prennent un peu garde; quand ils nous disent que ces gens-là sont les sources du bon goust & de la raison, et les lumieres destinées à éclairer tous les autres hommes, que l'on n'a d'esprit qu'autant qu'on les admire, que la Nature s'est épuisée à produire ces grands originaux, en vérité ils nous les font d'une autre espèce que nous, et la Phisique n'est pas d'accord avec toutes ces belles frases."

62. Ibid., 265–66. "Un bon esprit cultivé, est, pour ainsi dire, composé de tous les esprits des Siècles précédens, ce n'est qu'un mesme esprit qui s'est cultivé pendant tout ce temps-là. . . . Il est maintenant dans l'âge de la virilité, où il raisonne avec plus de force & a plus de lumieres que jamais."

63. Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, "Réponse de Fontenelle à l'évêque de Luçon, Lorsqu'il fut reçu à l'Académie françoise le 6 mars 1732," in *Œuvres de Fontenelle*, 1:151–64 (quotation on 158–59): "Il s'est répandu depuis un temps un esprit philosophique presque tout nouveau, une lumière qui n'avait guère éclairé nos ancêtres; et je ne puis nier aux ennemis de La Motte qu'il n'eût été vivement frappé de cette lumière, et n'eût saisi avidement cet esprit." Also quoted in Mortier, *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières*, 28; Spector, "Les lumières avant les Lumières," 53; and Spector, "The 'Lights' before the Enlightenment."

64. For Voltaire's biography of Fontenelle, see Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV*, in *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, 14:71–74 (quotation on 72).

65. Wallace K. Ferguson, *The Renaissance in Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1948), 49.

66. Matthew T. Gaetano, "'The evil poison of the Sorbonne': A Protestant History of Medieval Philosophy, 1550–1750," forthcoming.

67. Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire des éditeurs," *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonnée des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, 28 vols. (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton & Durand, 1751–72), 1:i–xlv (quotation on xx): "Aussi fallut-il au genre humain, pour sortir de la barbarie, une de ces révolutions qui font prendre à la terre une face nouvelle: l'Empire Grec est détruit, sa ruine fait refluer en Europe le peu de connoissances qui restoient encore au monde; l'invention de l'lmprimerie, la protection des Medicis & de François I raniment les esprits; & la lumiere renaît de toutes parts."

68. Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV*, in *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, 14:539: "Tous les genres de science et de littérature ont été épuisés dans ce siècle; et tant d'écrivains ont étendu les lumières de l'esprit humain, que ceux qui en d'autres temps auraient passé pour des prodiges, ont été confondus dans la foule. Leur gloire est peu de chose, à cause de leur nombre; et la gloire du siècle en est plus grande."

69. Ibid., 564: "Il suffit ici d'avoir fait voir que dans le siècle passé les hommes ont acquis plus de lumières d'un bout de l'Europe à l'autre, que dans tous les âges précédents."

70. D'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire," xxiii: "La Scholastique qui composoit toute la Science prétendue des siecles d'ignorance, nuisoit encore aux progrès de la vraie Philosophie dans ce premier siecle de lumiere."

71. César Chesneau Dumarsais, *Le philosophe*, in *Nouvelles libertés de penser* (Amsterdam: 1743), 173–204 (quotation on 197): "Ces sentimens ne sont-ils pas dans le fond de l'homme, indépendamment de toute croyance? Encore un coup, l'idée de malhonnête homme est autant opposée à l'idée de philosophe, que l'est l'idée de stupide; & l'expérience fait voir tous les jours que plus on a de raison et de lumiere, plus on est sûr & propre pour le commerce de la vie." Large portions of Dumarsais's text were used in the article "Philosophe," in the *Encyclopédie*, 12:509–11. For more on the text and its attribution, see Herbert Dieckmann, *"Le philosophe": Text and Interpretation* (Saint Louis: Washington University, 1948); Ira O. Wade, *The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment*, vol. 1: *Esprit Philosophique* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 15–16; Ira O. Wade, *The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment*, vol. 2: *Esprit Révolutionnaire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 71–72.

72. Jean-François Marmontel, *Poétique françoise*, 2 vols. (Paris: Lesclapart, 1763), 1:186: "Il y a des phénomènes dans la Nature, des opérations dans les Arts, qui quoique présens à tous les hommes, ne frappent vivement que les yeux des Philosophes ou des Artistes. Ces images d'abord reservées au langage des Arts et des Sciences, ne doivent passer dans le style oratoire ou poëtique qu'à mesure que la lumière des Sciences et des Arts se répand dans la société."

73. Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger, *Recherche sur l'origine du despotisme oriental* ([Geneva], 1761), xx–xxi: "N'apercevra-t-elle point la Raison, & la Loi fondée sur la Raison, doivent être les uniques Reines des mortels, que lorsqu'une Religion établie commence à pâlir & à s'éteindre devant les lumières d'un siècle éclairé, ce n'est plus qu'à cette Raison qu'il faut immédiatement recourir, pour maintenir la Société, et pour sauver des malheurs de l'Anarchie. C'est cette Raison qu'il faut alors presque diviniser, au lieu de l'affoiblir et humilier."

74. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, *Sur l'instruction publique*, in *Œuvres complètes de Condorcet*, ed. Maire Louise Sophie de Grouchy, 21 vols. (Brunswick: Vieweg and Paris: Henrichs, 1804), 9:263: "Dans les siècles de préjugés, ceux qui ont éclairé les hommes ont diminué souvent le mal que leur faisaient ceux qui les gouvernaient, et dans un siècle de lumières toute vérité nouvelle devient un bienfait. L'histoire des pensées des philosophes n'est pas moins que celle des actions des hommes publics une partie de l'histoire du genre humain."

75. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (Paris: Agasse, 1795), 14–15: "Il faudroit y montrer . . . par quels liens la nature a indissolublement uni les progrès des lumières et ceux de la liberté, de la vertu, du respect pour les droits naturels de l'homme."

76. See, e.g., Maturin Veyssière La Croze, *Entretiens sur divers sujets d'histoire* (Cologne: Marteau, 1711), 251: "Seroit-il possible que l'Athéïsme eût fait tant de progrès dans un Siècle aussi éclairé? Une vérité, aussi sensible que celle de l'existence de Dieu, pourroit-elle jamais tomber dans une pareille décadence?" Also quoted in Mortier, *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières*, 29.

77. Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, *Traité des animaux, où après avoir fait des observations critiques sur le sentiment de Descartes & sur celui de M. de Buffon, on entreprend d'expliquer leurs principales facultiés* (Amsterdam, 1755), 6: "Sans doute nous sommes bien loin de ce siècle éclairé, qui pourroit garantir d'erreur toute la postérité. Vraisemblablement nous n'y arriverons jamais; nous en approcherons toujours d'âge en âge; mais il fuira toujours devant nous. Le temps est comme une vaste carrière qui s'ouvre aux Philosophes. Les vérités, semées de distance en distance, sont confondues dans une infinité d'erreurs qui remplissent tout l'espace. Les siècles s'écoulent, les erreurs s'accumulent, le plus grand nombre des vérités échappe, et les athlètes se disputent des prix que distribue un spectateur aveugle."

78. Denis Diderot, *Lettres à Sophie Volland*, in *Œuvres complètes de Diderot*, ed. J. Assézat and Maurice Tourneux, 20 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1875–77), 18:337–536 (quotation on 420) (30 Oct. 1759): "Je pense que ce déclin a un terme; les progrès de la lumière sont limités; elle ne gagne guère les faubourgs. Le peuple y est trop bête, trop misérable et trop occupé: elle s'arrêta là; alors le nombre de ceux qui satisfont, dans l'année, à la grande cérémonie est égal au nombre de ceux qui restent, au milieu de la révolution des esprits, aveugles ou éclairés, incurables ou incorruptibles, comme il vous plaira.—Ainsi voilà le troupeau de l'église.—Il peut s'accroître, mais non diminuer.—La quantité de la canaille est à peu près toujours la même."

79. Grimm, *Correspondance littéraire*, 3:328 (15 Jan. 1756): "Il est singulier que l'histoire ne nous ait pas désabusés depuis longtemps, de la chimère d'une perfection et d'une sagesse idéales auxquelles les hommes n'atteindront malheureusement jamais. On n'au qu'à lire les annales de tous les peuples pour se convaincre de cette triste vérité. Il n'y a point de nation illustrée dans l'histoire qui n'ait vécu pendant des siècles dans l'ignorance et dans la barbarie."

80. Ibid., 6:428–29 (1 Dec. 1765): "Malheureusement le monde va ainsi dans les temps de ténèbres; mais lorsque les siècles de barbarie sont passés, lorsque des mœurs plus douces ont succédé à des mœurs féroces, la force qui constitue l'autorité change de forme comme les mœurs. Les souverains comprennent que le moyen le plus sûr de rendre leur pouvoir durable, c'est de faire du bien aux hommes, et de se faire aimer de leurs sujets." For more on Grimm's and Diderot's views, see Alan Charles Kors, "Political Skepticism in d'Holbach's Circle" (forthcoming).

CÉLINE SPECTOR

The "Lights" before the Enlightenment

The Tribunal of Reason and Public Opinion

The appearance of the phrase "the century of lights" (*siècle des lumières*) has been the subject of several recent studies.[1] The work of Roland Mortier has been particularly helpful in paving the way for new avenues of research: Mortier has argued that the appearance of the plural form of the metaphor "the lights" (*les lumières*) in France can be dated to the seventeenth century.[2] Considered in a religious context, the metaphor of light was transposed onto the secular terrain of the "natural light" thanks to René Descartes and his disciples. My goal in this essay is to determine the moment at which the idea of a "century of lights" first appeared. The novelist and historian Charles Sorel denounced the tendency of his age to define itself with reference to enlightenment as early as 1671: "This century is well enlightened, for one hardly hears of anything but lights. One puts this word everywhere in place of where one used to use 'mind' or 'intelligence'; and it often happens that those who use this word apply it so badly, that one might say they see nothing at all with all of their lights."[3] In the April 1684 issue of the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, Pierre Bayle proclaimed himself to be in favor of a rigorous method in historical research that would allow his century to be properly praised: "Will it be said . . . that we have abandoned the honor of this century to the ridicule of those of who will come after us? . . . One prides oneself on being extremely enlightened in this century: and yet, perhaps one has never had more audacity to make up fables."[4]

Consequently, it seems tempting to oppose the lights (of autonomous reason) to the darkness (*ténèbres*) of prejudice, to the reliance on traditional authorities, and to the barbarism of fanaticism and superstition. In 1732 Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, the perpetual secretary of the Académie des sciences, illustrated this combative attitude in expressing his desire to disperse the darkness that posed an obstacle to the expression of the truth: "For some time, an almost entirely new philosophical spirit [*esprit philosophique*], a light that hardly enlightened our ancestors, has spread all over."[5] In discussing the merits of Antoine Houdar de La Motte's literary works, Fontenelle took up the defense of his modern party and criticized the Ancients, whom one read now only "out of duty" and no longer "for pleasure,"

as was the case with the Moderns. As Roland Mortier has noted, numerous Enlightenment thinkers, including Montesquieu, Turgot, Voltaire, and the *encyclopédistes*, followed Fontenelle's lead in praising the Moderns and extolling the literary and philosophical achievements of their century. In the *Encyclopédie* article "Gens de Lettres," Voltaire proclaimed the following with enthusiasm:

> Previously, in the sixteenth century, and well before the seventeenth, literary scholars spent much time on grammatical criticism of Greek and Latin authors; and it is to their labors that we owe the dictionaries, the accurate editions, the commentaries on the masterpieces of antiquity; today this criticism is less necessary, and the philosophical spirit has succeeded it. This philosophical spirit seems to constitute the character of men of letters and, when combined with good taste, forms an accomplished literary scholar. One of the great advantages of our century, is the number of educated men who [can] pass from the thorns of mathematics to the flowers of poetry, and who [are able to] judge equally well a book of metaphysics and a theatrical play: the spirit of the century has rendered them for the most part as suitable for society as for [solitary] scholarship; and this is what makes them superior to those of previous centuries.[6]

In the "Tableau de l'esprit humain au milieu du XVIIIe siècle" that opened his *Essai sur les élémens de philosophie* (1759), the coeditor of the *Encyclopédie* Jean Le Rond D'Alembert similarly maintained that "every century that thinks well or thinks poorly, provided that it believes that it thinks and that it thinks differently from the century that preceded it, adorns itself with the title of philosophical; . . . Our century has thus called itself supremely the *century of philosophy*."[7] By contrast, Jean-Jacques Rousseau diagnosed the mutations of his century in a way that deplored the vanity of his contemporaries: "We live in a climate and a century of philosophy and of reason. The lights of all the sciences seem to come together at the same time to enlighten our eyes and to guide us in this obscure labyrinth of human life. The greatest geniuses of all the ages bring together their lessons to teach us; immense libraries are open to the public; and, from infancy, a multitude of colleges and universities offer us the experience and meditation of 4,000 years. . . . And have we become better or wiser from this?"[8]

This essay aims to locate the emergence of a consciousness of the age in the eighteenth century—a consciousness that preceded the development of the formal discipline of the philosophy of history. How can we understand the birth of a historical consciousness that would allow Immanuel Kant to theorize about the Enlightenment not only according to its motto, "dare to know" (*sapere aude*)—that is, have the courage to use your own understanding and liberate yourself from

religious and political tutelage—but also according to its self-reflexivity, which is the ability, for the first time, to think of a present that is one's own and that truly makes up an epoch? Michel Foucault's interpretation evokes the essential element here, insofar as he is less interested in discovering the origin of the word than in understanding what enabled a change of perspective by virtue of which the century itself became the object of its own interrogation and evaluation.[9] This essay thus aims to make sense of the transition from "lights" to "the Enlightenment" (*des lumières aux Lumières*) and to understand how the term "century of lights" came to designate an era with unstable boundaries. This question concerns not just a verbal transformation and the appearance of a new phrase, for the historical investigation would remain incomplete unless one questions the conditions that enabled the invention the Enlightenment as a self-reflexive category. The origins and nature of a consciousness that allowed a century to think of itself as "a century of thought" need to be analyzed. Thus, rather than reviewing aspects of social and cultural history, which have recently seen major works on this question, my focus here is on the history of philosophy.[10]

I wish to advance the following hypothesis: the phrase "century of lights" appeared at the precise moment of the constitution of the "tribunal of public opinion"—a tribunal that was dedicated to judging intellectual accomplishments and evaluating their progress over time. Giuseppe Ricuperati has already established the role of literary history in the emergence of periodization and in the appearance of the self-reflexive category of the Enlightenment.[11] Likewise, Diego Venturino has shown the importance of historical paintings after the French Revolution.[12] However, reflections about the appropriate means of judging artistic and literary works and about the proper tribunal for evaluating the merit of intellectual accomplishments appeared well before the Revolution. In this essay, I argue that the constitution of the tribunal of public opinion was the prerequisite condition for the emergence of the Enlightenment as a historiographical concept. The Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns played a decisive role in this process. Without revisiting the controversy surrounding the interpretations of the Quarrel (whether it was a culture war, a simple polemical contest in which the Ancients were assigned the role of conservatives, and where the Moderns where the most fervent supporters of Louis XIV's absolutist regime and even of ethnocentrism), I hope to locate the origins of historicism in these debates.[13] The emergence of a historical consciousness took place at a moment when the contest between the Ancients and Moderns was at its most heated point, and when each side tried to mobilize the best arguments in favor of or against the superiority of the present age in the domains of science, politics, ethics, and aesthetics. Having brought attention to the "century

of Louis the Great," Charles Perrault, the leader of the Modern party, developed the tendency of using this concept with reference to historical periodization, and he forced the Ancients, led by Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, to define themselves in response.[14] Consequently, the following paradox emerged: the transition from "lights" to the "Enlightenment" is not only the product of the militant arguments marshaled by the partisans of the Moderns but also a result of the claims of the supporters of the Ancients, who were critical of the notion of the progress of the philosophical spirit. From Hilaire-Bernard de Longepierre to Jean-Baptiste Dubos, we will thus find a singular gallery of portraits that will reshape our traditional view of the Enlightenment.[15]

The Tribunal of Reason versus the Tribunal of Public Opinion

It has not been sufficiently noted that the origin of historiographical categorization was derived from a conceptual displacement: at first, it was the mind that was described as "enlightened" or "philosophical"; it was the mind that received light, whether divine or natural; it was the mind that enlightened itself by fighting against the blindness of prejudice or the darkness of ignorance and superstition. How did it come to be, then, that it was no longer the mind, but rather the century that became qualified as "philosophical," "enlightened," or "of lights"?

Without a doubt, it is necessary to explain the factors that gave rise to the "charts of the progress of the human mind" in the emergence of the history of philosophy. In fact, what is often attributed to d'Alembert, Voltaire, or Turgot had earlier roots: from the end of the seventeenth century, Cartesianism and empiricism generated debates about the origins of ideas and the genealogy of human knowledge—about the training of the mind at the individual, societal, and universal level. In this context it became suitable to think about the progress of the human mind, about the factors that hamper the development of its faculties, and about those that stimulate its improvement. According to Fontenelle, cultivated minds possess the achievements and knowledge of all the minds that preceded them, and the accumulation and the diffusion of knowledge account for the transition from *an enlightened mind* to *an enlightened century*.[16] However, this transition presupposes another important transformation: what is in play is no longer a notion according to which God, by His grace, touches the mind with His light; nor is it the Cartesian concept of a natural light that enlightens the mind by putting it in touch with clear and distinct ideas. From this point on, what matters is the production and the diffusion of knowledge. Before one can think of a "century of lights," one must be able to reflect on the means by which knowledge, emancipated from theology and speculative metaphysics, becomes recognized and disseminated in

public. In the scientific domain, the perception of an epistemological rupture that occurred thanks to individual geniuses (the Galilean, Cartesian, or Newtonian "revolution") often takes priority over an analysis of the cultural and political conditions of the production of knowledge. The reception of scientific texts should be conceived of as a process of transmission in the context of academies and learned societies. However, when it comes to evaluating works of art, there needs to be a criterion of merit that does not solely consist in the understanding of a single individual, who secretly engages in observation in his study or undertakes experiments in a laboratory.

What is the appropriate tribunal in this case, and where might one find a qualified judge? For the Moderns, who saw themselves as the heirs of Bacon and Descartes, this court was undoubtedly the tribunal of reason. Nicolas Malebranche testified to this in the preface to *De la recherche de la vérité* (1674). He presented God as the source of "the light of truth that enlightens the whole world," because even those who are plunged in vice remain united to the truth.[17] St. Augustine served as Malebranche's source here: it is the burden of the body and of the sensible world that prevents human beings from contemplating the eternal truth; it is the body that pulls man away from the presence of God "or from the interior light that enlightens him."[18] Man is constantly at risk of being blinded by the senses, by the imagination, and by the passions.[19] It is thus necessary to make sure that reason does not get lost or blind itself with the false glamour of the imagination: "It is necessary that the mind judges all things according to the interior lights, without listening to the false and confused testimony of the senses and of the imagination; and [that] it examines all the human sciences according to the pure light of truth that enlightens it."[20]

What then is the proper criterion of truth? And how can it be recognized in an age of corruption? In a crucial passage in the same preface, Malebranche associated the theme of light with that of a tribunal (of reason) that could offer judgments that opposed established opinions. Malebranche affirmed that one must not be afraid, when rendering one's work public, of shocking opinions established over the course of centuries:

> So that my hopes are not in vain, I give this counsel: that you should not be immediately repelled if you find here things that shock the ordinary views that you have held your whole life and that you have seen generally approved by all men down through the ages. For these are the most general errors that I mainly seek to destroy. If men were fully enlightened, then universal consent would be a [valid] argument; but just the opposite is the case. Be advised then, once and for all, that

> only reason should stand in judgment on all human opinions that are not related to faith, in which God alone instructs us in an entirely different way from that in which he reveals natural things to us. Let us enter into ourselves and draw near the light that constantly shines there so that our reason might be more illuminated.[21]

The tribunal of reason thus stands against the tribunal of opinion, because reason alone is the source of lights, and opinion has no legitimacy in the search after the truth. However, this postulate of a solipsistic reason that is in touch with its own light was called into question in considerations concerning the enlightened century that could grant a positive value to the judgments of opinion.

After the Quarrel of the Cid, which saw the first appearance of the concept of a "public" called upon to judge literary works,[22] the role of the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns became crucial: for if Descartes left questions of taste outside the scope of evidence, the criterion for judging literature and art was even more uncertain. Malebranche furtively took on this question by siding against the Ancients and against the testimony of authority: it is absurd to imagine, he claimed, "that the ancients were more enlightened than we could ever be, and that there is nothing to be achieved in matters where they did not succeed."[23] But in questions that do not concern science and philosophy, should the tribunal of reason take precedence over the tribunal of opinion? If the criterion for evaluating the quality of literary and artistic works is no longer one of objective certainty that can be guaranteed by one's inner conscience, then it can become something that is issued by the public and, thus, by public opinion.

The Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns

In one sense, nineteenth-century debates about which thinkers were and were not part of the Enlightenment had an antecedent in another, earlier exercise of inventory. Just as the Enlightenment was invented through reflections on the philosophical origins of the French Revolution, the notion of an enlightened century developed out of the critique of the great thinkers (philosophers, orators, and poets) of antiquity, who were accused of not conforming to the ideals of refinement, politeness, and gallantry of the age of Louis XIV. This critical inventory allowed for the deployment of a self-reflexive analysis on the century. The Quarrel was particularly important in reflecting on technical and scientific progress and on the fine arts, especially poetry and eloquence. By provoking a rupture in the imitation of ancient models, the proponents of modern knowledge and the institutions that supported them allowed for the improvement of the arts.

This question first appeared in the polemical exchange between Charles Perrault and Longepierre, an eminent translator of ancient Greek works who immediately responded to the *Siècle de Louis-le-Grand* (1687). Perrault claimed that it was necessary to abandon the errors of the past and to rely on one's own lights. Longepierre responded in his *Discours sur les Anciens* (1687) by claiming the force of the lights for the Ancient party.[24] However, the lights upon which he relied reflected the experience of the Ancients, and they stood opposed to the "lights of reason alone," which the Moderns championed.[25] By denouncing the blind presentism of the Moderns, which he attributed to their pride, Longepierre maintained that "the greatest men have regarded the Ancients as a source of light, as the only rule of good taste, and as the sanctuary of right reason and good sense."[26] He retraced the brief history of the West, noting the rebirth of lights after a period of medieval barbarism: "The dark forces of ignorance and barbarism were soon entirely dispersed by such an abundant source of light."[27] It was necessary to turn to the Ancients, because enlightened men who had taken them as a model in the past could not have been misled. Universal consent served as the guarantor of the truth.[28] Of course, "the torrent of opinion" was not a certain mark of the truth, but it allowed one to attain a level of reasonable verisimilitude. To prove the contrary, Longepierre insisted, "it is necessary to clearly convince me that the esteem we have for the Ancients hurts the lights of reason," which could not be the case.[29] It was also important to trust the heart, which judged beauty without error, he maintained: "If the mind and reason can be and are always seduced by the false light that only enlightens them in order to deceive them," the heart, by contrast, cannot err.[30] From this it followed that in judging the quality of artistic and literary productions, the tribunal of opinion that favored the Ancients could not be eclipsed by the tribunal of reason.

The Moderns were thus not alone in claiming to possess the lights. In making the case against universal rationalism, the Ancients were driven to justify the historical and cultural relativity of customs and traditions. As Larry Norman has recently shown, their loyalty to ancient models of conduct drove them to form a self-reflexive awareness of the unique nature of their own nation and their own age. Without advocating for a "counter-culture" that could call into question the legitimacy of the absolutist regime, and without freeing themselves of the strategies of cultural hegemony, the partisans of Homer, who refused to accept the disparagements cast on the "barbaric" centuries, contributed to the emergence of a historical consciousness that was not reducible to naive progressivism. A partisan of the Ancients such as the abbé Dubos, who intervened in the second phase of the Quarrel, offered a profound reflection on the century of lights.[31] It

was informed by a novel distinction between the physical and moral causes of genius. A disciple of Locke and, in this sense, a Modern, Dubos was quite familiar with the English empiricists. However, he remained a steadfast supporter of the Ancients in matters of aesthetics. According to Dubos, progress in the natural sciences came as a result of the accumulation of discoveries. At the same time, he argued, the poets and orators of Louis XIV's century did not surpass their ancient predecessors: "We do not reason better than the ancients in matters of history, politics, or civic morals."[32] As a result of his research into the physical and moral causes of the superiority of the "illustrious centuries" that had featured numerous geniuses, Dubos claimed "that the veneration for the great authors of Antiquity will always last" and asked "whether it is true that we reason better than the ancients."[33] Thus, while Dubos recognized that natural philosophy had improved since antiquity, he did not argue that there had been a general progress of reason or of the arts. In his view, factual knowledge could be accumulated over time, but individual minds remained the same. Of course, one could certainly praise the Moderns when it came to the art of reasoning and the method for acquiring knowledge:

> If one is to judge by the state of the natural sciences, [it is clear] how much our century is more enlightened than the ages of Plato, Augustus, and Leo X. The perfection to which we have been carried by the art of reasoning that has allowed us to make so many discoveries in the natural sciences is a fertile source of new lights. These lights already spread themselves on the *belles-lettres* and they make old prejudices [in that domain] vanish as they did in the natural sciences. These lights will get passed on to the different professions in life, and they are already dying out at every level.[34]

But does this mean that human beings have necessarily become wiser or more reasonable? One must not confuse the amount of knowledge possessed by people in a particular age with reasonableness, Dubos insisted: "Our century may be more knowledgeable than those that preceded it, but I deny that today, generally speaking, the minds have more insight, more uprightness, and more precision than they did in the past. Just as the most learned men are not always those that have the most sense, so the century that is most knowledgeable than others is not always the most reasonable century."[35] If we surpass the Ancients with respect to "speculative reason," they outdo us in "practical reason."[36]

Dubos thus contemplated the meaning and significance of the terms "enlightened century" or the "century of lights" well before the official appearance of "the Enlightenment" as a historical category. The century that inherited the discoveries

of Bacon and Descartes, of Harvey and Copernicus, could be called the "century of lights," insofar as it witnessed the improvement in natural philosophy. However, the dissemination of these lights did not necessarily form enlightened minds. In this sense, it is necessary to reject the thesis according to which the emergence and spread of the "philosophical spirit" produced a scientific, artistic, moral, and political rupture. Indeed, Dubos observed, its perverse effects could even spark a new age of barbarism:

> This date of seventy years [ca. 1650] that we give to the age of this supposed renewal of the minds is poorly chosen. I do not wish to enter into odious details about the states and about the particulars, and I will content myself with stating that the philosophical spirit, which renders men so reasonable and, so to speak, so logical, will do the same thing to a great part of Europe that the Goths and the Vandals had done, assuming that it continues to make the same advance that it has for the past seventy years. I see essential arts being neglected, prejudices most useful to the preservation of society abolished, and speculative reasoning preferred to practical [matters]. We conduct ourselves without regard for experience, which is the best teacher that humankind has ever had, and we imprudently act as if we were the first generation that has known how to reason. The concern for posterity is entirely neglected.[37]

Thus, well before Rousseau, Dubos refused to grant the Moderns an exclusive claim to progress.[38] The generation that considers itself a pioneer conceals the negative effects of a one-sided and impoverishing development of reason; it praises itself all the more comfortably if it lacks vision and depth of field. Had not the Romans conceived of their period as a century of lights inherited from the Greeks? Dubos invoked Quintilian:

> The latest inventions [the compass, the printing press, glasses . . .] spread a marvelous light on the knowledge that we already had. Luckily for our century, it finds itself at a time of maturity, when the progress of the natural sciences was at its fastest. The lights resulting from the preceding inventions, each of them having caused a separate advancement, began to combine eighty or a hundred years ago. We can say about our century what Quintilian said about his: "Antiquity has furnished us with so many materials, so many examples that one could not, it seems, be born in an era that is more favored than our own, since the preceding ages have worked toward its instruction."[39]

Ultimately, the very expression "century of lights" is at stake in this polemic. The possession of lights is the object of a battle among scholars. The phrase is claimed by all sides to the point that its use becomes purely ideological: "Our

savants, much like the ancient philosophers, do not agree about the facts, and they mutually refute one another concerning all that can only be known by way of reasoning, each treating the others as if they were voluntarily blind and refused to see the light. . . . Those who praise so strongly the lights that the mind has spread over our century might reply that they understand nothing else by 'our century' than themselves and their friends and that one must not consider all others who are not in agreement with them on all matters, such as the Ancients, to be philosophers."[40] Dubos clearly conceptualized the ideological use that could be made of a notion such as "the century of lights," when the phrase was claimed and deployed by those who categorically supported the validity of their own philosophical position.

The Public and Public Opinion

The debate concerning the meaning of the phrase "to be from one's own century" thus took place during the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns. It was not enough to know the extent to which an author might be able to escape his own age—to know if Homeric poetry was necessarily barbarous, to the point where the modern public could not help but be outraged by the coarseness and irrationality of the heroic ages. It was also necessary to justify the criterion of judgment that would establish the superiority of one's own century.

Once again, Dubos provides invaluable assistance: his *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture* questions the claims and pretentions of reason in the domain of fine arts. Can the jurisdiction of reason extend beyond the science of nature and become the sole tribunal before which all the creations of the human mind must appear? Dubos categorically denied this. In the second part of the *Réflexions critiques*, he defended the idea according to which feeling (or sentiment) was the only appropriate judge for evaluating the merit of literary and artistic works. Section XII proposed two different adjudicators for assessing the productions of the human mind: professionals and "the public." However, only the public could properly judge works according to their true worth, unless it was corrupted by the opinions of the critics. In artistic matters, the manifestation of the truth was hampered by the untimely use of critical reason that plunged the public into uncertainty and made it founder in error, until sentiment finally managed to take back its rights.

And so, we might attempt the following hypothesis. The sense of what "an enlightened century" or "a century of lights" was took shape at the moment a two-dimensional right of inventory emerged: on the one hand it concerned the heritage of the Ancients, and on the other it dealt with the legitimate claims of

reason to judge the works of another time period. By making sentiment the rightful criterion for evaluating beauty that moves and touches us and by rejecting the claims of critics to evaluate nonscientific works of genius, Dubos offered a new sense of the term "public" that helped to constitute an enlightened century with its judgments. A public that was capable of appreciating the excellence of art was a public that would patronize artistic and literary productions and form a new kind of a public space.[41] It was limited in size, since the public was not the same thing as the people: "The word 'public' only included people who had already acquired lights, either by reading or by their experience in the world." However, this audience could become more democratized with time, as literary and artistic works became diffused more widely: "The public in question here is confined to people who read, who are familiar with theatrical plays, who see and discuss paintings, or who have acquired, by whatever means, the discernment known as 'the taste of comparison.'"[42] Following Longepierre, Dubos considered that the heart, enlightened by experiences, was the organ of truth in aesthetic matters.

Finally, the lights invoked by Dubos can be understood as the refinement of artistic sensibility. The result is paradoxical: if the century of lights was not the age of reason or of the philosophical spirit, it took many lights to attain the ability to judge well and to constitute a lucid tribunal of opinion. The lights discharged for ideological use reappeared in practical form, associated with the experience necessary to evaluate the merit of artistic and literary productions. The tension thus reaches its highest point: it was by defending the Ancients that Dubos contributed to the invention of what constituted one of the words characteristic of modernity after 1750—that is to say, "public opinion," established as the sovereign judge and tribunal capable of evaluating the aesthetic and political creations of the human mind.[43]

Conclusion

Following Habermas, Ricuperati has unearthed the authors who have analyzed the legacy of the philosophical spirit after the death of Louis XIV, and he has described the eighteenth century as the moment of the emergence of public opinion.[44] However, critical reflections concerning the beneficial and harmful effects of the philosophical spirit appeared before the birth of the historiography of the Enlightenment and before the emergence of theories about the relationship between the philosophes and the French Revolution. The aim of this essay has been to show that the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns had posed this question in an unprecedented way and to highlight the role that the abbé Dubos played in the emergence of reflections about "the century of lights." Even if he had witnessed

a social and cultural evolution of a greater scale, Dubos remained a pioneer. His reflections on the ambivalent nature of the philosophical spirit brought together analyses of the social, political, and cultural conditions that produced a learned elite. His examination of "the public" revealed the important attention paid to the role of feeling and sentiment in the creation of the Enlightenment.

Far from seeking to defend the Ancients, in the manner of Marc Fumaroli or Larry Norman, this essay has tried to reestablish the origins of historical self-reflexivity. The emergence of the concept of public opinion—a process that occurred before the appearance of the actual phrase in the 1750s—remains to be studied. Casting off the tutelage of traditional authorities, the public became the only sovereign authority for judging the merits of the creations of the human mind. It did so by daring to use not only its own understanding but also its own feelings.[45]

NOTES

This essay is a revised version of a contribution that appeared under the title "Les lumières avant les Lumières: tribunal de la raison et opinion publique" (http://revolution-francaise.net/2009/03/01/299-les-lumieres-avant-les-lumieres-tribunal-de-la-raison-et-opinion-publique). After having written this essay, I have learned of an existence of an article by D. Ribaud entitled "Les lumières avant les Lumières? Historiographie de l'opinion publique et discours d'auteurs (dix-septième siècle)," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* (2006): 12, 65–74. However, the subject matter discussed there is of a radically different nature from my topic here. This essay was translated from French by Anton M. Matytsin.

1. See Fritz Schalk, "Zur Semantik von 'Aufklärung' in Frankreich," in *Festschrift W. Von Wartburg*, ed. Kurt Baldinger (Tübingen: Niemayer, 1968), 251–66; Jacques Roger, "La lumière et les lumières," *Cahiers de l'Association internationale des études françaises* 20 (1968): 167–77; Roland Mortier, "'Lumière' et 'Lumières,' histoire d'une image et d'une idée au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle," in *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières: études sur le XVIIIe siècle littéraire* (Geneva: Droz, 1969), 13–59; Michel Delon, "Les Lumières. Travail d'une métaphore," in *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 152 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1976), 527–41. For more on the historiography of the Enlightenment and its link with the debates about the origins of the French Revolution, see Vincenzo Ferrone and Daniel Roche, "Le XIXe siècle: l'identité refusée. Les Lumières et la Révolution française," in *Le monde des Lumières*, ed. Vincenzo Ferrone and Daniel Roche (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 497–522.

2. The 1727 edition of Furetière's dictionary highlighted the distinction between the singular and plural uses of the term: "Mais lorsque *lumière* signifie les belles connaissances de l'esprit, il se doit toujours mettre au pluriel." See "Lumière," in Antoine Furetière, *Dictionnaire universel, contenant généralement tous les mots françois, tant vieux que modernes, et les termes des sciences et des arts*, 4th ed., 4 vols. (The Hague: Husson, Johnson, Swart, Van Duren, Le Vier & Van Dole, 1727), vol. 3.

3. Charles Sorel, *De la connoissance des bons livres, ou Examens de plusieurs autheurs* (Paris: Pralard, 1671), 454–55: "Ce Siècle est bien éclairé, car on n'y entend parler que de *Lumieres*. On met partout ce mot aux endroits où l'on aurait mis autrefois l'*esprit* ou l'*intelligence*, & il arrive souvent que ceux qui se servent de ce mot l'appliquent si mal, qu'avec toutes leurs lumières, on peut dire qu'ils ne voyent goutte."

4. Pierre Bayle, "Vienne deux fois assiégée par les Turcs en 1529 & 1683 & heureusement délivrée, avec des Reflexions historiques sur la Maison d'Autriche, & sur la Puissance Ottomane, par. M. J. B. de Rocoles Hisoriographe," *Nouvelles de la République des lettres* (Apr. 1684): 169–70: "Sera-t-il dit [. . .] que nous abandonnerons l'honneur de ce Siècle à la raillerie de ceux qui viendront après nous ? . . . On se pique dans ce Siècle d'être extrêmement éclairé : cependant on n'a jamais peut-être eu plus de hardiesse à débiter des fables."

5. Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, "Réponse de Fontenelle à l'évêque de Luçon, lorsqu'il fut reçu à l'Académie française, le 6 mars 1732," in *Œuvres de Fontenelle*, 5 vols. (Paris: Salmon, 1829), 2:442: "Il s'est répandu depuis un temps un *esprit philosophique* presque tout nouveau, une lumière qui n'avait guère éclairé nos ancêtres."

6. Voltaire, "Gens de Lettres," in *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonnée des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, 28 vols. (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton & Durand, 1757), 7:599: "Autrefois dans le seizieme siecle, & bien avant dans le dix-septieme, les littérateurs s'occupoient beaucoup de la critique grammaticale des auteurs grecs & latins; & c'est à leurs travaux que nous devons les dictionnaires, les éditions correctes, les commentaires des chefs-d'oeuvres de l'antiquité; aujourd'hui cette critique est moins nécessaire, & l'esprit philosophique lui a succédé. C'est cet esprit philosophique qui semble constituer le caractere de *gens de lettres;* & quand il se joint au bon goût, il forme un littérateur accompli. C'est un des grands avantages de notre siecle, que ce nombre d'hommes instruits qui passent des épines des Mathématiques aux fleurs de la Poésie, & qui jugent egalement bien d'un livre de Métaphysique & d'une piece de théatre: l'esprit du siecle les a rendus pour la plûpart aussi propres pour le monde que pour le cabinet; & c'est en quoi ils sont fort supérieurs à ceux des siecles précédens."

7. Jean-Baptiste le Rond d'Alembert, *Essai sur les éléments de philosophie, ou sur les principes des connaissances humaines*, in *Œuvres complètes de d'Alembert*, 5 vols. (Paris: Slatkine, 1967), 1:122: "Tout siècle qui pense bien ou mal, pourvu qu'il croie penser, et qu'il pense autrement que le siècle qui l'a précédé, se pare du titre de philosophe. . . . Notre siècle s'est donc appelé par excellence siècle de la philosophie." Also see Friedrich Melchior Grimm, *Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique*, ed. Maurice Tourneux, 16 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1877–82), 10:465 (Aug. 1774).

8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Lettres morales*, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 4:1088: "Nous vivons dans le climat et le siècle de la philosophie et de la raison. Les lumières de toutes les sciences semblent se réunir à la fois pour éclairer nos yeux et nous guider dans cet obscur labyrinthe de la vie humaine. Les plus beaux génies de tous les âges réunissent leurs leçons pour nous instruire, d'immenses bibliothèques sont ouvertes au public, des multitudes de collèges et d'universités nous offrent dès l'enfance l'expérience et la méditation de 4000 ans . . . En sommes-nous devenus meilleurs ou plus sages?"

9. Michel Foucault, "Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?," in *Dits et Ecrits*, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 2:1381–97.

10. One must not, of course, exclude references such as one that appears in d'Alembert's *Essai sur la société des gens de lettres et des grands* (1753), where the Enlightenment is described as a social phenomenon, whereby a man of letters operates under the patronage of the state and of the aristocracy. For more, see Hans U. Gumbrecht, "Who Were the *philosophes*?," in *Making Sense in Life and Literature*, trans. Glen Burns (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 133–77, and Daniel Brewer, *The Enlightenment Past: Reconstructing Eighteenth-Century French Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

11. Giuseppe Ricuperati, "Le categorie di periodizzazione e il Settecento. Per una introduzione storiografica," *Studi settecenteschi* 14 (1994): 9–106.

12. Diego Venturino, "L'historiographie révolutionnaire française et les Lumières, de Paul Buchez à Albert Sorel," and Diego Venturino, "Appendice sur la genèse de l'expression 'siècle des lumières' (XVIIIe–XXe siècles)," both in *Historiographie et Usages des Lumières*, ed. Giuseppe Ricuperati (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2002), 21–58, 59–83.

13. The interpretation of the Quarrel as a fin de siècle culture war appears in Joan DeJean, *Anciens against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). DeJean supports the perspective of the Moderns by proposing a gendered analysis of the Quarrel. By contrast, Larry Norman attempts to change our view of the Quarrel by pointing to the shock experienced by the Ancients, who were hardly traditionalists. Norman sees the partisans of the Ancients as the precursors of historicist thinking; they were able to perceive the radical otherness of the ancient world, and Norman presents the Moderns as more conservative and conformist. See Larry F. Norman, *The Shock of the Ancient: Literature and History in Early Modern France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). For a nuanced critique of Norman's thesis, see Marie-Pierre Harder, "Les Anciens contre-attaquent ou la Querelle revisitée," *Acta fabula* 13, no. 1. (Jan. 2012), http://www.fabula.org/acta/document6731.php.

14. For more on this semantic evolution, see Hillel Schwartz, *Century's End: A Cultural History of the Fin de Siècle from the 990s through the 1990s* (New York: Doubleday, 1990).

15. For a remarkable contribution on this topic, with which this essay is in great agreement, see Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

16. Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, *Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes*, in *Œuvres de Fontenelle*, ed. Alain Niderst, 9 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1989–2001), 2;425–26: "La comparaison que nous avons de faire des hommes de tous les siècles à un seul homme, peut s'étendre sur toute notre question des Anciens et des Modernes. Un bon esprit cultivé est, pour ainsi dire, composé de tous les esprits des siècles précédents; ce n'est qu'un même esprit qui s'est cultivé pendant tout ce temps-là. Ainsi cet homme qui a vécu depuis le commencement du monde jusqu'à présent, a eu son enfance, où il ne s'est occupé que des besoins les plus pressants de la vie; sa jeunesse, où il a assez bien réussi aux choses d'imagination, telles que la poésie ou l'éloquence, et où même il a commencé à raisonner, mais avec moins de solidité que de feu. Il est maintenant dans l'âge de la virilité, où il raisonne avec plus de force, et *a plus de lumières que jamais*."

17. Nicolas Malebranche, *De la recherche de la vérité*, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis and Germain Malbreil, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), 1:8: "la lumière de la vérité, qui éclaire tout le monde."

18. Ibid., 10: "ou de cette lumière intérieure qui l'éclaire."

19. Ibid., 12.

20. Ibid., 14: "Il faut que l'esprit juge de toutes choses selon ses lumières intérieures, sans écouter le témoignage faux et confus de ses sens, et de son imagination; et [qu']il examine à la lumière pure de la vérité qui l'éclaire, toutes les sciences humaines."

21. Ibid., 17–18: "Afin que mes espérances ne soient point vaines, je donne cet avis, qu'on ne doit pas se rebuter d'abord, si l'on trouve des choses qui choquent les opinions ordinaires que l'on a crues toute sa vie, et que l'on voit approuvées généralement de tous les hommes et de tous les siècles. Car ce sont les erreurs les plus générales que je tâche principalement de détruire. Si les hommes étaient fort éclairés, l'approbation universelle serait une raison ; mais c'est tout le contraire. Que l'on soit donc averti une fois pour toutes, qu'*il n'y a que la raison qui doive présider au jugement de toutes les opinions humaines*, qui n'ont point de rapport à la foi, de laquelle seule Dieu nous instruit d'une manière toute différente de celle dont il nous découvre les choses naturelles. Que l'on rentre dans soi-même, et que l'on s'approche de la lumière qui y luit incessamment, afin que notre raison soit plus éclairée."

22. See DeJean, *Ancients against Moderns*, 34–35.

23. Malebranche, *De la recherche de la vérité*, 1:210–14: "que les Anciens ont été plus éclairés que nous ne pouvons l'être, et qu'il n'y a rien à faire où ils n'ont pas réussi."

24. Hilaire-Bernard de Longepierre, *Discours sur les anciens* (Paris: Aubouin, 1687), preface, n.p.: "La vérité, surtout lorsqu'elle est aussi évidente qu'en cette occasion, a un certain éclat et une certaine force qui perce tous les nuages, et qui surmonte tous les obstacles qu'on ose en vain lui opposer. Elle frappe la vue de ceux même qui veulent fermer les yeux à sa lumière."

25. Ibid., 9. Longepierre asks: "N'est-ce pas en quelque manière prostituer la raison que de leur en opposer les lumières, qu'ils font vanité de mépriser?"

26. Ibid., 11: "Les plus grands hommes ont regardé les Anciens comme une source de lumière, la seule règle du bon goût, et l'asile de la droite raison et du bon esprit."

27. Ibid., 18: "Les ténèbres de l'ignorance et de la barbarie furent bientôt entièrement dissipées par une source si abondante de lumière."

28. Ibid., 25–27.

29. Ibid., 29: "Il faut pouvoir me convaincre clairement que l'estime qu'on a pour les Anciens blesse les lumières de la raison."

30. Ibid., 35: "L'esprit et la raison peuvent être et sont tous les jours séduits par un faux éclat, qui ne les éclaire que pour les égarer."

31. The Quarrel is traditionally divided into two phases. The first part, 1687–94, concludes with the "peace" between Boileau and Perrault. The second phase, lasting from 1710 until 1716, is rekindled by Houdar de la Motte's publication of Madame Dacier's 1699 translation of the *Iliad*.

32. Jean-Baptiste Dubos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture*, 2 vols. (Paris: Mariette, 1719), 2:452: "Nous ne raisonnons pas mieux que les anciens en histoire, en politique, & dans la morale civile." A diplomat and author of the *Interests de l'Angleterre mal-entendus dans la guerre présent* (1703), Dubos was elected to the Académie française in 1720 and named perpetual secretary in 1722. His *Histoire critique de l'établissement de la monarchie française dans les Gaules* (1734) was analyzed and criticized by Montesquieu; see Céline Spector, *Montesquieu. Liberté, droit et histoire* (Paris: Michalon, 2010), chap. 6. An intellectual biography of Dubos remains to be written.

33. Dubos, *Réflexions critiques*, 2:120: "Section XII. Des siècles illustres & de la part que les causes morales ont au progrès des arts." See also ibid., 224: "Section XIV: Comment les Causes Physiques ont part à la destinée des siècles illustres. Du pouvoir de l'air sur le corps humain."

34. Ibid., 422: "Qu'on juge par l'état où sont aujourd'hui les sciences naturelles de combien notre siecle est déja plus éclairé que les siecles de Platon, d'Auguste & de Leon X. La perfection où nous avons porté l'art de raisonner, qui nous a fait faire tant de découvertes dans les sciences naturelles, est une source féconde en nouvelles lumieres. Elles se répandent déja sur les belles Lettres, et elles en feront disparoître les vieux préjugez ainsi qu'elles les ont fait disparoître des sciences naturelles. Ces lumieres se communiqueront encore aux différentes professions de la vie et déja l'on en aperçoit le crépuscule dans toutes les conditions." Also cited in Anne-Marie Lecoq, ed., *La Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). Also see the opening essay in *La Querelle*: Marc Fumaroli, "Les abeilles et les araignées," 8–218.

35. Dubos, *Réflexions critiques*, 2:423: "Notre siecle peut être plus sçavant que ceux qui l'ont precedé; mais je nie que les esprits ayent aujourd'hui, generalement parlant, plus de penetration, plus de droiture & plus de justesse qu'ils n'en avoient autrefois. Comme les hommes les plus doctes ne sont pas toûjours ceux qui ont plus de sens, de même le siecle qui est plus sçavant que les autres n'est point toûjours le siecle le plus raisonable."

36. Ibid., 456: "Ils nous auront surpassé, si l'on peut se servir de cette expression, en *raison pratique*, mais nous les surpassons en *raison spéculative*."

37. Ibid., 424. See also Jean-Baptiste Dubos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture*, 3 vols. (Paris: Mariette, 1733), 2:454–55. "Cette date de soixante & dix ans qu'on donne pour époque à ce renouvellement prétendu des esprits est mal choisie. Je ne veux point entrer dans des détails odieux pour les Etats & pour les particuliers, & je me contenterai de dire que l'esprit philosophique qui rend les hommes si raisonnables, & pour ainsi dire *si consequens*, fera bien-tôt d'une grande partie de l'Europe ce qu'en firent autrefois les Gots & les Vandales, supposé qu'il continuë à faire les mêmes progrès qu'il a faits depuis soixante & dix ans. Je vois les arts necessaires négligez, les préjugez les plus utiles à la conservation de la societé s'abolir, & les raisonnements spéculatifs préferez à la pratique. Nous nous conduisons sans égard pour l'expérience, le meilleur maître qu'ait le genre humain, & nous avons l'imprudence d'agir, comme si nous étions la première generation qui eut sçu raisonner. Le soin de la postérité est pleinement négligé." In the 1733 edition, Dubos modified the starting point: the century of lights started seventy years ago, around 1660. In the 1719 edition, he wrote that the lights began to spread sixty years ago. Perhaps Dubos had in mind the foundation of the royal academies in England and France. See Dubos, *Réflexions critiques* (1719), 2:424.

38. Dubos, *Réflexions critiques* (1733), 2:458: "Il suffit qu'un siècle vienne après un autre pour raisonner mieux que lui dans les sciences naturelles, à moins qu'il ne soit arrivé dans la societé un bouleversement assez grand pour éteindre, au préjudice des petits-fils, les lumieres qu'avoient leurs ancêtres."

39. Ibid., 471–72: "Les dernières inventions ont répandu une lumiere merveilleuse sur les connaissances qu'on avoit déja. Heureusement pour notre siecle il s'est rencontré dans la maturité des temps, & quand le progrès des sciences naturelles était le plus rapide. Les lumieres resultantes des inventions précedentes, après avoir fait séparément une

certaine progression, commencerent de se combiner il y a quatre-vingt ou cent ans. Nous pouvons dire de notre siècle ce que Quintillien disait du sien. *Tot nos præceptoribus tot exemplis instruxit antiquitas, ut possit videri nulla sorte nascendi ætas felicior quàm nostra, cui docendæ priores elaboraverunt.*"

40. Ibid., 486–87: "Nos Sçavans, ainsi que les Philosophes anciens, ne sont d'accord que sur les faits, & ils se réfutent réciproquement sur tout ce qui ne peut être connu que par voïe de raisonnement, en se traitant les uns les autres d'aveugles volontaires qui refusent de voir la lumière. . . . Ceux qui vantent si fort les lumieres que l'esprit philosophique a répanduës sur notre siecle, répondront peut-être qu'ils n'entendent par notre siecle qu'eux & leurs amis, & qu'il faut regarder comme des gens qui ne sont point Philosophes, comme des anciens, ceux qui ne sont pas encore de leur sentiment en toutes choses."

41. For more on this topic, see Fabienne Brugère, *Le goût. Art, passions et société* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000), 22–30.

42. Dubos, *Réflexions critiques* (1733), 2:335: "Le public dont il s'agit ici est donc borné aux personnes qui lisent, qui connoissent les spectacles, qui voient & qui entendent parler des tableaux, ou qui ont acquis de quelque manière que ce soit, ce discernement qu'on appelle *goût de comparaison*, & dont je parlerai tantôt plus au long."

43. I cite only the major studies on the theme of public opinion that have created a new interpretive approach to eighteenth-century studies: Jürgen Habermas, *L'espace public. Archéologie de la publicité comme dimension constitutive de la société bourgeoise*, trans. Marc Buhot de Launay (Paris: Payot, 1978); Roger Chartier, *Les origines culturelles de la Révolution française* (Paris : Seuil, 1990), chap. 2: "Espace public et opinion publique"; Keith Michael Baker, "Politique et opinion publique sous l'Ancien Régime," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 42, no. 1 (1987): 41–71; Mona Ozouf, "Le concept d'opinion publique au XVIIIe siècle," in *L'homme régénéré* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 21–53; Arlette Farge, *Dire et mal dire. L'opinion publique au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 1992); Hélène Merlin-Kajman, *Public et littérature en France au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1994). Merlin-Kajman has notably insisted on the emergence of public opinion in the sphere literary (rather than political) debates.

44. See, e.g., Ernest Lerminier, *De l'influence de la philosophie du XVIIIe siècle sur la législation et la sociabilité du XIXe siècle* (Paris: Prévost-Didier, 1833); Désiré Nisard, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 16th ed. (Paris: Didot, 1889); Ernest Bersot, *Etudes sur le dix-huitième siècle* (Paris: Durand, 1855).

45. In response to the Habermasian archaeology, Joan DeJean brings up the origin of this new public space with the appearance of the *Mercure galant*, the most influential periodical on the French literary science between 1672 and 1710. She discusses the strategy of its editor, Jean Donneau de Visé, who encouraged his readers to send the journal collective letters that offered testimonies of their personal opinions. This was especially the case with the publication of *La Princesse de Clèves* in 1678. See DeJean, *Ancients against Moderns*, 57–65.

DARRIN M. MCMAHON

Writing the History of Illumination in the *Siècle des Lumières*

Enlightenment Narratives of Light

Although scholars will probably always debate the precise characteristics of the Enlightenment, one central feature was undoubtedly contemporaries' own understanding that they were living in a unique time of "light"—an age of clarity, reason, possibility, and progress. Whether that was the case matters less than the belief that it was so. And of that belief there can be little doubt. The long eighteenth century ushered in a new *régime d'historicité*, François Hartog has observed, a self-conscious awareness of historical particularity in relation to a "dark" past and a "bright" future, whose horizon lay open with possibility.[1] Indeed, this awareness seems to have been fundamental to the articulation of Enlightenment narratives by eighteenth-century actors, a contention that Dan Brewer, Dan Edelstein, and J. G. A. Pocock, among others, have put forth, in their respective ways, with particular force.[2]

Light metaphors, quite clearly, played a central role in these narratives, marking off a "dark ages" from a time of enlightenment.[3] But there was nothing new in the eighteenth century about the metaphor of light. Light, after all, had long served as the principal metaphor of truth in the Western intellectual tradition, and it was of special significance to Christians and Jews.[4] If in the beginning was the word, the word was light, for God and light were one and the same. Christ had come in his luminous glory to bear witness to that truth. He was himself, as He proclaimed, the "light of the world" (John 8:12). True enlightenment, generations of Christians had affirmed, came from Him: Light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, one in being with the Father.[5]

Somewhat ironically, then, the central metaphor employed by eighteenth-century actors to highlight their own *historicité* was, in itself, rather hackneyed. What *was* new, however, and what gave special resonance to the novel ways in which this venerable metaphor was employed, was the advent of widespread public illumination—first in Paris in 1667 and then, not long thereafter, in leading cities across Europe and the British Isles: Lille (1667), Amsterdam (1669), Hamburg (1673), Turin (1675), Brussels (1675–79), Rotterdam (1676), Berlin (1682), Groningen (1682), Copenhagen (1683), London (1684–94), Vienna and Hanover (1690–96),

Dublin (1697), Dusseldorf (1699–1701), and Leipzig (1701).[6] By the second half of the eighteenth century, in fact, when the pace of public lighting initiatives accelerated significantly across Europe, contemporaries were clearly living in an unprecedented age of illumination. Fueled first by tallow and then, increasingly, by oil, the ubiquitous lanterns of the night sky—well over five thousand in such cities as London, Paris, and Amsterdam by midcentury—were visual symbols and reminders that human beings could dispel darkness on their own. That power, it seemed, was greater than ever before, and it led contemporaries to remark on how the illuminated urban landscapes of European cities set them apart from all previous cultures and civilizations. As one visitor to Paris remarked, typically, as early as 1692, blurring the distinction between metaphorical enlightenment and literal illumination: "The 'invention of enlightenment' [*l'invention d'éclairer*] by an infinite number of separate 'lights' merits that the most distant people should travel to see what the Greeks and Romans never even thought of for the civilizing [*la police*] of their republics. . . . The spectacle is so beautiful and so widespread that Archimedes himself, were he still alive, could not have added anything more agreeable and useful."[7] In Paris, the light of moderns outshone even that of the ancients, who lived in comparative darkness. Light itself was a measure of progress. It rendered the metaphor of enlightenment literal.[8]

Enlightenment authors thus set out to write the history of this progress as a history of illumination, inventing, in effect, a new genre: the comparative history of lighting. It was a European-wide literature and discussion, with works on the subject produced in the United Kingdom and across the Continent. Works written in eighteenth-century France, however, whose capital was already acquiring the label that it retains to this day, *ville lumière*, are the focus of this chapter. Taken together, these works serve as a measure of the light of the times.

To Write the History of Illumination

The first attempt to write a formal history of public lighting was undertaken, not surprisingly, by a policeman. For the police were closely familiar with the practice and had been from the beginning. Paris's system of public street lighting and the office of the lieutenant general of the police were founded in the very same year (1667), and the first man to occupy that office, Gabriel Nicolas de La Reynie, played a major role in initiating and implementing the citywide installation of lanterns in Paris.[9] Part of an integrated effort to pacify and "civilize" what were seen as unruly and dangerous urban environments, lighting was an extension of *police* in the broad sense of the term, intended at once to refine and to secure by the cultivation of rational order. The original edict proclaiming the establish-

ment of public lighting in Paris, issued by Louis XIV and La Reynie in September 1667, underscored the close connection between lighting and security. "The great number of vagabonds and thieves that may be found in Paris after dark," it declared, and the corresponding "number of murders and robberies" made it of "extreme consequence to establish lanterns in every neighborhood and on every street of Paris in order to provide them with light [*les éclairer*]."[10] To enlighten was to enhance surveillance and the corresponding power of the state.

Anne-Louis Leclerc du Brillet served as the longtime secretary to the Paris police commissioner Nicolas Delamare, who himself achieved fame as the author of the "best-selling" *Traité de la police*, published in three successive volumes between 1707 and 1718. Upon Delamare's death, Leclerc continued his work, publishing a fourth volume in 1738 as the *Continuation du Traité de la Police*. At the same time, he gathered materials for an ambitious study of his own, *Des Lumières publiques*, which, though never finished and never published, exists in draft form at the Bibliothèque Nationale, along with the extremely useful materials he gathered to support it on the early history of French public lighting.[11] Written in the 1730s and 1740s, the work is without precedent. And though it is largely an administrative account of the gradual emergence of public lighting in France, it is framed against the background of world history.

"The usage of public lighting in cities," the manuscript begins, "does not seem to have been established in any nation or among any people previously, not even those that passed for the most civilized [*les plus policés*]—the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans."[12] Leclerc conceded that in nations where "the day lasted longer than it does among us," public lighting was probably less important than it seemed to his contemporaries. He also pointed out that the ancients adjusted their habits (*moeurs*) to accommodate the lack of light, habitually going to bed early so that they could rise at the crack of dawn (*le grand matin*). Still, it was striking that the ancients forfeited the considerable advantages that public lighting afforded to "public security" and "social intercourse" (*commerce de la vie*). Indeed, what was singular about the current epoch was that even those who had long inhabited the same climates and spaces now occupied by contemporary Europeans had apparently "never even imagined," let alone tried to procure, "the advantage of public lighting."[13]

Leclerc's sense of the singularity of Western European Christendom may have been misplaced. There are indications, for example, that the city of Córdoba under Muslim rule was not only exceptionally clean and well ordered, with well-paved streets and running water, but also well lit, "with lights attached to the outer doors and corners of houses."[14] The twelfth-century commentator al-Shaqundi

went so far as to state that in the tenth century one could walk for ten miles beyond the city and still see by the radiant glow of its lanterns.[15] Such references, no doubt overstated, are difficult to confirm. But as other eighteenth-century authors recognized, lighting of one sort or another possessed histories that shone beyond the boundaries of Christendom.

Still, Leclerc had no doubt that modern Europeans had made the greatest use of public lighting, and he emphasized that its origins were comparatively recent, even as he acknowledged that it was "not easy to establish the precise epoch" of its earliest adoption and use. Philippe V of France, he noted, had issued *lettres patentes* in 1318 requiring that a lantern be lit in front of the Grand Châtelet in Paris. The law specified the use of a tallow candle of particular length and weight. Philippe, Leclerc speculated, may well have had intentions to extend this practice throughout the city. But good intentions amounted to nothing in the end, with no more than a flicker of light emerging from this otherwise dark age. "One can see perfectly," Leclerc conceded, "that this exceptional measure hardly resembled that of the lighting of an entire city." It would take another two centuries for leaders to think seriously about undertaking the "entire illumination of Paris."

In this long interval of time, there was only one other "fleeting illumination" (*une illumination momentanée*). In July 1395, Leclerc reports, King Richard of England sent an ambassador to France, accompanied by a retinue of some twelve hundred men, to ask for the marriage of his eldest daughter to Charles VI. The presence of so many foreign emissaries threatened to disturb the "public tranquility," and so the prévôt of Paris imposed a curfew after nightfall, ordering householders in the city to hang a lantern in their window that would remain lit until daybreak.[16] However exceptional, the measure is indicative of Leclerc's own preoccupations. Lighting in his view was first and foremost a matter of insuring public order.

After having guarded "a profound silence on the matter of the lighting of streets for over two centuries," authorities began to speak again on the subject after the outbreak of the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century. In the turmoil and upheavals, "public lights were not forgotten," Leclerc observes, and he follows in detail the various measures put in place by authorities, along with the growing conviction among the populace that not only civil violence but witchcraft and crime flourished by cover of dark. As the Paris Parlement put it in 1551, "seeing that the majority of 'evil deeds' [*malefices*] are committed by night and in the dark [*à l'obscurs*], all homeowners of this town are ordered . . . to attach a lantern with a burning candle above the first-floor window from six o'clock in the evening during the months of November, December, and January." In Leclerc's opinion,

this measure was at the "origin of the annual and perpetual establishment of lanterns and public lights during the long winter nights." And though implementation was left in private hands—with the inevitable result that lanterns were placed in those areas where "bourgeois had greater means at their disposal and greater desire to bear this expense"—a degree of public organization gradually followed, spurred on in part by the upheavals of civil war and, later, the Fronde. This process reached its apogee in the ordinance of 1667 and the extensive public illumination that followed.[17]

Leclerc's history, in the end, is a functionary's history, and its heroes are La Reynie and the police of Paris, flanked by the magistrates and commissaries who provided them support. Leclerc devotes the bulk of his work to the triumphal implementation of public lighting in Paris during the reign of Louis XIV—highlighting the "great pains" (*grandes soins*) taken by magistrates, the chief of police, and the commissaries in the ongoing and laborious work of his charge. But Leclerc also pauses to consider the "great pains" taken by those who did the dirty work of illumination. In what is, in effect, an early foray into the social history of public lighting, Leclerc devotes a separate chapter to describing the work of candlemakers, lamplighters, and the so-called *commis allumeurs*, men chosen by neighborhood councils to clean and oversee the lanterns themselves.

Leclerc associates these individuals, along with those who guaranteed their security, with the broader *police d'illumination*, and such security, it seems, was necessary.[18] For the new lanterns—strung on cables to hang from the middle of the street, rather than mounted on fixed lampposts at the sides—were not only susceptible to accidental breaking but were frequently willfully destroyed.[19] Lantern-smashing, it is clear, followed closely on their erection. A 1669 police ordinance complained, for example, of "pages, lackeys, and all other loose-living disturbers of the public order who would maliciously break any lantern at will."[20] Such complaints were repeated for the whole of the eighteenth century, levied not only at pages and lackeys but also at young men from "good bourgeois homes," *courreurs de la nuit*, out, it seems, for a little fun.[21] Often fueled by alcohol, these assailants and pranksters did not just damage the lanterns but were known to attack and harass the lamplighters themselves. Little wonder that the job of *commis allumeur* was unpopular. Leclerc lists numerous instances of individuals seeking to avoid it and of fines imposed on those who refused to carry it out.[22]

Such forced illumination was undoubtedly all the more galling for the taxes levied to support it. By 1704, Leclerc reports, the tax on *boues et lanternes*, imposed to cover the costs of both street cleaning and street lighting, had reached 450,000 livres per year.[23] Illumination was clearly expensive, yet in Leclerc's estimation

An eighteenth-century lantern seller in Paris. Anne Claude de Caylus. Metropolitan Museum of Art. Courtesy of the Harris Brisbane Dick Fund.

it was more than worth the cost, paying for itself not only in utility and enhanced security but in aesthetic terms as well. Paris's system of lighting was a new wonder of the world, presenting a *"coup d'oeil* that provides infinite satisfaction and announces an opulent and well-policed city—in a word, the capital of the realm."[24]

In the final pages of his unfinished manuscript, Leclerc addressed Louis XIV's edict of 1697, which aimed to spread the innovation of Parisian lighting to the major cities of the French provinces.[25] Although detailed in its prescription, the edict, as Leclerc was no doubt well aware, was in truth a revenue scheme, drafted with the principal aim of raising money to finance not just lighting operations but Louis's XIV's insatiable appetite for war.[26] Consequently, the edict met with considerable resistance. Notwithstanding some exceptions, the illumination of French cities outside of Paris developed in a halting and inconsistent manner.[27] It was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that it gathered momen-

tum. By that point Leclerc was dead, his manuscript unfinished. It would be up to others to continue the story of the spread of light.

A Cultural History of the Lantern

The anonymous group of scholars who composed the *Essai historique, critique, philologique, politique, moral, littéraire et galant sur les lanternes, leur origine, leur forme, leur utlilité, etc.*, first published in 1755, approached the history of lighting and illumination from a very different perspective from that of Leclerc.[28] The self-styled *société des gens de lettres*—composed, it seems, of the lawyer and man of letters Jean-François Dreux de Radier, Antoine Le Camus, the abbé Jean Lebeuf, and François-Louis Jamet—was concerned neither with administrative history nor with policing and public order. Rather, the scholars examined the history of illumination through the perspective of the lantern, doing so with a decidedly lighter touch.

The work, in fact, is a satire, dedicated to the *très respectable, très gais, et très éclairé* Dr. Swift, the late doyen of St. Patrick's Church in Dublin and a master of the satirical craft. In a fragment from his *A Tale of the Tub*, Swift had mocked dissenting Christians of the "inner light," who resembled, in his view, lanterns composed of "leaves from Old Geneva Bibles," an invention, he further claimed, that was approved and undertaken under Humphrey Edwin, the dissenting lord mayor of London, who in putting such lanterns into use believed himself to be fulfilling the words of scripture: "Thy word is a lantern to my feet, and a light to my path" (Psalms 119:105). The authors of the *Essai* could not have approved more of Swift's wicked satirical bent. But they were quick to point out that Edwin's attempt to fulfill the letter of the word was based on an error of translation. What was rendered "lantern" here was, in truth, they argued, a "lamp." And thus did "one error engender another."[29]

The text proceeds in a similar fashion, with the authors bringing formidable philological erudition to bear on the many uses (and abuses) of "lanterns" in human history—most of which turn out to be nothing more than mere lamps. Their target is, on the one hand, the savants of the seventeenth century—"men born for study and the cabinet," such as Scaliger or Casaubon, who steeped their work in vast erudition and knowledge of ancient languages but who, in the opinion of their eighteenth-century satirists, thought little for themselves. On the other hand, the authors take aim at their more modern (enlightened) counterparts, who, in place of learning, "think" (*pensent*), while dismissing most everything that was thought and known before them. Whereas the former locked themselves up in their study,


ESSAI
HISTORIQUE,
CRITIQUE, PHILOLOGIQUE,
POLITIQUE, MORAL,
LITTERAIRE ET GALANT;
SUR
LES LANTERNES,
LEUR ORIGINE, LEUR FORME,
leur utilité, &c. &c.
AVEC QUELQUES NOTES DE L'EDITEUR,
& une Table très-ample des Matiéres.
Par une Société de Gens de Lettres.
A DOLE,
Chez LUCNOPHILE & Compagnie.
M. DCC. LV.

Frontispiece to the *Essai historique, philologique, politique, moral, littéraire et galant sure les lanternes, leur origine, leur forme, leur utilité, etc.* (Dole, 1755). Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Yale University.

so that "all smells of work and the lamp in their productions," the latter proclaim themselves *génies créateurs* with a surprising ease. Indeed, the moderns are altogether modest, the authors pun, for in place of producing titles with heavy authority—*examens, disquisitions, diatribes*—they simply "try" (*essayer*), writing essays (*essais*).[30]

Poking fun, then, at both seventeenth-century *érudits* and the enlightened generalists of the eighteenth century, the authors offer a precise definition of the "lantern": "a square or polygon, circular or conic furnishing, which serves to protect light from wind, the open air, rain and other accidents by means of a transparent material, such as thin cloth, mousseline, taffeta, glass, bladder, bone,

or paper, which covers the circumference of the body."[31] Everything else that might be called a "lantern" in a florid, if imprecise, French—whether *lampe, lampion, terrine, chandelle, bougie, flambeau de cire, de suif, de poix résine, de sapin, ou autre bois seché et fendu en forme d'allumettes, phare, fanale, [ou] torche*—was nothing of the sort, and so had "no right to appear here." The *Essai historique* was a work about "lanterns" in *quarto modo* in the Aristotelian sense—about lanterns, that is, strictly speaking, and nothing else.[32]

Having established the precise scope of their investigation, the authors proceed to sketch the history of lanterns proper, arguing that prior to the late fourth century BCE, one can detect only "hints" (*soupçons*) of them, which, upon closer inspection, prove in truth to be torches, cressets, flambeaux, or candles, to say nothing of lamps. Thus, after going through their Homer, the authors conclude that one would have to have a "spoiled imagination, no knowledge of customs, and no taste for Antiquity to believe that one could find *Lanterns* in the divine *Iliad* or the miraculous *Odyssey*." To be sure, Perrault, La Motte, and Charpentier (seventeenth-century scholars all) had the effrontery and the ignorance to tell us that these works are full of lanterns. But in truth, there is nothing of the sort, only torches and lamps, the usage of lanterns having not yet been introduced. So too do the authors affirm that the poet who composed the poem of Hero and Leander "certainly didn't speak of lanterns." The light that Hero, priestess of Aphrodite, lights in her tower each night to guide her lover Leander across the waters of the Hellespont was only a simple candle, however much "ignorant translators" might try to convince us otherwise. And though a German scholar may have lately claimed to have found lanterns in the *History* of Herodotus, the latter work could not stand up to the *Essai historique*'s close scrutiny. Even Herodotus's long description of the festival of lanterns at the city of Sais in ancient Egypt turns out to be a festival of lamps! To be sure, the Egyptians did use abundant lights in their public celebrations, as did the Jews, Romans, and Greeks, whose festivals of Isis and Athena, especially, sparkled and shone. The careful investigator would find, however, no trace of lanterns there.[33]

Indeed, the first use of lanterns proper at public festivals must be credited to the Chinese—"all the honors," the authors assert, belong to them. Providing an extensive, and appreciative, description of the various rites and rituals of the Chinese festival, the authors speculate on its origins and describe its practices, marveling at the liberal use of as many as "200 million lanterns" throughout the country, many of enormous size. And though they conclude that the small lanterns that adorn the Hôtel de Ville in contemporary Paris produce an effect that

is "more beautiful and gallant," their description is nonetheless generous and serious in tone, conducted without overt satire and drawing liberally on contemporary travel accounts.[34]

The work's account of the Chinese festival, in fact, highlights the way in which this whimsical text is, almost despite itself, a genuine cultural history of the lantern. Tracing that object's origin and adoption in the West, the authors observe that Athenaeus could remark in the second century that the "usage of lanterns was not very old." Athenaeus spoke of two kinds of lanterns—one, which the Greeks called φανός, the origin of the French *fanal*, that was suspended on the end of a staff or piece of wood, and the other, the so-called *lanterne de corne*, which was generally mounted and used thin shards of transparent bone to protect the light.[35] Athenaeus cites texts from the poet Theodoridas of Syracuse in the third century BCE that invoke the latter, as well as early lines from the poet Alexis, from the fourth century BCE. Finding no references earlier than these, the authors conclude that the lantern's origins in the West date from this period when they began to make sporadic appearances in history and culture. The celebrated lantern of Diogenes, which the cynic philosopher carried with him to dramatize his search for an honest man, seems to have been genuinely a lantern, as does the lantern held up by the traitor Judas to expose Christ to his captors. The latter, however, appears to have been something of an exception in the early history of the faith. After working painstakingly through the various biblical references to lights and lamps in scripture, the authors conclude that, Judas's lantern aside, "To advance that there is talk of lanterns in the corps of the biblical texts is to fall into error." Jonathan Swift was right to poke fun at Humphrey Edwin.[36]

Part parody and part a fireworks display of erudition, the text plays in this fashion down through the ages, pointing out, for example, that the fact that there are relics of Judas's lantern in the Church of the Holy Cross in Jerusalem, the abbey of St. Denis outside of Paris, *and* a church in Rome should not excite incredulity as it did for the author Maximilien Misson, who remarked snarkily on the subject in his *Voyages en Italie*.[37] The Vulgate, the authors point out, speaks of Judas arriving to betray Christ *cum Laternis* and not *cum Laterna*. Clearly, there was more than one. By contrast, the authors cast doubt on the legend of the famous lantern of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, said to have been sold for three thousand drachmas in the ancient world. Although the Romans possessed lanterns constructed both from horn and from bladder—as any attentive reader of Martial would know—that of Epictetus was merely a floor lamp!

Roughly the last third of the text is devoted to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The authors give a rapid sketch of the illumination of Paris, whose

magistrates, like the Chinese, have seemingly transformed the lantern into an object of veneration, using it to adorn the "most flourishing realm of Europe." And they offer thoughts on the evolution of the "magic lantern" from the time of Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century. The exposition, however, is largely anecdotal. Thus, we hear of the abbé Laudati, who just before the great installation of 1667, received *lettres patentes* to establish in the capital and the major cities of France a lantern walking service, whereby one could hire a *commis port-lanterne* to accompany nighttime strollers across the city for the price of five sols for fifteen minutes. If the abbé Laudati presented the curious spectacle of an ultramontane monk engaged in the task of "enlightening France" (*la France éclairer*), the rumor that the Swedish Lutheran king Charles XII had ordered the manufacture of seven thousand lanterns in 1707 excited animated speculation in the cafés of Paris.[38] Whom or what did he intend to enlighten, and how? The answer was



Image of the prototype of Dominique-François Bourgeois de Chateaublanc's reflecting oil lamp, the *réverbère*, submitted to the Academy of Sciences and approved in 1744. Bibliothèque Nationale.

never clear. More clear, though, was the light of the "celebrated abbé P," Luc-Joseph Matherot de Preigney. Though his work was supplanted by that of the inventor and engineer Dominique-François Bourgeois de Chateaublanc, Preigney appears to have been among the first inventors of the *réverbère*, a reflecting mirror lantern that upon its adoption in Paris in 1766, transformed the technology of public illumination, broadcasting light with much greater intensity and power.[39]

Preigney's name is now forgotten, and like so many inventors before and since, he was unable to see his invention put to general use. He was hailed as a genius nonetheless. As the poet Adrien-Joseph Le Valois d'Orville declaimed in the first lines of his long encomium "Les nouvelles lanternes," amply cited in the *Essai*:

> Le régne de la Nuit désormais va finir.
> Des mortels renommés par leur sage industrie,
> De leur climat sont prêts a le banir.
> Vois les effets de leur génie![40]

Such anecdotes are told by the authors of the *Essai* with their tongues firmly in cheek and, at times, with bawdy or scatological asides. And yet, however comically presented, the material is more often than not relatively sound, drawing attention to matters that might otherwise have been forgotten. Laudati did in fact launch a lantern-rental service at the end of the seventeenth century; Preigney was among the early inventors of the *réverbère*; and the final pages of the book, which recount the uses of the word *lanterne* in contemporary French argot—from *lanterne* for *vielle femme* to *lanternistes* for the members of the Academy of Toulouse, who thought of themselves as *lucerna in nocte*—are valuable sources of information. When the scholar Édouard Fournier published in the mid-nineteenth century one of the first serious histories of public lighting in Paris—appropriately titled *Les Lanternes*—he treated the "humorist" Dreux de Radier and his *Essai historique* as a legitimate source, citing the work approvingly on more than five occasions.[41] The fact that the *Essai* is equipped with a thorough subject index—a relative rarity for eighteenth-century texts—draws attention to the fact that there is information there worthy of being consulted.

More to the point, the *Essai* draws attention, albeit in humorous and sometimes mocking fashion, to the lantern's role as a potent eighteenth-century symbol of human progress and "enlightenment." The essay's purview is wider than that of Leclerc, nodding to China and acknowledging the light of Christian civilization when it is due. And yet, like Leclerc's history of the illumination of France, the *Essai historique* recounts a history of progress that culminates in the *ville lumière*, with the lantern of human civilization evolving from the time of classical antiquity,

when the first sparks of its flame were kindled, down to the mid-eighteenth century, when those "brilliant phenomena," the *réverbères*, could be regarded as the "rivals of the sun."[42] The century of lights was well named, and it was fitting that its scholars should trace the history of a symbol that was rapidly becoming the beacon of the age.

The Technology of Public Illumination

Whereas Leclerc addressed the history of public lighting from the perspective of administration and police, and Dreux de Radier and company approached the subject through the cultural history of the lantern, Pierre Patte was interested in the technology of lighting. An accomplished architect and author, who produced one of the first composite maps of the city of Paris, Patte was a man of the Enlightenment, having served as an engraver for Diderot's *Encyclopédie* for a period of ten years.[43] He was also an important theorist of enlightened urban planning, whose *Mémoires sur les objects les plus importantes de l'architecture* (1769) treated in farsighted and functional terms such matters as water distribution, ventilation, the placement of cemeteries, sewerage, and indeed public lighting.[44] Patte was already well acquainted with the latter subject, having published, in 1766, *De la manière la plus avantageuse d'éclairer les rues d'une grande villle, pendant la nuit*.[45]

The work was written in response to an essay contest sponsored in the 1760s by Antoine de Sartine, the lieutenant general of police, and adjudicated by the Academy of Sciences. The great chemist Antoine Lavoisier submitted a proposal, as did Bourgeois de Chateaublanc, whose revised design for the *réverbère* was awarded a prize, leading to its rapid adoption and implementation in Paris. Lavoisier, for his part, earned a special gold medal from the king. But though Patte came up empty himself, his submission was published separately in Amsterdam.[46]

The place of publication is revealing in its own right, as Amsterdam was not only, with Paris, one of the earliest cities to implement public street-lighting but also an innovator in lantern technology. The extensive lighting system put in place there by the painter and inventor Jan van der Heyden as early as 1669 was widely regarded as among the best in Europe, and Van der Heyden's trademark oil-fueled lantern and lampposts—described at length in his learned treatise on the subject, *Het licht der lamplantarens ontsteking*—were imitated throughout the Low Countries and Germany, serving as the model for public illumination in Leipzig, Berlin, and Cologne.[47] A practical handbook, Van der Heyden's treatise included numerous drawings and illustrations and described at length the technical aspects of lantern design and installation, including reflections on the use



Prototypes for a Van der Heyden lantern. Courtesy of the Vereniging Vrienden van de Amsterdamse Binnenstad.

of wicks, on ventilation and smoke extraction, on glass type and shape, and on the use and varieties of oil (Van der Heyden employed rapeseed).[48]

Van der Heyden's treatise was an early example of the Enlightenment's extensive search for superior technical solutions to the challenge of spreading light. The theory and practice of lantern design, in fact, drew considerable enlightened energy throughout the long eighteenth century, attracting a steady stream of submissions to learned academies such as the Académie des sciences, while occupying the thoughts of such luminaries as Benjamin Franklin and Lavoisier, who began his career, as he tells us, devoting effort to "chemical experiments made on lamps, to the materials that can be burned in them most efficiently, and to the best type of wicks and fuel reservoirs."[49] The century's quest to perfect the lantern would culminate in the 1780s with the development in Switzerland, France, and England of the Argand lamp, which, on the basis of a much more efficient delivery of oxygen to the flame, burned hotter and brighter than any previous source of artificial illumination.[50]



Illustrations from Pierre Patte's *De la manière la plus avantageuse d'éclairer les rues d'une ville* (Amsterdam, 1766). Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Yale University.

Patte's own treatise may be situated comfortably in this evolving technical discussion. It is true that he takes pains to distinguish his own work from that of a lantern maker (*lanternier*), whose "sole aim is to discover a new form of lantern, and who thinks he has succeeded if he has used a smaller pane, or rendered it as a square or a triangle, or placed a reflecting mirror behind the light." Patte's aim was more ambitious. He would provide a theory, at once practical and demonstrative, of concrete measures that could be taken to better illuminate an urban environment.[51]

Patte organized his exposition around five principal questions, beginning with the question of fuel. "What are the most suitable combustible materials to illuminate a city?" he asked. As Patte well knew, oil, wax, and animal fat had been in use in various forms since antiquity, and France itself had employed candles from rendered animal fat for much of the century. Patte dismissed wax, though—in all of its various forms—as too expensive and argued that, "from the standpoint of political economy," oil was "most advantageous." Whether produced domestically or imported from abroad, it was about a third cheaper, he claimed, than

candles made from tallow. In addition, oil produced a light with more "clarity," "action," and "vivacity" than candles.[52]

Of the two main types of oil—that of vegetable products and that derived from animal or fish—Patte argued for the superior merits of the former. Unlike oil from animal products, vegetable oil did not spoil or go rancid, and so could be stored indefinitely. It could also be produced in a great many varieties, and in a great many regions, depending on climate and soil. Olive oil, rapeseed, and flaxseed were all viable sources, as was oil derived from carnation flowers and beechnut. Patte argued that beechnut oil (which could also be used in salads or for frying) was the optimal choice for France, because it did not require extensive cultivation and grew plentifully in French forests in the wild, above all in Burgundy. Inexpensive, it burned as well as olive oil, gave off comparatively little smoke, and produced an admirable flame. In addition, it would not spoil or freeze. Patte recommended establishing processing mills close to the forests in Burgundy and then transporting the oil by land to the Seine, where it could be shipped directly to Paris. The resulting savings, he argued, would allow the city of Paris to expand its lighting service from the then-current nine months out of the year to the full twelve, and permit authorities to keep the lanterns illuminated throughout the night.

However ingenious Patte's plan—and however environmentally sound—he was, in the near term at least, on the wrong side of history as far as lighting fuel was concerned. London, which by midcentury could boast the best street-lighting in Europe, was rapidly converting to the use of whale oil (and, above all, the prized spermaceti oil) provided by enterprising merchants in North America. A great many cities in the Atlantic world would follow, including Paris in the aftermath of the American Revolutionary War, when merchants from Nantucket and New Bedford established themselves in Dunkirk and Le Havre to provide their erstwhile French allies with the fuel that was powering an Atlantic lighting revolution. Valued for its intense bright light and its clean combustion, spermaceti oil (and spermaceti candles) became the lighting fuel of choice until its eventual displacement by gas in the nineteenth century, resulting in the slaughter of hundreds and thousands of sperm whales.

If Patte's beechnut oil missed the mark, his answers to the questions of what was the best form of lantern and what was the best way to position it were more farsighted. Providing diagrams of prototypes along with explicit instructions to lantern manufacturers about how best to assemble them, Patte argued for the superiority of a single-flame design over that of a lantern containing numerous separate lights. Just as a single torch was more powerful than it would be if divided up into separate branches, so a single source of light in the lantern was optimal.

The more pressing issue, in Patte's view, was how best to ensure consistency of illumination. As lanterns depleted their fuel source, they tended to burn irregularly, feeding the wick only imperfectly, which mushroomed and gathered in a mass, with the result that after only a few hours lanterns gave off a "sketchy and listless light" (*une lumière louche et sans activité*). To remedy these shortcomings, Patte offered a design that would deliver fuel from above the flame, rather than from a container below it, doing so from two separate reservoirs that were constructed to pivot as they emptied so as to maintain an equilibrium of oil throughout even the longest night. Guaranteeing a constant and even consumption of fuel and wick, they assured a constant and steady flame, delivering a superior light that burned not only more equally but also more economically.

Patte offered numerous other improvements. He made provisions to prevent the freezing and congealing of oil in the lantern reservoirs in winter. He speculated about the best design, material, and shape of the wick. And he suggested a lantern in the shape of a semi-hexagon with four panes of glass for ease of access and repair, painted with white oil-paint on the nonglass interior to reflect light, and with a special air current to prevent blackening of the glass by smoke. On the question of placement, Patte argued resolutely for mounting lanterns on the sides of buildings and homes, pointing out that France was one of the only countries in Europe that had opted, since the time of Louis XIV, to suspend lanterns on cables in the middle of the street.

Subject to the vagaries of wind and rain, these lanterns were unstable, resulting in a shifting and imperfect light. Far better to mount them in a fixed spot, ten to eleven feet above the pavement, alternating right to left at a distance of eighteen toises if *réverbères* were employed, and twelve toises if they were not. Finally, to avoid the use of ladders, which were employed in cities such as London and Copenhagen, to access the lanterns for cleaning and maintenance, Patte placed them on pulleys that could be lowered and raised from a mounted box on the wall, which also addressed the need for extra lighting to accommodate shops and boutiques.

In the closing pages of his text, Patte considered the proper use to be made of reflectors (*réverbères*) and the simplest and most efficient means to undertake the daily service of the lanterns themselves. Regarding *réverbères,* Patte, by his own admission, had little original to say, concurring with others that they were useful and offering several paragraphs of advice on their shape (parabolic), size, and placement so as to maximize reflection and minimize smoke. On lantern service, however, he was more expansive, showing his broader knowledge of urban planning and administration. Patte sketched plans to erect a central depot to house oil and wicks in the city and for individual lamplighters to take charge of fifty

Antoine Humblot, "Rue Quincampoix en l'année 1720" (INHA). This engraving is one of the earliest extant representations of the Parisian lanterns introduced by Louis XIV. Bibliothèque Nationale.

lanterns apiece, delivering their oil each day by means of an ingenious portable tank that they would wear on their back. After cleaning and refueling the lanterns each morning, they would return to light them each night by means of a long, ready-lit candle constructed to withstand wind and rain. In Patte's calculation, by following an exact timetable that would vary with the seasons and the placement of the moon, lamplighters, working together and in consort, could light the entire city in just six minutes.

Patte's suggestions regarding lantern service and synchronization reflect the fact that the provision of public lighting in European cities was undergoing a process of greater rationalization and administrative precision. Paris abandoned the use of *commis allumeurs* in the 1750s in favor of professional lamplighters, who throughout the country were coming under the control of private contractors, *entrepreneurs de l'illumination*, who worked in conjunction with the police to guarantee the lighting of cities. One such entrepreneur, Pierre Tourtille Sangrain,


ANNÉE 1789.

TABLEAU de l'Illumination de Paris pour l'année 1789, contenant les jours & heures que l'on doit éclairer, & ceux de Cessation*; avec l'indication des Entrepôts, & des Employés qui composent la Régie.

JANVIER. FÉVRIER. MARS. AVRIL. MAI. JUIN. JUILLET. AOUST. SEPTEMBRE. OCTOBRE. NOVEMBRE. DÉCEMBRE.

* Les Mardi marqués les mois de Carême, Carnaval & Quatre-Temps, ainsi que les Veilles de grandes Fêtes, n'éclairent point. Il n'éclaire pas non plus les Nuits où il y a Concert à la salle des Pensionnaires de l'Opéra, rue Saint-Honoré, & les Nuits où il y a Feu d'artifice, soit à la Place de Louis XV, soit à celle de la Bastille.

La Régie de l'Illumination est composée de deux INSPECTEURS, de dix COMMIS, de cent soixante-cinq ALLUMEURS, & de cinq ENTREPÔTS, dans chacun desquels il y a deux COMMIS, & toujours un de garde. Le nombre des Lanternes est de 3528, contenantes 7962 lumieres.

MM. SERREAU & THIOT, Commissaires.
LE SIEUR DAMOUR, Inspecteur.
LE SIEUR JULIEN, Adjoint.

L'Entrepôt général, rue des Poteaux.

M. BEAULIEU, Inspecteur, demeurant rue des Poteaux.
Les Sr. VANDIER & MARIE, Commis, demeurant audit Dépôt.
33 Allumeurs faisant le Service des Quartiers ci-après:
de Saint Denis.
de Saint Martin.
du Marché-neuf.
du Saint Jacques la Boucherie.
des Halles;
& Saint Opportune.

L'Entrepôt des Capucins, rue S. Honoré.

M. FERCAULT, Inspecteur, demeurant rue Quincampoix, N°. 5.
Les Sr. LESOR & CHEVRIER, Commis, demeurant audit Dépôt.
34 Allumeurs faisant le Service des Quartiers ci-après:
du Palais Royal.
du Saint Esprit.
du Louvre.
& du Faubourg S. Honoré.

L'Entrepôt de la rue de Bourgogne.

M. FERCAULT, Inspecteur, demeurant rue Quincampoix, N°. 5.
Les Sr. DUCAMP & MAURICE, Commis, demeurant audit Dépôt.
33 Allumeurs faisant le Service des Quartiers ci-après:
du Luxembourg.
du Saint Germain-des-Prés,
& le Gros-Caillou.

L'Entrepôt de la rue S. Nicolas du Chardonnet.

M. BEAULIEU, Inspecteur, demeurant rue des Poteaux.
Les Sr. DUHAMEL & ROCHE, Commis, demeurant audit Dépôt.
33 Allumeurs faisant le Service des Quartiers ci-après:
de la Cité.
de Saint André-des-Arts.
de la Place Maubert.
de Saint Benoît.
& de l'Isle Saint Louis.

L'Entrepôt de la rue de la Cerisaye.

M. BEAULIEU, Inspecteur, demeurant rue des Poteaux.
Les Sr. DUBOST & BERRUET, Commis, demeurant audit Dépôt.
33 Allumeurs faisant le Service des Quartiers ci-après:
du Marais.
de Saint Paul.
de Saint Antoine,
& du Faubourg,
de la Greve
& Saint Avoye.

ETAT des Années qui pourront arriver par différens accidens de voiture & autres causes:

Pour chaque carrosse d'une Lanterne à 3 & à 2 verres..... 1s
Pour chaque carrosse de Lanterne à 1 verre..... 1s 6d
Pour un Cheval monté d'une Lanterne..... 1s
Pour un Porteur-d'eau à tête de Lanterne..... 1s
Pour mener aucun arrêté chez l'Auteur, y rédiger du contentieux, par addition..... 1s
Pour chaque Fiacre vuide rencontré..... 1s 6d
Pour chaque Fiacre chargé de 1 à 2 Lanternes..... 1s
Pour une Lanterne cassée..... 1s
Pour une Vitre cassée..... 1s

Présenté à Monseigneur DE CROSNE, *Maître des Requêtes, Lieutenant Général de Police, par l'Entrepreneur de l'Illumination de Paris, le premier Janvier 1789.* TOURTILLE SANGRAIN.

De D. PIERRES, Premier Imprimeur Ordinaire du Roi, de la Police, &c. rue S. Jacques. 1789.

An illumination table for Paris in the year 1789 provided by Pierre Tourtille Sangrain, the city's *entrepreneur de l'illumination*, to the police. The table provides the precise hours that the city's 3,528 lanterns (comprising 7,962 lights) are to be lit and extinguished for every day of the year. An example of the increasing rational order brought to the administration of public illumination, the table specifies that lamp lighting will be overseen by two inspectors, ten superintendents, and sixty-five lamplighters operating from five central depots in the city. Archives Nationales, France.

would in fact capitalize on the results of the same essay contest in which Patte competed, teaming up with one of its winners, Bourgeois de Chateaublanc, to secure a royal monopoly to provide lighting in Paris for twenty years.[53] By the end of the Old Regime, Sangrain was lighting as many as twenty-seven cities in France, along with numerous lighthouses.[54] Administering them with increasing uniformity and precision, he had lighting tables printed for Paris and other cities that detailed the hours of service for each day of the year.

Meanwhile, the daily newspaper, the *Journal de Paris*, printed the hours of the illumination of the *réverbères* just below its masthead, along with the hours of the rising and setting of the sun. Given the looseness of time in the Old Regime, it would likely have been hazardous to set one's watch by the nightly illumination. But the provision of public lighting in Paris and other cities in Europe was becoming more regulated and systemized than ever before.

Although Patte, despite his own considerable technical expertise, was awarded neither a prize nor a contract for his work, arguably its greatest value lay less in what it had to say about lantern technology and innovation and more in its ability to situate that technology and the accompanying desire for light in the context of the Europe of his day. For Patte, too, was a historian, and indeed he begins his essay by drawing attention to the singularity of the light of the times. "If nothing is more important than to light cities at night—as much for the comfort of their citizens as to prevent the disorders and crimes favored by the dark," that was not always the case. The Ancients could offer no help in the matter. "If we are ignorant of how all those vaunted cities of the past—Babylon, Nineveh, Thebes, Carthage, Alexandria, Rome, and Athens—were illuminated by night, there is reason to believe that the cause is because they were deprived of this advantage," Patte judged, "just as are the cities of Japan and China today." Notwithstanding the good order that reigned in Chinese society and their lavish festivals of lanterns, the Chinese "seem to have regarded as useless the precaution of lighting their cities in common during the night." Similarly, there was no illumination in Constantinople, Cairo, Isfahan, or any of the cities of the Near East. Public illumination was a European innovation, Patte maintained, and a recent one at that, begun in Paris under Louis XIV in 1667 and adapted by the leading cities of Europe steadily thereafter.[55]

Having emphasized the singularity of Europe's illumination, Patte then provided a comparative appraisal of the lighting regimes of leading European cities, emphasizing differences, advantages, and innovations. Whereas Paris (as well as other major French cities such as Rouen and Lyon) was illuminated only from the end of August until May—with the lanterns burning from sundown until one or two in the morning—the lights of London burned throughout the night, all year long. In London, the lanterns were mounted on iron posts on sidewalks on the street, and burned fish and whale oil. In Paris they were suspended from cords and burned tallow candles. Patte claimed dubiously that the light of London—financed privately instead of by the city—was inferior to the light of Paris. Copenhagen, like London, employed square glass lanterns, equally spaced along the sidewalked streets, some on lampposts, some attached to buildings. They too were fueled by fish oil, which had the advantage of not freezing in the cold, and were serviced by ladders. But unlike those of London, the lanterns of Copenhagen were maintained and paid for by the city. In Madrid, the lanterns were lit only eight months of the year and fueled by olive oil. Every house was required to maintain one, which resulted, Patte noted, in the inconvenience that the intensity

of light depended on the concentration of houses. In Flanders and the Low Countries, lanterns composed of small glass panes were placed along the walls, burning rapeseed oil.[56]

Patte used these examples to draw attention to what worked and what didn't, emphasizing his preference for oil, for mounted lanterns and *réverbères*, and for practices that minimized expense and manpower. But even the best-lit and most efficient cities fell short. "The different methods that have been employed until now to light cities are insufficient and subject to all sorts of inconveniences." Although Europe in the eighteenth century had achieved an unprecedented level of public illumination, it was not yet an illuminated age.[57]

Conclusion

The Age of Enlightenment was an age of illumination, a fact reflected in the growing consciousness of Europeans that they lived in a unique time of light. That consciousness was metaphorical but also literal, and the two—theory and practice—reinforced one another. The illuminated night skies of European cities were vivid illustrations of human beings' capacity to employ ingenuity and reason to combat the forces of the dark, making for themselves a safer and more comfortable world without precedent in human history.

The symbol of the long eighteenth century's project of illumination was the lantern, a venerable technology, whose history and culture enlightened authors explored. Improved over the course of the eighteenth century, the lantern was the vehicle of the conquest of the night and a useful metaphor—overdetermined and ready at hand—upon which French Revolutionaries could seize in their efforts to put an end to the struggle against the long reign of darkness that the *siècle des lumières* had so valiantly begun.

Lanterns in the Revolution were everywhere, in fact, conspicuous for their presence on the streets as authorities marshaled greater numbers of *réverbères* and extended their hours of service in an effort to cope with popular mobilization, and conspicuous for their presence in print.[58] From Camille Desmoulins's *Discours de la lanterne aux Parisiens* (1789) to Mirabeau's periodical *La Lanterne magique* (1789–90) to sundry plays, poems, and works of prose, lanterns served as a powerful symbol of choice that called attention to their capacity to clarify and shed light.

They also drew attention, if only unwittingly, to light's capacity to blind. Desmoulins's "lantern," after all, watched over the lynching on 22 July 1789 of Jean-Baptiste Foulon and Berthier de Sauvigny, an act that helped create a new verb


LE TRAITRE LOUIS XVI.
VOUÉ AU MÉPRIS ET A L'EXÉCRATION DE LA NATION FRANÇAISE DANS LA POSTÉRITÉ LA PLUS RECULÉE.
LA PANTHERE AUTRICHIENNE
VOUÉE AU MÉPRIS ET A L'EXÉCRATION DE LA NATION FRANÇAISE DANS LA POSTÉRITÉ LA PLUS RECULÉE.

The "Traitor Louis" and the "Austrian Panther" Marie Antoine depicted as *révèrberes* (reflecting mirror lamps), ready to be "lanterned." British Library.

lanterner, to string up by the lantern cord or lamppost. The act bid others to rush "à la lanterne!" It was also a prompt to the muse. Poets wrote epistles to the "celebrated lantern" or simply "*the* lantern," avenger of the public good.[59] And lanterns were celebrated in song. "A *réverbère* gave clarity / to our affair of liberty," ran the first verse of a popular ditty, "Sur la lanterne des parisiens."[60] "Les aristocrates à la lanterne," intoned another, "Ah, ça ira, ça ira, ça ira."[61]

For the revolutionaries who invoked these words, the lantern remained a symbol of transparency, a medium of the public eye and a tool of surveillance that dispensed summary justice when traitors were revealed in the dark. For others, however, the tools of illumination were revealed in a new light—as harsh and blinding ancillaries of police repression. So did counterrevolutionaries along with many erstwhile proponents of the light of the times discover what those who smashed lanterns in the Old Regime probably already knew: light could act as the coercive servant of power, casting shadows accordingly. Those writing narratives of enlightenment—and histories of illumination—have wrestled with this paradox ever since.

NOTES

1. François Hartog, *Régimes d'historicité. Présentisme et expérience du temps* (Paris: Seuil, 2003).

2. Daniel Brewer, *The Enlightenment Past: Reconstructing Eighteenth-Century French Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*: vol. 2: *Narratives of Civil Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

3. In addition to the essays in this volume, see Roland Mortier, *Clarté et ombres du siècle des lumières: études sur le XVIIè siècle littéraire* (Geneva: Droz, 1969). See also Michel Delon, "Les Lumières: travail d'une métaphore," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 1552 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1976): 527–41; Jacques Roger, "La lumière et les lumières," *Cahiers de l'Association international des études françaises* 20 (1968): 167–77; and Karin Elisabeth Becker, "Licht-[L]umières—Siècle des lumières: Von der Lichmetapher zum Epochenbegriff der Aufklürung in Frankreich" (PhD diss., University of Köln, 1994).

4. See Hans Blumenberg, "Light as a Metaphor for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Philosophic Concept Formation," trans. Joel Anderson, in *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*, ed. David Michael Levin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 30–62.

5. The lines are those of the Nicene Creed: "Lumen de Lumine, Deum verum de Deo vero, genitum non factum, consubstantialem Patri."

6. Craig Koslofsky, *Evening's Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 131–32.

7. *Lettre d'un sicilien à un des ses amis contenant une agréable critique de Paris et des François* (Chamberi: Maubul, 1720), 39–40. Single quotations marks added.

8. On the general relationship between the Enlightenment and actual illumination, see my article, "Illuminating the Enlightenment: Public Lighting Practices in the Siècle des Lumières," *Past & Present* 240 (2018).

9. See the fine account in Cesare Birignani's excellent "The Police and the City. Paris, 1660–1750" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2013), 161–77.

10. Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BN), manuscrits français (ms. fr.), 21864, fol. 63, (*Déclaration par le Roi et Monsieur le prevost de Paris ou son Lieutenant de Paris*, 2 Sept. 1667).

11. "Collection Delamare," BN, ms. fr. 21545–21808. Leclerc's manuscript may be found at BN ms. fr. 21684, fols. 77–117.

12. BN, ms. fr. 21684, fol. 77.

13. Ibid.

14. Robert Hillenbrand, "'The Ornament of the World': Medieval Córdoba as a Cultural Centre," in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. Salma Khadra Javyusi and Manuela Marín (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 118.

15. See Emilio García Gómez, ed., *Andalucía contra Berbería: reedición de traducciones de Ben Hayyān, Šaqundī Ben al-Jaṭīb* (Barcelona: Departamento de Lengua y Literatura Árabes, 1976), 128–29. Al-Shaqundi's treatise is cited in Ahmed Mohammed al-Maqqari's seventeenth-century history *al-Nafh al-Tib*.

16. BN, ms. fr. 21684, fols. 78–79.

17. Ibid., fols. 79–83.

18. Ibid., fol. 99.

19. Throughout the eighteenth century, the police issued ordinances forbidding activities that could result in broken lanterns. See, typically, *Ordonnance de police portant defenses de jouer dans les rues ou places publiques au volant, au bâtonnet, aux quilles, ni même d'élever des cervolans et autres jeux, dont les passans puissent être incommodés ou blessés, les lanternes publiques cassées, à peine de deux cens livres d'amende* (Paris: H. Guerin, 1752).

20. Cited in Commandant Hérlaut, *L'éclairage des rues de Paris à la fin du XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: 1916), 98. Leclerc cites another ordinance from 1667 that "forbids all pages and lackeys from smashing lanterns and breaking their supports [*poteaux*], boxes, and cords" (BN, ms. fr. 21684, fol. 115).

21. Koslofsky, *Evening's Empire*, 144. On the phenomenon of lantern smashing, see Frédérique Pitou, "Jeunesse et désordre social: les coureurs de nuit à Laval au XVIIIe siècle," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 47, no. 1 (2000): 69–92, as well as Catherine Clemens-Denys, "Le bris de lanternes dans les ville du nord de la france au XVIIIe siècle: quelques reflexions sur la signification d'un delit ordinaire," in *La petite delinquance du Moyen Age à l'époque contemporaine. Actes du colloque de Dijon 9 & 19 octobre 1991*, ed. Benoit Garnot (Dijon: Editions Universitaires de Dijon, 1998), 309–19.

22. BN ms. fr. 21684, fols. 108–14. On the unpopularity of serving as a *commis-allumeur*, see the discussion in Hérlaut, *L'éclairage de rues des Paris*, 59–88.

23. BN ms. fr. 21684, fol. 103.

24. Ibid.

25. "Edit de Roi pour l'Etablissement des Lanternes dans les principales Villes du Royaume" (Metz: Brice Antoine, 1697).

26. On this point, Sophie Reculin, "L'établissement et la diffusion de l'illumination publique à Rennes au XVIIIe siècle," *Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l'ouest* 120, no. 4 (2013): 89–106.

27. On one notable exception, the city of Lille, which adopted widespread public lighting at almost the same time as Paris, see Koslofsky, *Evening's Empire*, 140–45.

28. [Jean-Francois Dreux de Radier et al.], *Essai historique, critique, philologique, politique, moral, littéraire et galant sur les lanternes, leur origine, leur forme, leur utlilité, etc. Par une société des gens de lettres* (Dole: Lucnophile, 1754).

29. Ibid., vii–xii, 57–59.

30. Ibid., 2–3.

31. Ibid., 11.

32. Ibid., 12.

33. Ibid., 12–27.

34. Ibid., 34, 38, 47.

35. On the *lanterne de corne*, see Jaucourt's brief article in the *Encyclopédie*, which invokes Pliny, Plautus, and Alfred the Great to trace the history of this invention.

36. Radier et al., *Essai historique*, 51.

37. See François Maximilien Misson, *Voyage d'Italie. Edition augmenté de remarques nouvelles et interessantes*, 4 vols. (Amsterdam and Paris: Clousier, David, Durand & Damonneville, 1743), 2:225.

38. This episode was in fact widely reported in the European gazettes and journals of the day; see, e.g., the *Journal historique et littéraire*, Mar. 1707, 205–6. Stockholm didn't undertake extensive public lighting until 1749.

39. Ibid., 96–110.

40. *Les nouvelles lanternes, Poëme, par M. de Valois d'Orville* (Paris: J. B. Delespine, 1746). The poem is reproduced in Radier et al., *Essai historique*, 111–14.

41. Édouard Fournier, *Les Lanternes: Histoire de l'ancien éclairage de Paris, suivi de la réimpression de quelques poèmes rares* (Paris: Dentu, 1854), 14, 15, 28, 38, 40.

42. Radier et al., *Essai historique*, 108.

43. Mae Mathieu, *Pierre Patte, sa vie et son oeuvre* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1940), 332.

44. On Patte's importance in the history of architecture, see Andrew Sutcliffe, *Paris: An Architectural History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 51–53, and Sophie Descat, "Pierre Patte, théoricien de l'urbanisme," in *Urbanisme parisien au siècle des Lumières*, ed. Michel Le Moël (Paris: Action artistique de la Ville de Paris, 1997), 58–65. Patte also made important innovations in stage lighting. See Briant Hamor Less, "Pierre Patte: Late 18th Century Lighting Innovator," *Theatre Survey* 15, no. 2 (1974): 177–83.

45. Pierre Patte, *De la manière la plus avantageuse d'éclairer les rues d'une grande villle, pendant la nuit, en combinant la clarté, l'économie, et la facilité du service* (Amsterdam, 1766).

46. On the essay contest, see Robert Ellissen, *Le Concours Sartine, 1763–1766* (Paris: Société Anonyme des publications périodiques, 1922).

47. See Lettie S. Multhauf, "The Light of Lamp-Lanterns: Street Lighting in 17th-Century Amsterdam," *Technology and Culture* 26, no. 2 (1985): 236–52.

48. "Het licht der lamplantarens ontsteking," *Het Gas* 33 (1913): 311–406.

49. Antoine Lavoisier, "Sur les différents moyens qu'on peut employer pour éclairer une grande ville," in *Œuvres de Lavoisier, Mémoires et rapports sur divers sujets de chimie et de physique pures*, ed. Jean-Baptiste Dumas, Édouard Grimaux, and Ferdinand André Fouqué, 6 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1864–68), 3:2. Lavoisier's elaborate original sketches of lanterns and light angles are at the Archives de l'Académie des Sciences, Fonds Lavoisier, Paris.

50. The complicated story of the lamp's development and production is told in John J. Wolf, *Brandy, Balloons, & Lamps: Ami Argand, 1750–1803* (Carbondale/Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999).

51. Patte, *De la manière la plus avantageuse d'éclairer les rues d'une grande villle*, 17.

52. Ibid., 8–19.

53. *Arrêt du conseil d'état du Roi, qui reçoit les Soumissions des sieurs Lavalar, Sangrain, et Bourgeois de Chateaublanc pour l'Illumination de la ville de Paris* (Paris: L. F. Delatour, 1769).

54. On the life of Sangrain, see Darrin M. McMahon and Sophie Reculin, "Un entrepreneur de lumière," *L'Histoire*, no. 535 (2017): 66–71.

55. Patte, *De la manière la plus avantageuse d'éclairer les rues*, 3–5.

56. Ibid., 6–12.

57. Ibid., 12.

58. See August-Philippe Herlaut, *L'éclairage de Paris à l'époque révolutionnaire* (Paris: Mellottée, 1932).

59. M. Lieutaud, *Épître à la lanterne* (Paris: Devaux, 1789).

60. *Sur la Lanterne des Parisiens*, chanson et air connu (Mâcon, 1790). "Un réverbère donna de la clarté / A notre affaire, touchant la liberté."

61. This is a well-known refrain from the extremely popular revolutionary song, "Ça Ira."

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Part Two. *Veritas*

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JO VAN CAUTER

Another Dialogue in the *Tractatus*

Spinoza on "Christ's Disciples" and the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers)

Spinoza is often portrayed as the secular saint and founding father of the Radical Enlightenment who draws on the new sciences to support his philosophical arguments.[1] While this image is not wholly false, it has led to a neglect of the religious sources of his thought. In fact, key elements of Spinoza's philosophy draw on ideas found in the religious ferment that accompanied the confrontation between Collegiant and Quaker thought in seventeenth-century Holland. Spinoza's profound and abiding influence on the European Enlightenment lies not so much in his critical assessment of revealed religion as in his sustained attempt to bring the precepts of scripture into dialogue with the teachings of philosophy.

Spinoza's involvement with the Collegiants, an eclectic company of Dutch Protestants who placed themselves outside the Calvinist Reformed Church to read scripture and freely debate religious matters, has received considerable scholarly attention.[2] By contrast, Spinoza's relations with the early Quakers remain a relatively unexplored topic. Much of the existing research can be attributed to Richard Popkin, whose contributions remain the subject of controversy among Spinoza scholars. Popkin has ascribed a brief Quaker period to Spinoza's life, following his excommunication in 1656, and has identified Spinoza's first publication as the Hebrew translation of two Quaker conversionist pamphlets circulating at that time in Amsterdam.[3] A lack of conclusive historical evidence has left other commentators wondering. The implication that Spinoza once actively supported a religious sect in its endeavor to convert and attract Jews to a new purified form of Christianity has been received with disbelief and even ridicule.[4] If we defer the question of "Spinoza's first publication," Popkin's research generates fruitful lines of inquiry. Regardless of whether Spinoza ever officially joined the ranks of the Quakers, and there is no evidence he did, his contact with their movement exposed him to some of the most groundbreaking religious ideas of that moment. The Quakers' denial that scripture is the Word of God, their emphasis on the individual's independence in interpreting scripture, on the use of the inner light and conviction with no mention of creeds—to name but a few—all permeate Spinoza's own work.

Spinoza's critique of revelation is often presented as the hallmark of his notorious rebellion against scriptural religion. For Spinoza, God acts simply out of the necessity of his nature; divine activity is nothing but the operation of the eternal and immutable laws according to which all things happen and are determined. Spinoza's radical rejection of a personal God who could by act of will interfere in the order of the natural world excludes the possibility of any special or miraculous intervention, aid, or insight. Spinoza's God does not act for the sake of man.[5] Given Spinoza's ontology, the Quaker reliance on direct inspiration and the spontaneous authority of Christ's inward light may at first seem to represent much that is antithetical to his thought. As we shall see, however, that is only partly true. Spinoza's metaphysical critique of anthropomorphism, divine providence, and teleological thinking expressed most forcefully in the *Ethics* (1678) has little bearing on his assessment of religious prophecy as presented in the *Theological-Political Treatise* (*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, 1670). That is, Spinoza maintained a distinction between philosophical and theological assessments of divine revelation.

In the context of biblical religion, Spinoza argued, individuals are not punishable for the alleged irrationality of their convictions; the mark of faith lies entirely in one's commitment to the practice of justice and charity. Insofar as individuals are guided in conduct to others by loving-kindness and justice, faithful obedience to God is posited. If viewed from a theological-political perspective, metaphysical or epistemological concerns are irrelevant, or secondary at best. Whatever enthusiastic appeals are made, people should be restrained only insofar as their religious opinions give rise to practices that endanger or undermine sociopolitical stability.

Whereas many scholars often characterize Spinoza's enlightened stance toward the religious phenomena in terms of a confrontation between reason and revelation, this study contends that this is a misguided view.[6] Spinoza's reflections on religion indicate an awareness of the inevitability of human appeals to prophetic inspiration and the responsibility of the state alone in steering prophetically inspired actions in the right direction. An examination of Spinoza's concept of piety in light of the early Quaker phenomenon is particularly useful in bringing this feature of Spinozism to attention.

Quakers and Collegiants on the Principle of Light

In 1656 the English preacher and writer William Ames arrived in Amsterdam to spread the Quaker message more widely in the Dutch Republic.[7] Like many of the early Friends, his story is one of a profound spiritual awakening that followed

many years of wandering and religious introspection. Ames wrote that during his time as a Baptist preacher he knew "that sin was alive in [him], and that [he] was under the power of Darkness." He explained that he "had only the forms of holiness," yet lacked the power "by which Sin might be overcome."[8] A spiritual transformation occurred when it was shown to him that the Word of God was already present within; that all men by turning to the inward light of Christ might find their salvation. Early Friends maintained that only through recognition of Christ's light within could humankind once again cultivate pious desires toward God and commence the work of sanctification.

To fully appreciate the depth and radicalism of the Quaker experience of the "divine indwelling," a focus on the Quaker idea of the second coming of Christ is useful. The Quakers, like other millenarians of the period, were convinced that this moment in Christian eschatology was imminent.[9] Scholarship, however, emphasizes that, although the early Quakers initially had diverging views concerning what they called the end-times, most Friends believed that a second coming could already be experienced inwardly.[10] For the early Quakers, Christ no longer was known "at a distance."[11] God had sent His Son—Christ, "God's Word, Life and Light that enlightens every man that comes into the world"—so that people could believe and be guided directly through Christ's eternal spirit.[12]

By emphasizing an immediate, inward knowledge of Christ, Quakers claimed to experience the Word of God in the same way that they believed the primitive Christians had done.[13] They advocated a firsthand experience of divine reality, grounded not in any external liturgical form but in the covenant of life with God himself, one that was similar to Christ's early followers, who lived in a time when the New Testament had not yet been written.[14] For the early Quakers, as William Braithwaite puts it, God dwells "not in temples made with hands but in men's heart—His people were His temple and He dwelt in them."[15] Quakers felt that by rejecting ecclesiastical authority and basing their faith directly on the guidance of the light within, they could reclaim primitive Christianity and thereby avoid corruptions that plagued other churches.[16] The age of the Spirit was now—"Christ is come and coming"—and it was left to people like George Fox, Margaret Fell, William Ames, and many others to "declare this *Primitive Message* . . . That God is Light."[17]

Ames, who soon emerged as the central figure of the Quaker community in Holland, played a pivotal role in what came to be known as the "war of pamphlets" between the Quakers and the Collegiants. Given the shared features of their faith and practice, both groups were quickly drawn to each other. Collegiants, like the Quakers, met without preachers to read the Bible and to freely discuss religious

matters, and they also emphasized the importance of a belief in the light within.[18] However, despite many points of resemblance between the two groups, important Collegiant figures soon became critical of the Quaker message.

One crucial point of contention concerned the exact nature of the inner light. According to Andrew Fix, a "final break" between the Collegiants and Quakers arose in 1660 when Collegiants started to abandon a spiritualistic interpretation of the light in favor of rationalism.[19] The doctrine of the inner light gradually "transformed from a belief in direct divine inspiration of the individual soul to an embryonic idea of the natural light of reason."[20] Fix places special emphasis on Pieter Balling's *Light upon the Candlestick*, a Collegiant manuscript written by one of Spinoza's intimate friends.[21] Fix argues that while Balling's work was still "solidly anchored" in the spiritualist tradition, it now "identified the light of truth with that fundamental and indubitable rational knowledge upon which Descartes built his new philosophy." The controversy with the Quakers is seen as "an event of great importance" for this development. Fix, for instance, writes that "Collegiants reacted to Quaker spiritualistic zeal by modifying traditional Collegiant spiritualism in a rationalistic direction." By "developing a secular interpretation of the inner light these Rijnsburgers perhaps hoped to undercut the legitimacy of Quaker claims based on the inworking of the Holy Spirit."[22]

The Quaker controversy seems to have played a key role in pushing Collegiants like Balling toward a naturalistic conception of the inner light that was influenced by the new philosophy of Descartes and Spinoza. We find a similar assessment in Jonathan Israel's and Wim Klever's scholarship. Although Balling's concept of the "true light" presented in *Candlestick* is "well clothed in spiritual terms," for Israel it ultimately refers to the clear and distinct knowledge of the Cartesians. *Candlestick*, at any rate, should not be "mistaken for a Quaker tract," he argues.[23] Klever points out that the text contains several "evangelical" words or concepts, yet maintains that for Balling himself these always retain "a purely naturalistic or secular meaning." For Klever, *Candlestick* is nothing but a "Spinozistic tract."[24] These commentators thus agree that *Candlestick* represents both a clear example of the evolution of Collegiant thought from spiritualism to naturalism as a direct result of Cartesian and Spinozistic influences and a decisive departure from Quaker views.

The fact that Balling was close friends with Spinoza gives considerable credibility to the first hypothesis. Spinoza's *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*, written in 1662 and published in 1663, was translated into Dutch in 1664 by Balling himself.[25] Given that Spinoza developed this work at the same time as Balling wrote

The Light upon the Candlestick, it is likely that they discussed Cartesian philosophy together. Cartesianism and Spinozism clearly influenced Balling in his work.

The second assertion—that *Candlestick* represents a departure from Quaker views—poses more significant problems. Fix remarks that *Candlestick* "has attracted more scholarly attention that any other Collegiant work."[26] Indeed, besides the mentioned ambiguity concerning the interpretation of the inner light, additional confusion resulted from the anonymous title page that references the separate work *Mysteries of the Kingdom of God* as authored by Ames. We now know that Balling wrote the anonymously published *Candlestick*.[27] Furthermore, while the title page might suggest an attempt to refute Ames, a comparative assessment of the two works shows that Candlestick actually affirms Quaker thought. In other words, "it was not that someone decided to put Ames's name to Balling's work, but that the title page was describing (and acknowledging) the influence of William Ames's work on *The Light upon the Candlestick*."[28]

Ames's *Mysteries of the Kingdom of God* was itself a reaction to the work of another important Collegiant, Abraham Galenus. The main points of discussion between Galenus and Ames touched on in *Mysteries* concern the precise nature of the inner light and the relative priority of the Bible over that inner light.[29] Two central premises ground Ames's argumentation in *Mysteries*. First, he saw the inner light as "the first principle of religion." Only the Light of Christ can reveal our sinful nature to ourselves and show us how to walk again in the goodness and power of God: "It is the light . . . —that enlightens every man that comes into the world—that cultivates in men good desires towards God, the fountain of eternal life; . . . the light reveals in the conscience of man, the impurity of his ways."[30] Second, Ames observed that the Bible could be properly understood only when read with the illumination of the light within. His treatise exposed the deficiencies of a literal reading of scripture: only by first embracing the inner Christ, the light to which scripture testifies, can the biblical writings fulfill their function as a source of spiritual truth. Ames wrote that men like Galenus taught people "a form of Godgloriness (which consists of external labours) to be followed to the letter . . . and thus they lead them away from the path in which God gives his Spirit, to search for the Spirit in a path where they are unable to ever obtain it."[31]

Balling's *Candlestick* defended these same two principles. Balling confirmed that the light is the first principle of religion: "For seeing there can be no true Religion without the knowledge of God, and no knowledge of God without this *Light*, Religion must necessarily have this *Light* for its first Principle."[32] Similarly, he claimed: "Direct thee then to within thyself, that is, that thou oughtest to turn

into, to mind and have regard unto that which is within thee, to wit, *The Light of Truth, the true Light which enlighten every man that cometh into the world*. . . . Here thou shalt find a Principle certain and infallible, and whereby increasing and going on therein, thou mayest at length arrive unto a happy condition . . . hereby he may happily attain unto his chiefest salvation, which consisteth only in *Union with God*." Balling also agreed with Ames that the Bible can be properly understood only when read with the illumination of the light within: "Is not this [the *Light*] that by which we must see and know God, and so consequently that by which we must judge all things Divine? Certainly 'tis: then it follows also, That we can judge of no Doctrine, no Book that is Divine, but by this *Light* and judging it thereby to be Divine . . . *The letters, the words are not the Scriptures*, but the mind alone is the Scripture, and this meaning can never be truly and justly hit, but by those alone that stand in the same *Light*, out of which the Scriptures proceed." In sum, Balling's *Candlestick* defended the very same principles that Quaker Ames had earlier defended against Galenus.

Readers familiar with *Candlestick* might object that Balling's use of the light clearly has a more naturalistic and Cartesian undertone than the one we find in Ames. After all, Balling defined the Light as "a clear and distinct knowledge of truth in the understanding of every man, by which he is so convinced of the Being and Quality of things, that he cannot possibly doubt thereof." However, immediately preceding this definition, Balling also stressed that it ultimately does not matter what one calls this light principle: "It's all one to us whether ye call it, *Christ, the Spirit, the Word,* &c. seeing these all denote but one and the same thing." For Balling, light stood for both "Christ, the Spirit, the Word" and "a clear and distinct knowledge of truth." What matters most, as Sadler points out, is that in *Candlestick* "neither the rational nor the spiritual sense of the 'light' triumphs over the other."[33] Indeed, Balling's discussion of the light is couched in such ambiguous terms that it does not allow for any specific, straightforward interpretation.[34] At any rate, while Balling's use of Light in *Candlestick* leaves open the way for naturalist readings of this concept, it still is not a refutation of Quaker thought. On the contrary, Balling unambiguously sided with Ames on both principal issues.

It is safe to assume that naturalistic interpretations of *Candlestick* may influence our understanding of Spinoza's own relation with the Quakers. On this reading, the gradual yet undeniable naturalization of the Collegiants' concept of the inner light was at least partly due to disagreement with the Quakers; and because it was Spinoza himself who advocated Cartesian principles among Collegiants, we are led to assume that Spinoza probably had little patience with

Quaker views. A comparison of Balling's *Candlestick*, Ames's *Mysteries*, and Spinoza's *Short Treatise*, however, shows that Spinoza's views at that time harmonized quite well with Quaker doctrine.

Spinoza's *Short Treatise* on the Principle of Light

In all likelihood, Spinoza met Ames in 1657.[35] In a letter to Quaker Margaret Fell, Ames described this event in the following way: "There is a Jew at amsterdam that by the Jews is Cast out (as he himself and others sayeth) because he owneth no other teacher but the light and he sent for me and I spoke toe him and he was pretty tender and doth owne all that is spoken; and he sayde to read of moses and the prophets without was nothing toe him except he came toe know it within: and soe the name of Christ it is like he doth owne."[36] Ames's meeting with Spinoza appeared to be a fruitful one. According to Ames, Spinoza agreed that there was no other teacher but the light and that the Old Testament law could be read meaningfully only when it was first known within. To know scripture "within," for the early Quakers, implied the necessity of cultivating an understanding of the Bible that transcended a mere diligence to the letter. William Penn explained that there must be "a more Inward Spiritual and deep grounded Faith of those things recorded in Scripture . . . then the meer Letter is able to give. And therefore that Light and Spirit which gives that discerning . . . must needs be as well the Rule as Author of it."[37] Similarly, Ames wrote that we need to open our "internal spiritual ear without which man is unable to hear God's word."[38] According to Ames, Spinoza thus supported the very same principles defended in *Candlestick* and *Mysteries*. Spinoza's *Short Treatise*, an early work written and circulating around the same period, provides considerable support for Ames's assertion.[39]

First, Spinoza affirmed that there is no other teacher but the light. In chapter 19, he wrote that the light teaches us that we exist as a "part of the whole"—that is, that we are totally "dependent on God"—and hence that we can "accomplish very little, or nothing" without God.[40] Spinoza identified the knowledge of our union with God that we gain through the use of the light as constituting the essence of religion. He wrote that this knowledge "brings us so far that we attribute all to God, love him alone because he is the most glorious and the most perfect, and thus offer ourselves up entirely to him; for these really constitute both the true religion and our own eternal happiness and bliss." Furthermore, "this knowledge frees us from Sorrow, from Despair, from Envy, from Terror, and other evil passions."[41] Spinoza thus posited the light as man's guiding principle, as that through which we experience union with God and are capable of leading worthy lives.

Second, the Quaker claim that scripture can only be read meaningfully with the light also emerged in the *Short Treatise*, albeit in a somewhat veiled form. In chapter 24, Spinoza asked "how God can make himself known to men" and whether this "could have happened, by means of spoken words." Spinoza's answer was no: "For in that case man must have known the signification of the words before they were spoken to him. For example, if God had said to the Israelites, *I am Jehovah your God*, then they would have had to know first, apart from these words, that God existed, before they could be assured thereby that it was he [who was speaking to them]."[42] Spinoza explained that human beings are capable of recognizing something as divine only by means of the natural light. Without a preexisting idea of God, revelation would be meaningless and impossible.[43] The *Short Treatise* explained that this idea of a union with God necessarily follows from our existence as finite bodies. Being aware of our own body, the human mind is automatically drawn to that "without which the body and Idea [i.e., the mind] could neither be, nor be understood [i.e., God or infinite substance]."[44] In other words, as finite beings that exist *in* God, human beings necessarily have an idea of God.[45]

This idea, of course, in many cases will not be perfect. Spinoza remarked that we must not "know him just as he is, or adequately, for it is sufficient for us to know him to some extent, in order to be united with him."[46] And men have a certain idea of God due to their existence as finite beings, and hence it follows that it is through the light alone—and not through external signs—that God makes himself known to men. Consequently, scripture too can have meaning only to those who already have a certain conception of God. Or, to put this differently: the letter by itself is dead, and we need what the Quakers call "an inner ear" to penetrate its message. Indeed, as Spinoza later explained in the *Theological-Political Treatise* (1670), in order to appreciate the teachings of the prophets the reader of scripture himself must have "a heart inclined to the right and the good."[47]

Some might object to the spiritualistic, perhaps mystical, reading suggested here. After all, for Spinoza the knowledge of God we gain through the light, as Steven Nadler has emphasized, "is the knowledge of Nature in its broadest Dimension."[48] However, despite Spinoza's commitment to a rationalistic conception of the light, it is significant that he still could fall back on spiritualistic terms to refer to it. Indeed, in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza used the term "Son of God" to refer to the corpus of adequate knowledge of nature that human beings gain through the use of reason.[49] Similarly, many early Friends, who likewise distinguished between the light within and the rational faculty,[50] also saw fit to use the term

"reason" to refer to the inner light. Quaker Samuel Fisher, another contact of Spinoza, wrote that the light "is not against, but according to right reason; for they are synonymous."[51] Arguably, Collegiants such as Balling and Spinoza and Quakers like Fisher regarded the efficacy of the principle of light in teaching ethics and love of God to be more important than the debated nature of the light itself. What matters is moral improvement, whether one is moved by the spirit or by reason.

Still, one may wonder why Spinoza, for whom the inward light is nothing but the natural light, did not straightforwardly condemn spiritualist notions, such as the Quaker idea of the divine indwelling. The answer may be found in Spinoza's more mature thought.

Quaker Piety from the Perspective of the *Theological-Political Treatise*

In the *Theological-Political Treatise*, Spinoza argued that the central teaching of the Bible is easily discernible: "From Scripture itself we have perceived its most important themes without any difficulty or ambiguity: to love God above all else, and to love your neighbor as yourself."[52] Scripture's purpose is thus to teach "that God is supremely just and supremely merciful, *or*, that he is the unique model of the true life."[53] Spinoza remarked that, as far as faith is concerned, it is irrelevant whether one considers "God (*or* that model of true life)" as "fire, spirit, light, [or] thought."[54]

Because, according to Spinoza, scripture's teaching boils down to the *command* to love one's neighbor, it followed for him that its narratives are only means to instill obedience, not ways to provide knowledge about God's nature. Spinoza emphasized that "faith is not saving by itself, but only in relation to obedience. Or as James says (James 2:17), faith by itself, without works, is dead."[55] Quakers likewise placed primary emphasis on the necessity of works. Also relying heavily on the Epistle of James, Friends argued that men "could not expect to be justified by faith when their lives brought forth only the fruits of unbelief."[56] William Penn, for instance, wrote that "no man hath Faith without Sanctification and Work; therefore the Works of Righteousness, by the Spirit, are necessary to complete Justification."[57] For both Spinoza and the early Quakers, people are acquitted by obedience only when the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in them. When Quakers argued that scripture's only purpose is to direct people to the light—one that empowers and commands men to do good works and "walk in obedience to that which is pure"—they advocated a form a religious piety perfectly in line with Spinoza's own interpretation of scripture.[58]

Spinoza's claim—one shared by many early Friends—that charitable behavior alone is the true sign of biblical faith is captured adequately in a letter to Catholic Albert Burgh:

> Since we know (to quote from the Apostle John, First Epistle, Chapter 4 verse 13) that we dwell in God and God dwells in us, it follows that whatever distinguishes the Roman Church from others is of no real significance, and consequently is constructed merely from superstition. For, as I have said with John, justice and charity are the one sure sign of the true catholic faith, the true fruits of the Holy Spirit, and wherever these are found, there Christ really is, and where they are not Christ is not. For only by the Spirit of Christ can we be led to the love of justice and charity.[59]

Spinoza affirmed that men could achieve salvation through works of justice and loving-kindness alone. For Spinoza and the Quakers alike, ceremonies, sacraments, and other outward practices are no longer seen as essential. Spinoza, moreover, identified the idea that charitable behavior alone is the true sign of biblical faith with the concept of the "Spirit of Christ." Now, "to know Christ according to the spirit, and to have Christ within oneself," is a well-known Quaker expression.[60] Spinoza, as the quotation makes clear, identified this concept with the love of just and charitable behavior. To conduct acts of justice and loving-kindness is to be guided by the Spirit of Christ.

In the *Theological-Political Treatise*, Spinoza outlined two distinct bodies of knowledge capable of providing the motivational basis for acting accordingly. First, as his reply to Burgh already suggests, Spinoza associated the Spirit of Christ with exemplary moral behavior; it seems to relate primarily to knowledge that incites people to act justly.[61] Other passages from the *Theological-Political Treatise* indicate that the aim of this knowledge is not as narrow as it seems. In chapter 4, Spinoza discussed Romans 8:9, in which Paul had taught his disciples that "no one becomes blessed unless he has in himself the mind of Christ." After citing the apostle, Spinoza added the following words: "by which he perceives God's laws as eternal truths."[62] According to Spinoza, eternal truths about substance are truths that follow necessarily from the very nature or definition of substance; they are logically necessary truths that are timelessly true.[63] The Spirit of Christ thus relates to the corpus of adequate knowledge of nature. He who has the Spirit of Christ within him participates in divine understanding and has at his disposal unshakeable truths about substance.

Furthermore, in the *Ethics*, Spinoza equated the "idea of God" (*idea Dei*) with God's infinite intellect.[64] According to Spinoza, the infinite intellect is the "im-

mediate infinite mode of thought." Spinoza's account of infinite modes is one of the most ambiguous issues in his metaphysics, and there is no consensus on how to interpret them.[65] What matters for our present concern (and this is uncontroversial) is that God's infinite intellect contains adequate ideas of everything. Further suggestive evidence is found in the *Short Treatise*: Spinoza calls the infinite intellect the mode of understanding immediately dependent on God, the "Son of God."[66] When, in a letter to Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza identified the Spirit of Christ with "the eternal son of God" or "God's eternal wisdom,"[67] he equated it with nothing else than God's infinite intellect.[68] Indeed, in the *Ethics*, Spinoza too explicitly related the Spirit of Christ with the idea of God. He wrote that a person who is "guided by the Spirit of Christ" is guided by nothing else than "the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man should be free, and desire for other men the good he desires for himself."[69] The ethical dimensions of the Spirit of Christ are those just acts that follow from this knowledge.[70] The Spirit of Christ thus signifies the aggregate of adequate knowledge of nature—that is, the idea of God. Such knowledge inspires a love of justice and loving-kindness in the man of reason. He who has the Spirit of Christ within him possesses a clear and distinct conception of God and uses that knowledge for the benefit of mankind. The Spirit of Christ is present in those who spontaneously devote themselves to justice and charity because they understand that this is what reason demands.[71]

Spinoza's letter to Burgh further suggested, intriguingly, that Christ according to the Spirit was found not only in the intellectual elite but also in men who act justly without a robust collection of adequate knowledge. Christians who devoted themselves to justice and charity—and hereby, according to Spinoza, exhibit "the one sure sign of the true catholic faith"—also had the spirit of Christ within them.[72] Evidence that the spirit of Christ was equally manifested in those who act justly through earnest Christian obedience also appears in the *Theological-Political Treatise*. While discussing the seventh dogma of faith (viz., that God pardons the sins of those who repent), Spinoza wrote that "whoever firmly believes that God, out of mercy and the grace by which he directs everything, pardons men's sins, and who for this reason is more inspired by the love of God, that person really knows Christ according to the Spirit, and Christ is in him."[73] The Spirit of Christ thus manifests itself in at least two distinct groups of people: in those who act justly out of intellectual enlightenment and in those who through pious faith are inspired toward justice and charity.[74]

Earlier, in the first section, I argued that Balling and Spinoza due to their confrontation with the Quakers in the early 1660s developed and accepted an

account of the light as an inner source of religious truth, regardless of its specific connotation. On this account, the spiritual "light within" and natural "light of reason" are both presented as gateways to moral improvement and divine union. Spinoza's reading of scripture presented in the *Theological-Political Treatise* reflects this spirit of reconciliation and tolerance. He presented piety in such a way as to confirm the equivalence of the prophetic and natural light as effective means to the pursuit of justice and loving-kindness and hence salvation.[75] Spinoza wrote that "[he] see[s] no difference here whether it's by the natural light or by revelation that God teaches and commands the true practice of justice and loving-kindness. It doesn't matter how that practice is revealed, so long as it obtains the supreme right and is the supreme law for men."[76] Despite Spinoza's harsh philosophical critique of the idea of a supernatural light, the realm of theology demands a more tolerant approach to spirituality. Provided that the prophetic light succeeds in stimulating in believers a love of justice and loving-kindness, it ultimately does not matter how they perceive that light.[77] Indeed, he claimed, "in every Church there are very many honourable men who worship God with justice and charity. For we have known many such among the Lutherans, the Reformed Church, the Mennonites and the Enthusiasts, and, to say nothing of others."[78]

Moreover, in both the *Theological-Political Treatise* and the aforementioned letter to Burgh, Spinoza invoked 1 John in support of his claim that charitable behavior alone is the true sign of biblical faith. Spinoza's use of 1 John is ingenious, to say the least. 1 John's accusation is directed not only against those who neglect the importance of good conduct. The text also identifies both ethical and Christological errors. John's first letter centers around the idea that it is only through a confession of the incarnation, that is, through a genuine conviction that Jesus is the Christ or that "Jesus Christ has come in the flesh," that salvation can be obtained (see 1 John 2:18–27 and 4:1–3).[79] It is exactly the belief in the identity of the man Jesus with the divine Son of God, and the redeeming value of his sacrifice, that allows 1 John to assimilate possession of the Spirit with the love of one's neighbor. 1 John's concern therefore is to warn against those who abnegate this truth. It is only by recognizing that Jesus is the incarnation of God's Word that one can open the pathway to the Kingdom of God: to know Christ according to the Spirit is to regard Jesus as the risen, universal savior.

Spinoza's revision of the notion of the incarnation reminds us of the reinterpretation that the early Quakers had undertaken. As we have seen, Quakers advocated an inward, spiritual knowledge of Christ. The spirit of Christ is no longer known "at a distance." Instead, Christ is present "immediately" in those who through obedience to the light are empowered to do good works. For many con-

temporaries, the Quaker emphasis on the inwardness of Christ entailed a clear diminishing of the importance of the historical Christ. Baptists, for instance, realized that if the inner light is sufficient for salvation, then Christ need not to have come into the world; his sacrifice simply would have been without purpose.[80] In his valuable study of the Baptist-Quaker conflict in seventeenth-century England, T. L. Underwood describes the manifold difficulties that the Quakers faced in countering this objection. What matters here is that the early Quakers stood their ground: "Although they did not deny that the events of Christ's life had occurred outwardly," they generally maintained an understanding of the "resurrection as occurring within."[81] When Oldenburg questioned Spinoza for his claim that "for salvation it is not altogether necessary to know Christ according to the flesh,"[82] a similar reply followed. Spinoza explained that he accepts the "passion, death and burial of Christ" literally,[83] yet he maintained that "Christ's resurrection from the dead was in fact of a spiritual kind."[84] Both the Quakers and Spinoza agreed that a belief in the historical Christ is no longer a necessary condition for salvation. Christ's incarnation is interpreted spiritually, that is, the spirit of Christ manifests itself in those who devote themselves to justice and charity.

Our inquiry into Spinoza's relations with the Quakers has generated remarkable conclusions. In both the *Short Treatise* and the *Theological-Political Treatise*, Spinoza defended and expounded several quintessential Quaker claims. Another passage in the *Theological-Political Treatise* that we turn to now allows us to place Spinoza's assessment of Quakerism in a more nuanced light.

Quakerism and the *Theological-Political Treatise* 19.31

Early Quakers initially faced relentless opposition from officials and churchmen.[85] Because of their systematic attempts to disturb Reformed worship services and their refusal to take off their hats before magistrates or observe other social niceties, the Quakers soon became known as disturbers of peace and social order.[86] Although they were generally rather tolerant, many Dutch magistrates regarded Quakerism as a potential danger to the fragile yet stable order in church and society. Spinoza appeared to be fully aware of this. In his discussion of the necessity of accommodating the external practice of Religion to the peace of the state, he wrote:

> Suppose someone asks now "By what right could Christ's disciples, who were private men, preach religion?" I say they did this by right of the power they'd received from Christ over unclean Spirits . . . [however,] no one is allowed to take this as an example . . . [for] if he'd said this to everyone, the state would be established in vain, and that saying of Solomon—*my son, fear God and the king* (Proverbs 24:21)—would

> have been impious. That's far from true. So it must be confessed that the authority Christ gave his disciples he gave to them only, and that others cannot take them as an example.[87]

Because early Quakers believed that they were reclaiming primitive Christianity, they considered themselves the apostles to their age and hence saw themselves justified to spread the message of light with all the available means. Although Friends themselves advocated peaceful submission to state authority, it was exactly their fanaticism and spiritualistic excess in spreading the Word that led them to being labeled as a danger to state power. By emphasizing that Christ gave his original Apostles—and them alone—the authority to spread the Christian message in places and states where it was not properly upheld, Spinoza appears to be warning Quakers against an overly excessive religious zeal. Indeed, an important issue of contention among Collegiants and theologians in the 1660s and onward concerned the continued accessibility to the form of divine inspiration commonly associated with Christ and his earliest disciples. According to both Jewish and Christian orthodoxy, the authors of scripture were supernaturally guided by God to write the exact things He wanted expressed. An era of extraordinary divine inspiration created texts with a perfection that is unapproachable in other messages. However, on the standard orthodox account, writings from periods that followed the Apostolic Age are excluded from this special form of inspiration. So-called public revelation was completed around the first centuries following Christ's death, and religious texts from that moment onward could only have the value of private revelations.[88] The Collegiant Abraham Galenus, Quaker William Ames's opponent in *Mysteries*, directly addressed this issue when he introduced the distinction between extraordinary divine inspiration (*heerlijkmaking*) and salvational divine inspiration (*heiligmaking*). Whereas the former includes the power to convert others and purify the church, the latter form of inspiration at best can affect one's own personal salvation. While Galenus and many others limited the *heerlijkmaking* gift to the early days of Christianity, Quakers, on the other hand, believed that like the Apostles before them they too had the power to convert others.[89] Spinoza's message in the preceding passage can be seen as directed against this Quaker attitude. To emphasize his point, he remarked that although the original Apostles and "Prophets themselves were endowed with a divine virtue, still, because they were private men, the freedom they showed in warning, chiding and reproaching people aggravated them [the people] more than it corrected them."[90] The same warning against "public revelation" by private individuals is present in the *Political Treatise*:

> I don't have, as the disciples of Christ once did, the power to cast out unclean spirits and to perform miracles. This power, of course, is so very necessary for spreading Religion to places where it's forbidden that without it, not only do we waste time and trouble, as they say, but in addition we create a great many sources of distress. Every age has seen the most grievous examples of this. Everyone, therefore, wherever he may be, can worship God in accordance with true Religion, and look out for himself, which is the duty of a private man. Moreover, the responsibility for spreading Religion must be committed either to God or to the supreme powers, who alone have the responsibility for Public Affairs.[91]

Spinoza's conclusion was straightforward: without the authority or permission of the state, no one has the right to administer religious matters. Individuals who claimed to possess the gift of extraordinary inspiration and performing miracles could try their luck. However, Spinoza suggested that those states which do take control over the practice of religion never will have anything to fear from prophets. Indeed, only in situations where the state fails to fulfill its regulatory function does the danger of opposing forms of authority—in which God (i.e., Nature) steps in—emerge. At any rate, Spinoza criticized the rebellious political use Quakers made of the idea of a supernatural light.

Conclusion

Jonathan Israel's by now famous assertion in *Radical Enlightenment* that "Spinoza and Spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone of the European Enlightenment everywhere, not only in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, and Scandinavia, but also Britain and Ireland" has given rise to much debate among Spinoza scholars.[92] While some have targeted the simplifications and distortions inherent in such a portrayal, others have questioned Israel's particular emphasis on the "irreligious" or "secularizing" nature of Spinoza's project.[93] That is, while it still might be common, even among Spinoza scholars, to associate Spinozism with naturalism and atheism, these by no means are undisputed facts. It could well be argued that Spinoza's philosophical rejection of teleological thinking, anthropomorphism, and miracles is accompanied by an equally forceful appraisal of revealed religion as a valuable, even indispensable, tool of morality. Although Spinoza undercut the common understanding of prophecy as a privileged and supernatural form of cognition, he saw no reason to question the utility of appeals to illumination and inspiration. Thus, even though the imaginative idea of God as lawgiver is false, its inadequacy is irrelevant to the positive moral effect it generates.

An important caveat here, of course, is that subjective appeals to illumination and inspiration often enhance rather than subdue superstitious behavior. Although conduct prompted by faithful obedience may coincide with the right behavior that supervenes upon the true knowledge of God, this outcome is far from guaranteed. Indeed, Spinoza emphasized that "men are apt to make great mistakes in matters of religion, and to compete vigorously in inventing many things, according to the differences in their mentality."[94] Our examination of the early Quaker phenomenon has shown exactly this.

Additionally, this study has shown that Spinoza's reliance on religious sources and use of religious terminology comprises more than, as is often assumed, a clever or cunning ploy to conceal his genuine, allegedly atheistic, intention.[95] While there is no doubt that Spinoza regularly altered the meaning of traditional theological concepts, giving them a new and sometimes contrary signification, such transformations by no means were meant to completely undermine the foundation of revealed religion. Far from constituting a drastic rupture between faith and reason, Spinoza's use of religious language can be construed as constituting a powerful rapprochement between the realms of theology and philosophy. Significantly, Spinoza's concept of the spirit of Christ celebrates the lives of all those who exercise loving-kindness, justice, and righteousness on earth (whatever their background knowledge). As such, "the spirit of Christ" presents an interestingly overlooked argument for toleration in Spinoza studies, one undoubtedly relevant to any proper understanding of the Spinozist Radical Enlightenment.

NOTES

1. E.g., Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

2. E.g., J. C. van Slee, *De Rijnsburger Collegianten* (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1980); Andrew Fix, *Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early Enlightenment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Wim N. A. Klever, *Mannen rond Spinoza, 1650–1700: presentatie van een emanciperende generatie* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1997); Travis L. Frampton "Benedictus de Spinoza among Heterodox Christians," in *Spinoza and the Rise of Historical Criticism of the Bible* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 162–76; Wiep van Bunge, "Spinoza and the Collegiants," in *Spinoza Past and Present: Essays on Spinoza, Spinozism, and Spinoza Scholarship* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 51–66.

3. See Richard H. Popkin, introduction to *Spinoza's Earliest Publication? The Hebrew Translation of Margaret Fell's "A loving salutation to the Seed of Abraham among the Jews, wherever they are scattered up and down the Face of the Earth,"* ed. Richard H. Popkin and Michael A. Singer (Assen-Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1987), 1–15. See also Popkin's "Spi-

noza's Relations with the Quakers in Amsterdam," *Quaker History* 73, no. 1 (1984): 14–28; "Spinoza and Samuel Fisher," *Philosophia* 15 (1985): 219–36; and "Spinoza, the Quakers and the Millenarians, 1656–1658," *Manuscrito* 6 (1984): 113–33.

4. For an extremely critical assessment, see Friedrich Niewöhner, "Review of Popkin/Signer: Spinoza's Earliest Publication," *Studio Spinozana* 4 (1988): 398–407. For a more balanced account, see Steven Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 158–63.

5. See, e.g., Baruch Spinoza, *E*I App. All references to Spinoza's *Ethics* are from *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). References to the *Ethics* (*E*) will be by part (I–V), proposition (Prop.), demonstration (Dem.), scholium (Schol.), appendix (App.). Hence, *E*I App. refers to the appendix to part one of the *Ethics*.

6. E.g., Leo Strauss, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 35: "The context to which it [viz., Spinoza's work] belongs is the critique of Revelation as attempted by the radical Enlightenment."

7. William Ames (d. 1662), an English Baptist minister who converted to Quakerism, became a prominent figure in the Holland Quaker movement. He wrote numerous Dutch Quaker tracts. His *Mysteries of the Kingdom of God* (original title: *De Verborgentheden van het Rijcke Godts, ende de werckinge leydinge en bestieringe van Godts Geest verklaert in tegenstellinge van de letterlijcke oeffeningen voorgestelt als de ware Godtsdienst door Galenus Abrahamsz ende door sijn aenhangers ende toestemmers gelooft*) has recently been translated into English. See Jo Van Cauter and Laura Rediehs, "Spiritualism and Rationalism in Dutch Collegiant Thought: New Evidence from William Ames's *Mysteries of the Kingdom of God* (1661), with a Translation," *Lias* 40, no. 2 (2013): 105–75. All subsequent references to Ames's *Mysteries* will be to this edition.

8. Quoted from T. L. Underwood, *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War: The Baptist-Quaker Conflict in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 53.

9. Popkin, "Spinoza's Relations with the Quakers," 17.

10. E.g., Rosemary Moore, *The Light in Their Consciences: The Early Quakers in Britain, 1646–1666* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 68; Pink Dandelion, *An Introduction to Quakerism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31.

11. Underwood, *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War*, 35.

12. Ames, *Mysteries*, 127.

13. Underwood, *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War*, 4.

14. William C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, facsimile reprint with introduction by Rufus M. Jones (Westminster: Heritage Books, 2009), 96.

15. Ibid., 33.

16. Van Cauter and Rediehs, "Spiritualism and Rationalism," 111.

17. Underwood, *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War*, 11.

18. E.g., Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 139.

19. Fix, *Prophecy and Reason*, 196.

20. Ibid., 192.

21. Pieter Balling (d. 1669) was a mercantile agent, Mennonite, and member of the Collegiant movement. He is most famous for his *Het Licht op de Kandelaar*, discussed in this section. Two versions of this work in English are available: as a pamphlet published

by Quaker Universalist Fellowship, 1992 (2005 online version: http://universalistfriends.org/pdf/candle.pdf), and the version available as an appendix to William Sewel, *The History of the Rise, Increase, and Progress of the Christian People Called Quakers* (London: J. Sowle, 1722). Balling's text has been republished in Dutch in Wim N. A. Klever, "De Spinozistische prediking van Pieter Balling. Uitgave van 'Het licht op den kandelaar' met biografische inleiding en commentaar," *Doopsgezinde Bijdragen* 14 (1988): 55–85.

22. Fix, *Prophecy and Reason*, 199.

23. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 344 and 170, n. 60.

24. Klever, *Mannen rond Spinoza*, 15–29.

25. Fix, *Prophecy and Reason*, 193.

26. Ibid., 204.

27. E.g., Klever, *Mannen rond Spinoza*, 14.

28. Van Cauter and Rediehs, "Spiritualism and Rationalism," 110.

29. Ibid., 113. For an in-depth treatment of these matters, see also Laura Rediehs, "Candlestick Mysteries," *Quaker Studies* 18, no. 2 (2014): 151–69.

30. Ames, *Mysteries*, 147.

31. Ibid., 151.

32. All references to Balling's *Candlestick* are from the online edition published by the Quaker Universalist Fellowship, http://universalistfriends.org/candle.html#3.

33. Jesse Sadler, "The Collegiants: A Small Presence in the Dutch Republic, a Large Metaphor for the Book," in *Bernard Picart and the First Global Vision of Religion*, ed. Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt (Los Angeles: Getty Publications, 2010), 66.

34. Wiep van Bunge, *From Stevin to Spinoza: An Essay on Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 107. See also Rienk Vermij, "The Light of Nature and the Allegorisation of Science on Dutch Frontispieces around 1700," in *Art and Science in the Early Modern Netherlands*, ed. Eric Jorink and Bart Ramakers (Zwolle: WBooks, 2011), 228.

35. Popkin, "Spinoza's Relations with the Quakers," 26.

36. Quoted from Popkin, "Spinoza's Relations with the Quakers," 15. There remains some discussion as to whether Spinoza was the "Jew at Amsterdam" described by Ames. Niewöhner points out that Ames's letter does not specify the exact year of excommunication. Spinoza was not the only Jew who was expelled at that time. The letter, Niewöhner argues, does not provide complete proof for Popkin's assertion. See his "Review of Popkin/Signer: Spinoza's Earliest Publication," 399. While Niewöhner's caution should be taken into account, others have argued that Spinoza at least is the most plausible candidate. See, for instance, David Katz, *Sabbath and Sectarianism in Seventeenth-Century England* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 160; Asa Kasher and Shlomo Biderman, "Why Was Baruch de Spinoza Excommunicated?," in *Sceptics, Millenarians and Jews*, ed. David Katz and Jonathan I. Israel (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 135.

37. Quoted from Underwood, *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War*, 115.

38. Ames, *Mysteries*, 153.

39. All references to the *Short Treatise* (ST) are from *Spinoza: Complete Works*, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), and include the part, chapter, and page numbers. Hence, ST 2.18, 85 refers to part two, chapter 18, p. 85 of the *Short Treatise*.

40. Spinoza, ST 2.18, 85. It is interesting to see how contemporaries of Spinoza associated this idea of an intimate union with God of all things with both Spinozism and Quakerism. Robert Hook, referring to ongoing discussions on pantheistic metaphysics in his diary dated 24 July 1678, writes that he was occupied with "much discussion about Spinosa Quakers." Louis S. Feuer, *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism* (Edison: Transaction Publishers, 1987), 55.

41. Spinoza, ST 2.18, 85.

42. Spinoza, ST 2.24, 97.

43. Klever, "De Spinozistische prediking van Pieter Balling," 80.

44. Spinoza, ST 2.22, 94.

45. For an excellent discussion of the "in-relation" in Spinoza's metaphysics, see Mogens Laerke, "Spinoza's Cosmological Argument in the *Ethics*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49 (2011): 439–62

46. Spinoza, ST 2.23, 94.

47. Spinoza, TTP 7.11, 172. References to both the *Theological-Political Treatise* (TTP) and the *Political Treatise* (TP) are from *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vol. 2, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), and include the chapter, paragraph, and page numbers. Hence TTP 7.11, 172 refers to chapter 7, paragraph 11, p. 172 of the *Theological-Political Treatise*.

48. Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 189.

49. Spinoza, ST 1.9, 59 and ST 2.22, 94. For further discussion, see the section on Quaker piety in this chapter.

50. Jeffrey Dudiak and Laura Rediehs, "Quakers, Philosophy, and Truth," in *The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies*, ed. Stephen W. Angel and Pink Dandelion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 513.

51. Quoted from Samuel Preus, *Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 61, n. 92. This tendency to blur the distinction between the workings of the inner light and the process of reasoning is also found in the work of Quaker Robert Rich. See especially Nicholas McDowell, "Washing in Cabalinus' Well: Quakerism, Scepticism, and Radical Enlightenment," in *The English Radical Imagination: Culture, Religion, and Revolution, 1630–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 434.

52. Spinoza, TTP 12.34, 255.

53. Spinoza, TTP 13.23, 262.

54. Spinoza, TTP 14.30, 269.

55. Spinoza, TTP 14.14, 266.

56. Underwood, *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War*, 58.

57. Quoted from ibid., 57–58.

58. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, 141.

59. Spinoza, Ep. 76, 948. All references to Spinoza's *Correspondence* (Ep.) are from *Spinoza: Complete Works*, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), and include letter and page numbers.

60. See, e.g., Richard Popkin, "Spinoza and Bible Scholarship" in *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 402.

61. E.g,. Spinoza, TTP 5.46, 150.

62. Spinoza, TTP 4.36, 134.

63. See, Spinoza, TTP 4.1, 125.

64. Spinoza, *E*II Prop. 4, Dem.

65. Several scholars identify infinite modes with the most general laws of nature according to which all singular things are governed. See, for instance, Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza," in *God and Nature: Spinoza's Metaphysics*, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 79–96, and Don Garrett, "Spinoza on the Essence of the Human Body and the Part of the Mind That Is Eternal," in *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics*, ed. Olli Koistinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 284–302. An opposing view can be found in Tad M. Schmaltz, "Spinoza on Eternity and Duration: The 1663 Connection," in *The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making*, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 205–20. He argues that Spinoza's infinite modes of extension should be seen as permanent features of the material world rather than eternal laws.

66. Spinoza, ST 1.9, 59 and ST 2.22, n. 24, 94.

67. Spinoza, Ep. 73, 943.

68. Melamed, for this reason, argues that "Christ according to the Spirit" is nothing but Spinoza's infinite intellect, which harbors all eternal truths: "Indeed, without the infinite intellect one cannot attain the state of blessedness, which is the affect accompanying the identification with the infinite intellect. The infinite intellect defines what is true and false (it is the totality of truth), and the achievement of full identification with the infinite intellect (i.e., a complete knowledge of God), is man's true *summum bonum*." Yitzhak Y. Melamed, "'Christus secundum spiritum': Spinoza, Jesus and the Infinite Intellect," in *The Jewish Jesus*, ed. Neta Stahl (New Yok: Routledge, 2011), 140–51. This "intellectualist" reading of the Spirit of Christ, though correct, captures only one dimension of Spinoza's use of it. As we shall see, Spinoza holds that the "Spirit of Christ" is not reserved for the intellectual elite alone.

69. Spinoza, *E*IV Prop. 68, Schol.

70. See Spinoza, TTP 4.46, 137.

71. Consequently, these persons need no instruction by the Bible: "Someone who is completely unfamiliar with these narratives, and nevertheless has salutary opinions and a true manner of living, is completely blessed and really has the Spirit of Christ in him" (TTP 5.46, 150).

72. Spinoza, Ep. 76, 948.

73. Spinoza, TTP 14.28, 269.

74. For a more in-depth treatment, see Jo Van Cauter, "Spinoza on Christ according to the Spirit," in "Spinoza on History, Christ, and Lights Untamable" (PhD diss., Ghent University, 2016), 125–70.

75. There might also have been epistemological reasons for Spinoza's "attraction" to the Quaker notion of the divine indwelling. Remarkably, some of Descartes's contemporaries compared his epistemological approach (viz., the notion of divinely imprinted clear and distinct ideas that guarantee the truth of one's judgment) with Quakerism. See Michael Heyd, *Be Sober and Reasonable: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 109–43. It is not difficult to see why Spinoza, who equally maintains that someone who has a true idea cannot doubt its veracity, would find this connection worth exploring. Moreover, Descartes, in the Second Set of Replies

to the Meditations, declares that both the natural light and the *lumen supernaturale* give rise to an irresistible assent of the intellect. John Cottingham, while elaborating on the question as to how this notion of a supernaturally induced subjective certainty fits within the overall Cartesian scheme, suggests that "the emphasis, at least in the case of revealed truths, would be on the utility of religious belief, rather than its rational demonstrability." John Cottingham, "Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief," in *Cartesian Reflections*, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 230.

76. Spinoza, TTP 19.5, 333.

77. For Spinoza, the emphasis is on motivational efficacy rather than veracity: "Faith requires, not so much true doctrines, as pious doctrines, i.e., doctrines which move the heart to obedience, even if many of them do not have even a shadow of the truth" (TTP 14.20, 267).

78. Spinoza, Ep. 76, 948.

79. Marianne Meye Thompson "The Gospel according to John," in *Cambridge Companion to the Gospels*, ed. Stephen C. Barton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 188. See also the introduction to "The First Letter of John," in *The Harper Collins Study Bible: Fully Revised and Updated*, ed. Harold W. Attridge (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2006), 2072–73. All references to the Bible are in this edition.

80. Underwood, *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War*, 112.

81. Ibid., 5.

82. Spinoza, Ep. 73, 943.

83. Spinoza, Ep. 78, 953.

84. Spinoza, Ep. 75, 946.

85. See, e.g., John Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 168–70.

86. Rosemary Moore, "Seventeenth-Century Context and Quaker Beginnings," in *The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies*, ed. Stephen W. Angel and Pink Dandelion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 22.

87. TTP 19.31–33, 338–39.

88. Daniel J. Lattier "The Orthodox Rejection of Doctrinal Development," *Pro Ecclesia* 20, no. 4 (2011): 389–410 (393).

89. Fix, *Prophecy and Reason*, 192; Van Cauter and Rediehs, "Spiritualism and Rationalism," 118.

90. Spinoza, TTP 19.45, 341.

91. Spinoza, TP 3.10, 522.

92. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, vi.

93. E.g., Susan James, "Life in the Shadow of Spinoza," *Times Higher Education Supplement*, no. 1518 (21 Dec. 2001): 31–32. See also Wiep Van Bunge, "The Idea of Religious Imposture," and "Radical Enlightenment: A Dutch Perspective," both in *Spinoza Past and Present: Essays on Spinoza, Spinozism, and Spinoza Scholarship* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 67–85 and 189–209.

94. Spinoza, TTP 16.62, 294.

95. Many (if not most) of his Dutch contemporaries concluded that Spinoza's professed loyalty to scripture stemmed merely from rhetorical and political considerations. See, e.g., Van Velthuysen's commentary on the TTP, in which he took for granted that Spinoza's

true intention in the TTP was teaching atheism by means of "furtive and disguised arguments" (Ep. 42, 878). The intimated charge that Spinoza strategically uses equivocation and double language in order to hide his real, antireligious position would resurface repeatedly, in various guises, over the years. Leibniz, for instance, charged Spinoza with irony (see Edwin Curley, "Homo Audax: Leibniz, Oldenburg and the 'Theological-Political Treatise,'" in *Studia Leibnitiana*, suppl. 27 [1990]: 277–312), while others attributed to Benedictus nothing less than deception and mendacity (see, e.g., Strauss, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*).

PHILIPPE BUC

A Backward Glance

Light and Darkness in the Medieval Theology of Power

In the version of *Leviathan* that circulated on the Continent, Thomas Hobbes declared that "the Kingdom of Darkness . . . can be defined as a confederation of impostors, who in order to dominate others in this present world, attempt to snuff out through erroneous and obscure doctrines the light both of natural reason and that of the Gospel, and to bring forth spiritual darkness on the road to eternal salvation."[1] His 1651 *Leviathan* was not in itself a theological tract detailing the cogs and gears of Christian conversion. However, Hobbes, deeply versed in theology, used theological concepts alongside biblical texts to argue that *in illo tempore* human beings converted themselves to a certain type of polity in order to escape fear.[2] This polity, Hobbes's Civil Commonwealth or the Leviathan, was dangerously established between the twin shoals of Roman papal tyranny and Presbyterian theocracy, regimes that both claimed to be the Kingdom of God on Earth. Sophistical arguments in favor of these two regimens, Hobbes explained, "snuff out the natural light [of reason], and create such darkness in the minds of men, that the subjects no longer know to whom they had sworn obedience."[3]

Hobbes's recourse to light and darkness does not constitute a hapax in seventeenth-century political theory. One may cite among others Cardinal de Richelieu, who opposed "la raison [qui] doit être le flambeau, qui éclaire les princes" (reason, [which] must be the torch that enlightens princes) to "la passion, qui aveugle tellement qu'elle fait parfois prendre l'ombre pour le Corps" (passion, which so much blinds that it sometimes makes one confuse the shadow for the body).[4] This essay's purpose is not to examine the intellectual, ideological, or even cultural origins of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution, which is a much criticized and complicated endeavor.[5] Nor is its purpose to analyze in detail the pair light and darkness in eighteenth-century thought (for France we have a guide in the still classic book by Roland Mortier, *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières*). Still, Hobbes points to some important medieval fields of meaning associated with light and darkness that would have given his words their symbolic and affective force. The methodological premise behind this exploration is that the semantics developed in the medieval discourse help to understand the more

secularized discourse of the Enlightenment. Notwithstanding Marc Bloch's famous critique of the "idol of origins" and the related position taken by Michel Foucault, beginnings can matter.[6]

The pair light and darkness is theologically foundational. It stands at the forefront of Christianity's origin myth. The Word or *logos* in the Genesis creation story divides light from darkness; the Word in John's Gospel (1:3–4) is described as follows: "In Him was life, and life was the light of men; and the light shines in darkness, and darkness did not comprehend it." The illuminating *logos* was God's Truth and Reason. From the earliest centuries, the Christian liturgy reiterated over and over again this meaning of light as Truth. The second-century theologian Clement of Alexandria thus explained Sunday as an image of the Creation, saying: "From this day wisdom and knowledge radiate to us; indeed, the Light of Truth is in essence light without shadow, which God's Spirit doles out undivided to those who are hallowed by Him." The *logos* itself was per essence, so Clement, "the day"; it "throws light on what is hidden," and "through it each creature reaches Life and Being."[7] And from the late thirteenth century on at the latest, the Mass closed on a reading of these very first words of John's Gospel.[8]

Being placed at the beginning of both Testaments, and being related to anthropological basics, the pair darkness and light overflowed with meanings and meaningfulness. It was (to state the obvious) related to vice and virtue. Christians had to individually and collectively reeffect in their lives the exodus out of sinful Egypt into the promised land of purity.[9] (In reverse, one could, "repudiating the light," lapse into darkness, to cite as one among many examples a Jesuit missionary's bitter words about a once-Christian Japanese warlord, like another Egyptian Pharaoh bent on persecuting the Chosen People.)[10] It was a pair involving gradations in blackness. It was a dynamic pair, insofar as its normative content called for an ideally irreversible movement from the first term, darkness and error, to the second, light and truth—a process of enlightenment; it was a dynamic pair, insofar as this movement, for humankind as a whole, proposed a basic historical narrative from Old to New Testament. This movement was in essence a liberation, yet the liberation was paradoxical. One passed from a negative bondage identified with the false freedom to sin and err, to a positive bondage to God that was true freedom. In this enlightening transition, the passions of fear and love played a key role. So could some degree of compulsion or coercion: eyes were compelled to light.

In relation to darkness and light, the two Testaments were not in the same position. But this unequal relation came in several versions. One was quasi-dialectical, in giving almost equal weight to the two scriptural collections. The Old Testament, centered on the Law of Moses, was shadows; it prefigured darkly,

forward-looking, the New Testament; the New Testament, in turn, was illumination and cast a revealing light backward on the hidden essence of the older scripture.[11] This was—one should insist on this—a fundamental dialectic for all of Christian theology, and therefore the pair light-darkness was likely to accompany many theological arguments.

The dialectic was (as it were) cast in stone. In churches, where since the earlier Middle Ages architecture and ornaments celebrated illumination, a system of representation sometimes involving the *regnum* as a protective power of light,[12] the South stood for the New Testament, the North for the Old. The "true Israel" (*verus Israel*), the New Man, thus faced the "Israel of Old" (*vetus Israel*) and the Old Man. But, in a positive twist, in the Christian South there could be present the Old Testament North. In the Cathedral Church of Chartres, midday light from the South illuminates to this day the thirteenth-century rose, a huge stained-glass window displaying four prophets (Jeremiah, Isaiah, Ezechiel, and Daniel) as giants, on whose back smaller figures, the four evangelists, stood. Framed by the royal Capetian colors, the South Rose illustrates both the superiority of New over Old (in the light of Christian truth, the evangelical dwarves see farther than the giants) and also a form of continuity (the dwarves cannot do without the truth nestled darkly in the giants' sacred writings).

More radically, the people of the Old Alliance, the Jews, after their hard-necked refusal of the Savior, Christ, were now in the dark. The veil of the Temple had been rent at Christ's crucifixion, signifying that the Old Testament foreshadowings were now fulfilled in Christ and had been transmuted into the blindfold that the renitent synagogue now wore (2 Cor. 3:12–18)—a blindness often illustrated, for instance, in the famous portal of the Strasbourg Cathedral that dates to the thirteenth century, like the Chartres South Rose. There, a triumphant and crowned personification of the Church, holding a banner and a eucharistic chalice, faces a dejected and blindfolded Synagogue, whose own flagpole is broken. Indeed, the Latin word for "darkness," *tenebrae*, also meant "blindness" (for which another word was *caecitas*). And the Jewish fate could get worse. In a treatise devoted to the light that shines in the New Testament, Augustine wrote: "[The Jews] are now in the outer darkness, which means that one should not despair of their rectification (*correctio*); but should they reject this rectification, they shall go into the outermost darkness, where there shall no longer be any place for rectification—for God is light, and in Him there is no darkness." It had been foreordained that the gentiles would come from Orient and Occident to replace the Jews in the Kingdom of Heaven and sit with the Old Alliance's saints, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.[13] This Augustinian topography implicated a first outer

circle, the "outer darkness" (*tenebrae exterae*), wherein dwelled those humans lacking in the faith. This first darkness was itself surrounded by an outermost darkness (*tenebrae exteriores*), outermost, that is, relative to these sinners. At the end of times, the renitent would go into this more extreme black, Satan's "penal society" (the Devil's *societas pœnalis*, an association in punishment with him).[14] This polarity was sensual. The Devil's realm, set in the North, was "harsh ice," as opposed to the grace flowing "from the South as if from luminous and warm lands," as a waft of perfume.[15] Grace might yet melt those bent down in subjection to the Lord of the North—Satan.

The day's trajectory of light around a church building spoke of Sacred History. The liturgist Sicardus, bishop of Cremona (d. 1215), explained the spatial and eschatological dimensions in a church's consecration. Placing the Jews to the darker North and the gentiles to the luminous South, Sicardus played on the East-West axis to indicate temporality.[16] The Northeastern angle (left) stood for Judaea, the Israel of the Old Alliance; the Southeastern angle for the Primitive Church; the Southwestern angle for the converted gentiles; and the Northwestern angle for the still left-leaning "remnants of Israel." During a church building's consecration, the officiating bishop traced two diagonals; each went from the one of the Eastern angles (where light first appears during the day) to the diametrically opposite Western angle (where light ends). The diagonal from the Northeast to the Southwest signified the translation of the Kingdom of God from the unbelieving Jews to the initially heathen gentiles. The diagonal from the Southeast to the Northwest pointed to the Eschaton. It signified that, while the Primitive Church had been first to hold the faith, at the end of times, once "the fullness of the gentiles" would have entered the church, the currently blind Jews with their "darkened eyes" would finally see the light and convert (Rom. 11:7–10, 25–26).[17] History started thus in the Northeast, with the Jews of Old who rejected Christ, and moved on with the day's light to the Southeast and the Primitive Church, then to the Southwest and the gentiles who took on with Christianity the mantle of the Old Alliance, and then finally, in the evening, in the Northwest, to those Jews who would end up seeing the Truth.[18] This history of light thus was both gradual and admitted of a good ending—with sight restored to the blind.

While obviously eschatological, the pair light-darkness could be employed to signify epochal change. One sees this at work early enough in the history of the church with the so-called Conversion of Constantine (which actually was just one of several episodes in which Roman contenders for the imperial title took measures in favor of the Christian churches and put an end to the so-called Great Persecution, the last meted out by Roman emperors). Lactantius, around 315,

opposed the dark tempest of the Great Persecution to the desired light that now, thanks to Licinius and Constantine, graced the church.[19] In the mid-twelfth century, the Cistercian Otto, bishop of Freising, recounted the course of Providential History in his famous *History of the Two Cities* (first version 1143/46). It ended apocalyptically, with the final separation of light and darkness at the Last Judgment. But major turning points in this eschatological trajectory were also "enlightening." Typologically, the Creator's division of light and darkness signified the exodus of Israel from Egyptian bondage, itself a type for God calling out the City of God's elect from "this world, this Egypt." For Otto, the four phases of Sacred History consisted in the stepping out of darkness into light, in four luminous victories of God's City against the Body of the Devil and dark times—that of Moses over Egypt, that of Christ against Herod, that of Constantine over the night of the Great Persecution, and finally that, yet to come, of Christ over Antichrist. Then, "after the thickest darkness of persecutions, there will appear, all the more welcome, the eternal peace's eternal day."[20] Hopes for epochal reform also were framed in terms of the pair light-darkness. In his decade-long tireless pleading for a new reformed Christian chivalry devoted to a victorious fight against Islam, Philippe de Mézières imagined that it would be the core of a wider regeneration. In the wake of Ottoman Sultan Bayazid's bloody victory over the crusaders at Nicopolis (1396), the Celestine monk wrote: "The darknesses in which one sees today Christendom should be re-enlightened anew (*de nouvel . . . renluminées*) by the light of this holy knighthood, and through the example of the latter's holy life, Christendom anew (*de nouvel*) be reformed and repaired." The military vanguard was to enlighten the Christian world as a whole. One should take due note of the adverbial *de nouvel*, indicative of a pivotal moment of reform and, in some cases, of an eschatological threshold.[21]

As Mézières's crusading dreams may well suggest, the topography of light and darkness could also involve fear and bondage.[22] Darkness and light stood for two people, the Israel of Old and the New Israel, and for two covenants, the one based on the punishing Law given through Moses, the other on the freedom from sin granted by Christ. Among other exegetical "types," the two dispensations were symbolized by Abraham's two wives, the slave girl Hagar and the free woman Sarah. History was thus a quasi-political trajectory from bondage to freedom, from darkness to light, and this trajectory was miniaturized in individual processes of conversion.[23] Sarah coerced Hagar, signifying coercion into the freedom to believe what was true, the freedom to be free from sin. The apostle Paul proclaimed that with Christ's lawgiving, humankind had not "received anew, in fear, the spirit of servitude" (Romans 8:15). The elect were, considered Augustine,

"those who live by Faith, are heirs to the New Testament, and have been called into freedom."[24] But here too was a paradox, because Christian freedom was ultimately bondage to God. And in a second paradox, one could coerce into freedom. For Augustine, the outer darkness was surrounded by the outermost darkness: the spiritual evils that turned a mind toward sins and away from the light of charity were "outer darkness"; the corporal punishments that these fallen beings would suffer at the end-times were the "outermost darkness." "Those who are still beholden to servile fear," said Augustine, feared corporal punishments. And this was good. For were sinners to enjoy impunity, Augustine explained, "they would never want to reach God, be enlightened, and adhere to Him through love [*caritas*], love in which there inheres a chaste fear lasting into eternity, a fear that does not torture, but instead makes the soul hold on more firmly [to God]."[25] Thus, for the sinful majority, fear of the Last Judgment's penal colony allowed a turning to God's light and a conversion to a love of God that was also identical with the chaste fear of losing God's grace.

This may seem innocent enough—fear of hell leading to conversion—but this reasoning also justified actual, material coercion in matters of religion. It was not solely a matter of brandishing the prospect of hell's darkness to one's audience. Augustine, when discussing hardened heretics, paired Truth's light and fear as agents in the liberation from error (here too the Latin *tenebrae* meaning both "darkness" and "blindness"): "When salvific teachings are conjoined to useful terror, as a result, not only does the light of Truth [*lux veritatis*] expel the darkness of error [*tenebras erroris*], but also the force of fear [*uis timoris*] ruptures the chains of evil habit [*consuetudo*]."[26] He put it in a more lapidary formula: "Ubi terror, ibi salus" (Where terror is, there is salvation).[27] This fear was fear of the mobilized Roman imperial army. To justify religious coercion, Augustine invoked a spectacular model, that of Saul, a leader in the Jewish persecution of Christians, who was forcefully converted by God's might to become the Apostle Paul. Traveling to Damascus to round up Christians, he was thrown down from his horse by a miraculous light, and blinded. In Damascus, a believer, moved by a vision of Christ, healed Saul. Saul recovered his sight, was baptized, and became Paul. Augustine commented in the following way: Saul, "who saw nothing [of the Truth] with his open eyes," had been unhorsed and blinded. God had blinded him corporally so that he, "who had raged in the darkness [*tenebrae*] of lack of faith [*infidelitas*] would be pushed to desire light in his heart." The persecutor was thus compelled to seek physical and spiritual healing. Thus, "a great fear forced [him] into love [*caritas*]," and "his love, made more perfect, expelled fear."[28] On this

model, now that—as prophesized—the Roman emperors had converted, the church could use its armed might to coerce heretics into true sight, true love, and Christian liberty. Coercion into liberty was possible, since error was a chain. To cite Augustine anew, "the light of Truth expels the blindness of error," and "the force of fear ruptures the chains of evil habit." High medieval thinkers, building on this coupling of light and force, paired crusade and mission to enlighten. In the same breath, the missionary bishop James of Vitry beseeched his readers to "to pray for me . . . pray that the merciful Lord may deign to enlighten Eastern darkness and move forward the business of the Holy Land," that is, the crusade. This would not be an easy task, given James's lengthy description of the errors of the local Christian sects and of the Muslims.[29]

A thousand years later after Augustine, Andreas Didaci de Escobar, bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo, polemicizing against Poland-Lithuania on behalf of the Teutonic Knights at the Council of Constance (1413–18), turned to the church father to justify missionary war against alleged Baltic pagans.[30] The bishop denied that the knights were "attacking" the pagans. Rather, they were "rebuking them, and striking them with blows in order to directly coerce them to the Christian Faith." This violence was aimed at making the Baltic pagans "give up the blindness [*cecitas*] [existing] in their mind and voluntarily [*voluntarie*] submit their necks to Christ, receive His baptism, and freely abandon Christ Jesus's lands which they occupied."[31] After this savory sophistry, the good bishop turned to Augustine, as mediated by twelfth-century Canon Law, the Catholic Church's authoritative law: "This is not coercing to the Faith, but this is illuminating their minds' darkness [*tenebrae*] by means of the scourge of tribulations, and this is keeping them away from sin through the fear of Hell, as Augustine says when commenting on Psalm 127: 'When a human being restrains itself from sin out of fear of Hell, there arises a habit [*consuetudo*] to do what is just; what used to be hard begins to be loved; fear begins to be excluded from love [*caritas*]; and there follows a chaste fear, which lasts into eternity.'"[32]

This well-engrained Catholic pairing of doctrine and fear to effect a spiritual transformation passed into understandings of revolution. At the height of the so-called *Terreur,* on 16 November 1793, the Comité de Salut Public could exhort its *représentants* to the Armée du Nord to carry to the traitors light and the sword (*Portez sur les traîtres la lumière et le glaive*).[33] This light revealed, but also burned. Drumming slightly earlier the Revolution's victories, Jean-Baptiste Carrier told the same Comité de Salut Public that "prejudices and fanaticism were being swept away by the irresistible force of reason" (*préjugés et fanatisme, tout croule aujourd'hui devant*

la force irrésistible de la raison), to pursue in the same breath "that the flaming torch of the Lumières was at once irradiating the world and scorching its enemies."[34]

I conclude on a suggestion. As Roland Mortier has sketched it, within church tradition, the French Enlightenment found and, from the mid-eighteenth century on, mobilized against institutional Christianity the highly charged pair of light and darkness. The Jesuits, according to Friedrich Melchior von Grimm, were *enfants des ténèbres*, who as such, naturally feared *la lumière*.[35] Earlier, the Reformation had mobilized this pair against the Church of Rome. In the 1559 edition of the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Jean Calvin agreed with the age-old idea that the (true) church was the bearer of light and that outside it "there was for sure nothing but darkness and blindness" (*extra aecclesiam certe nonnisi tenebras et caecitatem*). Satan of course worked accordingly. To deprive the church of the Last Supper's sacramental help, Satan, "brought first fog, then darkness to obscure its light" (*primum nebulas, deinde tenebras obscurandae eius lucis*), meaning false understandings and controversies.[36] The adopted language transported potent schemes. The Enlightenment and its philosophes placed themselves alongside the New and against the Old. The pair spoke of a historical trajectory, which came in at least two versions. One was smoother, signifying the motion from dark prefiguration of the truth to glowing fulfillment of these earlier types into the Truth. The other was more catastrophic, as in Paul's violent eye opening away from spiritual darkness and into the Truth. These were the theological analogons, as it were, of the Reformation and the Revolution, respectively. Is the French Revolution the child of the Enlightenment? Hegel famously posited that the abstract utopia of absolute freedom identified with Reason had to realize itself in the *Terreur*. But one can simply say that there inhered in the church tradition that the *Lumières* rejected as darkness,[37] in the meanings of light and darkness themselves, the notion that the leap into light and freedom involved force and terror.

NOTES

1. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Noël Malcolm, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2011–13), 3:957, § 2.44, "On the Kingdom of Darkness." This is my translation from Hobbes's own Latin translation. The English original (3:956) reads: "The Kingdome of Darkness . . . is nothing else but a Confederacy of deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous Doctrines, to extinguish in them the Light, both of Nature, and of the Gospell; and to dis-prepare them for the Kingdome of God to come." For the reception, see Jon Parkin, "The Reception of Hobbes's *Leviathan*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2007), 441–59. The continental reception was especially strong, but passed through Hobbes's own Latin translation, and a Dutch one, printed in Amsterdam. For more on natural light and reason, see Roland Mortier, *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières: études sur le XVIIIe siècle littéraire* (Geneva: Droz, 1969), 16. For a contrasting approach to Mortier's, see Craig Koslovski, *Evening's Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

2. See Andreas Bähr, "Die Furcht vor dem Leviathan. Furcht und Liebe in der politischen Theorie des Thomas Hobbes," *Saeculum* 61, no. 1 (2011): 73–97.

3. Hobbes, *Leviathan* § 2.44, ed. Malcolm, 3:960–61 (here the Latin, in my translation). The English version reads: "putteth out the Light of Nature, and causeth so great a Darknesse in mens understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience."

4. Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, *Testament politique*, ed. Louis André (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1947), 326.

5. See Keith Michael Baker, "On the Problem of the Ideological Origins of the French Revolution," and Roger Chartier, "The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution," both now conveniently excerpted in *The French Revolution: The Essential Readings*, ed. Ronald Schechter (Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 52–74 and 75–105.

6. See Marc Bloch, *Apologie pour l'histoire ou le métier d'historien*, with a preface by Jacques Le Goff (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 81–89; Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire," in *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite*, ed. Suzanne Bachelard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), 145–72, reprinted in Foucault, *Dits et Écrits*, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 2:136–56. An argument for the *longue-durée* formative potential of key theological formulas despite the putative passage from premodern to modern is made in Philippe Buc, *Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror: Christianity, Violence, and the West* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). For a discussion of the nature of these "continuities," "re-iterations," or "re-installments" (*Fortsetzungen*), see ibid., 3–8, 288–89. I owe the notion of *Fortsetzung* to Marcus Sandl, *Medialität und Ereignis. Eine Zeitgeschichte der Reformation* (Zurich: Chronos, 2011), 18.

7. Clement, *Stromata* 6.16, rev. ed. Otto Stählin, Ludwig Früchtel, and Ursula Treu, *Clemens Alexandrinus Stromata* 1–V6(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985), 501–2, 506. Also see Geneviève Bührer-Thierry, "Lumière et pouvoir dans le haut Moyen Âge occidental: célébration du pouvoir et métaphores lumineuses," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome, Moyen Âge* 116, no. 2 (2004): 521–56; see 527–29 and 530–32 for further bibliography.

8. Otto von Simson, *The Gothic Cathedral: The Origins of Gothic Architecture and the Medieval Concept of Order* (London: Routledge, 1956), 55.

9. See, e.g., Otto of Freising, *Chronica sive historia de duabus civitatibus*, book 8, prologue, ed. Adolf Hofmeister, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores in usum scholarum 45 (Hannover: Hahn, 1912), 1.30, 54, relating typologically the Creator God's division of light and darkness to the flight from Egypt and to the permanent fight against vices.

10. Luís Fróis, S.J., *Historia de Japam*, Segunda parte § 36, ed. José Wicki, vol. 4 (Lisbon: Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, 1983), 271:59–65: "Porem como o pobre e infelice do mancebo [Ōtomo Yoshimune, Daimyō of Bungo] estava tão submerso em suas desventuras, com as redeas tão soltas e libertadas a todo genero de desordens e apetitos, e totalmente predominado da obstinação que infestava nelle a verdade conhecida, repudiando a luz e desprezando os innumeraveis beneficios que de Deos Nosso Senhor tinha com tanta afluentia

recebido, de nada se fez capaz, antes como outro Faraó ficou seo coração mais obstinado e toldado de obscuridade [cf. Exod. 7:22]" (However . . . the wretched and accursed young man [Ōtomo Yoshimune, Daimyō of Bungo, d. 1605] was so drowning in his misadventures, since he had let loose his reins and freely given himself to all sorts of disorders and appetites, fully dominated by the obstinacy which had infested him after he had come to know the Truth, then repudiated the Light and disdained the numberless gifts that he had received in such abundance from our Lord God. He was [as a result] unable to achieve anything, like another Pharaoh before [him], his heart had been hardened and clouded by darkness). See Jurgis Elisonas, "Christianity and the Daimyo," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 4: *Early Modern Japan*, ed. John Whitney Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 301–72 (quotation on 350–51). For more on the historical context, see Haruko Natawa Ward, *Women Religious Leaders in Japan's Christian Century, 1549–1650* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 111–92. Ironically, the apostate Yoshimune's baptismal name had been "Constantine," that of the first Roman emperor to embrace Christianity.

11. See, e.g., Augustine, Ep. 140 an Honorarum = *Liber de gratia novi testamenti* 3.8–9, ed. Alois Goldbacher, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 44 (Prague and Vienna: Tempsky; Leipzig: Freitag, 1985), 155–234, here 160–61: Christ as light is fundamentally "the grace of the New Testament, which was hidden in the Old Testament, yet never ceased to prophesy and foretell even while it was put in the shadow of [typological] figures." See the tellingly entitled book by Jean Daniélou, *From Shadows to Reality: Studies in the Biblical Typology of the Fathers* (London: Newman Press, 1950).

12. Bührer-Thierry, "Lumière et pouvoir." A single example: Visigothic kings might dedicate crowns to churches, where they were recast as hanging luminaries—kingship providing light to Christendom. See the famous Recceswinth crown, with its inscription "King Recceswinth donated [this]," now in the Museo Arqueológico Nacional of Madrid, Spain, in *The Art of Medieval Spain, 500–1200* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Arts, 1993), 53–55, no. 12a–b.

13. Augustine, *De gratia* 22.54, ed. Goldbacher, 200.

14. Augustine, *De gratia* 23.57, ed. Goldbacher, 203.

15. Augustine, *De gratia* 22.55, ed. Goldbacher, 202.

16. Sicardus Cremonensis, *Mitralis de officiis ecclesiasticis* 1.6, ed. Gábor Sarbak and Lorenz Weinrich (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 30. Recent historiography and bibliography on dedication can be accessed by way of Louis I. Hamilton, *A Sacred City: Consecrating Churches and Reforming Society in Eleventh-Century Italy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), and Mette Birkedal Bruun and Louis I. Hamilton, "Rites for Dedicating Churches," in *Understanding Medieval Liturgy: Essays in Interpretation*, ed. Sarah Hamilton and Helen Gittos (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 177–203.

17. That this scheme, while anti-Judaic, also proposed a positive eschatological role for the Jews has been recently reaffirmed by Jeremy Cohen, "*Synagoga conversa*: Honorius Augustodunensis, the Song of Songs, and Christianity's 'Eschatological Jew,'" *Speculum* 79 (2004): 309–40.

18. This scheme went back to Origen's commentary on Romans; see Cohen, "*Synagoga conversa*," 327–28, and more fully his "The Mystery of Israel's Salvation: Romans 11:25–26 in Patristic and Medieval Exegesis," *Harvard Theological Review* 98 (2005): 247–81.

19. Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum*, ed. J. L. Creed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 6. See T. D. Barnes, "Lactantius and Constantine," *Journal of Roman Studies* 63 (1973): 29–46.

20. Horst Dieter Rauh, *Das Bild des Antichrist im Mittelalter: Von Tyconius zum deutschen Symbolismus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1973), 325–29, citation at 329 from Otto of Freising, *Chronica sive historia de duabus civitatibus*, book 8, prologue, ed. Hofmeister, 391:33–392:1.

21. Philippe de Mézières, *Une epistre lamentable et consolatoire. Adressée en 1397 à Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, sur la défaite de Nicopolis (1396)*, ed. Philippe Contamine, Jacques Paviot, and Céline Van Hoorebeeck (Paris: Picard, 2008), 146: "Il est doncques expedient que les tenebres de la crestienté au jour d'ui considérée <par la> lumiere de ceste sainte chevalerie de nouvel soient renluminees et par l'example de ceste sainte chevalerie denouvel soit en Dieu refformee et reparee." Discussion of the theological import of "new" in Buc, *Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror*, 49–50, 61–66, 282–83. For Philippe de Mézières and the crusade, see the older book by Nicolae Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières, 1327–1405 et la croisade au XIVe siècle* (Paris: Bouillon, 1896), and now Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Kiril Petkov, eds., *Philippe de Mézières and His Age: Piety and Politics in the Fourteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Blumenfeld-Kosinski, "Philippe de Mézières's Life of Saint Pierre de Thomas at the Crossroads of Late Medieval Hagiography and Crusading Ideology," *Viator* 40, no. 1 (2009): 223–48; Philippe Buc, "*L'épistre lamentable* au regard de l'exégèse et de la tradition des croisades," in *Philippe de Mézières et l'Europe médiévale: Nouvelle histoire, nouveaux espaces, nouveaux langages*, ed. Joël Blanchard and Renate Bulmenfeld-Kosinski (Geneva: Droz, 2017), 205–20.

22. The following paragraphs draw on Buc, *Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror*, 213–41.

23. I owe the concept of miniaturization to Gerard Caspary, *Politics and Exegesis: Origen and the Two Swords* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 117–18 and n. 16.

24. Augustine, *De gratia* 19–20.47–49 (the two Testaments) and 21.52 (citation), ed. Goldbacher, 195–96, 199.

25. Augustine, *De gratia* 23.58, ed. Goldbacher, 204.

26. Augustine, Ep. 93.1.3, ed. Goldbacher, 448, or ed. Klaus-Detlev Daur, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 31A (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 169.

27. Sermo 279, Patrologia Latina 38, col. 1277.

28. Augustine, Ep. 185.7.22, ed. Goldbacher, 20–21. The authoritative handbook of medieval canon law, Gratian's *Decretum*, C. 23 q. 6 c. 1, ed. Emil Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, 2 vols, (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879–81), 1.947, follows Augustine. The typological parallels between Paul and the lay ruler, former persecutor but miraculously enlightened to become a defender of the church and a persecutor of dissenters, was established with Gregory the Great in his Moral Commentaries on the Book of Job. See Moralia in Job 31:3.1–7 (on Job 39: 9), ed. Marcus Adriaen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 143B (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 1549–55; Marc Reydellet, *La royauté dans la litérature latine de Sidoine Apollinaire à Isidore de Séville* (Rome: Bibliothèque de l'École française de Rome, 1981), 474–76, and Carole Straw, *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 196, n. 14; 251 n. 251.

29. Jacques de Vitry, Epistula 2, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 171 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 549–649, here 570 and 576.

30. The Teutonic principality had had to deal with the conversion, late in the fourteenth century, of the erstwhile Lithuanian princes to Catholic Christianity. They sought to tar their neighbors and rivals as still pagan. Context in Eric Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades: The Baltic and the Catholic Frontier, 1100–1525* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 223–32.

Discussion in Stefan Kwiatkowski, *Der Deutsche Orden im Streit mit Polen-Litauen*, Beiträge zur Friedensethik 32, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000), 16, and Jürgen Miethke, "Heilige Heidenkrieg? Theoretische Kontroversen zwischen Deutschem Orden und dem Königreich Polen vor und auf dem Konstanzer Konzil," in *Heilige Kriege. Religiöse Begründungen militärischer Gewaltanwendung. Judentum, Christentum und Islam im Vergleich*, ed. Klaus Schreiner and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 109–25.

31. For the will and its transformation through coercion, see Johannes Fried, "Wille, Freiwilligkeit und Geständnis um 1300: Zur Beurteilung des letzten Templergrossmeisters Jacques de Molay," *Historisches Jahrbuch* 105, no. 2 (1985): 388–425; and Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). John Arnold, *Inquisition and Power: Catharism and the Confessing Subject in Medieval Languedoc* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), provides a fine Foucaldian reading of the transformative power of coercion that inquisitors believed they had (and did have).

32. Andreas Didaci de Escobar, "Revoco, casso, annulo," in Erich Weise, *Die Staatsschriften des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen im 15. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1: *Die Traktate vor dem Konstanzer Konzil 1414–1418 über das Recht des Deutschen Ordens am Lande Preussen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1970), 391–413, here 408: . . . *non eos impugnabant, non increpabant, non verberabant, ut ad fidem Christianam cogerent de directo, sed quod mentis cecitatem deponerent et voluntarie colla sua Christo subderent . . . hoc non est ad fidem cogere, sed flagellos tribulacionem mentis tenebras illuminare et timore Gehenne a peccato continere, secundum verba Augustini*, [super] *Psal. 127*. See Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 23 q. 6 dictum post c. 4, ed. Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, 1.949–50, citing Augustine, *Ennaratio* in Ps. 127.7–8, ed. Emilius Dekkers and Johannes Fraipont, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 40 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), 1872–73: *Cum autem per timorem continent se a peccato, fit consuetudo iustitiae, et incipit quod durum erat amari* (As, owing to fear, they abstain from sin, there arises [in them] the custom to be just, and they begin to love what had been hard [to love]).

33. *Recueil des actes du comité de salut public*, ed., François-Alphonse Aulard, 16 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1889–1904), 8:458–59.

34. Jean-Baptiste Carrier, "au Comité de salut public" (12 November 1793), in Aulard, *Recueil des actes du comité de salut public*, 8:381.

35. Mortier, *Clartés et ombres*, 31, 32–33, 41–44.

36. *Christianae religionis institutio* 2.3.1 and 4.17.1, in *Ioannis Calvini opera que supersunt omnia* 2 = Corpus Reformatorum 30 (Berlin: Schwetschke, 1864), 210 and 1002.

37. Mortier, *Clartés et ombres*, 30–31.

MATTHEW T. GAETANO

Lumen unitivum

The Light of Reason and the Aristotelian Sect in Early Modern Scholasticism

Scholasticism survived the attacks of humanists, Protestant Reformers, and Enlightenment philosophes. Indeed, despite seventeenth- and eighteenth-century associations of scholasticism with the so-called Dark Ages, treatises defending Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and other schoolmen continued to be written during the Enlightenment period.[1] These early modern scholastics took the opportunity not only to provide answers to thirteenth-century questions but also to respond directly to some of the recent charges against the scholastic tradition.[2] In reply to the widespread criticism of scholasticism as slavish to Aristotle, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Thomists and Scotists made it clear that they sought illumination mainly from the two lights of faith and reason, not (at least primarily) from any human authority. Divine revelation and the human intellect could enlighten because they both made reality manifest to human beings. Knowledge, however, was difficult to attain—almost impossible without the support of great teachers. Therefore, these scholastics indicated that there was a third light: the common philosophical vocabulary and shared principles provided by Aristotle and his commentators. They did not look exclusively to Aristotle and his corpus but also to what they perceived as a more or less continuous and developing Aristotelian tradition. These seventeenth- and eighteenth-century scholastics believed that this tradition had been and could remain a light of unity—*lumen unitivum*—to aid students in the pursuit of truth.

Historians have generally ignored the scholastic writers who used Aquinas, Scotus, and other medieval writers in Enlightenment-era debates. And, in rare instances when they have examined scholastic thinkers from this period, attention often turns to the Jesuits, who were known even by their contemporaries for having an eclectic approach to scholastic controversies.[3] This essay examines the works of three mendicant friars: the Dominicans Serafino Piccinardi and Salvatore Maria Roselli and the Franciscan Giuseppe Antonio Ferrari. Each of them saw the "new" philosophies of René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, and other thinkers—figures often identified collectively by these friars as *novatores* or *recentiores*—as leading students into error and away from the better path of Aristotle and the great

scholastics.[4] These friars were thus willing to be seen as defenders of an "old" approach to philosophy. Though they saw themselves as illuminated by faith, reason, and the intellectual traditions of the past, they were resistant to the major currents that constituted the Enlightenment, even the Catholic Enlightenment.[5] Nonetheless, they rejected the claim of scholasticism's opponents that they were somehow enslaved to ancient ways of thinking. They sought to defend a way of being part of a philosophical "sect" that is compatible with an appropriate freedom for philosophy and that is open to the light of reason and experience.

Each of these friars had teaching positions in an Italian university or in schools run by the Dominican or Franciscan order. The Dominican Piccinardi taught metaphysics at the University of Padua from 1669 until 1679 and then theology from 1681 until 1689; he died in 1695.[6] Piccinardi's confrere, Roselli, who died in 1784, taught at the College of St. Thomas in Rome, and his works played a role in the following century's revival of scholasticism.[7] Giuseppe Antonio Ferrari was a Conventual Franciscan theologian who served as regent of the Franciscan College of Bologna in the middle of the eighteenth century.[8] As was customary for the teachers in each order, the two Dominicans defended Thomas Aquinas, and the Franciscan championed John Duns Scotus.

But these Italian friars did not focus on intrascholastic disputes; instead, they deployed their dialectical skills to challenge ancient and especially modern opponents of Aristotelianism. They all challenged the innovative philosophical perspectives of René Descartes and Pierre Gassendi. The two eighteenth-century writers, Ferrari and Roselli, also took up English thinkers such as John Locke and Isaac Newton as well as key figures of the Italian Enlightenment like Antonio Genovesi. This sustained engagement certainly did not mean that these scholastics were seeking to make significant adjustments to scholasticism in light of the criticisms of the previous century or so.[9] They were not attempting to harmonize scholasticism with the new philosophy or the Enlightenment. The titles of their works suggest as much: *Nine books of dogmatic, Peripatetic, Christian philosophy in defense of Aristotle against those who hate him*; *A summary of philosophy according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas*; and *Peripatetic philosophy against the old and especially more recent philosophers, defended in accordance with the even firmer reasons of John Duns Scotus, the Prince of Subtlety*. Each figure understood his work as defending the major medieval teachers from the challenges of the *novatores* like Descartes but also from antischolastics within the Dominican or Franciscan order, such as the Dominican Tommaso Campanella or Fortunato da Brescia, a Franciscan scientist substantially influenced by Descartes, Gassendi, Newton, Nicolas Malebranche, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.[10] But the key

reason for examining these figures is that, partly in response to the common accusation of slavishness to Aristotle, their scholastic philosophical texts each directly pose the question whether it is appropriate for a Christian philosopher to choose a philosophical sect. Rather than taking Aristotelianism's centrality to scholasticism for granted, as perhaps their predecessors had done, each of these friars set out a clear defense of sectarianism in general and Aristotelianism in particular.

These defenses of sectarianism still gave faith and reason primacy in the pursuit of wisdom. These early modern scholastics sought illumination by way of a "twofold light": the supernatural light of faith and the natural light of reason.[11] The three friars believed that these two lights were distinct but compatible sources of enlightenment for the human being in search of truth. Piccinardi thought that the light of reason made it possible for the ancient philosophers to discover many truths about nature and to live virtuously, but he opposed those who confused the two lights. Claims that pre-Christian philosophers like Aristotle could discover supernatural truths like the Trinity failed to maintain the proper distinction between faith and reason.[12]

As a professor at the University of Padua, Piccinardi also weighed in on a long-standing debate about the so-called double truth.[13] Is it possible that the concept of creation ex nihilo is true according to the Christian faith, while the contradictory doctrine of the world's eternity is true according to philosophy? He mentioned the major Italian philosophers Pietro Pomponazzi and Cesare Cremonini and his fourteenth-century confrere Robert Holcot as raising this difficulty. Does not the impossibility of such things like creation ex nihilo or transubstantiation, philosophically speaking, mean that "something could be true according to natural reason in philosophy, even though it is false according to the supernatural light of faith"?[14] Piccinardi challenged this account by pointing to the Fifth Lateran Council's condemnation of the doctrine of the double truth.[15] For Piccinardi, something true philosophically could not be false theologically or vice versa. He recognized, however, that some recent philosophers—even his predecessor at the University of Padua, the natural philosopher Cremonini—could be interpreted as having bracketed (or "prescinded from") the truths of the Christian faith rather than having opposed those truths. It is only when philosophers positively assert, for example, that "philosophy refutes the resurrection or contradicts the resurrection" that "they are deceived."[16] Philosophers, therefore, are permitted to say that a certain truth or action is not connatural with the natural powers of the human being—that is, they may prescind from considerations of faith. But Piccinardi believed that they should never assert a contradiction between truths of

faith and of philosophy. Such a contradiction, he thought, could not really be a genuine result of philosophical inquiry; rather, in Aquinas's words, it was an abuse of philosophy from the defect of reason. Contrariety could not exist between the natural light of reason and the light of faith; otherwise, the principle of noncontradiction would be undermined, which would "undoubtedly subvert the whole natural light."[17] The unity of truth, for Piccinardi, both preserves the integrity of the natural light of reason and encourages a consideration of those things revealed by God.

Ferrari the Scotist also defended the harmony of the two lights and the fundamental role of natural reason in philosophical inquiry.[18] He began his prefatory remarks on logic by saying, "Human beings, with nature alone as guide, bring forth some right judgments and many apt ratiocinations. Nonetheless, this light which they call the intellect, imparted to us by the creator of all, is not sufficient for making us able to guard against all errors."[19] Ferrari did not point to divine revelation as making up for this insufficiency but underscored the fundamental role of the liberal arts, especially logic, in helping to clear up difficulties and uncover what vitiates argumentation. In a later section of the work, when talking about the virtue of religion, Ferrari said that there was not much to say because he was "assuming the persona of a philosopher, not a theologian." "We are," he continued, "now bringing out from the light of nature what is pertinent to our work [*institutum*]," leaving to be disputed elsewhere what is "drawn from the divine light of faith."[20] While he sought to make a clear distinction between the two lights, Ferrari did not entirely exclude scripture from philosophical inquiry. His discussion of rules for disputation dealt with one pertaining to the argument from authority. Ferrari stated that "the authority of no human being . . . brings forth certain and infallible knowledge."[21] Even the greatest philosophers are merely human and thus capable of error. But divine authority is different because "it descends from God the source of truth, who cannot be deceived nor deceive."[22] "Divine authority," Ferrari said, "drives away every doubt," and this certainty includes ecclesiastical authority, which "obtains its force and infallible strength not from man but from God."[23] Arguments from authority are among the weakest arguments, but a divine source provides such arguments with profound strength and certainty.

In the eighteenth century, the Dominican Roselli took up the relationship of the two lights as he confronted the challenges of Pierre Bayle and Antonio Genovesi. Roselli saw Bayle as having said that the mysteries of faith are not merely above but even contrary to human reason.[24] Genovesi, an eighteenth-century Italian philosopher who was deeply influenced by John Locke and Isaac Newton, taught that certain problems in theology are insoluble for those who

love truth and philosophize in good faith.[25] Roselli challenged the notion that the mysteries of faith are contrary to human reason by emphasizing that God is also the source of man's rational nature. Roselli sought to grant a high role for reason, even in theological inquiry, stating that "there is no argument against the mysteries of faith that cannot be solved,"[26] while also preserving the distinction between the two lights by saying that the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason and that human reason cannot be a legitimate criterion in things of faith.[27] For Roselli, philosophy is the natural desire for wisdom, the pursuit of knowledge about the causes of things, and the banishing of ignorance.[28] Though philosophy could "serve the orthodox faith" in various ways,[29] the pursuit of knowledge by the philosopher is guided by the natural light of reason and does not require divine revelation.[30]

All three Italian friars thus believed that the light of natural reason has a role distinct from the light of faith. For a philosopher who is a Christian, the light of faith could help that philosopher to avoid error and provide conclusions that turn out not to be beyond the capacities of human reason. But theology does not supply the principles of human disciplines; these principles are derived from the light of reason in the human intellect.[31]

The notion of human reason being a light depended on a conception of luminous bodies as making something manifest. The scholastics also saw light as having an irresistible force; one could not fail to affirm a conclusion made evident to the intellect any more than a healthy person could fail to see something in broad daylight with open eyes. Roselli saw the human intellect as a light because of its capacity to make manifest the essential characteristics of things in the world. The way that objects are evident to the eye in the light of the sun is analogous to how the essences of things can be evident to the mind after the activity of the intellect. Roselli defended this notion against an erudite Italian philosopher and historian, Odoardo Corsini, who said that this account of understanding had no real value "unless it be shown that these spiritual rays, by which the corporeal image is imbued, can go forth from the intellect."[32] In reply, Roselli clarified that spiritual rays do not actually emanate from the intellect; rather, the illuminating power of the intellect is nothing other than its capacity to abstract the nature or "whatness" of a thing from the individuating conditions still found in the phantasm. This power of abstracting universals from phantasms could be called illuminating because it makes manifest the essences of material things.

Decades before, one of the most important figures in early modern scholasticism, the Jesuit Francisco Suárez, employed by all three Italian friars, attempted to clarify the notion of the intellect as a light. He made it clear that the notion of

the light of the intellect should not be confused with that which is "material and tangible," as Odoardo Corsini apparently did when he conceived of intellectual illumination in terms of rays. Nonetheless, Suárez resisted any reduction of this notion to mere metaphor. Light is rightly associated with the intellect because "light is properly anything manifestative."[33] In his commentary on the words of Genesis, "Let there be light," Benito Pereira, Suárez's contemporary Jesuit, also emphasized the importance of light's power to make things manifest. God wisely created light after the making of the primary elemental bodies of the world—at first "confused and dark"—because light is "the ornament not only of colors but also of all bodies."[34] He continued, "Through light, as Basil, Bede, and Damascene say, all things are made conspicuous and manifest not only that they might be discerned but also that they might be discerned with pleasure, for, through [light], the variety, elegance, and beauty of all things is apparent."[35] Enlightenment, for these scholastics, would thus be conceived as something being made manifest to the human intellect.

Many philosophers outside of the scholastic tradition continued to associate understanding with light, but the scholastics resisted key aspects of these accounts. Roselli thought that the modern way of speaking about God's relationship to the intellect and innate ideas lost sight of what is natural to human cognition. In response to Malebranche's position that "God is conjoined with our mind by a most intimate chain and illuminates it immediately,"[36] Roselli insisted that God and the light of reason are not the same. The light of reason is merely "a participated similitude of the uncreated light."[37] Roselli also believed that Descartes's notion of innate ideas failed to take seriously man's embodiment: "If God produced ideas in us because we need them, no sufficient reason could be assigned for the union of the soul with the body."[38] Roselli argued that the body exists for the sake of the human intellective soul; the body serves the soul by virtue of the fact that human ideas arise through the mediation of the senses.[39]

In Ferrari's engagement with the notion of clear and distinct ideas as a criterion of truth, he noted that this Cartesian rule was too close to the notion of a "private spirit" held by some Protestants. Ferrari argued that, just as some "heretics" said, with respect to supernatural matters, "that of which we have a clear and distinct idea through the light of grace is true," so the Cartesians said, with respect to natural matters, "that of which we have a clear and distinct idea through the light of nature is true."[40] Ferrari worried that this approach to truth made philosophers overconfident about the extent to which the light of nature had illuminated them and that they consequently became immune to criticism. Ferrari thought that the connection of innate ideas with God did not take seriously enough the limited

nature of the human intellect.[41] In response to the Cartesian view that God would be a deceiver if clear and distinct ideas were false, he said, "God gave man a power intrinsically fallible because it is intrinsically finite and limited."[42] But God is not made the author of falsity because He gives human beings a fallible power, just as God is not the author of evil even though human beings have the ability to sin.

Enlightenment, for these schoolmen, involved a struggle with the obscurity brought about by material things, the body, and the weakness and limited nature of the human intellectual light.[43] These Italian friars thought that the moderns or the *recentiores*—at least Descartes and Malebranche—attempted to overcome this obscurity not only by positing an access to sources of illumination beyond human nature, such as the immediate, unparticipated light of God or clear and distinct innate ideas, but also by making any individual philosopher his or her own *magister*. Ferrari took this up in the context of defending the first principles that are known per se. The Cartesians accused the Aristotelians of unfairly criticizing their notion of clear and distinct ideas when the Peripatetic notion of evidence amounted to the same thing. While Ferrari admitted that some Peripatetics failed to explain the role of evidence properly, he wanted to clarify the difference between Aristotelians and Cartesians by showing the different levels of evidence.[44] Although the principle of noncontradiction and logic provide essential guidance, Ferrari also thought that even evident propositions still need to be brought before an external criterion of truth: the "consensus of the wise."[45]

At this point in the argument, Ferrari brought out another characteristic of light that has an analogy to the operations of the intellect: its compulsive character.[46] "Evidence," Ferrari wrote, "is nothing other than a spiritual light which, having been infused in our minds, compels the intellect to assent, just as—almost in the same way—material light, having been infused in the eye, compels it to see."[47] But just because someone sees something in a particular way does not make it so; similarly, just because some idea is evident or compelling to someone does not make it true. Human beings consult those with "healthy and open eyes" for gathering whether or not there is a visible object. Ferrari extended this analogy to healthy or wise minds: "By virtue of the fact that the wise do not assent to certain objects proposed to them, we duly gather that the spiritual light does not appear by which their intellects are illuminated."[48] Ferrari believed that what comes about by nature necessarily happens in all those who are rightly disposed. If the rightly disposed or wise mind does not see the immediacy of a certain principle or the propriety of a certain inference, then "it cannot be said to happen from the necessity of nature."[49] To make sure that a certain notion is really evident to the human intellect, philosophical conclusions—even the most fundamental

principles—should be examined in dialogue with the greatest philosophers of the past and present. But, according to Ferrari, the Cartesians were not at all moved by "the judgment of the wise." "In the end," he said, "evidence alone, which they contend that they have, is sufficient for them; anyone is a *magister* for himself who makes a show of pursuing all things in accordance with clear and distinct ideas."[50] "We hold with certainty," Ferrari continued, "that a human being understands few things and is ignorant of many things, and from this we recognize no other rule more liable to errors than that a human being becomes a *magister* to himself and directs himself according to his own thinking [*cogitationes*]."[51] Ferrari thus thought that, because of the limits of human intellectual capacities, being one's own primary teacher was the surest path to self-deception and many erroneous beliefs.

Although these early modern scholastics held that first principles could be known with certainty and that even the senses were in certain respects unable to be deceived (*non falluntur*), they continued to consult the ancient philosophers, especially Aristotle.[52] They did not do this because they believed that any philosopher was infallible. They did so because, in Roselli's words, "the search for truth . . . can scarcely be done without a guide."[53] Nature posed extreme difficulties for human inquirers.[54] Even matters of the senses, must, according to Ferrari, be pondered diligently "before anyone devotes himself to his own judgment."[55] The challenges to pursuing truth were daunting. As the famous aphorism of Hippocrates attests, "Art is long, life short, occasion fleeting, experience fallacious, judgment difficult."[56] The question then is whether the judgments of the wise, in Ferrari's words, "will be able to bestow light upon us."[57] A good teacher shines light on the path.

Knowledge is gained either through discovery or through learning from a teacher or a book. The way of discovery is much more difficult. Roselli said that discovery arises "in those in whom there is a more perspicacious genius and a more vivid light," while teaching is that by which "the mind of a disciple is in a certain way illuminated."[58] Even benefiting from scientific discoveries or experiments requires some trust in the experiences of others; one individual cannot have all the experiences of the innumerable human beings required for making advances in the natural sciences, nor can that individual repeat all of the relevant experiments. Science demands many centuries to advance; giving some role to human authority, Roselli believed, is the only way to benefit from the experience of the ages.[59] The limitations of the individual human knower as a finite being and as an animal living in a complex world of material things inherently difficult

to understand led these Italian friars to argue that most human beings stand in need of teachers and the best books to achieve wisdom.

Defending the consultation of the wise was less controversial than advocating that thinkers choose one of the philosophical sects. Perhaps because the scholastics had been criticized at least since the early days of Renaissance humanism for slavishness to ancient authorities and blind devotion to Aristotle, early modern scholastics took up these issues much more explicitly than their medieval forebears. Piccinardi, Ferrari, and Roselli each asked whether it is expedient for a philosopher to wander (*vagari*) through all the sects.[60] The answer in each thinker's work was a negative one. Though the critique of philosophical sectarianism was quite widespread in this period, these friars had a reply.[61] They believed that a unified, communal effort was beneficial to the progress of philosophy. Piccinardi thought that the unity of teaching provided by adherence to a philosophical school prevented confusion and contention and made philosophy more "perfect and long-lasting."[62] His main support for the importance of unity in the pursuit of truth was Pseudo-Dionysius's reference to a *lumen unitivum*: "For it is perfective and thus conversive, converting them from many opinions to what truly exists [*ad vere existens*], gathering the various visions or phantasies to the true, uniform cognition, and filling them with one unitive light."[63] The light that makes truth known gathers human beings together; it scatters the obscurity of falsehood. And in doing so, this light prevents divisions between human beings because, as Aquinas put it in his commentary on this text, "those who know the truth come together in one way of thinking [*sententia*], while those who are ignorant [of the truth] are divided by diverse errors."[64]

For Ferrari, sharing principles with other philosophers allowed for a greater facility in addressing difficulties and in advancing knowledge. Wandering through different schools of philosophy would lead to instability in philosophical inquiry. Roselli made explicit that this adherence to a sect is relevant especially for students, who need coherent principles to make progress in their studies.[65] The approach of the eclectics to philosophy, an approach that chooses anything said correctly from any of the philosophical sects, might sound attractive, but Roselli pointed out that it leads to incoherence and widespread confusion—"it is not easy to find an eclectic agreeing with an eclectic"—and sometimes to outright skepticism.[66] Roselli defended sectarianism against the eclectics by pointing out that "our mind is weak" and by asking whether there are enough individuals who can "diligently weigh the opinions and reasons of all or at least many of the philosophers" and then "construct one body of doctrine . . . from what they have chosen."[67]

These friars thought that choosing a sect is even more appropriate for a philosopher who is a Christian. The higher light of faith, which firmly teaches the importance of unity in the church, illuminates the way of the philosopher, who should be much more concerned about seeking unity in philosophical pursuits, particularly among Christians.[68] In reply to those who might say that the arguments for the benefits of unity are relevant only to the "superior truth of religion and faith" but not to "inferior philosophy," Piccinardi invoked the principles that the lower is ordained to the higher and thus said that "the destruction of unity in this inferior truth dispose[s] to uncertainty in the superior one."[69] It is clear from Piccinardi's account that the notion of the twofold light of faith and reason—making truths manifest in a harmonious way—also shaped his support of choosing a philosophical sect; unity should be the goal of philosophy and theology.

These Italian friars, however, thought that this sort of unity is compatible with the freedom to philosophize (*libertas philosophandi*) celebrated by their contemporaries.[70] This unity, Piccinardi argued, does not rule out divergences of opinion—indeed, it provides "a vast field for subtlety"—but students must be trained in unified, coherent principles, lest a small error in the beginning becomes a great one at the end.[71] Ferrari took up the *libertas philosophandi* more directly. The Franciscan knew that the *novatores* as well as ancient defenders of eclecticism believed that having a philosophical master would "spread darkness over the mind."[72] In response, he agreed that one must philosophize freely. Indeed, Ferrari stated the point rather forcefully: "May it be absent from the free-born lover of truth" for the philosopher "to swear by the individual words of any master."[73] Not individual philosophers but only "divine faith, evident reason, and proven experience" have rights over the human intellect.[74] But Ferrari thought that one could have freedom as a philosopher while being part of a philosophical sect: "Affection for the patron of a sect is useful and does not distract the mind from truth, if it does not exceed the limits of moderation."[75] Preventing confusion and quarrels by using the general principles of a certain sect as a "touchstone" can genuinely benefit philosophical inquiry.[76]

Roselli explicitly distinguished between two kinds of sectarianism. The first way of belonging to a sect is "a kind of servitude" and "entirely unworthy of a philosopher, who must follow the truth."[77] He associated this inappropriate sectarianism with the Pythagoreans who accepted the authority of Pythagoras "without any reason" and responded to inquiries with "he has said it" (*ipse dixit*).[78] On the other hand, for "truth not yet explored," a sect could help to provide arguments for certain positions. Those whom "learned men commonly judge to be wise" can be assumed to have come to their conclusions on the basis of sound reason-

ing. This second form of sectarianism, Roselli said, "in no way impedes the liberty of philosophizing."[79] Roselli invoked Christian Wolff's understanding of *libertas philosophandi* as standing for oneself rather than by the judgment of others, arguing that the better form of sectarianism meets Wolff's standard because it is still based on reason, not on authority alone. Thus, rather than thinking of sectarianism as the darkness from which enlightenment liberates the philosopher, these Italian friars thought that a moderate sectarianism was essential for pedagogy and useful for the philosophical community as a whole.

This defense of moderate sectarianism actually set up the embrace of Aristotelianism by the Italian friars because Aristotle's philosophy was believed to allow for a reasonable eclecticism. Piccinardi argued that philosophers should choose the school that can best "gather into itself the truths of the others into one."[80] After Ferrari made clear that he did not swear by Aristotle's words, that he recognized many errors in the Aristotelian corpus, and that the opinions of Aristotle had weight only when "natural reason, evident experience, and especially faith" indicate nothing to the contrary, the Franciscan embraced the Aristotelian sect because it "contains in itself the truths of the other sects."[81] These scholastics consequently gave special emphasis to those thinkers from other schools, such as Cicero the Academic or Seneca the Stoic, who sang the praises of Aristotle. Piccinardi explicitly defended Aristotelianism on the basis of its eclecticism. Plato, Piccinardi noted, called Aristotle "the Reader" because of his profound interest in the opinions of his predecessors. Indeed, the Dominican professor indicated that a sect that did not have this eclectic character would be inappropriate for the true philosopher or the Christian.[82]

These Italian scholastics thought Aristotelianism could synthesize the benefits of sectarianism and eclecticism not only because of its willingness to engage dialectically the opinions from other sects but also because of how Aristotle and Aristotelianism were historically situated. According to Piccinardi, some of the modern philosophers who defended a return to atomism argued that Democritus should be examined with care because of his greater antiquity and consequently his greater proximity to the perfect knowledge infused into Adam at his creation.[83] Piccinardi responded to such claims not by making a case for the antiquity of Aristotelian wisdom but by turning the tables entirely. Piccinardi pointed out that "the progress of natural philosophy" can be compared to the "progress of a human being" from infancy to maturity. He argued that Aristotle had the benefit of examining the views of philosophers like Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Plato, and others when formulating his positions.[84] When it comes to truths known directly from God, proximity to the source should be privileged. But "with

sciences and arts which human beings have . . . acquired by their own acts, they have been made more perfect with the succession of time."[85]

The argument that Aristotle should be preferred in part because his work reflected the progress and maturity of Greek philosophy could put the Italian friars in a difficult position with the *novatores*—the "new" or modern philosophers. If the embrace of Aristotle came about in part because he was later than Democritus and Plato, why would seventeenth-century thinkers like Descartes and Newton, living around two millennia after Aristotle, not be accorded much greater authority than any ancient philosopher? Though the friars did not address this difficulty in precisely these terms, their position becomes clearer once one grasps that they rejected the alternatives posed by the controversy so decisive for the intellectual history of the Enlightenment: the *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*.[86] Both the Ancients and the Moderns in the French *querelle* assumed a rupture between the achievements of ancient culture and the enlightenment of the period since the Scientific Revolution. While they debated the relative merits of ancient and modern architecture, poetry, philosophy, and so on, both sides assumed that a gulf existed between these two eras—"a thousand years of barbarism" in which society had fallen into "the deepest obscurity."[87] By contrast, these seventeenth- and eighteenth-century defenders of the Aristotelian sect believed that philosophy had developed much more continuously from antiquity to their own day. They acknowledged the reality of setbacks for philosophy as well as forgetfulness of the achievements of the past, but they did not think that the ordinary progress of the arts and sciences over the course of time was entirely interrupted by a Dark Age.[88] They spoke of a continuous succession of philosophers; Piccinardi employed the image of children standing on the shoulders of giants.[89]

To show the continuity and progress of the Aristotelian sect, these friars argued that thinkers in what we call the High Middle Ages, such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus, had improved upon Aristotle. First of all, the theologians and philosophers in the Latin West purified the philosophy of Aristotle from errors against the faith.[90] As Piccinardi put it, "In purging philosophy under the light of nature, Aristotle surpassed the rest of the ancients; St. Thomas more than others purified [philosophy] under the supernatural light."[91] But the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholastics made other substantial contributions. Ferrari pointed out that, while Aristotle wrote esoterically to protect philosophy from the common people and to provoke diligence, the commentaries and expositions—"handed down from his disciples in uninter-

rupted succession until this day"—disclosed Aristotle's "genuine meaning" with much greater clarity.[92] Aristotle's obscurity, Piccinardi said, was substantially reduced "by the great light of [Aquinas's] commentaries."[93] In Piccinardi's account of Aristotelianism among the Greeks and the Muslims, he argued that their explanations of Aristotle often confused his positions with those of Platonists or Stoics. Latin commentators like Aquinas gave a much better exposition of Aristotle's actual views. These friars, however, professed some disdain for those bookish philosophers who merely sought to grasp the meaning of Aristotle's texts. They were worried about this approach in part because such thinkers did not benefit from the purifications, corrections, and other developments over the course of the centuries. Indeed, Ferrari called such figures "cobblers of human wisdom."[94] "We," Ferrari said, "pay heed to Aristotelian philosophy as it is now [*modo*]."[95]

These scholastics thus did not reject the modern philosophers because they were developing philosophy beyond the texts of Aristotle. Nor did they do so because of their careful attention to nature. Indeed, the major reason for choosing the Aristotelian sect over Platonism was Aristotle's deeper interest in nature. Plato might have had more to say about divine matters, but the friars wanted philosophy to deal with what is proper to the "natural light." They were not seeking, in Ferrari's words, an "ape of a theologian," but "a philosopher, who best examined natural things."[96] These scholastics claimed to embrace the new experiments and the discovery of new lands and heavenly bodies.[97] "From the experiments [of the modern philosophers]," Ferrari said, "a great light and the greatest renown is added to philosophy."[98] What then accounts for the hostility of the scholastics to the conclusions of the so-called *novatores*? These friars believed that, even if the modern philosophers claimed that they were establishing a new philosophy on surer foundations, they were often reviving principles of the pre-Socratics, Epicureans, or Stoics.[99] In doing so, confusion reigned in philosophical discussions because of the use of different terminology and principles by each of the modern schools.[100] And, indeed, they thought that the recent philosophers were sometimes as sectarian as the scholastics and no less contentious among themselves.[101] Instead of abandoning the achievements of many centuries, these Italian friars thought that modern philosophers should incorporate the results of new experiments and observations into the framework of Aristotelian philosophy, which had provided guidance, especially in the Latin Christian West, for so long. According to Ferrari, "Peripatetic philosophy should be perfected and adorned, not overthrown."[102]

These three Italian friars were not seeking an ancient or a modern light. Roselli even quoted Francis Bacon to make the point that "truth must be sought not in the felicity of any time . . . but from the light of nature and experience."[103] These figures focused on light's "manifestative" power. Making truth manifest to oneself and to others is aided by every light available: the light of the sun, the light of reason, the torches of ancient guides like Aristotle, the unitive light of a philosophical school, and certainly the light of faith.[104] They cherished anything that might pierce the darkness, an obscurity that results partly from sin but also, to a great extent, from the fact that human beings are animals seeking to gain truths about other material things. The scholastics believed that the senses are reliable and that the intellect can know some truths with certainty; the light of reason can penetrate the obscurity of material things. But they held that the human intellect is weak. Students must be trained; even a mature philosopher must consult those who are wise. These scholastics believed that Aristotle had successfully taken up what was best in the teachings of the ancient philosophers and had addressed logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics in a unified way. And they thought it even more important that he was taken up by so many philosophers over the course of almost two millennia. By virtue of its historical importance, the Aristotelian sect had become a storehouse of human wisdom. These friars held that such a treasure could not be thrown aside by any prudent thinker. In the view of Piccinardi, Ferrari, and Roselli, the new methods, too reliant upon the individual knower, were losing touch with historical experience and community consensus. They quoted Aristotle's statement in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that gave experience and maturity a place alongside logical demonstrations and that also connected such experience to clear vision: "We ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people . . . not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright."[105] When confronting the willingness to reject the opinions and arguments accumulated by the Aristotelian tradition over so many centuries, these friars asked their contemporaries whether "they alone enjoy the midday light of truth."[106]

In the context of substantial engagement with the criticisms of their contemporaries, the scholastics defended the Aristotelian tradition as a light of unity (*lumen unitivum*) for philosophers. Historians of the Enlightenment should give more attention to the fact that scholasticism had defenders during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who sought to explain their complex relationship to Aristotle, the history of philosophy, and the scientific achievements of their day. Although the friars' counternarrative of the relationship between the Ancients

and the Moderns—mediated by the scholastics of the Middle Ages—and their attempt to reconcile sectarianism with the *libertas philosophandi* did not persuade their contemporaries, the scholastics were genuine participants in the rich debates of the Enlightenment period.

NOTES

1. For an important example of the connection between scholasticism and the Dark Ages, see Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*, trans. Richard N. Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 71–74. The influential eighteenth-century historian of philosophy, Johann Jakob Brucker, often associated scholasticism and darkness, including the darkness of the Middle Ages. See, e.g., *Historia critica philosophiae* 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1742–44), 3:557–58, 836, 872–73; 4, pt.1:146, 258, 295, 340–41. For a discussion of scholasticism's connection with medieval barbarism during the Enlightenment, see Edward Grant, *God and Reason in the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 324–26.

2. Marco Forlivesi, "A Man, an Age, a Book," in *Rem in seipsa cernere: saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673)*, ed. Marco Forlivesi (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2006), 29–114, for an excellent discussion of scholasticism from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, especially the complexity of terminology, periodization, and the recent literature. See also Roger Ariew, *Descartes among the Scholastics* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

3. Marcus Hellyer, *Catholic Physics: Jesuit Natural Philosophy in Early Modern Germany* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 77–79.

4. All three friars used these terms, but see Daniel Garber, "Descartes among the *Novatores*," *Res Philosophica* 92 (2015): 1–19, which argues that Descartes wanted to separate his philosophy from that of the *novatores*.

5. For a helpful discussion of the Catholic Enlightenment's relationship with scholasticism, see Ulrich L. Lehner, *The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7–9. According to Lehner, "Catholic Enlighteners differed among themselves as to how such a modernization should be brought about, but all agreed that Aristotelian scholasticism could no longer serve as the universal foundation for theology" (7).

6. Dominicans at the University of Padua taught theology and metaphysics *in via sancti Thomae*—alongside Franciscans who taught both subjects *in via Scoti*—from the second half of the fifteenth century until the eighteenth century. Very little has been written on Piccinardi, but see Antonino Poppi, *Ricerche sulla teologia e la scienza nella Scuola padovana del Cinque e Seicento* (Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2001), 105–7. See also Giambattista Contarini, *Notizie storiche circa li pubblici professori nello Studio di Padova scelti dall'Ordine di san Domenico* (Venice, 1769), 80–84, 184–85; Hugo Hurter, *Nomenclator literarius recentioris theologiae catholicae*, 4 vols. (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1873–86), 2:330–32; Benedict M. Ashley, *The Dominicans* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2009), 157.

7. F. J. Roensch, "Roselli, Salvatore Maria," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed., 15 vols. (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 12:380–81; James A. Weisheipl, "The Revival of Thomism as a

Christian Philosophy," in *New Themes in Christian Philosophy*, ed. Ralph McInerny (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 171–73; Ashley, *Dominicans*, 179, 196–97; Gerald A. McCool, *The Neo-Thomists* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1994), 27.

8. More work should be done on the career of Ferrari. The information here is based on what is found in the front matter of his *Philosophia peripatetica adversus veteres, et recentiores praesertim philosophos firmioribus propugnata rationibus Joannis Dunsii Scoti subtilium principis*, vol. 1: *Philosophiae prolegomena, logicam, metaphisicam, et ethicam complectens* (Venice: Fentius, 1746). See also the second edition, printed in Venice in 1754, which indicates that Ferrari was no longer regent in Bologna but instead serving in Milan as an official for the Franciscan province. And he was certainly alive in 1774 because, in that year, he preached during Lent at Florence's Santa Croce. See *Applausi poetici alla profonda dottrina e singolare eloquenza del molto reverendo padre Giuseppe Antonio Ferrari* (Florence, 1774).

9. See the entries for all three figures in Jacob Schmutz, *Scholasticon*, http://scholasticon.ish-lyon.cnrs.fr.

10. Ugo Baldini, "Fortunato da Brescia," in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, ed., Alberto Maria Ghisalberti, 88 vols. (Rome: Instituto della Enciclopedia italiana 1960–), 49:239–43.

11. The entry for *lumen naturale* in Johann Altenstaig's *Lexicon theologicum* lays out the *duplex lumen* quite clearly and demonstrates its traditional character. See *Lexicon theologicum complectens vocabulorum descriptiones, diffinitiones et interpretationes* (Antwerp, 1576), 177v–178r.

12. Serafino Piccinardi, *Philosophiae dogmaticae peripateticae christianae libri novem in patrocinium Aristostelis ac in Osores eiusdem*, vol. 1 (Padua: Frambotto, 1671), 110–11 (hereafter *Philosophia*).

13. Ibid., 114.

14. Ibid.

15. The bull *Apostolici regiminis* was promulgated on 19 December 1513 at Lateran V's eighth session. See Eric A. Constant, "A Reinterpretation of the Fifth Lateran Council Decree *Apostolici regiminis* (1513)," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 33, no. 2 (2002): 353–79.

16. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 116.

17. Ibid., 117.

18. In nearly all discussions (however rare) of the work of the Franciscan Giuseppe Antonio Ferrari, he has been identified as a thinker seeking to establish philosophy upon the supernatural principles of faith. One nineteenth-century historian of philosophy associated Ferrari with those Italian thinkers who "endeavored to construct a philosophy on the basis of Revelation" in order to "counteract . . . materialistic tendencies." See Vincenzo Botta, "Appendix II: Historical Sketch of Modern Philosophy in Italy," in Friedrich Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy, from Thales to the Present Time*, vol. 2: *History of Modern Philosophy*, trans. George S. Morris (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1874), 482.

19. Giuseppe Antonio Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica adversus veteres, et recentiores praesertim philosophos firmioribus propugnata rationibus Ioannis Dunsii Scoti subtilium principis opera et studio*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Venice: Bettinelli, 1754), 1:36 (hereafter *Philosophia peripatetica*).

20. Ibid., 333–34.

21. Ibid., 79.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 80.

24. Salvatore Maria Roselli, *Summa philosophica ad mentem angelici doctoris S. Thomae Aquinatis*, vol. 1: *Pars prima logicam complectens* (Madrid: Cano, 1788), 468 (hereafter *Summa philosophica*). Roselli referred to Pierre Bayle's *Réponse aux questions d'un provincial*, 5 vols. (Rotterdam: Leers, 1704–7), 3:999, where a contrast was made between human reason and universal reason, which is in God. He also pointed to Bayle's remarks about faith and reason in the *éclaircissement* to the *Dictionnaire* pertaining to Manichaeism. See Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 11th ed., 16 vols. (Paris: Desoer, 1820), 15:280.

25. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:468. See also Mario Rosa, "The Catholic *Aufklärung* in Italy," in *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe*, ed. Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 223. For some of Genovesi's hesitations with Locke and others, see Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 517–18, and Richard Bellamy, *Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio, and the Italian Political Tradition* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2013), 32–33.

26. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:469. See also ibid., 553, for Roselli's comparison of the certitude of demonstrations that depend on "the light of human reason" and those that depend on "the light of divine science."

27. Ibid., 467.

28. Ibid., 59, 90.

29. Ibid., 91. See also ibid., 101.

30. Although Roselli believed that many of the ancient philosophers, especially Plato, derived many of their doctrines about natural religion, morality, and other matters from the revelation to the Hebrews (ibid., 84), he made it clear that truths, even about God, the soul, and natural law, can be discovered by human reason (ibid., 88). His view was that, without the help of revelation and the Hebrews, it would have taken mankind a very long time as well as intense study to discover these truths.

31. Though not directly pertinent to this essay, which focuses on describing the perspective of the scholastics, it is perhaps worth noting that this account would not have been satisfying for many Enlightenment thinkers. See Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 1: *The Rise of Modern Paganism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 233–36.

32. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:248. For more on Corsini, see Gregorio Piaia, "The General Histories of Philosophy in Italy in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century," in *Models of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 2: *From the Cartesian Age to Brucker*, ed. Gregorio Piaia and Giovanni Santinello (New York: Springer, 2011), 292–97 (hereafter *Models*).

33. Francisco Suárez, *De anima*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Michel André, 30 vols. (Paris: Vivès, 1856–78), 3:743. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 106, a. 1. Despite the fact that Suárez was a rather eclectic Thomist, Suárez's resistance to a merely metaphorical "translation" of the word "light" to the intellectual order—insisting that such a usage is "proper"—might still be useful for a reexamination of Hans Blumenberg's claim that "Thomas Aquinas is completely hostile to the 'language of light' because, in his view, it blurs the distinction between metaphysics and metaphorics. . . . 'light' may be spoken of, in intellectual contexts, only *aequivoce vel metaphorice*, where the *ratio manifestationis* of what is [*des Seiende*] (i.e., its ontological truth) is concerned." See Hans Blumenberg,

"Light as a Metaphor for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Philosophical Concept Formation," trans. Joel Anderson, in *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*, ed. David Michael Levin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 49–50.

34. Benito Pereira, *Commentariorum et disputationum in Genesim*, 4 vols. (Lyon: Cardon, 1594–1600), 1:68–69.

35. Ibid., 69.

36. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:216.

37. Ibid., 221. To support his point, Roselli quoted Psalm 4:7: "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."

38. Ibid., 199. He invoked Gassendi, Locke, and Malebranche as agreeing with elements of his criticism of Descartes (ibid., 195).

39. Ibid., 199–200.

40. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:95.

41. Ibid., 96. He also observed that the sin of Adam was the "cause of every defect." "God," Ferrari said, "created man upright," alluding to the very end of Ecclesiastes 7.

42. Ibid.

43. Roselli described human intellects as feeble (*imbecilla*) "in the intellective order." See Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:369.

44. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:96.

45. Ibid., 97.

46. For an elaborate discussion of this point by one of the leading figures of seventeenth-century Thomism, see *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises*, trans. Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 455–61.

47. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:97. See ibid., 89, where Ferrari said, in reply to Cartesian doubt, that the human will cannot overwhelm what is "perspicuous and evident to us" because the human intellect necessarily assents to such evidence according to the natural operations of the intellect. Thus, the compelling character of the intellectual light is part of Ferrari's rejection of universal doubt.

48. Ibid., 97.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., 96.

52. For the infallibility of the senses, see ibid., 15, in reply to the Academic skeptics, and 82–86, in reply to Epicureanism. And see Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:384–85, 437–39, where in the last section he engaged Antonio Genovesi at some length. Roselli said that "the senses can be the occasional causes of the defects of our judgments" (437). See also Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 150–51, 326. It might also be useful to note the scholastic affirmation of the infallibility of the first operation of the intellect. See Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:379–80.

53. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:98.

54. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:17.

55. Ibid., 16.

56. Ibid., 18.

57. Ibid., 19.

58. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:585. See also ibid., 566–67. He recognized that teachers could also be a source of error (454–55).

59. Ibid., 95. For evidence that Roselli was speaking not only of experience but also of experimentation, see Salvatore Maria Roselli, *Summa philosophica ad mentem angelici doctoris S. Thomae Aquinatis*, vol. 2: *Prima secundae partis physicam generalem complectens* (Madrid: Cano, 1788), 33–39.

60. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 16; Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:18; Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:92. It is not clear when this question became standard in scholastic textbooks. In antiquity, Seneca wrote, "He who would arrive at the appointed end must follow a single road and not wander through many ways." See Seneca, *Epistles 1–65*, trans. Richard M. Gummere (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), 291 (Epistle XLV). See Charles B. Schmitt, *Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) and His Critique of Aristotle* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), 40, n. 23, for a similar formulation in Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's *De studio* (1496). See especially Tommaso Campanella, *De gentilismo non retinendo* (Paris: Du Bray, 1636), 58, 61, where Campanella said, "to swear by the words of pagan philosophers, such as Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, Parmenides, or any other is heresy . . . and the greatest impiety." The universities and religious orders, he said, did not swear by the words of a master but "swore to read and declare St. Thomas or Augustine" in order to maintain unity of teaching and doctrine and teach adolescents and the mediocre without confusion. "It is better for our [Dominican students]," he continued, "to adhere to one approved doctor and to progress until they can discover better things than for them to wander [*vagari*] through many [doctors] without any progress."

61. See *Models*, x, 305, 351, 408, 413, 455. See also Leo Catana, *The Historiographical Concept "System of Philosophy"* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 49, for the association of sectarianism and Roman Catholicism in Brucker's history of philosophy.

62. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 17.

63. Ibid., citing *De divinis nominibus*, chap. 4.

64. Thomas Aquinas, *In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, chap. 4, lectio 4 (www.corpusthomisticum.org). Piccinardi referred to Aquinas's commentary after citing Dionysius's text.

65. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:92–93.

66. Ibid., 95–98, esp. 96. For a discussion of the importance of eclecticism to early modern philosophy, see Francesco Bottin and Marco Longo, "The History of Philosophy from Eclecticism to Pietism," in *Models*, esp. 303–6, 312–13. See also Catana, *Historiographical Concept*, 12–13, 22–31, 185–88, for an account of the distinction between syncretism and eclecticism in the historiography of philosophy leading up to Brucker. Brucker thought of eclecticism as systematic philosophy. Syncretism does not "produce a coherent system" (ibid., 28).

67. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:96–97.

68. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 17–20; Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:19, 21. Roselli was not as explicit on this point, but see *Summa philosophica*, 1:98.

69. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 18.

70. See Robert B. Sutton, "The Phrase *Libertas Philosophandi*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 14, no. 2 (1953): 310–16. For earlier sources of the notion of the freedom of philosophizing, see Ian Maclean, "The 'Sceptical Crisis' Reconsidered: Galen, Rational

Medicine and the *Libertas Philosophandi*," *Early Science and Medicine* 11, no. 3 (2006): 247–74.

71. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 19. See Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:20, who used the same image of a vast field for subtlety.

72. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:20.

73. Ibid., 19. But see Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 131, 139–44, and Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:105–6, for explanations of the oaths of Dominican teachers to follow Thomas Aquinas. Roselli made it clear that this rule was mainly for teachers.

74. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:20.

75. Ibid., 21.

76. Ibid., 20.

77. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:94.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 21.

81. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:23–24.

82. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 18–19.

83. Ibid., 21. He was referring to the claims of Jean Chrysostome Magnen in *Democritus reviviscens, sive de atomis*, first published in 1646, also quoted in Ilario Tolomio, "The 'Historia Philosophica' in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Models of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1: *From Its Origins in the Renaissance to the "Historia Philosophica,"* ed. Giovanni Santinello et al., English ed. Constance W. T. Blackwell and Philip Weller (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 134: "When the more venerable and older wisdom had . . . cast off its filth . . . and reclaimed its serene and natural countenance, then it seemed to me of a majesty all but worthy of worship, and it adduced an argument in its favour, namely that of being closer to the origin, that is eternal truth." But it does not appear that Magnen was explicit about the connection to Adam. Ralph Cudworth also expressed his concern about "phantastick atomists" who used divine revelation, especially the supposed connection of atomism to the teaching of Moses, to support their philosophical positions in *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (London, 1678), 12.

84. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 21.

85. Ibid., 22. See also Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:585, where he pointed out that science will never reach an "apex of perfection," but that a "progress towards perfection" that occurs as human experience expands and knowledge grows over the course of time is sufficient.

86. Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). See also Joan DeJean, *Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

87. Edelstein, *Enlightenment*, 75–76, quoting d'Alembert's "Tableau de l'esprit humain au milieu du dix-huitième siècle." See ibid., 160, n. 1, for references to similar intellectual histories. Larry F. Norman makes the same point about how the Ancient and the Modern parties were in agreement in their contempt of the Middle Ages. See *The Shock of the Ancient: Literature and History in Early Modern France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 21, 41.

88. Serafino Piccinardi, *De imputato scholasticis studio effraeni in Aristotelem ab effraenibus in philosophia recentioribus, praesertim Democriticis, Epicuraeis, seu Athomistis* (Padua, 1676), 348–49. In his continuous narrative of the "twenty centuries" of Peripatetic philosophy,

Piccinardi noted the interruptions in what we now call the early Middle Ages. See Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:25, where he explained that the "old Peripatetics" did not do many experiments because almost all of them "took up philosophy only to prepare the way for theology." See also Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:67–82, esp. 78–81.

89. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 40, citing the work of his late sixteenth-century confrere, Domingo Báñez.

90. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:23. See Craig Martin, *Subverting Aristotle: Religion, History, and Philosophy in Early Modern Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), for an excellent discussion of the profound importance of Aristotle's impiety and deviations from Christian doctrine for anti-Aristotelians of this period (177).

91. Piccinardi, *De imputato scholasticis studio*, 78. See also ibid., 47, 85–88, esp. 88, where Piccinardi compared Aristotle to Phaeton and Aquinas to Apollo. Phaeton, Apollo's son, wanted to drive the chariot of the sun and almost destroyed the earth in the process. Aristotle, though, did not have the "Thomistic sun" to rescue him; the best that Aristotle could do was take the path above the errors of the ancient philosophers (*errata priscorum philosophantium*) and below the light of Christian faith. But eventually Aquinas, in the role of Apollo, took the reins of the chariot of Aristotelian philosophy and brought it back to the "solar path of orthodox faith."

92. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:29.

93. Piccinardi, *De imputato scholasticis studio*, 360.

94. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:23. See also Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 129.

95. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:28.

96. Ibid., 30.

97. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 29, 38–39. See Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:79–80, where he highlighted discoveries and inventions during the Middle Ages. But to contextualize this embrace of modern discoveries and experiments, it is worth noting that all three friars rejected Copernicanism, though Ferrari and Roselli also criticized the Ptolemaic system. See Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 120–21. For Roselli, see *Summa philosophica ad mentem angelici doctoris S. Thomae Aquinatis*, vol. 3: *Secunda secundae partis physicam particularem complectens* (Madrid: Cano, 1788), 172–203. Roselli said that Copernicanism can be admitted as a hypothesis for showing the position of celestial bodies (ibid., 204–7). See also Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 3:34–49. But see ibid., 31, where Ferrari said, "the Ptolemaic system, in which solid heavens are established, coheres neither with physics nor with astronomy. . . . Although the old philosophers, such as Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Scotus, seem to have consented to this system, nonetheless, evident reason and experience excel by far any human authority whatsoever. The scholastic doctors embraced the opinion of the astronomers common in that time. Especially in matters of this sort does that old statement have a place: 'The subsequent day is the master of the one prior.'"

98. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:3. See also ibid., 31–32.

99. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 1; Piccinardi, *De imputato scholasticis studio*, 364–65; Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:81–82, 148, 549–50. See Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:22, where he made clear that the scholastics also acknowledged the differences between the ancient sects and the Gassendist, Cartesian, and Newtonian sects.

100. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 32–33; Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:422.

101. Piccinardi, *De imputato scholasticis studio*, 102–6, 365; Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:25; Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:95–97.

102. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:25. See also ibid., 33.

103. Roselli, *Summa philosophica*, 1:81, referring to *Novum organum*, bk. 1, Aphorism LVI. See also Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:18: "Truth is public. . . . A thing is not true on account of the fact that it is old or new."

104. The image of the philosophers as having torches comes from the Cistercian scholastic, Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz. See *Rationalis et realis philosophia* (Louvain: De Witte, 1642), 62, also quoted in J. L. Heilbron, *Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries: A Study of Early Modern Physics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 111.

105. Piccinardi, *Philosophia*, 22; Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:23, citing *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.11. For this passage, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, revised by J. O. Urmson, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:1806 (1143b11–14).

106. Ferrari, *Philosophia peripatetica*, 1:25.

DAN EDELSTEIN

The Aristotelian Enlightenment

Qualifying the Enlightenment as "Aristotelian" will likely strike many readers as ludicrous, misguided, if not downright perverse. "The fame of CICERO flourishes at present; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed," David Hume pronounced, in his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.[1] If Aristotle's fortune had floundered in the eighteenth century, it was largely due to his association with the school of philosophy that had embraced him most wholeheartedly, namely, the schola itself, and its scholastic professors. A rejection of scholasticism was perhaps the one thing that united the philosophes, Aufklärer, and *lumi*. In the intellectual history found in the opening "Discourse" of the *Encyclopédie*, d'Alembert thundered against "la Scholastique," which "composoit toute la Science prétendue des siecles d'ignorance," and "nuisoit encore aux progrès de la vraie Philosophie."[2] Only thanks to Bacon and Descartes did "la misérable philosophie de l'école" (Voltaire's words) begin to be dismantled.[3] Diderot was no kinder in his article on the schoolmen: "La scholastique est moins une philosophie particulière qu'une méthode d'argumentation syllogistique, seche & serrée, sous laquelle on a réduit l'Aristotélisme fourré de cent questions puériles," he wrote, adding "il n'y eut jamais tant de pénetration mal employée, & tant d'esprits gâtés & perdus, que sous la durée de la philosophie scholastique."[4] To suggest that the Enlightenment secretly perpetuated scholasticism would be to stretch revisionism beyond credulity. Even Peter Gay, who highlighted the contributions of antiquity to the Enlightenment, concluded that "the philosophes slighted whatever contribution Aristotle may have made to the scientific method; they saw him mainly as the favorite of the Scholastics—a pagan who had trafficked with the enemy."[5]

But if the scholastics stood for the philosophical darkness in the Enlightenment's *post tenebras lux* narrative, Aristotle himself, curiously, was often given a pass. D'Alembert's dismissal of scholasticism came with the following disclaimer: "On étoit persuadé depuis un tems, pour ainsi dire, immémorial, qu'on possédoit dans toute sa pureté la doctrine d'Aristote, commentée par les Arabes, & altérée par mille additions absurdes ou puériles; & on ne pensoit pas même à s'assûrer si cette Philosophie barbare étoit réellement celle de ce grand homme, tant on

avoit conçû de respect pour les Anciens."[6] We find a similar respect for "ce grand homme" in Diderot's article, which criticized scholasticism for having "éloign[é] de la véritable intelligence des ouvrages & des sentimens d'Aristote." This praise was not mere lip service, either: Aristotle is among the ten most cited figures in the *Encyclopédie*, where he is mentioned three times more frequently than Voltaire.[7]

The idea that the Enlightenment, particularly in its French incarnation, may have been indebted in certain ways to Aristotle is thus not as ungainly as it might seem. But how, where, and why did Aristotle's precepts inform Enlightenment thought? An examination of the different elements of Aristotle's philosophy, and their different trajectories in the eighteenth century, paradoxically reveals the extent to which Aristotle served less as a foil than as a model for the philosophes. And through Aristotle, other elements of Christian moral thought were also preserved.

Ancients and Moderns (and Ancients Again)

There had been a time when Aristotle's fortune was such that a royal edict, by François I in 1544, banned one of his detractors, Peter Ramus, from ever teaching philosophy in France again.[8] A century later, the Sorbonne was still defending Aristotelianism as an article of faith.[9] But the force of such institutional backing was on the wane. Francis Bacon leveled the first of his many attacks on Aristotle in *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), which he followed up in the *New Organon* (1620); his former secretary, Thomas Hobbes, similarly blasted the "Vain Philosophy of Aristotle" in *Leviathan* (1651).[10] In France, Pierre Gassendi led the charge in his 1624 *Exercitationum paradoxicarum adversus aristoteleos*; he would later be joined by Descartes, who derided "those who blindly followed Aristotle" in his *Principia philosophiae* (1644; French translation, 1647).[11] Later in the century, Malebranche joined in the fray, knocking Aristotle in *La recherche de la vérité* (2 vols., 1674–75), using language that would be recycled in the *Encyclopédie*: "Il faut respecter l'antiquité, dit-on; quoi! Aristote, Platon, Epicure, ces grands hommes se seraient trompés? On ne considere pas qu'Aristote, Platon, Epicure étaient hommes comme nous . . . et de plus, qu'au tems où nous sommes, le monde est plus âgé de deux mille ans, qu'il a plus d'expérience, qu'il doit être plus éclairé, et que c'est la vieillesse du monde & l'expérience qui font decouvrir la vérité."[12] As this passage indicates, the question of Aristotle's value had become entangled in the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, then simmering in France.[13] Other defenders of the Moderns would express similar scorn: in his *Digression sur les anciens et les modernes* (1688), Fontenelle scoffed that "Aristote n'a jamais

fait un vrai philosophe, mais il en a beaucoup étouffé qui le fussent devenus, s'il eût été permis."[14] The academician Nicolas Fréret was even more critical, arguing that "Aristotle made the Greeks abandon the study of nature and stopped their progress of philosophical discovery."[15] As Pierre Bayle observed, "en ce siécle XVII surtout on [l'a] violemment secou[é]."[16]

Just as Aristotle became a whipping boy for the Moderns, however, defenders of the Ancients celebrated him all the more. The Jesuit father René Rapin rose to Aristotle's defense in numerous works, calling him a "génie si plein de raison & d'intelligence"; in his defense of the *Logic*, Rapin rhapsodized that Aristotle "approfondit tellement l'abysme de l'esprit humain, qu'il en pénétra tous les ressorts, par la distinction exacte, qu'il fit de ses opérations. On n'avoit point encore sondé ce vaste fond des pensées de l'homme, pour en connoistre la profondeur."[17] This praise would be repeated by the humanist and onetime rector of the University of Paris, Charles Rollin, who placed Aristotle alongside Plato as "les deux plus grandes lumiéres de la philosophie ancienne" in his history of the ancient world.[18]

Another way to show support for Aristotle was to translate him. Over the course of the seventeenth century, most of his major works were translated into French, sometimes for the first time. One of the more notorious defenders of the Ancients, André Dacier, published a translation of Aristotle's *Poetics* in 1692; a second edition appeared in 1733.[19] No doubt the most popular Aristotelian text was the *Rhetoric*, which was translated into French on four separate occasions in the seventeenth century and appeared in ten separate editions (two more followed in 1718 and 1733).[20] The *Ethics* attracted significant interest as well: two early French translations saw the light of day in 1488 (by Nicolas Oresme) and in 1553 (by Philippe Le Plessis); two more appeared in the seventeenth century.[21] The *Politics* was similarly translated in the fifteenth century (1489), then again in 1568 by Loys Le Roy; subsequent editions appeared in 1576, 1600, and 1668. And various works on natural history came out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[22] Only the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* were scorned by French translators, though works on these topics were also available (as were Latin editions).[23]

While the pace of translations slowed down somewhat after 1700, eighteenth-century students would still have been introduced to many Aristotelian ideas in schools. Indeed, Aristotle remained a reference point in the Jesuit curriculum, where scholasticism continued to dominate.[24] The same held true in most universities. What's more, the generations of Voltaire (b. 1694) and Rousseau (b. 1712) tended to side with the defenders of the Ancients against the Moderns.[25] In their perspective, the Ancients had lived closer to nature, which they could thus observe more attentively, thereby gaining knowledge that the Moderns still lacked. Buffon's

assessment was commonplace: "Les Anciens étoient beaucoup plus avancez & plus instruits que nous ne le sommes." The high regard in which he held the Ancients extended to Aristotle, "ce grand Philosophe." The greatest naturalist of the French Enlightenment even went so far as to call Aristotle's history of animals "ce que nous avons de mieux fait en ce genre," singling out for praise its "caractère philosophique."[26]

The most sustained assault on Aristotelianism thus occurred in the seventeenth, not the eighteenth, century, and largely in the context of the Scientific Revolution.[27] By the time of the Enlightenment, anti-Aristotelian passions had cooled. The philosophes perpetuated their predecessors' rejection of Scholasticism, but their cultural predilection for the Ancients led them to reconsider its originator. Aristotle's surprising return to favor is perhaps most evident when we chart the evolving views of the longest-living and most emblematic philosophe, Voltaire.

The Philosopher and the Philosophe: Voltaire on Aristotle

Early in his career, Voltaire still echoed the deprecatory views of Modern partisans. The *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) contain several barbs directed toward Aristotle and his scholastic descendants. Describing the intellectual climate of Europe before Francis Bacon, Voltaire wrote, "And a Man who maintain'd a Thesis on *Aristotle*'s Categories; on the universals *a parte rei*, or such like Nonsense, was look'd upon as a Prodigy." In a subsequent letter on Locke, he was even more dismissive: "Aristotle, who has been explain'd a thousand ways, because he is unintelligble, was of Opinion, according to some of his Disciples, that the Understanding in all Men is one and the same Substance."[28] Here Voltaire mocked Aristotle *qua* logician and metaphysician; he would go on to knock Aristotle's physics in his *Eléments de la philosophie de Newton* (1738).[29] But already in this work we find a new appreciative tone for his overall knowledge and, more particularly, for his *Poetics* and *Rhetorics*: "Descartes et Mallebranche, ont combattu Aristote . . . mais ils auraient eu grand tort de le mépriser: c'était un génie qui avait au-dessus des Descartes, des Mallebranches et des Newtons l'avantage de joindre à une science immense, et à la philosophie de son temps, la plus profonde connaissance de l'éloquence et de la poésie."[30] To be sure, this "genius" was still a poor physicist ("sa physique n'est qu'un tissu d'erreurs"). But it is astonishing that Voltaire was willing to place Aristotle above his idol Newton. The formerly "unintelligible" philosopher now shines for this extraordinary breadth: "Je l'ai déjà dit, Aristote qui réunissait à la fois les mérites d'Euclide, de Platon, de Quintilien, de Pline; Aristote, qui par l'assemblage de tant de talents était en ce sens au-dessus de Descartes et même de Neuton, est pourtant un auteur dont il ne faut pas lire la

philosophie."[31] Through his achievements in geometry (Euclid), moral and political philosophy (Plato), rhetoric (Quintilian), and natural history (Pliny), Aristotle more than made up his failings elsewhere.

This same globally positive impression was carried over into *Le siècle de Louis XIV* (1750), which began by favorably comparing the Sun King's reign to the age of Alexander, the first time when the "human spirit" truly shone. This achievement was due to the greatness "des Périclès, des Démosthène, des Aristote, des Platon, des Apelle, des Phidias, des Praxitèle."[32] In a subsequent passage, Voltaire singled Aristotle out for praise: "On ne peut s'empêcher d'admirer Aristote, et le siècle d'Alexandre, quand on voit que le précepteur de ce grand homme, tant décrié sur la physique, a connu à fond tous les principes de l'éloquence et de la poésie." Such a remarkable feat seemed unthinkable even in Voltaire's enlightened age: "Où est le physicien de nos jours chez qui on puisse apprendre à composer un discours et une tragédie?"[33]

It is difficult when reading this flowering commentary not to conclude that Voltaire was implicitly offering himself up as the only comparable figure of his age who could dissertate equally comfortably on physics and on poetry. The range of Aristotle's knowledge, more than the particularities of his thought, was now a measure of philosophical success, and it allowed Voltaire to revise the expectations for a philosophe. Aristotle also offered a social model for those who would avoid the fate of Socrates. Voltaire drew a comparison between his own actions and Aristotle's when recounting the unwelcoming situation he would have faced in Paris, in 1759, had he sought to return to the capital: "Dans de telles circonstances, Paris ne devait pas être le séjour d'un philosophe, et . . . Aristote fut très-sage de se retirer à Calcis lorsque le fanatisme dominait dans Athènes."[34] Both the Philosopher and the philosophe had confronted religious intolerance and wisely chosen to withdraw in self-imposed exile.

Aristotle's repurposing as a role model reached its zenith in the lengthy article bearing his name in Voltaire's *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* (1770–72). This time, Voltaire let Aristotle off the hook entirely for his failings as a physicist, which he explained in historically relativist terms: "Aristote dut faire nécessairement une très mauvaise physique de détail; et c'est ce qui lui a été commun avec tous les philosophes, jusqu'au temps où les Galilée, les Toricelli, les Gueric, les Drebellius, les Boiles, l'Académie del Cimento, commencèrent à faire des expériences. La physique est une mine, dans laquelle on ne peut descendre qu'avec des machines, que les anciens n'ont jamais connues."[35] Where he had once dismissed Aristotle's logic as "nonsense," he now applauded it as "un grand service à l'esprit humain." Following Buffon, he claimed that Aristotle's *History of Animals* was "le meilleur

livre de l'antiquité." His *Rhetoric* was similarly unmatched: "Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait une seule finesse de l'art qui lui échappe." His moral philosophy was timeless and true: "La morale d'Aristote est comme toutes les autres, fort bonne, car il n'y a pas deux morales." His *Poetics* are distinguished by the philosopher's "grand sens" and "bon goût." Once again, however, it is the combination of all these scholarly accomplishments that truly marks Aristotle out for praise: "Quel homme qu'Aristote qui trace les règles de la tragédie de la même main dont il a donné celles de la dialectique, de la morale, de la politique, et dont il a levé, autant qu'il a pu, le grand voile de la nature!"

From echoing the Modern critics of Aristotle, Voltaire came around full circle to heralding the philosopher as an unsurpassed genius, whose eclecticism should serve as a model. This ultimate, nearly unreserved admiration is revealing, as it adds another dimension to the self-perception of the philosophes: in addition to being more worldly and socially conscious than philosophers of lore, they should also strive to be more encyclopedic.[36] This humanist ambition did not hold true just for collaborative efforts (e.g., the *Encyclopédie*) but for individual careers as well. Aristotle has not received any credit for his formative influence on Voltaire, but there is no denying the sustained interest in Aristotle that Voltaire maintained throughout this career.[37] In addition to the qualitative account offered here, one can also point to a quantitative measure: there are more references to Aristotle than to Locke in Voltaire's œuvre.[38]

Aristotle's Long Shadow

Just how representative was Voltaire's attitude toward Aristotle? In fact, his positive judgment was widespread in the French Enlightenment. If one considers, for instance, the mentions of Aristotle in the *Encyclopédie*, the following picture appears. Most references are contained in articles dealing with the history of philosophy, due in part to the 217 references in "Aristotélisme," an article that sketched a mostly favorable portrait of the Greek philosopher while skewering his scholastic followers. Otherwise, Aristotle tended to be cited in those areas where he was viewed positively (namely, articles on moral, aesthetic, scientific, and geographic topics) and far less in those fields where his contributions were less valued (e.g., theology and metaphysics).

This macroscopic view holds true when we zoom in for greater detail. It corresponds neatly, for instance, with the assessment of Voltaire's friend, the marquis Boyer d'Argens, who expressed similar views in his popular *Lettres juives* (1736–37): "Il faut rendre la justice à Aristote d'avouër que sa phisique est beaucoup plus passable, dénuée des réveries, que ses différens commentateurs y ont ajoûtées.



References to Aristotle in the *Encyclopédie*. Articles classified according to ARTFL's "Machine classification" (results from normalized classification are similar but include 44 percent unclassified articles). *Encyclopédie* articles have also been grouped here under more general headings. Graph by author.

On peut même dire, que ce philosophe est un esprit très vaste et très étendu. Il a parfaitement réüssi en ce qu'il a dit des passions dans sa rhétorique. Ses livres de politique et de morale contiennent de fort belles choses."[39] It was for these more specific contributions—in philosophy, rhetoric, poetics, ethics, and politics—that Aristotle found favor among most philosophes. Long before Voltaire recognized the benefits of Aristotle's logic, Diderot had celebrated its virtues in his *Lettre sur les sourds et muets* (1751). Here he credits "la philosophie péripatéticienne" with having rid the French language of inversions, as "cette philosophie a régné tandis que notre langue se perfectionnoit sous Louis XIII et sous Louis XIV." Aware that this claim might raise a few eyebrows, Diderot sought to rebut any objections: "Vous ne m'objecterez point ici, monsieur, que la philosophie péripatéticienne est celle d'Aristote, et par conséquent d'une partie des anciens; car vous apprendrez sans doute à vos disciples que notre péripatéticisme étoit bien différent de celui d'Aristote."[40] This positive assessment of Aristotle's logic was echoed in the lengthy article on "Aristotélisme" by the abbé Claude Yvon, in the *Encyclopédie*: "Aristote a beaucoup mieux réussi dans sa logique que dans sa morale. Il y découvre les principales sources de l'art de raisonner. . . . On peut

assûrer que si l'on pouvoit atteindre le terme de l'esprit, Aristote l'auroit atteint." To be sure, Yvon qualified his judgment: "Sa méthode, quoique loüée par tous les Philosophes, n'est point exempte de défauts."[41] But as we will see, this article generally celebrated Aristotle's contributions to human knowledge.

If there is one area where it is uncontroversial to call the French Enlightenment Aristotelian, it is surely with regard to poetics. *Le grand style* was inherently classical, and no one had shaped the rules of classicism like Aristotle.[42] His presence loomed large over the aesthetic treatises of the day. Early in the century, the abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos drew heavily from the *Poetics* in his *Refléxions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture* (1718; rev. ed., 1733), which references Aristotle favorably more than thirty times.[43] Another major aesthetic study published toward the middle of the century, the abbé Charles Batteux's *Les Beaux-arts réduit à un seul principe*, went so far as to credit Aristotle for its central thesis: "Le principe de l'imitation, que le philosophe grec établit pour les beaux arts, m'avoit frappé. . . . C'est ce qui a produit ce petit ouvrage." If Batteux had needed to rediscover this mimetic principle in the *Poetics*, it was because Aristotle's commentators had mangled his ideas: "Je croyois qu'il avoit été consulté et copié par tous les maîtres de l'art: plusieurs ne l'avoient pas même lû, et presque personne n'en avoit rien tiré."[44] Yvon similarly praised the *Poetics*, along with the *Rhetoric*, in no uncertain terms: "On y trouve des choses excellentes, & on les regarde encore aujourd'hui comme des chefs-d'œuvre de goût & de Philosophie . . . jamais personne n'a pénétré plus avant dans le cœur humain, ni mieux connu les ressorts invisibles qui le font mouvoir." In these works, Yvon continued, "par la force de son génie," Aristotle opened up "une route sûre jusqu'aux sources du vrai beau," to the extent that there was nothing new left to say: "Si aujourd'hui l'on veut dire quelque chose de bon sur la *Rhétorique* & sur la *Poëtique*, on se voit obligé de le répéter."[45] Diderot applauded Aristotle's philosophical approach to poetics in his essay *De la poésie dramatique* (1758); and Jean-François Marmontel followed Aristotle in his own *Poétique françoise*, approving how the original *Poetics* "ne laisse pas que de remonter aux principes de la nature, et c'est le sommaire d'un excellent traité."[46]

What these encomia reveal is not only Aristotle's near hegemonic role as an authority on aesthetic issues but also his more generalized status as a philosophical model. The "philosophe grec" had penetrated into the inner sanctum of the human soul and discovered its secrets, just as the philosophes strived to do. If modern theorists could merely echo his lessons, it was because there is only one human nature, and Aristotle had exhaustively mapped its contours. It is telling that the term that commonly appears in reference to Aristotle is *génie*.[47] In the century that turned genius into something people *are*, rather than something

people *have*, to be a genius was one of the most rarefied and exceptional achievements of the human mind.[48]

A final area where Aristotle shaped French Enlightenment thought more than we typically recognize is in moral and political philosophy. Not only were his *Ethics* and *Politics* readily available in French and Latin translation during this time, but they were also summarized in well-known places. One work that almost every eighteenth-century scholar read was Jean Barbeyrac's translation of Samuel von Pufendorf's *Le droit de la nature et des gens* (1706). In his lengthy preface to this work, Barbeyrac surveys the history of political thought and lingers lengthily on Aristotle, "ce grand génie de la nature."[49] His primary focus is the *Ethics*, which he does not present without criticism, but describes in detail. Readers of the *Encyclopédie* would also have found exposés of Aristotle's moral arguments, both in Yvon's article on "Aristotélisme" ("Ses traités de morale viennent ensuite; l'auteur y garde un caractere d'honnête-homme qui plaît infiniment," 1:655), and in Diderot's later article, "Péripatecienne, philosophie, ou philosophie d'Aristote, ou Aristotélisme." The two major political theorists of the French Enlightenment similarly engaged with the *Politics*: Montesquieu's taxonomy of political regimes into republics, monarchies, and tyrannies, in *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), builds explicitly on Aristotle's own sexpartite division;[50] and if Rousseau is mostly critical of Aristotle in *The Social Contract* (1762), he took the epigraph for the *Discourse on Inequality* (1755) from the *Politics*: "But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted."[51]

But Aristotle's influence on Enlightenment moral thought can be appreciated at a more conceptual level as well. One of the most notable innovations of the philosophes in political thought was their rejection of the social contract narrative, which lay at the heart of seventeenth-century natural law theory.[52] Writers such as Voltaire, d'Holbach, Diderot, Condorcet, and others downplayed the importance or even existence of a contracting moment, insisting instead that political order is the natural condition of human society. This is, of course, Aristotle's own understanding of political society and of man as a *zoon politikon*.[53] While some of the philosophes may have reached this same conclusion on their own, it bears recalling that they are likely to have encountered it while in *collège*. It was also a central tenet of physiocracy, perhaps the most influential political theory in eighteenth-century France.[54] And in the case of physiocracy's founder, the doctor François Quesnay, there is good evidence that the source of this particular idea was indeed Aristotle, one of the few authors that Quesnay, after reading him at a young age, appreciated throughout his life.[55]

Aristotle's broader influence on Enlightenment political ideas can also be detected in the philosophes' concentration on natural law as a key for political reform.[56] In their constant appeals to natural law above and beyond the corrupt civil laws of the state, they echoed Aristotle's description of "the law of nature" in the *Rhetoric* as "a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other." This kind of natural justice, he goes on, "makes up for the defects of a community's written code of law. This is what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law."[57] This is precisely how the philosophes thought of, and sought to use, natural law: in Mirabeau *père*'s words, "It is always necessary to uproot everything in a state that is contrary to natural right [*droit naturel*]."[58] The same sentiments animated Voltaire's *Poème sur la loi naturelle* (1755), as well as numerous other French Enlightenment works.

In these cases, it may be less obvious to trace a direct link back to Aristotle; yet the philosophes' attachment to natural law can still be qualified as Aristotelian, for two reasons. First, the philosophes did not share their English jusnaturalist predecessors' concern for natural *rights* to nearly the same degree. It is not that they disregarded rights, but securing the recognition of natural rights was not their primary goal. Rather, they believed that convincing states to reform their legislation in accordance with natural law was a surer way of achieving justice.[59] In this, they again revealed their classical and Aristotelian predilections, as ancient philosophers notoriously downplayed *rights* in favor of *right*.[60] Second, the natural law tradition that the philosophes inherited can itself be described as Aristotelian. As Robert Palmer suggested many decades ago, the French Enlightenment adopted a conception of natural law that owes much to its Jesuit professors;[61] these professors, in turn, perpetuated a late scholastic philosophy that built on Thomism, which of course had codified Aristotle. With a few degrees of separation, then, Voltaire's *Poème sur la loi naturelle* belonged to a jusnaturalist tradition that extends back to ancient Greece. In practice, this tradition may not even have been that discontinuous, given that (as noted earlier) Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was the most commonly translated, published, and praised of his works.

Conclusion

Despite the evidence detailed here, some readers may still find it extravagant to describe the French Enlightenment as Aristotelian. In any strong sense, this claim is obviously wrong: the philosophes did not look to Aristotle as an authority on all matters, as the scholastics had before them. In the looser sense of sharing a common epistemological ground, though, the epithet does not seem out of

place. The philosophes, like the philosopher, sought to explore the full spectrum of human and natural knowledge; they did not recognize any fundamental break between social and natural phenomena but rather considered the former as a subset of the latter; their aesthetic preferences trended classical; their moral philosophy drew from ancient sources. While the attribute "Aristotelian" does not fully exhaust the richness and originality of the French Enlightenment—no single descriptive ever could—it does highlight a broad pattern in the philosophes' thought, one that, moreover, has long been overlooked. Finally, this description is not simply the result of one scholar recognizing a similarity between two distinct bodies of thought but rather an affiliation actively promoted and underscored by the philosophes themselves.

In many respects, this reassessment of Aristotle's place in the French Enlightenment is part of the growing attention, among *dix-huitièmistes*, to the extensive legacy of classicism in eighteenth-century thought. Books by Elena Russo, Neven Leddy, Avi Lifschitz, Thomas Kavanagh, Louisa Shea, and Anton Matytsin have highlighted the place of Stoicism, Epicureanism, Cynicism, and skepticism for the philosophes.[62] In most cases, however, these classical schools of thought were appealing for their anti-Christian teachings—what Peter Gay called their "modern paganism." For Aristotle, the same conclusion can obviously not be reached. It might be more correct to say that the philosophes appreciated Aristotle *despite* his entwinement in Christian theology. But while largely true, this formulation misses the irony that they could have more in common with church fathers than they wanted to admit.

NOTES

The author thanks Darrin McMahon and Glenn Roe for their comments and suggestions.

1. David Hume, *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* (London: Millar, 1758), 284.

2. Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire des éditeurs," in *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonnée des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, 28 vols. (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton & Durand, 1751–72), 1:xxiii. Electronic editor Robert Morrissey (University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project, 2013), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/; 1:xxiii.

3. Voltaire, "Quatorzième lettre: sur Descartes et Newton," in *Lettres philosophiques* (Amsterdam: Lucas, 1734), 123.

4. Denis Diderot, "Scholastiques, philosophie des scholastiques," in *Encyclopédie*, 14:775, 777. For a similar critique, see Nicolas Fréret, "Réflexions sur l'étude des anciennes histoires, & sur le dégré de certitude de leurs preuves," in *Mémoires de littérature tirés des*

registres de l'Académie royale des inscriptions et belles-lettres (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1729), 6:146–89.

5. Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 1: *The Rise of Modern Paganism* (New York: Knopf, 1966), 82.

6. D'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire des éditeurs," xxiii.

7. More precisely, 1,044 vs. 313 mentions. To be sure, this is a rough measure, as it misses, say, references to "l'auteur de *l'Henriade*." But the order of magnitude is still striking. See my "Humanism, *l'Esprit Philosophique*, and the *Encyclopédie*," *Republics of Letters* 1, no. 1 (2009), http://arcade.stanford.edu/rofl/humanism-l'esprit-philosophique-and-encyclopédie.

8. Peter Mack, *A History of Renaissance Rhetoric, 1380–1620* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 137–38.

9. Craig Martin, *Subverting Aristotle: Religion, History, and Philosophy in Early Modern Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 139.

10. See Stephen Gaukroger, *Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For Hobbes, see *Leviathan*, chap. 46.

11. For Gassendi, see Martin, *Subverting Aristotle*; for Descartes, see *Les principes de la philosophie* (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 8; and Daniel Garber, *Descartes' Metaphysical Physics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), chap. 5.

12. See Nicolas Malebranche, *De la recherche de la vérité*, ed. Georges Lyon, 2 vols. (Paris: Delagrave, 1883), 2:85 (II.iii). Compare with the passage beginning "Un je ne sais quel respect" and ending with "l'expérience qui font decouvrir la vérité"; "Philosophie," in *Encyclopédie*, 12:514.

13. I discuss the place of the Quarrel in French intellectual history (and the relevant scholarship) in *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

14. *Digression sur les anciens et les modernes*, in *Œuvres diverses de M. de Fontenelle* (The Hague: Gosse & Neaulme, 1728), 2:137. This passage would also be recycled in "Philosophie," in *Encyclopédie*, 12:514.

15. Fréret, "Réflexions sur l'étude des anciennes histoires," 150. A similar idea can be found in Pierre Bayle, "Aristote," in *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 5th ed., 4 vols. (Amsterdam: Brunel, Humbert, Wetstein, Smith, Honoré, Chatelain, Covens, Mortier, Changuion, Catuffe, & Uytwerf, 1740), 1:327, note M. "Aristote abandonna le chemin des plus excellens Physiciens qui eussent philosophé avant lui."

16. Bayle, "Aristote," 323.

17. René Rapin, *Les Reflexions sur l'éloquence, la poétique, l'histoire et la philosophie*, in *Œuvres du P. Rapin*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Mortier, 1709), 2:374. Bayle also cites this passage in his article on "Aristote."

18. Charles Rollin, *Histoire ancienne des Egyptiens*, 13 vols. (Paris: Vve Estienne, 1740), 5:657, 673; for the Rapin quote, see 83.

19. Bibliographical information in this paragraph comes from the catalog of the Bibliothèque nationale de France. For Dacier, see *La poétique d'Aristote* (Paris: C. Barbin, 1692). An earlier translation, by the sieur de Norville, appeared in 1671. Another edition appeared in the eighteenth century: *Les quatre Poëtiques: d'Aristote, d'Horace, de Vida, de*

Despréaux, avec les traductions & des remarques par M. l'abbé Batteux (Paris: Saillant and Nyon, 1771).

20. See the translations by Jean Du Sin, *Les trois livres de la Rhétorique d'Aristote* (Paris: D. Douceur, 1608); 2nd ed., 1613; by Robert Estienne, 1624, repr. 1630; by François Cassandre, 1654, repr. 1675, 1691, 1698, 1718, 1733; and by André Baudnyn de La Neuf-Ville, 1669, repr. 1673.

21. See *La Morale d'Aristote*, trans. Charles Catel (Toulouse: P. Bosc, 1644); and *Aristote: de l'Amitié, livre premier, huictiesme de la Morale à Nicomachus . . .* , trans. Pierre Vattier (Paris: l'autheur et J. Huart, 1659). Nearly a dozen Latin editions were printed in the sixteenth century as well.

22. See, e.g., *Les Problèmes d'Aristote traitant de la nature de l'homme et de la femme, des principes de la génération, de la formation des enfans au ventre de leur mère et de l'usage de toutes les parties du corps humain* (Rouen: L. Behourt, 1668); and *Histoire des animaux d'Aristote*, trans. Armand-Gaston Camus (Paris: Vve Desaint, 1783).

23. See, e.g., the *Lettre d'Aristote à Alexandre sur le système du monde*, trans. abbé Batteux (Paris: Saillant, 1768); and *Les trois livres de l'Âme*, trans. Pierre de Marcassus (Paris: P. Rocolet, 1641).

24. See Lawrence Brockliss, *French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Cultural History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

25. See Elena Russo, *Styles of Enlightenment: Taste, Politics, and Authorship in Eighteenth-Century France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); and Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy*.

26. See Buffon, *Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière*, 44 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749), "Premier Discours," 1:41–47. On Buffon and Aristotle, see Peter Hanns Reill, *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

27. Steven Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution*, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 80.

28. Voltaire, *Letters Concerning the English Nation* (London: C. Davis and A. Lyon, 1733), 89, 96. Both passages are in the French edition of 1734 as well.

29. See, for instance, "Tous les corps connus pèsent, et il y a longtemps que la légèreté absolue a été comptée parmi les erreurs reconnues d'Aristote et de ses sectateurs," *Eléments de la philosophie de Newton*, in *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, ed. Ulla Kölving et al., 143 vols. (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1968–), 15:397 (hereafter *OCV*).

30. Ibid., 671.

31. Voltaire, "Réponse à toutes les objections," in *OCV*, 15:734.

32. *OCV*, 13A:1.

33. See the "Catalogue des écrivains," s.v. "Cassandre" (translator of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*), in *Siècle de Louis XIV, OCV*, 12:74–75.

34. See Voltaire, *Mémoires pour servir à la vie de Monsieur de Voltaire* (1759), in *OCV*, 45C:435.

35. Voltaire, "Aristote," *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, in *OCV*, 39:1–17 (quotation on 5; subsequent quotes in this paragraph are taken from this article and can be found on pages 4, 6, 10, 8, 16).

36. See the article "Philosophe," in *Encyclopédie*, 12:509–11.

37. For instance, he hardly appears at all in Roger Pearson's (otherwise excellent) biography, *Voltaire Almighty: A Life in Pursuit of Freedom* (London: Bloomsbury, 2005).

38. Respectively, 313 vs. 299 mentions. Results from the "Tout Voltaire" database (http://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/node/146). Again, I offer these numerical figures more as a general indication rather than a demonstrative finding.

39. Jean-Baptiste Boyer d'Argens, *Lettres juives, ou Correspondance philosophique, historique et critique entre un juif voyageur en différens etats de l'Europe et ses correspondants en divers endroits*, 2nd ed., 6 vols. (The Hague: Paupie, 1738), 2:343–44 (Lettre LXXVIII).

40. Denis Diderot, *Lettre sur les sourds et muets*, ed. P. H. Meyer (Geneva: Droz, 1965), 43.

41. Claude Yvon, "Aristotélisme," in *Encyclopédie*, 1:652–73 (quotation on 656). By my count, this article is the second longest in volume 1, after "Anatomie."

42. See Russo, *Styles of Enlightenment*.

43. Jean-Baptiste Dubos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture*, 3 vols. (Paris: Mariette, 1733). I discuss the importance of this work in *The Enlightenment*.

44. Charles Batteux, *Les Beaux-arts réduit à un seul principe* (Paris: Durand, 1746), vii–ix. On this work, see notably M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

45. Ibid., 655.

46. Diderot wrote, "Aristote est un philosophe qui marche avec ordre, qui établit des principes généraux, et qui en laisse les conséquences à tirer, et les applications à faire," "De la poésie dramatique," in *Le père de famille: comédie en 5 actes et en prose; avec un Discours sur la poésie dramatique* (Amsterdam, 1758), 34. For Marmontel, see *Poétique françoise* (Paris: Lesclapart, 1763), 4.

47. Yvon uses the expression twice in "Aristotélisme" (the other instance is apropos Aristotle's theory of movement: "On voit bien qu'il fait là de grands efforts de génie," 657). See also Voltaire's comment, cited earlier, in the *Eléments de la philosophie de Newton*, 671.

48. See Darrin M. McMahon, *Divine Fury: A History of Genius* (New York: Basic, 2013).

49. Samuel von Pufendorf, *Le droit de la nature et des gens*, trans. and ed. Jean Barbeyrac, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Henri Schetle, 1706), 1:lv–lxii (quotation, p. lxii). This translation also served as the basis of later English editions, which included Barbeyrac's notes and preface; see notably *Of the Law of Nature and Nations*, trans. Basil Kennett (London: J. Walthoe et al., 1729). On this text, see David Saunders, "The Natural Jurisprudence of Jean Barbeyrac: Translation as an Art of Political Adjustment," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 36, no. 4 (2003): 473–90.

50. Montesquieu presents his own distinction between monarchy and despotism as a refinement of Aristotle's description in the *Politics*; see bk. 11, chap. 9 of *The Spirit of the Laws*. Elsewhere, he follows Aristotle more closely; see, e.g., bk. 4, chap. 8; bk. 8, chap. 14; bk. 10, chap. 6; bk. 11, chap. 11; bk. 12, chap. 2. Montesquieu's general indebtedness to Aristotle is the object of much debate; see Melvin Richter, *The Political Theory of Montesquieu* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); David Wallace Carrithers, Michael A. Mosher, and Paul A. Rahe, eds., *Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on "The Spirit of Laws"* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), in particular the essays by Mosher and Rahe; and Céline Spector, *Montesquieu et l'émergence de l'économie politique* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2006).

51. "Non in depravatis, sed in his quae bene secundum naturam se habent, considerandum est quid naturale" (from the *Politics*, bk. 1, chap. 5; 1254a); English translation from

The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), 1:8. Rousseau also cites the *Politics* approvingly in his *Discours sur l'économie politique* (1755).

52. I discuss this transformation (and the obvious caveats, such as Rousseau) in "Enlightenment Rights Talk," *Journal of Modern History* 86, no. 3 (2014): 530–65.

53. Aristotle, *Politics*, bk. 1, chap. 2.

54. See Michael Sonenscher, "Physiocracy as Theodicy," *History of Political Thought* 23, no. 2 (2002): 326–39.

55. On Quesnay's appreciation of Aristotle, see Jacqueline Hecht, "La vie de François Quesnay," in *François Quesnay et la physiocratie*, 2 vols. (Paris: Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques, 1958), 1:211–94. I develop this argument in greater detail in my current book project, *On the Spirit of Rights* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

56. See my "Enlightenment Rights Talk."

57. *Rhetoric*, 1374a (trans. W. Rhys Roberts, http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/index.html).

58. *L'ami des hommes, ou, Traité de la population* (Avignon, 1756), III, chap. 5; 237.

59. See *On the Spirit of Rights*.

60. This distinction between "objective right" and "subjective rights" is today largely attributed to Michel Villey, though its roots stretch back to German legal scholarship. I discuss its place in rights scholarship in "Is There a 'Modern' Natural Law Theory? Notes on the History of Human Rights," *Humanity* 7, no. 3 (2016): 345–64.

61. See R. R. Palmer, *Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939). Palmer was himself developing a thesis famously put forward in 1932 by his teacher, Carl Becker, in *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). See also Brockliss, *French Higher Education*.

62. See Russo, *Styles of Enlightenment*; Neven Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz, eds., *Epicurus in the Enlightenment* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2009); Thomas M. Kavanagh, *Enlightened Pleasures: Eighteenth-Century France and the New Epicureanism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010); Louisa Shea, *The Cynic Enlightenment, or Diogenes in the Salon* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Anton M. Matytsin, *The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). See also my review essay, "The Classical Turn in Enlightenment Studies," *Modern Intellectual History* 9, no. 1 (2012): 61–71.

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Part Three. *Tenebrae*

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WILLIAM J. BULMAN

Secular Sacerdotalism in the Anglican Enlightenment, 1660–1740

Écrasez l'infâme! The Enlightenment has traditionally been understood as a revolt against priestcraft. On this view nothing under the Old Regime could be more offensive to rationalism, individualism, secularism, and the emancipation of mind and man than the Christian clergy's false and deleterious claim to legitimately mediate the transmission of saving grace and knowledge between men and God by means of its pastoral and sacerdotal ministries, and to thereby assume a powerful role in society and polity. Yet lately these traditional pieties have been thrown in doubt. After a torrent of revisionist scholarship that has documented the ties of Enlightenment to Christianity, monarchy, and empire and defined Enlightenment not ideationally but in terms of media and institutions, experts are less sure than ever that the Enlightenment should be understood as secularist or emancipatory in intent. But they remain without a viable alternative, unless they agree to define it very narrowly, to take ideas out of the equation, or to understand it as a narrative tradition.[1] This predicament is no more evident than in the work of the historians most eager to speak of Christian Enlightenment. To do so, they have identified philosophically inclined and tolerant styles of faith that fit within Jonathan Israel's "moderate" Enlightenment, the vast ocean of thought that he deems significant only as a series of influential but delusional betrayals of the Enlightenment's radical essence.[2]

In fact, a proper digestion of recent scholarship requires a fundamentally revised conception of the Enlightenment, one that drops the assumption that it was necessarily emancipatory in intent and philosophical in articulation, and one that aligns our understanding of its secularity with more recent debates about the secular. As I have suggested elsewhere, we might more profitably think of Enlightenment as the articulation, defense, dissemination, and implementation of ideas under a specific set of historical conditions. After more than a century of religious war and global expansion stretching from the early days of the Reformation to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, many European elites became convinced that religious and public life finally needed to be organized in a manner that prevented the fires of zeal from laying waste to civil order. They also became more acutely

aware than ever before that their own religious commitments (or lack thereof) constituted a choice among many available forms of religion (and irreligion), all of which could be embraced by sane and intelligent (if erring) people. These considerations left them pondering a pivotal question: How could schemes for civil peace—and, during the mature Enlightenment, schemes for more positive forms of human betterment—be defended, evaluated, and activated in a manner that people of widely varying types and degrees of belief and unbelief could possibly be expected to accept?

This question and the conditions that prompted it help to account for the familiar turn in Enlightened argument away from the theological, the demonological, the providential, and the revealed and toward the useful, the natural, the rational, the civil, the moral, the peaceful, the cosmopolitan, and the human. Enlightened solutions to the riddle of public religion were defended (and alternative solutions refuted) with recourse to both immanent critique and purportedly minimal, shared epistemological and ontological assumptions. The fact that specific people, institutions, ideas, and practices were vehicles for Enlightenment does not imply that they were Enlightened in toto. This is why we can speak of many people and institutions as Enlightened even when they retained traditional theological and doctrinal commitments and engaged in behavior that did not lead to peace. To do so is to capture only one aspect of their existence: the extent to which they were sites for active attempts to tackle the problem of civil peace and worldly flourishing in a state of what I like to call elite secularity. If we understand Enlightenment this way, we can leave behind the false choice between a single Enlightenment and plural Enlightenments by thinking in terms of a beam of light refracted into a spectrum.[3]

On this view, there would certainly be room for Christian priests in the Enlightenment, to the extent that they were able to defend their role in solving the problem of civil peace and human betterment with recourse to assumptions they shared with their enemies. In particular, they would have to defend priestly power on the basis of its terrestrial utility. As many scholars of anticlerical Enlightenment have long recognized, religion fit into schemes of Enlightenment to the extent that religion was described as civil religion. This strategy has most often been identified with the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the English republicans.[4] Yet there is no need to suppose that civil religion was or is an inherently anti-Christian, republican, or even particularly tolerant concept, as the authoritarian vision of Thomas Hobbes, for instance, makes clear.[5]

Since the pioneering essays of J. G. A. Pocock and Roy Porter in the 1980s, historians who admit of an English Enlightenment have regularly referred to its

unusually conservative and clerical character, while insisting that its genesis is to be found in "latitudinarianism" and Whiggery.[6] As I have demonstrated elsewhere, though, this view is mistaken: the Church of England was regularly defended as a civil religion by royalists, imperialists, Tories, and "high church" clergy from the Restoration (1660) onward. The civil religion that most of these priests defended was often nothing like the minimalistic, Erastian religion we might expect. Enlightened Anglican clerics routinely argued that the aggressive pastoral and sacerdotal agenda that attained notoriety during William Laud's tenure as archbishop of Canterbury in the lead-up to the Civil Wars (1642–51) could be defended in accordance with utilitarian, secular, deist, and even atheist premises. The Christianity best suited to civil peace and improvement, they argued, was a Christianity of beauty, ceremony, and uniformity, presided over by priests who inculcated moral virtue, provided expert political counsel, and awed the people by performing mysterious sacrifices before them. These clerics were convinced that only the popular auto-surveillance and self-government brought into being by the successful pursuit of their pastoral agenda could secure order in Britain. Secular law and legally enforced coercion would always be insufficient.[7]

In other words, many Anglican priests proffered a vision of modernity that was thoroughly religious and indeed highly controversial even in Protestant circles, but they premised their stance on secular rationality and the argumentative tools and resources they shared with their freethinking foes. They proceeded in this manner, of course, in hopes of refuting deists and freethinkers from Thomas Hobbes and Charles Blount to John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and Viscount Bolingbroke. But their refutations of freethinking were primarily crafted to reach and convince an increasingly large group of lay readers who took very seriously the assumptions and conclusions of the church's enemies. These priests' arguments were not simply clerical, but clericalist. They were not merely the work of divines; they worked *for* divines. They were meant to maintain and even to augment the power of the priesthood by making its pastoral and sacramental missions seem indispensable. In short, they were Enlightened arguments for priestcraft.

As it turns out, the consummate statement of this argumentative tradition was one of the two works that Pocock himself once identified as the central literary monuments of the English Enlightenment: William Warburton's *Divine Legation of Moses* (1737–41), a book closely related to crucial passages in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of the second monument, Edward Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–88).[8] Warburton's eccentric magnum opus, which runs to around 2,500 pages in its nineteenth-century edition, famously defended the reality of Christian revelation and the need for an Anglican

establishment with recourse to a meandering onslaught of historical erudition couched in a single syllogism. Its most unusual arguments—the most important of which was Warburton's claim that the absence of any knowledge of a future state of rewards and punishments among the Jews under Moses confirmed the divine origin of Mosaic law—were widely criticized by orthodox and heterodox figures alike. The arguments I discuss here were also criticized by some of Warburton's contemporaries, but they were nevertheless extrapolations upon decades of Enlightened Anglican apologetics. Future research on secular sacerdotalism in the eighteenth century will require more careful attention to specific contexts and to change over time than I can manage here. This chapter simply aims to lay the groundwork for such a project by establishing a basic continuity in Enlightened Anglican discourse over the eighty-year period from the Restoration to Warburton.

Magisterial Protestantism had always touted a mutually beneficial relationship between the prince and a reformed ministry. But in the wake of the Wars of Religion, the demand for civil peace and the predicament of elite secularity prompted many leading Anglican divines to abandon traditional arguments for Christianity's essential role in securing the health of the body politic. Reformation-era apologetics were overwhelmingly anti-Machiavellian: they rested on the assumption that the earthly utility of religion could in no way and to no extent be separated from its truth value. They usually employed the term "religion" to denote a single, true form of Christianity or, at most, the revealed tradition of Judaism and Christianity writ large. Universal statements about the functional relationship between religion and the state were essentially meaningless within this framework. States without religion (i.e., states without reformed Christianity) were taken to fail for providential, not practical reasons. All polities stood or fell on the basis of the truth of the theological opinions held by prince and people.[9]

Recognizing the inadequacies of this perspective after their world had been turned upside down at midcentury, Anglican divines furnished a novel defense of their confessional state. While it was clearly inspired in part by Thomas Hobbes's authoritarian vision of civil religion, it also drew upon a "politic" style of historical analysis and counsel born in the late Renaissance that had only rarely been used to address the positive role of the church and clergy in securing state power.[10] The "politic" clerics of the English Enlightenment championed the church and its establishment on the basis of principles that could be thought to appeal to conformists, dissenters, deists, Hobbists, Machiavellians, and atheists alike. They bracketed realms of theological disagreement, drew upon a global, comparative

history of religion and politics in the ancient and contemporary worlds, and focused their arguments on the workings of nature, the prerequisites of civilization, and the demand for civil peace and security.[11] They promoted a church that promised to perpetuate a mutually beneficial partnership or alliance with the state in joint service to civil society. They explained how an established religion could be used to create docile subjects. They accepted the idea—already present in the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and other infamous men—that the political utility of religion could be analytically separated from its truth value, at least for the sake of argument.[12]

"Civil society," the Laudian divine Adam Littleton wrote in 1669, "is concerned in the quiet exercise of the national religion." Conformity and establishment were "happy instrument[s] of government" and "necessary expedient[s]."[13] In passages like this one, apologists defended the civil utility of uniform, established religion without delving into either the mechanics of the relationship between the civil and the sacred or the particular benefits of Christianity and its Anglican variant. But even in these general discussions, divines often explicitly described religion as a form of mind control that could pacify the populace by fostering self-restraint and auto-surveillance. Religion, the future archbishop Edmund Gibson argued in 1715, was "the only sure foundation of order and government" because it "moulds the minds of men into a quiet and peaceable frame."[14] It had two disciplinary functions, one individual and the other communal. "*Religio à religando*," Littleton reminded his readers. "Religion has its name from binding up men, not only in themselves, binding up their spirits so as to restrain them from public disorders; but as to another one too, binding their hearts together in mutual offices of love and kindness."[15] In this way, once properly inculcated, the basic doctrines conveyed by many religions ensured human self-governance. "By perpetually presenting to their view an all-seeing providence and future judgment," Gibson explained, religion "not only leaves no place to hope for impunity, but makes the obligations of duty of an equal strength, at all times, and in all places."[16]

Clergymen were also unashamed to note that in emphasizing the civil utility of organized religion they were making observations identical to those of faithless, freethinking laymen. On this front the church differed from its enemies only in its normative judgment on reality. The fact that the infidels condemned uniform, established religion while admitting its power as a technology of security proved that their ultimate aim was to undermine the very peace and unity they claimed to cherish. Even atheists, Gibson noted, granted a singular "honour" to religion. They knew "that the ties and restraints it lays upon mankind, are in their nature and effects a singular advantage to society and government."[17] In a

similar survey of the temporal benefits of religion, England's greatest humanist, Richard Bentley, wrote that "the good influence of religion upon communities and governments" was "so apparent and unquestionable, that it is one of the objections of the atheists, that it was first contrived and introduced by politicians, to bring the wild and straggling herds of mankind under subjection and laws." Even freethinkers knew "that the wise institutors of government, souls elevated above the ordinary pitch of men, thought religion necessary to civil obedience."[18] The Oxford don George Fothergill summed up an era of such argumentation in 1735 by noting that religion's "very enemies have been forced to give such accounts of its original and propagation, as plainly imply an acknowledgement, that the belief of its truth has always been thought necessary, to deceive mankind into a regard to order, and a participation of the benefits of society."[19]

Indeed, the greatest claim of the atheist against religion, wrote the future bishop of Chester, Francis Gastrell, in 1703, is "that all the eminent politicians, in their wise precepts of advice, have thought it necessary for every prince to encourage and promote religion in his country, and to have a shew of it himself, whatever his inward sentiments were." The obvious problem with atheists making constant reference to this historical pattern was that it was "so far from being any plea for atheism, that 'tis a very strong argument for the truth, reasonableness, and necessity of religion: for that is certainly highly rational, which is most suitable and agreeable to the publick reason of mankind, considered together in society; without which there would be little use of reason at all."[20] Gastrell and others thus went so far as to argue that the rationality and even the truth of any religion could be evaluated at least in part with reference to its social utility, and *without* reference to its revealed status.

Others argued that for temporal purposes, the truth of religion was a secondary consideration; only *belief* in its truth was essential. Such a position, these divines insisted, did not imply an irreligious and narrow form of Machiavellianism. For it was by no means clear that insincere, concocted faith was more useful than the sincere expression of what was known to be true, even when considerations of providence were set aside. "Machiavil himself," wrote Littleton, "tutours his prince, that he will put on the shew at least of religion, to make his government dreadful; though he hold it dangerous to his interest to be bigotted into it, and would have him take up no more of it, then will serve his turn. But if the mask and vizard, the bare appearance of religion be, in the esteem of carnal worldly policy, so considerable a help to government; how serene and awful would it be in its genuine native countenance?" While Littleton was keen to align civil utility with earnest orthodoxy, the ultimate criterion in his analysis was neither truth

nor sincerity but rather practicality. And while in this passage Littleton certainly emphasized the need for rulers to elicit awe, he made clear that for his purposes, the Machiavellian debate about whether political societies found their origins and sustenance in fear or in love was beside the point. "Whether 'twere for fear or love, was the principle, which gathered mankind into nations or commonwealths, and brought them to live in community with the same laws and privileges," Littleton wrote, "we find them both in religion." No matter what his style of rule, a prince could not afford to forsake public piety.[21] In the end, as Bentley put it, religion was to be understood as a basic pillar of civilization; without it, there was only barbarity and anarchy.[22]

Adopting a more abstract perspective, other clerics argued for the necessity of revealed religion in particular by claiming that independent human reason was an insufficient (or, at the very least, a very cumbersome) guide to morality and religion, in theory and in practice. John Conybeare, bishop of Bristol, observed in 1732 that many truths were "founded in the reason of things" but nevertheless "not knowable in the use of our reason." Other truths were knowable by the use of reason, but not with a sufficient level of specificity or perfection. In any case, he observed, it was important to take a practical view of the matter: "Revelation may make matters easy; may save us the pains of hard study, and long deduction; may clear up things farther than our natural reason may be able to do; in short, may set them in a fuller view, and a stronger light." The key criterion for proper moral knowledge was that it be specific enough to guide action. A rule of life simply was not discoverable by everyone, even through instruction from first principles. This implied that divine revelation was at the very least "expedient, in order for a more easy, more perfect, and more general knowledge of the rule of life." It also provided external motives for doing good, without which most people would spurn all virtue. Human rationality and civil government alone, in other words, could never provide sufficient motivation for a prince's subjects to become docile and virtuous; civil law enabled the prince to punish crimes for the protection of the population, but it could never serve to cultivate self-restraint.[23]

Only once they went on to specify the best possible means of realizing religion's civil utility, though, did these apologists begin to pursue an explicitly Anglican and clericalist agenda. Two of the crucial influences of religion upon the men and women of a country, Littleton argued, were "in awing and uniting them."[24] This was achieved through communal worship. Reason dictated that natural religion included orderly public assemblies, and civil community was produced in part through liturgical communion.[25] Public liturgical uniformity, Littleton wrote, therefore succeeded in "uniting our brethren and companions in love" and "awing

subjects to obedience."[26] No common law or civil statute, Littleton insisted, could ever substitute for sacramental communion: "When we can walk together, as brethren and companions, to the house of God, and there take sweet counsel together; this is a kindly union: when all the members of the civil society are guided and governed by the same spirit of the mystical body, and hold the faith in unity of spirit, in the bond of peace, and in righteousness of life. This is the true cement, which conjoins neighbors and friends closer, then any legal privileges and obligations can do."[27] The "civil utility" of uniform public worship, as Fothergill put it, ultimately lay in the cultivation of virtue and the community.[28]

A clerical order, of course, was easily described as essential to the maintenance of any public liturgical order and to the cultivation of morality. "I have one argument to prove the usefullness, of a priesthood, or ministry that will reach you gentlemen that allow no revelation," wrote the prominent theologian William Nicholls in 1697:

> All you theists grant that to pray to God is a part of natural religion, and that in public too upon special occasions, as to deprecate God's vengeance in public calamities, and to thank him for public mercies and the like. Now you would not have all the people at church to be charming and gabling together every one at his own prayer, but for decency and order sake one ought to speak for the rest, to whom if the public allow any thing for his pains, then you have what we call a priesthood or clergy. So that even upon the principles of Deism, this order is requisite.[29]

Other apologists made explicit how these general claims related to the specific case of the Church of England and its priests.[30] They argued that the species of priestly order best suited to the role Littleton prescribed for it was one equipped with the repertoire of pastoral and sacerdotal media characteristic of a Laudian style of Anglicanism.[31] The instructional role of priests was paramount. " 'Tis the church that is the best part of every commonwealth," wrote the fierce and learned Restoration apologist Samuel Parker, "and when all projects are tried, religion is the best security of peace and obedience." This was because "the power of princes would be a very precarious thing, without the assistance of ecclesiasticks." Indeed, "were it not for the restraints of conscience, that are tied on by the hands of the priest, and the laws of religion, man would be a monstrously wild and ungovernable creature."[32] Machiavellian attitudes to religion thus led easily to clericalist conclusions on even the most sensitive topics. "If religion be only a politick contrivance of state," observed Nicholls in relation to debates over the appropriateness of tithing, "the clergy by instructing men to be virtuous and religious, and by that means peaceable at home, have as good a plea for the tenth of our estates, as

the soldiers have now the fifth, for fighting against our enemies abroad."[33] The Boyle lecturer Lilly Butler agreed: "The ministers of religion are the most useful members of a society," he wrote, "and ought to be esteemed and favoured, not only for their relation to God, but for their works sake, for the nature of their employment, which so highly and manifestly tends to promote the public good."[34]

These men deemed priestly indoctrination to be absolutely necessary; the most diligent efforts of private individuals and families, they insisted, would not suffice. This was partly a matter of expertise and division of labor. "Those persons," argued Fothergill, "who have voluntarily dedicated themselves to the office of explaining and inculcating the great principles of religion, and the duties of morality, and have devoted their time and their labours to a continual attendance on this service, may reasonably expect to be considered, regarded, and supported as useful members of the community." The fact that many men had access to reason and to the Bible did not imply that they could become good Christians on their own. Priestly "information and instruction," Fothergill continued, "are necessary to give mankind in general a proper acquaintance of those truths, which they are most nearly concerned to know."[35] "The world is very bad as it is," Nicholls observed, "but I believe it would be ten times worse, if there was not an order of men that did continually put people in mind of their duty." While it was true that "some men may live good lives without a priesthood, or clergy to instruct them," more important was the consideration that "all men must allow 'tis more easily done with an experienced guide."[36]

In the end, these apologists argued, only a sacerdotal style of Christianity could support a great civilization. "That a considerable part of our species does not degenerate into barbarians, or savages," Fothergill wrote, "is in great measure owing to some such stated returns of attendance upon the public worship of almighty God, and of hearing his Word explained and enforced."[37] Fothergill insisted elsewhere that secular education was insufficient for this purpose. "In civilized states," he wrote, "whilst the remains of a liberal education continue to operate, a certain decency of manners, aided by a sense of honour, may for a while preserve tolerable order, and even produce some beneficial effects, in the upper ranks of men." But it was important to recognize that "among less cultivated minds, the degeneracy will show itself much sooner."[38] With respect to the entire population of a state, Nicholls argued, "a good and conscientious clergy-man that makes it his business to incourage piety and virtue will do more good than a hundred Tully's and Seneca's."[39] And in a Christian society it was obvious—for the sake of convenience if nothing else—that religious education should be Christian education, and in England, Anglican education.

These apologists were keen to stress, though, that Anglican clergymen were essential and ideal adjuncts to the peace and prosperity of civil society not only because of their educational vocation but also because of their liturgical leadership. They regularly depicted the Anglican pastorate as an order of priests who performed or administered sacrifices on an altar and thereby mediated between God and men.[40] They described sacrificial priesthoods as an element of natural religion regularly instituted under particular historical conditions as a result of either human injunction or divine command. Like moral duties, John Conybeare argued, religious rites and ceremonies are necessitated (but not specified) by the natural need to worship God. The specification and refinement of rites and ceremonies were left to the creativity of God and men (in particular, the magistrate). Natural religion without instituted rites and ceremonies, Conybeare explained, had never been a persistent historical reality. In fact, no great religion in world history had been devoid of such institutions, "whether really or pretendedly revealed." In any case, from a purely instrumental perspective it was clear that positive religion ordained by God (or men) could have positive moral and pious effects only if it was public and uniform. Human cognitive defects—imperfect rationality, poor memory, and susceptibility to temptation over duty—were reasons for, not reasons against, such institutions. Religious rites had a crucial utility even when they were strictly speaking "indifferent" or devoid of intrinsic value; they possessed what Conybeare called "relative excellency."[41] In this manner, Anglican clergymen yoked their utilitarianism to their genuine commitment to the truth of orthodox Anglican theology, which they all endorsed in other contexts or on other occasions. Both functional and theological argument led (independently) to the conclusion that sacerdotalist Anglicanism was the best form of Christianity, especially for England.

Warburton's *Alliance of Church and State* (1736), along with related passages in the *Divine Legation*, may be seen as the culmination of this tradition of general and ostensibly speculative discourse on the relationship between an established priestly religion and the maintenance of public order. Warburton agreed with traditional Reformation apologists that "truth and general utility necessarily coincide," that "truth is productive of utility," and that "utility is indicative of truth." But he established these relationships with reference to a practical and material logic, not a providential and spiritual one. Natural religion, he argued, required a clerical order to preside over ritual. This claim was the bedrock of his anti-Hobbesian and anti-Erastian case for the role of the church in political affairs. Warburton explained that all great experts on politics, among whom he included Machiavelli, knew that religion was the best way to secure the legitimacy of and

obedience to any regime. What Warburton called the "coactive" power of the church in civil society in relation to the state was in essence pastoral power. The crucial role of religion in securing the state implied that clergy—religious experts—must be accorded an important role in the state's lawmaking and in the prince's counsels. In England, this was to occur most obviously in the House of Lords but also, more informally, at court and in council.[42] Warburton's predecessors had commonly depicted the clergy as expert counselors. "Men of this robe have usually undergone the greatest offices of state, and public employments," Littleton had written. " 'Tis very uncharitable wholly to impute this to churchmens ambition, and to allow nothing of merit in the case."[43] Warburton concurred. The slavish subordination of the clergy to the state would only lead to revolution.[44] A Christianity led by priestly counselors was for Warburton the best form of civil religion ever invented, and the form it assumed in England was uniquely well designed. Such a state religion was for him nothing less than "the voice of nature" and "a masterpiece of human policy." It did, however, require constant surveillance on the part of the magistrate; any mysterious religion that was free of such surveillance would degenerate, as the pagan rites had. All states and peoples in the ancient world, Warburton observed, had an established religion for this very reason.[45]

Enlightened Anglicans agreed that their exalted view of the priest's function in society was consistent, as Conybeare put it, with both "the reason of the thing, and the concurrent sense of mankind in all ages of the world."[46] In fact, even though writers were not always explicit about it, even the "rational" case for both the civil utility of religion in general and sacerdotalist Enlightenment in particular was usually rooted not in dialectical deduction but in the historical record, or "matters of fact." Apologists unabashedly compared the Christian priesthood to a long series of (mostly pagan) priestly orders attached to formidable civilizations throughout world history in order to make the case that the destruction of priestly authority would lead not only to disorder but also to barbarism. The primary reference point was ancient Rome. Clergy referred constantly to Numa Pompilius, the well-known historical cornerstone of freethinking on civil religion, in *support* of their position.[47] "As Romulus founded the city by arms," Littleton recalled, "so Numa settled it by religion."[48] Numa also offered a key instance of a successful, close relationship between regality and the priesthood. "The custom of the ancients," Nicholls wrote, was "that the king must be also priest or pontifex." Numa, in particular, instituted "those *sacra* called *regia*, which were to be performed by the kings only; ordaining likewise some subordinate priests, who

should supply their places, when they were engaged in the wars."[49] The learned historian and high church stalwart George Hickes added in 1707 that not only Numa but even Julian the Apostate had extolled the priesthood as a universal element of religion that was essential to the health of the polity.[50]

No great civilization, these clergy argued, had survived and prospered without a powerful priesthood and its accompanying religious forms.[51] "There was always in the world a rank of men who had the office of the priesthood annexed to them," Nicholls argued, "whose office it was to put up prayers to the deity for the people, to offer sacrifices and the like." Whether or not religions of sacrifice and divine revelation were perfectly natural (i.e., directly deducible either from ideas innate to all humans or from premises or definitions that no one would dispute), it remained the case, as Nicholls put it, that there had never been a natural religion "without any manner of rituous worship." In antiquity religion was "as ritual as it is now; and altogether as full of sacrifices and revelations."[52] The origins of these facts, apologists claimed, must ultimately lie in nature and utility. Ceremonious religion was certainly more inevitable than it was unnatural, and it had always been accompanied by at least a widespread *belief* in its divine sanction. Even if the institutors of all religions had been impostors, they would have been able to institute such elaborate, positive rites successfully only if everyone around them had assumed that God (or the gods) would normally dictate such things and be right to do so. Nicholls went through a variety of ancient examples to show that "all the anciently known world, from India to Britain, from Africa to Scythia, was all full of rites and ceremonies."[53] This ubiquity was easily explained in historical terms: natural religion was in fact a sacrificial religion created by God in a primordial moment. "The common rules of morality, or a good life, which we generally call natural religion," Nicholls explained, "were at first revealed by God." Similarly, he said, "the sacrifices of Cain and Abel will evince ritual worship to be as old as mankind itself." Indeed most basic forms of ceremonial religion could be traced back to the original religions of mankind—whether the Adamic, the Noachic, or the Abrahamic.[54] Others justified the notion of sacrifice as applicable to Christianity by constructing a universal definition of sacrifice drawn from the comparative religious history of the world.[55] As late as 1747, for instance, the Oxford biblical scholar Benjamin Kennicott was still working to perfect his predecessors' accounts of the primordial origins of the style of sacrifice practiced by Christians in his own time.[56]

Many of these orthodox scholars joined heterodox figures like John Locke in rejecting the traditional notion that a religion of nature could have existed inde-

pendently of early moments of divine revelation and the later perpetuation and expansion of natural religion by means of human agency. The ubiquity of morality and sacrificial religion among the people of the world could have only one explanation, one that made clear the dire necessity of effective religious education. Some Native Americans, Nicholls observed, understood morality in a manner that would be recognizable by Christians. Searching for an explanation, Nicholls could "conceive no other way than by tradition; his father taught them him, and his grand-father his father, and so up to Adam, the common parent of us all; who had them first from God-Almighty as the universal laws that all his posterity should be governed by."[57]

Another strand of argument focused not on the universality or rationality of sacerdotal religion but rather on its roots in ancient Judaism.[58] Many Anglican writers, including Warburton, were in fact willing to make aggressive use of John Spencer's increasingly infamous accommodation thesis in support of their ceremonialism. In a revival of late antique and Maimonidean formulations and in service to Restoration Anglican conformism, Spencer had argued at length that God had deliberately adapted the Mosaic law to the historical circumstances and abilities of the Israelites. The appropriation of Spencer's arguments by sacerdotalist divines began immediately and continued long after Spencer had been exploited by freethinkers. Accommodationism was used by Anglican apologists to bolster a case for the functional utility of continuity in ritual, whether the ritual in question was of human or divine institution.[59] Others used ancient Jewish history as the centerpiece of their arguments about sacrificial religion. In a series of sermons published in 1736, for instance, the learned minister Gloster Ridley offered a historical defense of the sacrificial nature of the Eucharist by describing it as "the Christian Passover."[60] Kennicott's 1747 discussion of the sacrifices of Cain and Abel similarly aimed to establish the primordial and (in its specifics) divinely ordained nature of eucharistic sacrifices and their perpetuation through the institution of the Jewish Passover. He directly rebutted the notion that sacrifice was a priestly invention.[61] As Hickes put it, this was easily done by demonstrating in a particular way that "Christianity is nothing but mystical, or reformed Judaism."[62]

All this historical argumentation amounted to sacerdotalism defended on secular premises—whether natural, political, or civilizational. Warburton's greatest work of historical scholarship, the *Divine Legation*, was the high point of this tradition. It was also perhaps the clearest example of the degree to which elite secularity had come to determine the structure and content of Anglican apologetics. Warburton contended that the minimal premises and logical structure of

his argument amounted to a "moral demonstration" that came "very little short of mathematical certainty."[63] In support of his broader argument about the divine origin of the Mosaic law, he set out to examine religious lawgiving in strongly functional, utilitarian terms, with respect to both religion and civil society. While he certainly believed that the most useful religion was also a true one, he separated these two criteria in order to address the irreligious argumentation of unbelievers, which proceeded from purely moral and political considerations.[64]

In the first two steps of his three-part argument, Warburton aimed to prove first that "to inculcate the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, is necessary to the well-being of civil society" because "civil society hath not, in itself, the sanction of rewards, to secure the observance of its laws," and also that "all mankind, especially the most wise and learned nations of antiquity, have concurred in believing and teaching, that this doctrine was of such use to civil society."[65] He supported these claims with particular attention to pagan antiquity. He was very clear about the contemporary import of his arguments about the distant past: "It is just such a representation of antiquity as this I have given, which can possibly be of service to our holy faith." The necessity of promulgating the reality of sanctions after death was amply confirmed by the fact that aside from the Jews (who according to Warburton did not require such a teaching because they were directly ruled by God), "there never was in any time or place, a civilized people" who "did not found their religion on this doctrine." Even atheistic societies embraced it. To be sure, many of the sages of antiquity doubted its existence, but they nevertheless insisted that the doctrine be preached to the people. "The most wise and learned nations of antiquity" all believed and taught that the inculcation of this belief was necessary to the well-being of society because of the virtue it encouraged. This commitment could be seen in the behavior of the lawgivers who founded these societies and in the "opinions of all the learners and teachers of wisdom, in the schools of ancient philosophy." This historical background made the doctrine appear to be a basic form of civilization. The great institutors of civil policy "taught it in civilizing man; and established it to prevent his return to barbarity and a savage life."[66]

Yet Warburton found much more in antiquity than basic support for the utility of organized religion and a providential doctrine about life after death. The ancients were also models for how this doctrine was properly to be cultivated: by means of education and a materially imposing, sacerdotal, and self-consciously mysterious set of religious institutions. The ancients, he reminded his readers, "were the first who built altars and erected statues and temples to the Gods.—The

first who taught that the soul of man was immortal." Rites were crucial to religion as a means of inculcating essential doctrines. In antiquity, belief in immortality and a future state was taught by means of "the institution of the mysteries" or, more precisely, the "lesser mysteries" of Warburton's account. This "most sacred part of pagan religion" was "artfully framed to strike deeply and forcibly into the minds and imaginations of the people." The mysteries and the rites associated with them, which were in any case dictated by nature, essentially consisted of the secret worship of a god after a process of initiation. They were presided over by priests, who interrogated prospective initiates. The lesser mysteries inculcated virtue, and in Athens, a specific set of moral precepts: "to honour their parents, to offer up fruits to the gods, and to forbear cruelty towards animals." Initiates were men of promising moral character, and the mysteries furnished them with a perpetual vehicle of virtue. They engaged to practice virtue and piety in the future, and they underwent a severe sequence of penance. Initiations themselves were "ceremonies," and the "discipline" they inaugurated made initiates the happiest men in their societies. The language Warburton used throughout his discussion of antiquity was clearly meant to be applied by his readers to Anglican Christianity, and he directly compared the initiations to Christian baptism. Awesome, ineffable mysteries of this sort were necessary in any society and comparable to the *arcana imperii* of the political realm.[67]

The only end of pagan religion and the lesser mysteries in particular, Warburton argued, was civil utility. Unlike medieval schoolmen, who conflated truth and mystery, the ancients insisted that truth was the province of philosophy and the perilous realm of the higher mysteries, in which monotheism was taught. Warburton's discussion of the ancient "double doctrine" or "dual religion" implied that a sacerdotal, mysterious cult was not really priestcraft if its proper function was well understood. After all, these ancient practices had been introduced not by priests but by legislators. The religion they saw fit to offer to the people was one of mystery and virtue, not philosophical truth; for they knew that a popular philosophical religion was good for nothing but sowing rebellion.[68]

Warburton singled out Egyptian civil religion as the ultimate ancient model on all these fronts. "Of all nations," he wrote, "the Egyptian was most celebrated for its care in cultivating religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular." And "the primum mobile of Egyptian policy" was its priesthood. Warburton made these claims in the course of an attempt to dispute the Newtonian alternative to John Spencer's elevation of Egyptian civilization and its influence on Mosaic Judaism. Newton's claims had recently come to prevail among

orthodox apologists, who were reluctant to countenance Spencer's ideas after they had been appropriated by freethinkers. Warburton condemned this trend. He reminded his readers that Spencer himself had been aware of deism but had nevertheless been confident that his arguments led not to impiety but to the divine legation of Moses. Spencer's most famous book, *De legibus Hebraeorum*, Warburton insisted, had done "great service to divine revelation" by noting both the similarities and the differences between Egyptian and Mosaic religion. As Spencer had known, anyone who failed to see the Jewish fondness for Egyptian ritual as both natural and obvious was a puritanical fool. In order not be misled in this way, both Spencer and Warburton argued, it was necessary to appreciate the compatibility of divinity with functionality or instrumental rationality. Moses's law came from God and also matched up in many ways with Egyptian customs; divine wisdom was in part an instrumental form of intelligence that responded to the particularities of human societies in time. The Hebrew rites borrowed from the Egyptians were in themselves indifferent but, in practice, essential to the perpetuation of true religion. Borrowing in itself was nothing evil; in fact, it was inevitable. What mattered was whether the borrowing in question was motivated by superstition, as in the case of Roman Catholicism, or by reason, as in the case of Moses and his God.[69]

Moses, according to Warburton, thus wisely retained a hereditary priesthood, sacrifices, and sacerdotal appendages in keeping with Egyptian tradition. In fact, versions of all of these originally pagan relics could still be seen in the excellent "English priesthood" of the present day. Warburton's discussion of antiquity thus connected seamlessly to his explicit position on the nature of Christian Holy Communion and the apparatus that surrounded it in its Anglican variant. "Sacrifice," he wrote in the final book of the *Divine Legation*, was "almost coeval with the human race." Eucharistic, propitiary, and expiatory sacrifices were all natural, arose from natural reason, had a powerful utility, and originated in the human actions of Cain and Abel. This led easily to Warburton's claim that the Christian Eucharist, that great mystery, was "a feast upon a sacrifice" and a conduit of saving grace embraced by "partakers of the altar." This was the same stance adopted by Daniel Waterland and other patristically oriented stalwarts of sacerdotalist orthodoxy in the early eighteenth century. Warburton himself traced his position on the Eucharist back to the Restoration period, setting it in opposition to more extreme high church notions that had emerged during the reign of Anne (1702–14).[70] In Christianity as in Judaism, the feast upon a sacrifice had necessarily been devised in partial imitation of previous practices. But it nevertheless served

to distinguish Christians from Jews and pagans and to shield them from idolatry, thus serving precisely the same functions it had for God's people under Moses. "By interpreting Scripture on the common rules employed in the study of other ancient writings," Warburton explained, "that is to say, having a special regard to the manners, customs, and opinions of those times, the true nature and genius of the Last Supper is discovered." The deep historical roots of Christianity were to be applauded as evidence of its truth and utility, not suspected as pathways to infidelity.[71] To suppress Christianity's debt to ancient paganism was in effect to depict it as a bizarre descent into barbarism, when it was properly understood as the culmination of the perennial sacerdotalist strain in the history of human civilization.

These arguments were not fundamentally different from those made by less pious and usually lay figures in the wider British Enlightenment who supported the Anglican establishment, not to mention more philosophically inclined clerical apologists, such as Joseph Butler and William Paley. Edmund Burke was very much an Enlightened figure in the sense explored here, and the tradition of thinking described here might even be taken to stretch, as Pocock has suggested, all the way to Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *Constitution of Church and State* (1830).[72] But other major exponents of the British Enlightenment who are considered to be actively impious figures, such as David Hume and Edward Gibbon, also supported the establishment, albeit for anticlerical reasons. Positions like these had a pedigree that went back to the very beginning of the impious English Enlightenment. Early English freethinking was hardly aligned with republicanism and religious dissent; it was just as often deeply conservative in its political and religious character.[73]

Anglican Enlightenment also appears to have been paradigmatic for the broader phenomenon of Christian Enlightenment in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[74] It therefore deserves, along with its successors, a level of attention equal to that paid to the primarily philosophical, irreligious, and protoliberal forms of Enlightenment that have been the usual focus of historians. We now know, for instance, that Christian Enlightenment persevered even in France, not only before the controversies of the 1750s surrounding Jean-Martin de Prades and the turn of most Jesuits away from Enlightenment, but long after.[75] Conflict between orthodox Christianity and its enemies, it appears, was as characteristic of the Enlightenment itself as it was a matter of Enlightenment versus Counter-Enlightenment.

NOTES

1. These are in essence the alternatives offered, respectively, by John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

2. Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). For reviews, see, e.g., David A. Bell, "Where Do We Come From?," *New Republic*, 1 March 2012; Anthony J. La Vopa, "A New Intellectual History? Jonathan Israel's Enlightenment," *Historical Journal* 52, no. 3 (2009): 717–38; Antoine Lilti, "Comment écrit-on l'histoire intellectuelle des Lumières? Spinozisme, radicalisme et philosophie," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 64, no. 1 (2009): 171–206; Darrin M. McMahon, "What Are Enlightenments?," *Modern Intellectual History* 4, no. 3 (2007): 601–16; Samuel Moyn, "Mind the Enlightenment," *The Nation*, 12 May 2010; Siep Stuurman, "Pathways to the Enlightenment: From Paul Hazard to Jonathan Israel," *History Workshop Journal* 54 (2002): 227–35. On religious Enlightenment, see, e.g., David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Ulrich L. Lehner, *Enlightened Monks: The German Benedictines, 1740–1803* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jeffrey D. Burson, *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Jeffrey D. Burson and Ulrich L. Lehner, eds., *Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe: A Transnational History* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014).

3. In earlier work I have elaborated on the points made in the previous paragraphs and included the relevant bibliography, which is too voluminous to cite here. See William J. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and Its Empire, 1648–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); "Introduction: Enlightenment for the Culture Wars," in *God in the Enlightenment*, ed. William J. Bulman and Robert G. Ingram (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–41; "Hobbes's Publisher and the Political Business of Enlightenment," *Historical Journal* 59, no. 2 (2016): 339–64; "Enlightenment and Religious Politics in Restoration England," *History Compass* 10, no. 10 (2012): 752–64; and "Constantine's Enlightenment: Culture and Religious Politics in the Early British Empire, c. 1648–1710" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2009). For a complementary and invaluable description of a spectral Enlightenment, see Dale K. Van Kley, "Conclusion: The Varieties of Enlightened Experience," in Bulman and Ingram, *God in the Enlightenment*, 278–316.

4. Justin Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and Its Enemies, 1660–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

5. Ronald Beiner, *Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Philip Gorski, *American Covenant: A History of Civil Religion from the Puritans to the Present* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017); Richard Tuck, "The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes," in *Political Discourse in Early*

Modern Britain, ed. Quentin Skinner and Nicholas Phillipson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 120–38; Richard Tuck, "The 'Christian Atheism' of Thomas Hobbes," in *Atheism From the Reformation to the Enlightenment*, ed. Michael Hunter and David Wootton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 111–30.

6. See, e.g., J. G. A. Pocock, "Clergy and Commerce: The Conservative Enlightenment in England," in *L'età dei lumi: studi storici sul settecento europeo in onore di Franco Venturi*, ed. R. Ajello, E. Cortese, and V. P. Mortari, 2 vols. (Naples: Jovene, 1985), 1:523–62; Roy Porter, "The Enlightenment in England," in *The Enlightenment in National Context*, ed. Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1–18; Brian W. Young, *Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debate from Locke to Burke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

7. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*.

8. J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999–2015), 5:230.

9. These arguments, of course, persisted into the eighteenth century and were often very prominent in political debate. See, e.g., Henry Sacheverell, *The Political Union* (Oxford: Lichfield, 1702); and William Nicholls, *The Religion of a Prince* (London: Bennet, 1704). Other prominent Anglican divines in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries partly abandoned this classic Reformation tradition only to focus their argumentation less exclusively on scripture and to turn to a sophisticated historical reconstruction of early Christianity, which they used to defend the church against its enemies and make a case for sacerdotalism. They were still doing so, though, on Christian premises. An extremely learned and influential eighteenth-century example of this non-Enlightened position is Daniel Waterland's major study of eucharistic doctrine, first published in 1737. See *The Works of the Rev. Daniel Waterland*, 6 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1856), 4:459–802.

10. For a recent account with the relevant bibliography, see Noah Millstone, "Seeing like a Statesman in Early Stuart England," *Past and Present* 223, no. 1 (2014): 77–127. The connection between pastoral power and reason of state is underexplored to date, but for an early analysis, see Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, ed. M. Senellart and trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 87–283.

11. For an explicit, early acknowledgment of this strategy, see Adam Littleton, *The Churches Peace Asserted Upon a Civil Account* (London: Chetwind, 1669), a1v.–a2r., 3.

12. Churchmen were nevertheless sensitive to charges of Hobbism. See ibid., 32–33.

13. Ibid., 12.

14. Edmund Gibson, *Religion, the Best Security to Church and State* (London: Churchill, 1715), 9–10. See also Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 6, 12.

15. Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 12–13 (quotation on 12).

16. Gibson, *Religion, the Best Security*, 9–10.

17. Ibid., 10.

18. Richard Bentley, "Sermon I. The Folly of Atheism, and (what is now called) Deism: Even with respect to the present Life," in *A Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion*, ed. Sampson Letsome and John Nicholl, 3 vols. (London: Midwinter, Wilkin, Bettesworth, Hitch, Pemberton, Innys, Manby, Rivington, Ward, Knapton, Birt, David, Longman, Osborne, Astley, Austen, Lintott, Wicksteed, Whiston, Downing & Thurlbourn, 1739), 1:10. See also Brampton Gurdon, "Sermon I. The Pretended Difficulties in Natural or Reveal'd Religion

no Excuse for Infidelity," in Letsome and Nicholl, *A Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion*, 3:281.

19. George Fothergill, *The Importance of Religion to Civil Societies* (Oxford: Clements, 1735), 1.

20. Francis Gastrell, *The Certainty and Necessity of Religion in General* (London: Bennet, 1703), 215.

21. Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 12, 13.

22. Bentley, "The Folly of Atheism," 10.

23. John Conybeare, *A Defence of Reveal'd Religion* (London: Wilmot, 1732), 219, 220 (quotations), 221, 335 (quotation), 341, 356–57, 384–87.

24. Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 6.

25. Benjamin Kennicott, *Two Dissertations* (Oxford: Clements, 1747), 142–44.

26. Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 12.

27. Ibid., 15.

28. George Fothergill, *Sermons on Several Subjects and Occasions*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), 1:189–224 (quotation on 214).

29. William Nicholls, *A Conference with a Theist. Part II* (London: Saunders and Bennet, 1697), 24.

30. Fothergill, *Importance of Religion to Civil Societies*, 26–28.

31. For details, see Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, chaps. 5–6.

32. Samuel Parker, *A Discourse in Vindication of Bishop Bramhall* (London: Collins, 1673), 50–52, 68–69 (quotation on 50).

33. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 13–14.

34. Lilly Butler, "Religion no Matter of Shame," in Letsome and Nicholl, *Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion*, 2:440.

35. Fothergill, *Importance of Religion to Civil Societies*, 30–31.

36. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 23–24.

37. Fothergill, *Importance of Religion to Civil Societies*, 31. See also Bentley, "The Folly of Atheism," 10.

38. Fothergill, *Sermons on Several Subjects and Occasions*, 1:190–91.

39. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 25.

40. See, e.g., Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 27; Adam Littleton, *Sixty One Sermons, Preached Mostly Upon Publick Occasions* (London: Marriott, 1680), 1:29.

41. Conybeare, *Defence of Reveal'd Religion*, 186, 191–92, 201–4, 209–12, 216–17 (quotations on 209, 210, 212, 217).

42. William Warburton, *The Works of the Right Reverend William Warburton*, 12 vols. (London: Cadell and Davies, 1811), 3:217 (quotations); 7:60, 70, 93, 94 (quotation).

43. Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 20, 21.

44. Warburton, *Works*, 7:99.

45. Ibid., 2:60–63, 264, 265 (quotation); 7:99, 165–208. See also ibid., 2:329–34.

46. Conybeare, *Defence of Reveal'd Religion*, 216.

47. See, e.g., George Hickes, *Two Treatises, One of the Christian Priesthood, The Other of the Dignity of the Episcopal Order* (London: Sare, 1707), 20–21.

48. Littleton, *Churches Peace Asserted*, 12. See also Humphrey Prideaux, *The True Nature of Imposture Fully Display'd in the Life of Mahomet* (London: Rogers, 1697), "A Discourse for the Vindicating of Christianity," 66–70.

49. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 22–23.

50. Hickes, *Two Treatises*, xxi–xxiii.

51. See, e.g., ibid., esp. 13–31.

52. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 21, 25. See also Conybeare, *Defence of Reveal'd Religion*, 212–14.

53. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 27–32 (quotation on 27). See also Conybeare, *Defence of Reveal'd Religion*, 214–15.

54. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 32 (quotation), 255–98.

55. See, e.g., Hickes, *Two Treatises*, xl.

56. Kennicott, *Two Dissertations*.

57. Nicholls, *Conference with a Theist*, 32–7 (quotation on 36), 99–103.

58. See, e.g., Henry Dodwell, *Discourse Concerning the One Altar and One Priesthood* (London: Tooke, 1683).

59. See, e.g., Conybeare, *Defence of Reveal'd Religion*, 210. The two key texts were John Spencer, *Dissertatio de urim et thummim* (Cambridge: Garthwait, 1669); and John Spencer, *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus et earum rationibus* (Cambridge: Hayes, 1685). For discussion, see Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, 178–95; Daniel Stolzenberg, "John Spencer and the Perils of Sacred Philology," *Past and Present* 214 (2012): 129–63; Dmitri Levitin, "John Spencer's *De legibus Hebraeorum* and 'Enlightened' Sacred History: A New Interpretation," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 76 (2013), 49–92. Most earlier work on Spencer incorrectly took him to be a closeted deist or Socinian.

60. Gloster Ridley, *The Christian Passover* (London: Clarke, 1736).

61. Kennicott, *Two Dissertations*, 109–239.

62. Hickes, *Two Treatises*, xlvii.

63. Warburton, *Works*, 1:197, 199.

64. Ibid., 210–355.

65. Ibid., 200–201, 203, 215 (quotations on 200, 203, 215).

66. Ibid., 1:219–20, 280–81, 297–98 (quotations on 219–20, 297–98); 2:209–10; 3:3–5, 13, 201–11.

67. Ibid., 1:302 (quotation); 2:1, 9, 11–13, 15–16, 32, 59 (quotations on 1, 9). Warburton went so far as to criticize the church fathers for calling the mysteries impostures (ibid., 2:66–67).

68. Ibid., 2:18, 24–26, 54, 72. The only drawback to this in antiquity that Warburton recognized was that it resulted in the masses being taught polytheism, which in his view threatened the social utility of religion because it was supported in part by "vicious stories of the Gods and Heroes" (ibid., 2:19, 25 [quotation]).

69. Ibid., 1:302 (quotation); 4:79–81, 83, 90–103, 283–323, 360, 363–64 (quotations on 90, 301). See also ibid., 7:103.

70. Ibid., 5:154, 205, 277–80 (quotation on 154); 6:275, 286–306 (quotations on 275, 287, 298); William Warburton, *A Rational Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper* (London: Millar and Tonson, 1761), 4, 48–49. This tract used the arguments of the *Divine Legation* to formulate an entire doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Compare also Hickes, *Two Treatises*, xlii–xliii.

71. Warburton, *Rational Account*, 8, 69 (quotation), 70–75. See also Hickes, *Two Treatises*, xlii–xlxi.

72. Richard Bourke, *Empire and Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund Burke* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 69; Pocock, "Clergy and Commerce," 561.

73. Sarah Ellenzweig, *The Fringes of Belief: English Literature, Ancient Heresy, and the Politics of Freethinking, 1660–1760* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

74. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, 203–5.

75. Burson, *Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment*; Anton M. Matytsin, "Reason and Utility in French Religious Apologetics," in Bulman and Ingram, *God in the Enlightenment*, 63–82; Mark Curran, *Atheism, Religion and Enlightenment in Pre-revolutionary Europe* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press and the Royal Historical Society, 2012).

JEFFREY D. BURSON

Refracting the Century of Lights

Alternate Genealogies of Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Culture

Recent work by Dan Edelstein, entitled *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (2010), emphasizes the extent to which regnant interpretations of the Enlightenment still owe much to triumphalist narratives that French philosophes bear much responsibility for creating.[1] Edelstein's book makes an essential contribution to the wider conversation about the impact of historical memory on ex post facto constructions of eighteenth-century thought and on the way in which such historical memory clouds or clarifies the historical quest for an answer to Kant's famous question, "What is Enlightenment?"[2] The notion of a triumphalist genealogy of Enlightenment, coupled with the significance of metaphors of light to eighteenth-century thought in general, conjointly begs a further question: What were the other genealogies of the Enlightenment? How did these become entangled with the ultimately victorious one and thereby slip into the dustbin of history?

The purpose of this essay is to impressionistically suggest some answers to these queries by focusing on the range and diversity of eighteenth-century thought concerning metaphors of light. What follows is a series of individual snapshots of ways in which various writers and movements associated with eighteenth-century culture, and of contemporary interest of eighteenth-century scholars, used metaphors of light to construct alternate genealogies of enlightenment. Without negating or undervaluing the significance of the wider project, or series of projects, conventionally referred to as the Enlightenment, this essay employs the term in a much more capacious sense. In what follows, "enlightenment" (with a lowercase "e") refers only to the diverse modes by which eighteenth-century authors used metaphors of light to explain their respective ideals and projects of human improvement or cultural reform, and then sought normative moments in the past (i.e., genealogies of light) to legitimize such notions.[3] Certainly the trope of "light" is among the "big ideas" that David Armitage and Darrin McMahon have recently and self-consciously embarked upon contextualizing in a new kind of intellectual history more attentive to the *long durée*.[4] Such extensive serial contextualization is well beyond my own scope in what follows. But insofar as the Enlightenment is variously referred to as an era of *luces*, *lumi*, *lumières*, and the like—and nearly

always in the plural—the culture of the eighteenth century is undoubtedly a watershed moment in the history of such genealogies of light.[5] Genealogies of light or enlightenment (with a lowercase "e") can be found among Jansenists Jesuits, Freemasons, anti-philosophes, and more radical materialists, and all of the aforementioned feature prominently in this chapter. A renewed focus on these genealogies of light affords us with a new way of considering the culture of this period. Such a recontextualization transcends, or at least reframes, controversies over where, when, how diverse, and how radical was the Enlightenment.

Each of these discursive fields (Jansenist, Jesuit, Freemasonic, anti-*philosophic*, and materialistic) defined the source and origins of the "century of lights" differently, but each was mutually entangled in ways that suggest a need to broaden, deepen, and nuance present definitions of eighteenth-century culture. The Jansenists, for example, specifically tied cultural reform and moral improvement in opposition to the darkness imposed on society by Papal Bull *Unigenitus* in 1713, whereas the French Jesuit genealogy of Enlightenment was more ambivalent. Without divine grace, many Jesuits believed that natural reason remained shackled by sense perception and was liable to moral, intellectual, and religious degeneration. To enlighten the world was to perfect and purify the science of theology through advances in textual criticism, universal history, and the skillful use of practicable reason. On the other hand, the "enlightenment" of the Freemasons, so prevalent and controversial in the eighteenth century, affords scholars with a prototype, less of revolutionary civil religion, than of an eighteenth-century "mystery religion"; as such, it is functionally parallel in form to the first centuries of Christianity itself but distinctively beholden to a postdogmatic form of religious experience and community with its own genealogy of light that stresses the harmony between reason and faith. Finally, this essay concerns itself with the recent debate over the boundaries between a so-called "Counter-Enlightenment" and "Radical Enlightenment."[6] The third portion of this chapter examines the ways in which the "enemies of the philosophes" often used key elements of genealogies of light shared by Jesuits and philosophes alike against the more radically anticlerical implications of eighteenth-century thought.[7] The final section on the other hand affords a very different view of the sources and progress of light from the vantage point of an Enlightenment materialist.

What unites these discussions is the complex, mutually constructive entanglement of various perspectives concerning what it means to discover and disseminate light. The nearly universal language and conflictive genealogies of light dynamically intersect and collectively constitute the culture of the long "century of lights." Most importantly, such a perspective allows us to descriptively tran-

scend the debate over whether the Enlightenment is unitary or plural, religious or radically secular.[8]

Luminosity against Barbarism: Genealogies of Light among Jansenists and Jesuits

The Jansenist relationship to the Enlightenment is a complicated one.[9] Jansenist moral theology came to emphasize the essential corruption of the original, prelapsarian human nature as a result of the sin of Adam—a seemingly unenlightened pessimism about the prospects of human improvement.[10] But underlying the deeply conflictive ways in which the Jansenists engaged with the Enlightenment is a starkly consistent genealogy of human improvement that often employed metaphors of light to speak of how best to uproot what was, for Jansenists, the source of all moral, spiritual, and intellectual: the Bull *Unigenitus*.

In a shocking overreaction to the popularity and presumed Jansenism of the 1673 reedition of Pasquier Quesnel's Augustinian moral treatise and New Testament commentary entitled *Le Nouveau Testament en françois avec des réflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture & la meditation plus facile à ceux qui commencent à s'y appliquer* (1692), the papacy of Clement XI issued the infamous bull *Unigenitus* (1713), at the instigation of Louis XIV and of a handful of zealous and embattled Jesuits. This bull, ostensibly aimed at Quesnel, was actually a sweeping censure of 101 supposedly heretical and Jansenist propositions on predestination, grace, and moral theology. However, inasmuch as Quesnel's work was also a popular (and, for many French Catholics, rather innocuous) restatement of the heart and soul of Augustinian teachings about irresistible grace and the corruption of the human soul after the fall, the bull seemed to attack the very foundations of theological perspectives thought by many to be central to Post-Tridentine Catholicism. Making matters worse was the more than subtle attack on the cherished Gallican independence of the French bishops. The result was a conflict lasting (in its most acute phase in France) from the Gallican bishops' unsuccessful appeal of the bull to a General Council in 1717 until the French suppression of the Jesuits in 1764 and the de facto retraction of the papacy's most assertive attempts to enforce the bull throughout Europe.[11]

By the papacy's seeming condemnation of Augustine, many Jansenists believed the institution of the church was being subverted from within by Jesuits who promoted novel ideas of grace that Jansenists often pejoratively attributed to the late sixteenth-century Spanish scholastic Luis de Molina. Among such notions feared by many Jansenists was the suggestion that "invincible ignorance, either of Natural Law, or of Positive Law, entirely displaces the will, and therefore

the sin is excused."[12] Jansenists blamed such moral laxity on the Jesuits who were promoting ignorance and superstition in order to corrupt the people. As such, public instruction was also vital to the Jansenist notion of light. Such a position was articulated by the Jansenists' leading journal, *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*, when in 1750 it extolled the importance of reading scripture and Augustinian books as the "true means of disseminating light and mollifying, to a certain extent, the ignorance that the Jesuits seek to introduce to . . . the clergy and, through the clergy, to the people."[13]

By contrast, Jesuit metaphors of light, especially those in France, often proceeded from an optimistic belief in the partial remediation of human nature through reason when properly instructed and perfected by revelation.[14] As one anonymous editorialist from the August 1754 issue of the Jesuit *Mémoires de Trévoux*, stated: "To say that a man guided by the light of reason alone could never exercise acts of equity, deference, moderation, humanity, respect, etc., . . . except with a secret view toward self-interest or vanity is to think too injuriously of our own nature: it is without a doubt disfigured, altered, and corrupted, but it is not destroyed: reason and religion are in accord on this point."[15] And, on this point, the Jesuits believed that the essence of human nature could not possibly have been essentially darkened by the fall unless one were to assume that human free will could trump the will of God when he created the original human nature. Accordingly, human nature could not have been essentially depraved at the fall; rather, it remained in need of illumination, both by the progress of arts and sciences and by the supernatural grace of God, as Jesuits argued. After the fall, many Jesuits often assumed a gradual degeneration of humanity from a state of postlapsarian nature, due to the nature of the human soul when it was no longer perfected by supernatural grace. As Claude Buffier, the longtime Jesuit editor of the *Mémoires de Trévoux*, opined, the natural sentiment of humanity darkened after the fall because of reason's dependence on sense perception. Original sin, in this respect, blinds humanity to direct perception of divine things. By implication, the dependence on sense perception caused the gradual degeneration of human knowledge and morals. Improvement in arts and sciences and the Catholic revelation are thus twin pillars of enlightenment for many French Jesuits.[16]

This abiding concern with the natural corruptibility of human understanding and moral behavior, then, actually unites the Jesuits with many other eighteenth-century writers. For John Locke, for example, whose views were among those that informed Buffier's own, early humans, still possessing only the most primitive comprehension of natural forces, tended to ascribe inexplicable natural events to the vengeance of humanlike supernatural forces and beings in nature—

beings that required appeasement and came to be worshiped. Accordingly, Parisian Jesuits like Buffier—in concert with Bayle, Locke, and Malebranche—derived all forms of superstition and idolatry from such failures of human understanding.[17]

But this Jesuit conception of human reason as both remediable and corruptible because of its dependence on sense perception begged an important question: What are the possibilities and limitations of human improvement through natural reason? Many Catholic writers including Jesuits proceeded from the assumption that individual reason, even once properly enlightened, could never rediscover or live by the pristine natural revelation of God before the expulsion from paradise. Rather, Jesuits argued that only the revealed religion of the Catholic Church was an effective bulwark against the inherently corruptive tendencies of natural reason. The task before many Jesuits and their likeminded apologists was therefore to demonstrate that the body of church traditions and teachings was historically verifiable in an unbroken succession dating to within living memory of Jesus and the apostles. To demonstrate the veracity of what they considered to be true religion from historical evidence, Jesuits concluded, would necessarily imply the existence of a divinely ordained revelation that could serve as a bulwark against the vulnerability of the light of reason to fears, passions, and carnal needs.[18] Because of their doctrine and their epistemology, Jesuits commonly allied theology with history and textual criticism, insofar as these sciences were vital to uncovering empirical evidence for the veracity of scriptural texts and church tradition.[19]

This historicoempirical mode of Enlightenment theology also led to the globalization of European religious and philosophical histories. In effect, the search for a more nuanced apologetic in defense of Catholic tradition necessitated a deeper engagement with the religious and philosophical heritage of the world beyond Europe. To more fully apprehend the process by which the original revelation (identified with the religion of the biblical patriarchs) had degenerated led Jesuits to assume an instrumental position as participants in what Guy Stroumsa has recently dubbed the "new science" of comparative religion in the Enlightenment.[20]

Whatever the Jesuit genealogy of Enlightenment may have been, it was a history of cyclical gains and losses. Without grace, natural reason was imprisoned by sense perception and liable to descent into darkness (defined as idolatry and barbarism). To enlighten the world was to perfect and purify the science of theology through advances in textual criticism, universal history, and historical certitude such that the skillful use of practicable reason could validate the probable

veracity of Catholic revelation. Only thus would the moral and intellectual degradation of reason's natural light be arrested. In short, the Jesuit genealogy of light eschewed not only the fideistic implications and moral pessimism of Protestants and Jansenists but also the overly confident faith in human progress through reason alone characteristic of the so-called *esprit-forts*.[21]

"Sheltered from the View of the Profane": Masonic Genealogies of Light

Rather like the Jesuits, the relationship of European Freemasonry to genealogies of the Enlightenment remains contested terrain for scholars. The long-term ramifications of Freemasonry among revolutionaries, radical enlightenment figures, and even counterrevolutionary societies remain a lively focus of attention by scholars of the Enlightenment and revolutionary era. Margaret C. Jacob's landmark work is certainly astute to note that, even as late as 1794, many lodges, including that of *Le Bien Aimée* (f. 1749) in Amsterdam, spoke in "the unmistakable language of the democratic revolutions." Yet, much evidence also exists for connecting Freemasonry to anti-philosophes and to conservatives of various stripes in the late 1780s.[22] Whatever diverse destinations Freemasonic societies and practices reached in the crucible of the Euro-Atlantic Revolutions from the 1770s to 1848, it is evident that Freemasonic culture was replete with genealogies of light triumphing over a world of superstitious darkness.

Seldom underscored, however, is the virtually nonexistent distinction between reason and religiosity that stands as a salient hallmark of the genealogy of light shared by many Freemasons. Masonic rhetoric, constitutions, and ritual frequently link fraternal reciprocity and harmony to enlightenment itself.[23] A vital source for the Masonic genealogy of light remains the almanacs currently housed at archives of the Masonic Cultural Center in The Hague. As repositories of useful information about shipping schedules, the tides, agricultural cycles, and other minor vignettes thought to be of interest to Freemasons, these almanacs also disseminated Masonic verse and song in a way that helped build community among far-flung Masonic societies.[24] But many of these songs also reveal a distinctively Masonic conception of what it means to be enlightened. One verse celebrates the building of "useful monuments" made possible because the order of Freemasons "opens within us a heroic flame from which the most beautiful of sentiments germinate."[25] One poem entitled "The Misanthrope Becomes a Freemason" paints an evocative portrait of a Masonic eschatology: "A new universe has just blossomed before my eyes / . . . / A Divinity descends into these lowly places / [and]chases from them suspicions, fear, and alarm / I perceive so many

amicable mortals / who, distinguished from the stupid vulgar, / are going to taste true pleasures / in a temple built by the God of the mysterious."[26] Despite their clear sense of superiority over the so-called stupid vulgar in need of Enlightenment, Freemasons believed that the egalitarian social harmony prevailing among themselves would allow them to be a kind of messianic vanguard whose secret devotion to amity and useful knowledge would reconsecrate the earth to the core of divinely inspired ancient wisdom.[27] From its own origin myths and self-referential genealogies of luminosity, one can therefore view Freemasonry as a kind of religious devotion to reason—a religiosity with only one doctrine: that amity, harmony, and moral utility are the light of the world.[28]

These ideals valorized an individual mason's active participation in the multinational history of dispersing the ancient light of wisdom to humanity. Individual Freemasons (male and, at times, even female) internalized a new drama of salvation—the salvation of humanity through equal access to practical reason, commerce, and fraternal sociality. This ancient natural revelation was supposedly uncovered by the Egyptians, made manifest through the building of Solomon's Temple, and conveyed by an international network of Freemasonic societies by the eighteenth century. Triumphalist histories of the progress of the movement were printed within these Freemasonic almanacs accessible to members regardless of nationality or station. These almanacs are truly artifacts of an increasingly global epistolary exchange designed to construct and reinforce a new kind of *congregatio fidelium* (congregation of the faithful).

The existence of the Freemasons pushes scholars to further examine the concept of the 1700s as strictly an age of reason and bids us, instead, to reframe the boundaries of religiosity and secularization in eighteenth-century culture. Nowhere is this more evident than the more than casual affinity to the proliferation of mystery religions, including early Christianity, throughout the third-century Mediterranean world. In an age of constant warfare, and the militarization of the *imperium*, the elites of the Roman world became a closed society of powerful landed proprietors, parasitic to the cosmopolitan civic structures of earlier Roman greatness, and often increasingly dogmatic and intolerant in their practice of Greco-Roman religion. Entire populations of Roman civic officers (*curiales*), traveling merchants, and even poor farmers and artisans became alienated from the high culture, religion, and governance of the Roman Empire. Alienation, then, facilitated the consolidation of new international networks of religious expression—the so-called mystery religions of Isis, Mithras, Apollo, and Christ. These religions afforded the alienated but often still ambitious and mobile individuals with access to new communities of initiates whose rites dramatized their own deeply held

and personal sense of being participants in a univocal history of divinely sanctioned enlightenment that transcended the *saeculum* of the eternal city itself.

Despite evident diversity that remains the fruitful preoccupation of scholars of Late Antiquity, Christian communities were nevertheless linked across the Mediterranean by sacred (and often secret) mysteries, including the rites of baptism and the Eucharist; by a social safety net that cut horizontally across the vertical and increasingly sclerotic hierarchies of the third-century Roman Empire; and by networks of epistolary exchange (the Pauline epistles most famously) that attempted some measure of orthopraxis and encouragement.[29] And so it was with Freemasons. In a hierarchical world of competitive dynastic states, and often hostile and intolerant state confessions, merchants, professional, and well-traveled notables formed spontaneous free associations in Scotland, England, and Amsterdam after 1715. Between the 1720s and 1780s, a transnational and increasingly hierarchical ensemble of Freemasonic "congregations" emerged and fanned out into France, parts of Italy, the Holy Roman Empire, Scandinavia, and the colonial enclaves of the British, Dutch, and French.[30] Members recognized one another as equals wherever they went by certificates attesting to "their sentiments as a true brother and zealous mason," as evinced by their communal initiation into the mysteries of their lodge.[31]

More than the prototype of revolutionary civil religion, then, Freemasonry—like that most stubborn of third-century mystery religions, Christianity itself—attempted to reinterpret the meaning of familiar cultural beliefs and practices. In the case of the Freemasons, the old wine was the early modern European Christian and classical culture. The new wine skin was a distinctively postdogmatic form of religious experience and community with its own genealogy of what it means to be enlightened: it is a discourse of harmonizing rather than crushing the infamy of dogmatism. Much as third-century apologists like Origen valued Christianity for its ability to illuminate the world by transcending both Athens and Jerusalem, an anonymous apology for Freemasonry from 1772 sought to illuminate the human heart by transcending philosophy and theology: "There is yet another Architecture that is more assiduously the object of our labors: that of morals. . . . the heart . . . is the True Temple of piety and virtue. . . . would this not be the temple most worthy of the Divinity? Would this not be the edifice most useful to Society?"[32] The anonymous apologist continues, "Neither Theology nor even Philosophy are the object of our investigations . . . let us leave all such beautiful ideas to those who might find themselves amused thereby; let us take from religion nothing but morality." The Freemasons' own notions of what it means to be enlightened exemplify Jonathan Sheehan's provocative suggestion that

scholars would do well to reframe the narrative Enlightenment secularization by focusing instead on the eighteenth century as a key moment in the "transformation and reconstruction" of religion itself.[33]

Light against "the" Enlightenment: Anti-Philosophes

The genealogies of light associated with Freemasonry helped construct a cosmopolitan accord between philosophy and religion. This quest for concord—for exalting the hidden truths that lay behind the apparent dichotomies between natural and supernatural, darkness and luminosity—was more than an origin of radical enlightenment tendencies. The quest for concord also animated conceptions of truth and light associated with anti-philosophe treatises as well. By anti-philosophe, I do not mean Counter-Enlightenment writers as such, but instead, a diverse group of Catholic apologists and lay authors like Fréron whose attacks on the likes of Dumarsais, Boulanger, Helvétius, or d'Holbach often proceeded from the very same stock of empiricism and mitigated skepticism, even from the very same arguments against dogmatism and superstition, which they also shared with many Enlightenment writers.[34]

Nicholas-Sylvestre Bergier is a famous example of an apologetic writer who has often been classified as "Counter-Enlightenment" but whose criticisms of later philosophes like Rousseau and d'Holbach derived from Bergier's own quest for the purest light of human understanding. To that end, Bergier did far more than attack the philosophes, and far less than attack the Enlightenment as such. In effect, Bergier's own methods were deeply imbued with eighteenth-century natural history and Lockean epistemology, both of which he considered vital. Like Buffier, Bergier used Lockean epistemology to frame the corruption of reason's access to natural revelation. Natural history that Bergier utilized in validating the historicity of the Catholic Church's claim to be the one repository of divine revelation vouchsafed against the corruptibility of human reason. As early as his 1764 *Éléments primitifs des langues*, Bergier established what appears in retrospect to be the foundation of his apologetics designed to eschew religious, as well as philosophical, fanaticism. Foundational in this respect was Bergier's notion of language, which borrows both from the Jesuit Claude Buffier and from John Locke. Bergier believed that words are "in general the image of the objects of our thoughts," and more abstract words are "so many metaphors that become naturalized in the end through a long course of habit and usage."[35] Accordingly, to comprehend the nature of language was for Bergier, as much as for the Jesuit Buffier and the philosophe abbé Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (both following Locke), the premier artifact of natural history. Language provided the most certain map of a universal

history of humanity and of the very progress of natural and religious understanding as well.[36]

Bergier's *Origine des dieux du paganisme* (1767) then applied such linguistic theories from *Éléments primitifs* to the universal history of religion. Bergier ultimately concluded that the fables of Greek mythology derive not from history but from the process of linguistic development. Bergier's *Origine des dieux du paganisme* displaced ancient religious understanding as a source of light worthy of emulation and reframed it as evidence of the inexorable corruptibility of human perceptions.[37] Bergier's *Origine* took to task the consensus opinion of the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres that the Greek gods and heroes derived from bastardized historical accounts of earlier Greek monarchs—an opinion echoed by Voltaire in *Dictionnaire philosophique* (1764) and even by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the *Émile* (1762). Instead, Bergier asserted that the Greeks were unremarkable among other peoples of the earth who had once worshiped the "true" God of the patriarchs.[38] Bergier concluded that Hesiod's references to the reign of the gods Ouranos (heaven) and, somewhat later, Chronos ("He who turns the heavens") indicated that the Greeks once believed in a single deity conveyed to them by the tradition of their own patriarchs descended from Noah. Like all peoples, the Greeks referred to the vital forces animating nature as "Titans" and eventually as nymphs and other spiritual beings. In time, in a process Bergier and, in truth, many apologists believed common to the universal history of humankind, the Greeks deified such beings, and the pantheon of Greek deities grew and diversified until the whole of nature was enchanted with divine beings in need of propitiation. The Greeks' lack of understanding of the natural world in the age of Ouranos and Chronos, coupled with the forgotten sources of metaphorical references to the natural forces that were later personified and deified in the age of Zeus, deprived them of access to the natural light of the original patriarchal revelation and led to the degeneration of an originally universal monotheism into Greek polytheism.[39]

In miniature, this process is the very thing that many late eighteenth-century Catholic apologists (most fruitfully considered "enlightened anti-philosophes") assumed was the driving force behind the need for divine revelation itself.[40] Namely, for Bergier, individuals were imprisoned by their passions and sense perceptions. Lockean sensationism was, in this sense, and as it had been for many Jesuits, the key both to the progress of enlightenment and to the corruption of morals and natural revelation. Thus, for Bergier, as much as for the philosophes, the methods of empirical reason, when applied to universal history, textual criticism, and nature itself, were a source of luminosity. Nevertheless, Bergier and many anti-philosophes also argued that the very thing that afforded *encyclopédistes*

like Diderot and D'Alembert an undiminished source of light—Lockean sensationalism—was, when unguided by the divine light of Catholic revelation, the source of moral degeneration.

The Original Light of Philosophy: Genealogies of Enlightenment Materialism

Paradoxically, both anti-philosophes like Bergier and materialists like Jean-Baptiste Boyer d'Argens shared the view that the purest source of philosophical illumination lay in the past purity of natural religion before its corruption. Moreover, both d'Argens the materialist and Bergier the anti-philosophe agreed that all humanity was monotheistic. The differences, however, lay in the sources of human corruption, the way in which early humankind defined spirit or deity, and the ability of unaided human reason to reclaim the purity of that natural revelation whence unbridled by any revealed tradition. The contrasts between the aforementioned anti-philosophe tradition and that of more radical materialists are latent within the *Lettres chinoises* (1739–40) of the marquis d'Argens.

The *Lettres chinoises* is structured around a fictional epistolary exchange between six Chinese correspondents who had supposedly lived and traveled in France. D'Argens's Chinese characters affirm Leibniz's understanding of ancient Chinese, ancient Stoic, and primitive Christian beliefs as being in fundamental agreement about vitalism of both matter and spirit—that matter can change and evolve by its own by impulsion from within. This belief, referred to as vitalistic materialism by John P. Wright and Ann Thomson, informed d'Argens's belief that the best, most primitive, and most original natural and moral philosophy is vitalistic materialism. The purity of the vitalistic material originary in ancient cosmologies stands in stark contrast with what d'Argens considered to be the dark forces of fanaticism and hatred animating the internecine strife between the Jansenist and Jesuit wings of the Gallican Church.[41] D'Argens's Chinese protagonists therefore spoke of Jansenists and Jesuits as analogies for what many European elites considered the source of superstition and fanaticism in China—Daoist and Buddhist sectarianism. D'Argens thereby clearly juxtaposed the natural light of *prisca theologica* (in this case a vitalistic concept of materialism) to the moral, religious, and philosophical darkness of Jansenist-Jesuit polemics of the middle eighteenth century.[42] By recovering the primitive origins of natural philosophy, modern philosophers would be able, d'Argens suggested, to surmount the decay wrought by metaphysical and doctrinal haggling caused by Jansenists and Jesuits.

By the character of the Chinese traveler Yue-che-chan, marquis d'Argens turned the popular work *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, sent from Jesuit missionaries

in China, Japan, and India back to Europe, on its head. For d'Argens's Chinese traveler recounts just how barbarously fractious Europeans were in "matters of religion."[43] In Europe, d'Argens writes, "One condemns what another approves; the latter then treats his adversary as ignorant, the former, as impious, [and] still another accuses him of libertine tendencies and debauchery."[44] D'Argens effectively exoticized Europeans to themselves and allows his Chinese characters to articulate his own genealogy of enlightenment. D'Argens's Chinese traveler, Yu-che-chan, explains the French *convulsionnaire* Jansenists in farcical terms.[45] Thus, "if the French were to imitate all the practices of Deacon Paris [of Saint Médard]," Yu-che-chan adds, "the sole inhabitants of their country would be fools."[46] The harshest criticisms, however, d'Argens reserved for a later dialog between the characters Sieou Tcheau and Yu-che-chan. Like Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, the Buddha had anciently "worked to disseminate his teaching" among "a prodigious crowd of ignoramuses that he brainwashed" in order to achieve political influence.[47] This dialog transparently contends that what was true of the Buddhists and their popular following among the high- and low-brow Chinese was just as true of the Jesuit influence in France.[48]

As might be expected, d'Argens's choice to ally the Chinese "Sect of Fo" (Buddhist practices in China) with the "Sect of Ignatius" is significant because d'Argens's Chinese characters go on to reveal that the supposedly Neo-Confucian notion of *Tai qi* (understood in this instance to mean active virtue of cosmic order and harmony) was in fact *essential* to the pristine and historically original vitalistic materialism of all peoples, including the most ancient tradition of the Chinese literati themselves.[49] By implication, then, the truest possessors of light on the opposite pole of Eurasia from China were not the "followers of Ignatius" but rather the men of letters vested in clubs, salons, lodges, and publishing houses who espoused a form of vitalistic materialism.[50] Consequently, through the *Lettres chinoises*, Marquis d'Argens abridged the history of philosophy in a way that implied his own more radical genealogy of enlightenment, one that rooted itself in the recovery and application of the *prisca theologica* of humanity—vitalistic materialism. In so doing, d'Argens exalts eighteenth-century European materialists as conveyers of the true light of philosophy.[51]

Conclusion

What do such disparate yet entangled genealogies of enlightenment among Jansenists, Jesuits, Freemasons, enemies of the philosophes, and more radical materialists have to tell us about eighteenth-century culture? While this series of snapshots of various discourses of light against darkness can only do so much,

they invite consideration of just how and why some narratives of enlightenment were incorporated into the metanarrative of *the* Enlightenment, whereas others were not. As is now well understood, the Jansenist and Jesuit genealogies of light do not sit comfortably in either Enlightenment or Counter-Enlightenment, and the distinctions themselves dim even further after the suppression of the Jesuits.[52] The Freemasons clearly have their own esoteric culture of light that, for many, facilitated further Enlightenment, but could just as often lead to less politically progressive forms of social engagement and are, in any case, part of the more esoteric side of the eighteenth century—arguably part of the so-called "Super-Enlightenment."[53] It is my view at least that political and social changes—that is, contingencies—are most crucial in explaining the eventual winners and losers among the constructed notions of light.[54] Anton Matytsin has intriguingly suggested that the Enlightenment is perhaps too contested and too circumscribed a category to encompass the plenitude of eighteenth-century culture. Instead, scholars may wish to focus on the long eighteenth century as possessing a culture that was veritably obsessed with the discourses of light and darkness, reform and barbarism. A cultural history of this nature would naturally include much about the culture of the Enlightenment, but it would do so, most fruitfully, in a way that would also transcend more conflictive definitional wrangling over what is and is not the Enlightenment.[55]

Perhaps one way to go about this would be to frame the history of eighteenth-century culture as a contested space in which competing genealogies of what it means to be enlightened—competing notions of light itself—ebb and flow in dialog with various contingencies. The Enlightenment would thus become one of many light-infused languages pervasive throughout eighteenth-century society. This approach to eighteenth-century culture would also be more process driven; it would employ Jonathan Israel's "controversialist method"[56] of intellectual history but in a way that eschews any presupposition concerning the supposed inevitability of events. This notion of contested definitions of what it means to seek light and vanquish darkness would also imply the wholesale displacement of Kant's question of what the Enlightenment is, thereby negating the definitional wrangling over "Radical Enlightenment," "Religious Enlightenment [singular or plural]," and the like. Without forgetting the important distinctions among these discursive fields, and without forgetting that the Enlightenment does matter, as Anthony Grafton's recent work reminds us, scholars might reframe the conversation entirely. Self-consciously viewing the long eighteenth century as one of disparate genealogies of "light," permits us increasingly to take a hard look at how *the singular* Enlightenment calcified as the eighteenth century gave way to the troubled

nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The concept of competing historical genealogies of enlightenment, refracted by political, religious, or economic contingencies (some, uniquely religious or state milieus, and some, transnational or global in nature), generates many new avenues of inquiry.[57] We may instead self-consciously ask how and why did *this* spectrum of Enlightenment prevail and not another? How, in turn, were other frequencies along the grand spectrum characterizing *le siècle des lumières* diffused or deflected, to what profit, and at what cost?

NOTES

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1. Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

2. Darrin M. McMahon, *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

3. For the broadest definition of the Enlightenment as attentive to human improvement, see John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–14, 43–44. However, my adaptation of his view in this context to refer to movements that may or may not have comported with the Enlightenment that Robertson was defending is mine alone.

4. David Armitage, "What's the Big Idea?," *Times Literary Supplement* (20 Sept. 2012), http://www.the-tls.com/tls/public/article1129685.ece.; Darrin M. McMahon, "The Return of the History of Ideas?," in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 13–31; for recent examples of this approach to retracing the genealogy of ideas through shifting contextual milieus over the long durée, see Darin M. McMahon, *Divine Fury: A History of Genius* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), and David Armitage, *Civil Wars: A History in Ideas* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017).

5. The significance of the plural usage of the words concerning "light" in the eighteenth century has also been underscored by Roland Mortier, "'Lumière et 'lumières': histoire d'une image et d'une idée au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle," in *Clartés et ombres du siècle des Lumières* (Geneva: Droz, 1969), 13–59.

6. A debate recently reignited by publication of Jonathan I. Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750–1790* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), and Jonathan I. Israel, *Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French Revolution from* The Rights of Man *to Robespierre* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

7. Didier Masseau, *Les ennemis des philosophes: l'antiphilosophie au temps des lumières* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2000).

8. For the further refinement and development of this point, see Jeffrey D. Burson, *The Culture of Enlightening and the Entangled Life of Abbé Claude Yvon* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2019, forthcoming); and Jeffrey D. Burson, "Entangling the 'Century of Lights' to Disentangle the Enlightenment," in *Belief, Politics, and Society in Enlightenment France: Essays in Honor of Dale K. Van Kley*, ed. Mita Choudhury and Daniel J. Watkins (Oxford: Oxford Studies in the Enlightenment, 2019, forthcoming).

9. Monique Cottret, *Jansénisme et Lumières: pour un autre XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 16.

10. Jean Ehrard, *L'idée de nature en France dans la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1963), 1:438–40; for an interesting discussion of how the Augustinian pessimism of the Jansenists could lead to a social morality based on enlightened self-interest, see Dale K. Van Kley, "Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of Enlightened Self-Interest," in *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany*, ed. Alan Charles Kors and Paul J. Korshin (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 69–85, and Dale K. Van Kley, "Robert R. Palmer's Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France: An Overdue Tribute," in *Sacred and Secular Agency in Early Modern France: Fragments of Religion*, ed. Sanja Perovic (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 13–36.

11. Dominique Julia, "L'affaiblissement de l'église gallicane," in *Histoire de la France religieuse*, vol. 3: *Du Roi Très Chrétien à la laïcité républicaine (XVIIIe–XIXe siècle)*, ed. Philippe Joutard (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991), 11–50; Jacques M. Grès-Gayer, "The Unigenitus of Clement XI: A Fresh Look at the Issues," *Theological Studies* 49 (1988): 259–82; Dale K. Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution from Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1561–1791* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 135–321.

12. "Denonciation faite par MM les curés de la ville de Sens à M. l'archévêque d'une thèse dediée à Prélat, soutenuë au Collège des Jésuites par le Père Busserot, le 18 de Juillet 1732," 18 pp., in *Miscellanea alla Bolla Unigenitus* 49: *Opuscoli varii pro et contra*, item 16, p. 2, Clementine Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections Department, McMullen Library, Catholic University of America, Washington, DC: "Voluntarium omnino tellit Ignorantia . . . et invincibilis sive Juris naturalis, sive sit Juris positivis; ac proindè excusat à peccato" ("L'ignorance antécédente et invincible soit qu'elle soit du Droit naturel, soit qu'elle soit du Droit positif, ôte entièrement le volontaire, et par consequent excuse de péché").

13. *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques* (1750), 112; quoted in Marie-Hélène Froeschlé-Chopard, "Les *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* et les Lumières (année 1750)," *Dix-huitième siècle* 34 (2002): 77–89 (86): "Pour le *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*, la lecture et la connaissance des *bons* livres est le 'vrai moyen de répandre la lumière et de remédier jusqu'à un certain point à l'ignorance que les jésuites cherchent à introduire et à entretenir dans le clergé, et par le clergé dans le peuple.'"

14. Catherine M. Northeast, *The Parisian Jesuits and the Enlightenment, 1700–1762* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1991), 217–18.

15. Quoted in Ehrard, *L'idée de nature*, VI:440: "mais dire qu'un homme guide par la lumière seule de la raison ne puisse jamais exercer les actes d'équité, d'obéissance, de modération, d'humanité, de reconnaissance, etc. . . . que par des vues secrètes d'intérêt et de vanité, c'est penser trop injurieusement de notre nature: elle est défiguré, altérée, corrompue, sans doute, elle n'est point détruite : la raison et la religion s'accordent ici."

16. Claude Buffier, *Traité des premières vérités et de la source de nos jugements*, in *Oeuvres philosophiques du Père Buffier*, ed. Francisque-Cyrille Bouillier (Paris: Charpentier, 1843), 33–35 (I.ix.72–76).

17. Ehrard, *L'idée de nature*, 423, n. 7; Frank E. Manuel, *The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 26–31, 44–55, 62–63, 132; Paul Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européene, 1680–1715* (Paris: Fayard, 1961), 90–109; Nicolas Malebranche, *Entretiens sur la métaphysique, sur la religion, et sur la mort* (Rotterdam: Leers, 1688), 131–33 (IV.xvii) and 478–80 (XII.ix); Bernard Cottret, *Le Christ des Lumières: Jésus de Newton à Voltaire, 1680–1760* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1990), 57, 75–76.

18. Buffier, *Traité des Premières vérités*, 62–65 (I.xix.142–48) and 73–75 (I.xxviii.175–79). Buffier's "Remarques sur la métaphysique de M. Locke" were published alongside his *Traité de premières vérités*, 225–32. For Locke's influence on Buffier, see Francisque-Cyrille Bouillier, introduction to *Oeuvres philosophiques de Père Buffier*, xii–xvi, xliii–xliv. For more on Locke's influence in France, see Ross Hutchison, *Locke in France, 1688–1734* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1991), 35–39; Robert J. Palmer, "The French Jesuits in the Age of Enlightenment," *American Historical Review* 45, no. 1 (1939): 44–58; Northeast, *The Parisian Jesuits*, 65; Jeffrey D. Burson, *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 1–274; Jeffrey D. Burson, "Claude G. Buffier and the Maturation of the Jesuit Synthesis in the Age of Enlightenment," *Intellectual History Review* 21, no. 4 (2011): 449–72.

19. Northeast, *Parisian Jesuits*, 56–63, 106–7.

20. Guy Stroumsa, *A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 77–100, 145–49.

21. For more detailed discussion of the Jesuit enlightenment, see Jeffrey D. Burson, "Between Power and Enlightenment: The Cultural and Intellectual Context for the Jesuit Suppression in France," in *The Jesuit Expulsion: Causes, Events, and Consequences*, ed. Jeffrey D. Burson and Jonathan Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 40–64; also Jeffrey D. Burson, "Distinctive Contours of Jesuit Enlightenment in France," in *Exploring Jesuit Distinctiveness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Ways of Proceeding within the Society of Jesus*, ed. Robert Aleksander Maryks (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 212–34.

22. Margaret C. Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 174; Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, *L'Europe des francs-maçons (XVIIIe–XXIe siècles)* (Paris: Belin, 2002); Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, *La République Universelle des francs-maçons: de Newton à Metternich* (Rennes: Éditions Ouest-France, 1999); Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, *Franc-maçonnerie et sociabilité au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Edimaf, 2013); see also Charles *Franc-Maçonnerie et religions dans l'Europe des Lumières*, ed. Porset Cécile Révauger (Paris: Champion, 1998).

23. "Notulen der Vergaderingen van de Z.:A.:L.: Concordia Vincit Animos van den 13 July 1755 tot en met den 30 Augustus 1761, 15," *Cultureel Maçonniek Centrum: Archievam van de loge Concordia Vincit Animos, [loge] nr. 5 te Amsterdam*, 38.1, F 14 (15 juillet 1755), 38.1, F 3 (13 juillet 1755); Jacob's study was first to underscore the significance of Freemasonic Almanacs. See Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment*, 162–78.

24. *Almanachs des Francs-Maçons. Cultureel Maçonniek Centrum* Kast 4, F nos. 3–21 (hereafter *CMC* K 4, F nos. 3–21).

25. "Autre, à l'air *Dans nous hameaux, la paix, et l'innocence*," in *Almanachs des Francs-Maçons* (1769), *CMC* K. 4, F no. 8B, p. 43. "Nous élevons d'utiles monumens; / Notre Ordre porte en nous un trait de flame / Qui fait germer les plus beaux sentimens."

26. "Le Misantrope devenu Franc-Maçon: Cantate," in *Almanachs des Francs-Maçons* (1769), *CMC* K. 4, F no. 8B, p. 48. "Un nouvel univers vient d'éclore à mes yeux, / Tout s'embellit, et tout m'offre des charmes / Une Divinité descend en ces bas lieux, / En chasse les soucis, la crainte, et les allarmes: / J'apperçois d'aimable mortels / Qui, distingués du stupide vulgaire, / Vont gouter des plaisirs reels / Dans un temple érigé par le Dieu du mystère."

27. For importance of Amity as "the Goddess of the Masons," see "Chanson nouvelle sur l'air *Accordez nous votre, &c.*," in *Almanachs des Francs-Maçons* (1757), *CMC* K. 4, F no. 6A, pp.42–43; also "Autre à l'air *Non, non Colette n'est pas trompeuse*," in *Almanachs des Francs-Maçons* (1757), *CMC* K. 4, F no. 6A, pp.47–48.

28. David G. Hackett, *That Religion in Which All Men Agree: Freemasonry in American Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); for related insights concerning Freemasonry as both secularization and emergent from new forms of religiosity, see Margaret C. Jacob, "Epilogue: Dichotomies Defied and the Revolutionary Implications of Religion Implied," in *Religion(s) and the Enlightenment*, ed. David Allen Harvey, special issue of *Historical Reflections / Réflexions historiques* 40 no. 2 (Summer 2014): 108–16.

29. Karl Christ, *The Romans*, trans. Christopher Holme (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 169–75, 189–200; Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150–750* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 49–68; on the etymology of the world, "secular" from the Latin, *saeculum*, and the emerging rift between the eternality of the Greco-Roman *saeculum* and that of the Kingdom of God in Christ as narrated by Augustine of Hippo, see Emmet Kennedy, *Secularism and Its Opponents from Augustine to Solzhenitsyn* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1–23; on a recent and compelling synthesis of scholarship on the origins and diversity of early Christianity, see Charles Freeman, *A New History of Early Christianity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

30. Roger Dachez, *Histoire de la Maçonnerie française*, 8th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003), 32–47; also Margaret C. Jacob, *Origins of Freemasonry: Facts and Fictions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

31. "Formule d'un attestation pour un Frère Maçon," *Cultureel Maçonniek Centrum: Archievam van de loge "Le Bien Aimée,"* 41.6, F 127; for lists of lodges in the Netherlands as of 1754 and the expansion in Scandinavia, the Holy Roman Empire, the Swiss Cantons, and France as of 1756, see ibid., F 23, 43, 55, 73; a more complete published listing of all known lodges as of 1766 in the Low Countries and France, see *Almanach des Francs-Massons pour l'année 1766* (Imprimé pour l'usage des frères, 5766/1766), *CMC* K. 4, F no. 8, pp. 18–21, 27–31; for a complete list of all American, Caribbean, and Canadian societies,

see *Almanach des Francs-Massons pour l'année 1769* (Imprimé pour l'usage des frères, 5769/1769), *CMC* K. 4, F no. 8B, pp. 31–34.

32. "Discours apologétique pour la Vénerable Société des Francs-Maçons," *Almanach des Francs-Maçons pour l'année 1772* (Imprimé pour l'usage des frères, 5772/1772), *CMC* K. 4, F no. 9, pp. 18–19.

33. Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), xi; also Jonathan Sheehan, "Thomas Hobbes, D.D.: Theology, Orthodoxy, and History," *Journal of Modern History* 88 no. 2 (June 2016): 249–74.

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36. Claude Buffier, *Cours de sciences sur des principes nouveaux et simples pour former le langage, l'esprit, et le coeur dans l'usage ordinaire de la vie* (Paris: Cavelier and Giffart, 1732), v–xvi, 893–1257; Kathleen S. Wilkins, *A Study of the Works of Claude Buffier* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1969), 31–39.

37. Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 436–96; Neven Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz, "Epicurus in the Enlightenment: An Introduction," in *Epicurus and the Enlightenment*, ed. Neven Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2005), 1–11.

38. Nicholas-Sylvestre Bergier, *Origine des dieux du paganisme et le sens des fables découvert par une explication suivie poesies d'Hésiode*, 2 vols. (Paris: Humblot, 1767), 1:5–12, 15, 23–24, 29–33.

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40. Jeffrey D. Burson, "Nicholas-Sylvestre Bergier (1718–1790): An Enlightened Anti-*Philosophe*," in *Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe: A Transnational History*, ed. Jeffrey D. Burson and Ulrich L. Lehner (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 63–88; Dale Van Kley has recently studied apologists who no longer fit neatly into the Jansenist-Jesuit dichotomy after the suppression of the Jesuits, and who utilize Enlightenment science in their criticisms of d'Holbach, Rousseau, or radical materialists like Helvétius and Diderot. See Van Kley, "From the Catholic Enlightenment to the Risorgimento."

41. Ann Thomson, *Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 22–27, 229–37; Ann Thomson, "'Mechanistic Materialism' vs. 'Vitalistic Materialism'?," *La Lettre de la Maison française d'Oxford* 14 (2001): 22–36; John P. Wright, "Materialismo e anima vitale alle metà del XVIII secolo. Il pensiero medico," in *L'età dei Lumi: Saggi sulla cultura settecentesca*, ed. Antonio Santucci (Bologna: Mulino, 1998), 143–57. For alternative views of vitalism, see Peter Hanns Reill, *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 1–16, 33–70, 119–42, 198; Elizabeth A. Williams, *A Cultural History of Medical Vitalism in Enlightenment Montpellier* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 3–11, 147–77, 275–81, 305–28; Elizabeth A. Williams, *The Physical and the Moral: Anthropology, Physiology, and Philosophical Medicine in France, 1750–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1–69, 107–10; Roselyne Rey, *Naissance et développement du vitalisme en France de la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle à la fin du Premier Empire* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2000), 1–18, 53–61; see also David Porter, "China and the Critique of Religious Fanaticism in Eighteenth-Century France," in *Les Lumières européens dans leurs relations avec les autres grandes cultures et religions*, ed. Florence Lotterie and Darrin M. McMahon (Paris: Champion, 2002), 61–80; David Porter, *Ideographia: The Chinese Cipher in Early Modern Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 8.

42. Jean Baptiste Boyer d'Argens, *Lettres chinoises, ou Correspondance philosophique, historique et critique, entre un Chinois voyageur & ses correspondants à la Chine, en Moscovie, en Perse, & au Japon*, 6 vols. (The Hague: Paupie, 1769), 1:v, xi–xii; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Preface to *Novissima Sinica*," in *Leibniz: Writings on China*, trans. Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosement Jr. (Chicago: Open Court, 1994), 72–3; Olivier Roy, *Leibniz et la Chine* (Paris: Vrin, 1972), 84–85.

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44. Argens, *Lettres chinoises*, 1:70–71 (quotation), 75, 78 (Lettre VIII): "L'un condamne ce que l'autre approuve; celui-ci traite son adversaire d'ignorant, celui là d'impie, un autre accuse de débauche & de libertinage."

45. Ibid., 79 (Lettre IX).

46. Ibid., 92 (Lettre X): "Et si le François imitoient tous le Diacre Paris, leur pays seroit uniquement habité par des fous."

47. Ibid., 108–9. (Lettre XI): "Pendant douze ans qu'il travailla à répandre sa doctrine, il entraîna à sa suite une foule prodigieuse d'ignorants, dont il renversa la cervelle: avec ces secours il remonta sur son trône, il devint très puissant."

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., 122–24. (Lettre XII).

50. Ibid., 2:280–81 (Lettre LI). For more on d'Holbach, see Alan Charles Kors, *D'Holbach's Coterie: An Enlightenment in Paris* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

51. For a more extended analysis of these points, see Jeffrey D. Burson, "Unlikely Tales of Fo and Ignatius: Rethinking the Radical Enlightenment through French Appropriation of Chinese Buddhism," *French Historical Studies* 38, no. 3 (2015): 391–420.

52. Dale K. Van Kley, "Jansenism and the International Expulsion of the Jesuits," in *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 7: *Enlightenment, Reawakening and Revolution, 1660–1815*, ed. Stewart J. Brown and Timothy Tackett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 302–28; Jeffrey D. Burson, "Catholicism and Enlightenment: Past, Present, and Future," in Burson and Lehner, *Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe*, 16–31.

53. Dan Edelstein, ed., *The Super Enlightenment: Daring to Know Too Much* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2010).

54. This stress upon contingency may be contrasted with that of Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment*, 1–36.

55. Anton M. Matytsin, *The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 265–74.

56. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*, 23.

57. Anthony Pagden, *The Enlightenment and Why It Still Matters* (New York: Random House, 2013); Sebastian Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique," *American Historical Review* 117, no. 4 (2012): 999–1027.

CHARLY COLEMAN

Enlightenment in the Shadows

Mysticism, Materialism, and the Dream State in Eighteenth-Century France

Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin—former lawyer and infantry officer turned Freemason and esoteric visionary—styled himself a *philosophe inconnu*.[1] The epithet seems fitting for a practitioner of Illuminism, the amalgam of mystical and Enlightenment thought that coalesced in the final decades of the eighteenth century.[2] Both intellectual currents ran through his writings. The treatise *Des Erreurs et de la Vérité* (1775) rejects the hubris of system building—the metaphysical *esprit de système* that Étienne Bonnot de Condillac and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert aimed to supplant with a new *esprit systématique*—for what its author considered "a more useful gift" to his fellows, "a ray of their own torch that I spark again before them, that it may cast light on the false ideas they have received about truth."[3] The quintessence of knowledge does not descend from the heavens, nor does it ascend from a material base. Rather, it radiates from within the human mind itself, as a "universal temporal cause" destined not only to "activate and direct all" but also to "reconcile all, once its power has been put to use."[4] Such metaphors have a long, illustrious history in the Christian tradition as well as in the foundational texts of the Enlightenment. Curiously, although Saint-Martin sets himself against the agenda of the latter, he nevertheless embraces its convictions regarding the sources of human misery in ignorance, and the functions of reason as a panacea for discontent, whether moral or intellectual.[5] His allusion to light would even seem to recall the article "Philosophe" from the *Encyclopédie*, with its proclamation that "reason is to the philosopher what grace is to the Christian. . . . He walks in the night, but is preceded by a torch."[6]

Less familiar, given the well-documented rise of public opinion during the eighteenth century, would have been Saint-Martin's admission that his audience comprised "only a small number of men," which necessitated operating "under a veil that even the least ordinary eyes will not always be able to penetrate."[7] Yet this open declaration of subterfuge remains in keeping with discreet Enlightenment practices. Of particular note is the *Encyclopédie*, which, despite its topical scope, and status as a best seller, made no pretensions to keeping all readers in mind, at all times. Beyond the technical expertise required to comprehend articles

on a vast range of subjects, from eucharistic theology to viniculture, the use of cross-references at once facilitated intellectual leaps and misdirected hostile readers.[8]

Yet the Illuminist, unlike the mainstream philosophe, pledged himself not to an autonomous human society imagined in the *Encyclopédie* "as a divinity on earth" but to a more sublime truth—that of God alone. "All your efforts," Saint-Martin writes in *Le Nouvel homme* (1792) "must be devoted to the total sacrifice and death of your mind."[9] To be clear, this exhortation does not entail succumbing to perpetual darkness; rather, "when God sees that we have preserved nothing in giving ourselves to him, he gives us in turn a spark of sacred light that is in itself millions of times greater than our being." Once the soul has been purged of the material defects occasioned by the wayward tendencies of the body, and restored to its status as an emanation of the divine, "the entire life of this new man" will consist of "continual growth" and the "development of all his senses and all his spiritual faculties, by which he will bear witness that the spirit has come into him, and that it has rendered him its instrument."[10] On this view, we are all Christs, dead to ourselves and risen unto God. Communion with the divine further holds out the promise, as Saint-Martin asserted in *Le Ministère de l'homme-esprit* (1802), of dispelling the shadows of our "earthly abyss" with "a ray of true eternity." We must remain ever vigilant in this fallen world, because it is "during sleep that primitive man became the prey of his adversary and the divine contract was forgotten."[11]

Although novel in certain respects, if not highly idiosyncratic in others, Saint-Martin's understanding of illumination follows antinomies that structured the mainstream philosophe movement: reason and enthusiasm, light and darkness. Yet bound up in these oppositions stood another binary, equally crucial, if less often recognized—that of wakeful self-governance versus the fugues of slumber. Under investigation in this chapter is the last set of terms, from a particular perspective: that of the dreamer's relationship to spiritual, material, and existential goods. The dream state elicited both fascination and dread, precisely because it threatened the image of the philosophe as endowed with a mind beholden to sense experience, yet in command of its ideas. The Enlightenment ideal operated within a broader culture of self-ownership, championed by orthodox theologians as well as mainstream philosophes, according to which men and women were defined by a possessive attachment to their being in general, and thus stood accountable for their individual actions. Defenders of self-ownership faced sustained criticism throughout the eighteenth century from partisans of a wide-ranging culture of dispossession that valorized the human person's loss of ownership, not only over

the self but also over a host of internal and external resources. Remarkably, this imperative aligned two otherwise antithetical positions—heterodox Christian mysticism and radical philosophical materialism.[12]

Once eighteenth-century debates over the self are restored to their operative context—the problem of relating personhood to property—the Enlightenment seems less a crucible of individualism and more a battleground for deciding its fate.[13] The eminent historian Daniel Roche, in his panoramic survey of eighteenth-century French society and culture, synthesized arguments from C. B. Macpherson to Louis Dumont to Charles Taylor: in the wake of the scientific and consumer revolutions, the individual came to fulfill Descartes's maxim in the *Discours de la méthode*, emerging as the "master and possessor" of nature.[14] Revisionist histories of the self by Dror Wahrman and Jan Goldstein have cast doubt on such certitudes.[15] In a similar vein, the analysis that follows will emphasize contingencies in the emergence of the modern subject. Individualism and antiindividualism arose in tandem throughout the century, through vehement disputes surrounding the human person's capacity for appropriation.

Viewed through this interpretive lens, the French Enlightenment, despite its entrenched anticlericalism, also takes on a new aspect vis-à-vis religion. The *Encyclopédie* famously declared the philosophe a socially conscious, rationally calculating subject, moved by passions that he nonetheless directs toward edifying ends. The Illuminist Saint-Martin, with his call for the mind to abdicate its will to God, problematized this credo. He was not singular in this regard. No less acclaimed a figure than Denis Diderot—a *philosophe connu* if ever there was—questioned the legitimacy of self-ownership. He did so, moreover, by refurbishing dispossessive language derived from heretical strains of mysticism. My essay situates articles he penned for the *Encyclopédie*, along with his dialogue *Le Rêve de d'Alembert* (drafted in 1769, first published in 1831), within contemporary theological and medical reflections on the dream state, including those by Saint-Martin. The case of Diderot, I argue, compels a reassessment not only of the identity of the philosophe but of the religious dimensions of the French Enlightenment.

To be sure, recent scholarship has taken considerable strides toward recovering the sheer diversity of thought that abounded during the eighteenth century.[16] Across a range of cultural and geographic contexts, it has become impossible to deny that the Enlightenment coexisted with occult practices—from alchemy to animal magnetism, from Jansenist *convulsionnaires* publicly overcome by the loss of their reason as well as physical sensation to Masonic lodges where adepts followed secret rites of sociability. For instance, monographs by John Fleming and Paul Kléber Monod have done much to expand the contours of Enlightenment-era

intellectual and cultural history. Fleming's account glimmers with scintillating personages such as the healer Valentine Greatrakes and draws attention to the enduring appeal of Rosicrucianism, but it also makes clear his intention not to advance a "new definition of Enlightenment or a fresh interpretation of it."[17] Monod rigorously charts the persistent allure of occultism down to the mid-seventeenth century, and its resurgence in the years surrounding the French Revolution. He also notes, however, that the esoteric tradition fell into abeyance from the 1710s to the 1780s—that is, during the decades of the High Enlightenment. The intellectual potential unleashed by the philosophe movement, on this view, gave Illuminism a new charge, one that, as Auguste Viatte contended in a classic study, abided in and through romanticism.[18]

The works of Fleming and Monod offer felicitous correctives. Yet, as the preceding summaries suggest, their judgments could be extended further and led in new directions. The age of Voltaire and d'Holbach was indeed that of Franz Anton Mesmer and Alessandro di Cagliostro, as well as of Saint-Martin. Even so, by fixating on these latter-day characters, historians and literary scholars have paradoxically tended to reinforce the oppositions their work aims to complicate. The emphasis on once-neglected figures has come at the expense of reconsidering the texts and contexts of canonical philosophes—and, more specifically, the multiple intersections between spiritualism and materialism. By taking the self's relationship to God and nature as a point of departure, and Diderot as exemplar, the agenda pursued here advances a distinct interpretation of the relationship between the Enlightenment as classically defined and embattled theological currents. Illuminism and mysticism have long been regarded as aberrations in the age of lights, from Ernst Cassirer's claim that "French Encyclopaedism declares war openly on religion," to Jonathan Israel's appraisal of the Enlightenment as a campaign for "rationalization" and "secularization."[19] These univocal pronouncements falter in the face of scrutiny: even committed philosophes did not merely coexist with spiritual seekers but also drew on their findings in productive ways. As Diderot himself acknowledged, it is through the dream state itself that this veiled confluence emerges from the shadows.

The Enlightenment Science of Dreaming

Diderot's musings joined the efforts of theologians and natural philosophers to classify forms of altered consciousness. Catholic orthodoxy had long regarded these states as possible conduits to revelation, albeit of dubious provenance.[20] By the eighteenth century, qualified skepticism had given way to outright contempt. Even churchmen rushed to sanitize the prophetic tradition by limiting its scope

to the apostles, the early fathers, and a rarefied cohort of saints.[21] In so doing, they conceded in no small measure to physicians, whose clinical observations sought to draw nocturnal visions into the light of reason. Not unlike alchemy, then, dreaming functioned as an epistemological terrain on which to map the boundaries that separated legitimate scientific endeavor from occult speculation. Yet, as we will see, it also inspired myriad experimental practices that threatened to efface those very limits.

While priests girded themselves against the charge of peddling superstition, amateur oneirologists set about producing manuals on dreaming. These guides, which could also be considered works of popular medicine, pursue the possibilities of directing dreams to a specific end. An especially revealing example of the genre is *L'Art de se rendre heureux par les songes*, first published in 1746. The anonymous author, whose nephew hailed him as a chemist and "great philosopher," relates how he honed his methods during an expedition to Canada. There, a native of the Illinois Confederation trained him in the preparation of ointments that could reliably affect the content of dreams. Although the allusions to Amerindian wisdom gesture toward an esoteric *philosophia perennis*, the author makes no pretensions to supernatural ends or means. Rather, his purposes are practical, even worldly in nature, and oriented toward buttressing the moral agency of those who practice the methods he outlines.

The experiences depicted in the guide range from sensual pleasures to the longing for social esteem to intellectual fulfillment. A typical recipe presents the formula for how to dream that one has slept with a woman. It calls for two ounces of scammony and Roman chamomile root, and three ounces each of cod bones and tortoise shells mixed in five ounces of beaver fat. One then adds to the preparation two ounces of the oil of blue scammony flowers, before boiling the mixture with an ounce of honey and six drams of dew gathered on a poppy flower. A small amount of opium—the active ingredient, one suspects—can also be included at this stage, if desired. The mixture must be dried in the sun for two months and stored in a cellar over the winter. Given the laborious process of a fabrication, the author advises the reader to make up several bottles of this "precious ointment," which he claims has granted him "tranquility" and "innocence," as well as "the entire system" of a "new art of happiness."[22]

The last comment points to the moral rationale behind his fanciful methods. The conscious manipulation of mind and body makes it possible to determine the content of dreams in advance, yet the enterprise is undertaken while unconscious, when dreamers are no longer in immediate control of themselves, and thus unaccountable for their actions. In contrast to the spiritual vigilance of wakefulness,

during sleep "divine and human laws no longer demand anything of us." In such a state, the only commandment one must follow is to "enjoy the possession [*jouissez*] of all that you can imagine."[23] The pleasure of having indulged deep-seated desires during sleep, thus reasons the author, neutralizes the compulsion to pursue them in reality, thereby animating a "love of virtue."[24] The logic might seem spurious, if not disingenuous, but it nonetheless resonates in certain respects with canonical Christian doctrine: Augustine himself had argued that the soul is not responsible for physical reactions during sleep, although he was careful to stipulate that one should not seek to spur such responses in a deliberate manner.[25] *L'Art de se rendre heureux par les songes* likewise complicates the soul's relationship to its thoughts and conduct. In particular, the greater sense of mastery and self-ownership achieved by the author's methods paradoxically depends on a prior—and previously prepared for—state of dispossession, or "voiding [*évacuation*] of the brain."[26]

Predictably, medical professionals tended to take a sterner view of minds that wandered in the night. Jean-François Lavoisier's *Dictionnaire portatif de médecine* (1764) describes a constellation of disorders, from dreaming to madness, believed to stem from the same source: a total physical inability to control internal and external reactions to stimuli. Dreams are deemed inherently pathological, "a kind of delirium." In turn, delirium, or "the alienation of mind, an imagination or rational faculty that is depraved," entails a lapse in capacity to govern oneself. It may manifest in a range of symptoms, which Lavoisier enumerates at length: "frenzy, lethargy, mania, melancholy, imbecility or insanity, hysteria [*la fureur utérine*], misanthropy," and even "werewolfism [*cynanthropie*], rabies, and tarantism [the compulsion to dance, thought to be induced by a spider bite]."[27]

Sleepwalking and related conditions, although less extreme or severe, further elicited strong reactions by complicating the dominant sensationalist psychology of the period, practitioners of which frequently equated *being* a self with *having* a self. The philosophes ridiculed the overwrought rationalism of seventeenth-century metaphysics, while acknowledging the role of sensation, amplified by sympathy and other passions, on the workings of the mind. Their observations led them not to resignation in the face of forces beyond their control but rather to self-ownership enshrined as a moral and epistemological desideratum.[28] According to Condillac's influential restatement of the paradigm, sensation engenders the successive formation of the faculties of imagination, memory, and reflection through the conversion of bodily impulses into abstract signs. The nervous system functions to exert control over the impressions to which it is also susceptible. Memory allows one to restrain the imagination. Reflection then empowers the

mind to take possession of its thoughts and actions. Pathology occurs when the individual "does not direct his attention on his own" and is thereby "subject to his surroundings and has nothing except by virtue of an outside force." Only after the mind prevails as "master of its attention" does it become self-sufficient, by honing ideas "that it owes to itself alone" and "enriches itself from its own resources."[29]

During sleep, however, the self's ownership of its ideas is prone to falter. As Voltaire described the conundrum, the soul is "free, and it is mad!"[30] A 1788 report on somnambulism issued by the Society of Physical Sciences in Lausanne approaches the matter in similar terms. Its authors, Louis Levade, Jean-Louis-Antoine Reynier, and Jacob Berthout van Berchem, likened madness to a "more durable" form of sleepwalking, which is itself regarded as "madness of a short duration." As they defined it, somnambulism involves "a nervous condition . . . during which the imagination represents objects to us that struck us while in a wakeful state, and with as much vigor as if they were really affecting our senses."[31] In other words, the nervous system effectively becomes short-circuited, unmoored from its grounding in actual experience. The center of self-mastery collapses in on itself. Sleepwalkers pursue an interest in external objects not upon willful reflection but in a confused, elliptical manner. Wayward imagination overwhelms their mental apparatus and operates beyond their conscious control for the duration of the episode.

As evidence for such claims, the Lausanne physicians cited the case of a thirteen-year-old boy named Devaud whose involuntary actions while sleeping—which ranged from performing calculations, to locating information in an almanac, to visiting his local church—suggested that his senses had, in effect, taken on a life of their own. They conducted a battery of tests under varying conditions, including the application of magnets. The clinicians noted that the child would open his eyes slightly when searching for objects, but only for an instant. From this observation they concluded that Devaud's "overexcited imagination paints objects with which he is familiar" and that "all his senses, subordinated to his imagination, seem to be concentrated on the object that it is struck by, and at that moment have no perceptions except those relating to it."[32]

Above all, Levade and his colleagues intended their report to explain the curiosities of somnambulism as a purely physical phenomenon, stripped of all supernatural trappings. For instance, Devaud's tendency to open his eyes struck them as an involuntary response, one that confirmed the axiom that the mind is incapable of distinguishing between physical objects not already encountered through sense experience. "The marvelous ceases," the doctors concluded, "as soon as

the flame of experiment can light the path of reasoning." They thus dismissed Mesmer's "magnetic somnambulism," then making waves in Paris. Enthusiasts purported it to cure illness through inducing unconscious states, during which the healer could manipulate a rarefied medium that flows through the body but is susceptible to obstruction. The physicians spoke, in contrast, of how imagination disrupts the workings of the nervous system, and how charlatans could exploit this defect to their advantage. "The fever of animal magnetism," they predicted, would dissipate as surely as "the dreams of the night subside upon waking."[33]

Despite these efforts to cast a cold light on the feverish world of dreams, religious referents continued to inform how its inhabitants were understood. For instance, the treatise *Du Sommeil* (1779) fuses discursive strands from medicine, philosophy, and spirituality in explicating its subject. The author, known only as P.F.L.M., described sleep in sensationalist terms typical of the scientific literature. Alongside mainstream philosophes, he further identified loss of consciousness with the suspension of reason—which he likened to "a theater of enchantment." Even in less intense states, such as distraction, "one belongs neither to others nor to oneself." A general principle followed: the greater the separation from external reality, the deeper the delirium, until one descends into the throes of madness.[34]

The author further ruminated on the metaphysical and even theological implications of his findings. Out of the ruins of mental disorder, he recognized the visage of the divine as "it advances toward the place it has chosen to stage its most illustrious favors," and where "the sovereign author of the universe lays bare his supreme power and makes his immortal voice understood to humankind." The dream state, he surmised, allows one to experience the transformative effects of God's power in and on the world—seemingly at a distance, yet also at "the origin and site of these mystic operations within the center of sensibility." Tellingly, he had previously defined this locus as "the seat of consciousness and the self [*moi*]."[35] Enlightenment seizes the mind, rather than the mind seizing Enlightenment, through illuminating disorientation.

Du Sommeil makes common cause with the Lausanne report on somnambulism, in that it employs sensationalist terminology to place "even the sphere of faith" under the "the jurisdiction of reason." Yet it would be inaccurate to claim that the text signals a direct turn toward secularization. P.F.L.M. did not dismiss the power that the supreme being exerts on the world. Among his stated aims is to see that "the duty . . . to believe and to adore is reconciled with the right to observe and to analyze."[36] Fulfilling this objective required bringing the human person in closer proximity to God through scrutinizing experiences during which the mind surrenders its ability to govern thoughts and actions. The author sought

to foster a deeper understanding of mystical communion, not to undermine its relevance. From his perspective, demystification does not disenchant; on the contrary, it expands the possibilities of observing the sublime mechanics of the divine at intensely close range—within the nerves and muscle fibers that constitute the human body.[37]

P.F.L.M. was not alone in evoking mystical abandon in describing the dream state and other forms of altered consciousness. Diderot himself adopted Quietist rhetoric to extol the self's dispossession in a resacralized material universe. This decision can be understood in light of the terminologies employed to depict the human person's alienation from itself. As we saw in the case of Lavoisier's dictionary, the dream state fell along a continuum extending from momentary distraction to incurable madness. What is more, the lexicon available to describe these conditions carried both religious and economic connotations, adding semantic ambiguity to conceptual disarray. This tangle of meanings looms large in Diderot's work. While heralded as a testament to human reason, the *Encyclopédie* also explores the shadows of the Enlightenment—the spiritual experiences, bodily sensations, and states of mind during which the thinking subject loses sight of itself and veers dangerously close to the fallacies that the work as a whole intended to combat. Across its pages, especially in articles treating esoteric knowledge and liminal states of consciousness, there unfurled a struggle for the soul of the philosophe, which was presented alternatively as an active, wakeful, self-owning subject or as an object under the sway of forces beyond its control.

The *Encyclopédie* and the Repository of the Imagination

In his article "Encyclopédie," Diderot notes how the project aimed at stabilizing the usage of problematic and contentious words.[38] He contributed to the enterprise with articles on distraction, dreams (*rêve*), and dreaming (*rêver*), terms that presented a semantic challenge in applying to both economic and legal operations, as well as to mental states. *Distraction*, for instance, could refer to "the separation of the part from the whole," as when paying an advance on a salary or fee, and also to a state of mental lapse.[39] *Rêve* could mean the sum levied on goods brought in and out of a territory in addition to thoughts and visions experienced during sleep.[40] Significantly, the terms share this polyvalence with *aliénation*, which referred alternatively to the transfer of property, the loss of another's esteem, or the collapse of one's reason.[41] This vacillation between economic and psychological deprivation implied another, deeper meaning—that the faculties constituting the human person could also be lost provisionally or permanently, depending on the circumstances.

While Diderot restricts himself to the moral components of this lexicon, his entries argue that the self constitutes both a thinking subject and an object that, like material property, could be alienated. The economic and the metaphysical thus converge in the human person, whose capacity for possession extends from external to interior goods, and back again. The article "Distraction," for instance, offers a separate definition as "the application of our mind to an object other than the one with which the present moment requires us to continue occupying ourselves."[42] Errant mental functions break the continuity between the self's psychological attention and bodily presence, whereas the "master of his mind" fixes his attention only on ideas that serve immediate aims. Diderot characteristically settles on a middle position between these two states: one "must be capable of distractions without, however, being distracted."[43]

Distraction's typological likeness to dreaming is explored in the article "Rêver." After briefly considering the dream state in general, the entry shifts to the related term *rêverie*, defined as "any idea that comes to us during the day in waking, as we imagine that dreams come to us during sleep." For Diderot, reverie signals the loss of self-mastery over one's own mental landscape, "allowing our understanding to go as it pleases, without taking pains to lead it." This diagnosis reflected the normative view of cognition outlined in "Distraction." Then, as if catching himself in the act, Diderot inquires, "What are you writing there? I don't know—a reverie passed through my mind, and it will become something or nothing." Reverie, he suggests, could replicate the products of intellection, while evading the governance exerted by a thinking subject. At this point in the article, Diderot returns from his semantic (and literary, if not actual) performance of reverie, with an unanticipated mention of distraction serving as an abrupt conclusion: "Dreaming is also synonymous with being distracted. . . . On other occasions, it signifies a profound consideration [of some subject]."[44] The form of the entry for "Rêver," then, would seem to reflect its content, meandering from the dreams of sleep (*rêve*) to waking dreams (*rêverie*) to *distraction*, even to alighting upon an epiphany, before the demands of intellectual sociability interrupt Diderot's musings.

The mind's tendency to stray outside the bounds of reason posed a problem all the more difficult to resolve in that the lexicon employed to describe it subverted theological as well as philosophical orthodoxies. Like distraction and alienation, the most common terms for the dream state—*songer* and *rêver*—implied an array of meanings, from the momentary abdication of self-governance during contemplation to the permanent derangement of the senses.[45] These states aroused both speculation and skepticism. Clerics engaged in campaigns against popular superstition and mystical heresy associated the dream state with discredited

dogmas that attenuated the soul's capacity for moral and spiritual discipline.[46] Philosophes committed to a program of public utility demurred from valorizing experiences that imperiled their rationalist creed.

As the *Encyclopédie* entries for "Songe" and "Songer" make clear, critics who equated the Enlightenment with wakefulness regarded all lapses in consciousness with deep suspicion. The first article, of unknown authorship, was based on an essay by the German-born Huguenot Johann Heinrich Samuel Formey. The seemingly omnipresent Louis de Jaucourt, who contributed some seventeen thousand articles to the project, composed the second. In their minds, the human need for repose represented nothing less than a nightly fall from empiricist grade. Formey's contribution in particular rails against dreaming as "a state that is bizarre in appearance, in which the soul has ideas without reflexive consciousness of them, and feels sensations without exterior objects seeming to make any impression on it." Jaucourt further stipulates that these ideas arise "without being chosen or determined in any way by the understanding," since during sleep one is by definition "alienated from the senses."[47]

Unlike the Encyclopedists, who dismissed biblical accounts of prophetic dreams, Christian apologists refrained from challenging revealed religion.[48] Yet orthodox Catholic commentators such as the abbé Jérôme Richard, canon of Vézeley, did not equivocate in denouncing the practice of divination in general, along with notable personages from the church's past who had fallen under superstition's sway, as affronts to both ecclesiastical statutes and the laws of reason. To entertain such illusions, he argued, is "to shut voluntarily one's eyes to enlightenment [*lumière*]." His *Théorie des songes* (1766) cited Formey's work with approval and advanced a similar opposition between self-governance and deviant forms of consciousness. Richard, in sensationalist fashion, affirmed "the soul, or the spiritual substance," as the force "that directs the imagination and pulls from it images or ideas upon which it wants to reflect or act." During sleep, however, "the soul is deprived of its interactions with external objects," thereby leaving the imagination without oversight, prone to strange visions and illogical turns.[49] It followed, then, that one must remain vigilant when taking possession of ideas from the repository of the imagination or else risk straying beyond the bounds of reason. Richard's work took particular aim at the devotees of Christian mysticism for defying this dictate. As he observed, the mystic "transported outside himself by the force of his imagination . . . was in a state resembling that of a deep sleep during which one dreams." According to Richard, spiritual dispossession depends on division: the mind alienated from itself by imagination also abdicates sovereignty over its thought, which loses all connection to physical

reality. He allowed that altered states of the soul might convey divine revelation but notes that even mystics remained wary of this "source of illusion and error."[50]

As evidence for his claims, he pointed to the Quietist affair of the 1690s, during which François de Fénelon and Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, two of the leading theologians of the period, quarreled over the teachings of the mystic Jeanne-Marie Guyon on the dispensability of spiritual goods and the limits of self-interest in Christian devotion.[51] Fénelon argued, against the prevailing orthodoxy, that pious indifference requires the total alienation of all personal properties, up to and including the self. As he expressed the matter in his works of spiritual direction, "there is no middle ground: we must return everything either to God or to ourselves." The aim was to break one's possessive fixation not merely on "criminal pleasures" but even on "goods legitimately acquired," so that their abundance or paucity did not hinder the workings of the divine.[52] Bossuet, for his part, countered that the soul's longing to possess spiritual goods was a natural and necessary desire. "God wants to give all these gifts," he argued, so that "one does not love oneself as it is necessary, without procuring, or at least desiring, all the goods that God has proposed for our faith."[53]

Richard left no doubt where his sympathies lay. "The illustrious Bossuet" is presented as the paragon of Christian rationality, whose "superior lights" exposed the deceptive charms of Guyon's system, which on his view led not to spiritual illumination but to moral degradation.[54] For Richard, then, the champions of orthodoxy contributed to the project of Enlightenment, while mystic heresy warranted dismissal as a product of erratic imaginations. He shared this conviction with Voltaire, who mocked Guyon as lost in "mystic reveries." Not unlike Richard, Voltaire also vilified the effects of passive imagination, when the mind, as if dreaming, surrenders to "an interior sense that acts with empire" over the formerly willful mind.[55] Despite his anticlericalism, Voltaire, like his fellow Encyclopedists, was not above staking out a position against altered states of consciousness that resembled those of theologians committed to the reasonableness of religion. The watchful philosophe and the enlightened abbé thus made common cause in fending off challenges to the soul's capacity for self-ownership.

Diderot's Philosophy of Dreaming

Given this configuration, it is all the more astonishing that Diderot would have recourse to the language of Quietism—especially in contributions to the *Encyclopédie* that address the boundaries of religious and philosophical thinking. For instance, his study of Neoplatonist thought in the article "Éclectisme" stipulates that "all is lost when theology degenerates into philosophy, and philosophy into

theology. It produces a ridiculous monster rather than a compound of one and other." Deluded by their spiritual aspirations, the eclectics, according to Diderot, pursued knowledge not through "natural intelligence," but by recognizing God within the soul. This approach informed their conviction that "the most worthy occupation of man is thus to separate his soul from all tangible things, draw it profoundly into itself, isolate it, and lose it in contemplation to the point that it entirely forgets itself." These references to annihilation and self-forgetfulness—which hearken back to propositions advanced by Fénelon and Guyon—were by no means casually placed. Diderot sharpens the point with a quip: "Quietism is quite ancient, as one can see."[56]

Yet, even while seeming to recoil from the stance, Diderot implicates himself in its ideal of dispossession. First, he offers a general definition of the eclectic that resembles the eighteenth-century philosophe as one "who, trampling underfoot prejudice, antiquity, authority, . . . dares to think for himself" and "to admit nothing unless by proof of experience and reason."[57] Moreover, personal speculations, as reflected in his *Encyclopédie* articles, convinced him that philosophes could become the objects of their own iconoclasm, with illuminating results. In this respect, Diderot might be regarded as a philosophical eclectic in his own right, sufficiently impetuous to challenge the axioms of his movement to forestall their ossification into mere dogma.

Diderot proceeds by observing that the "profound contemplation" advocated by the eclectics gives rise to a "delightful repose in which ceases all the dissonance that surrounds us and keeps us from experiencing the divine harmony of all intelligible things."[58] These terms echo an altered state described in a previous volume of the *Encyclopédie*, in which Diderot himself had inquired, "But what is a *delightful repose*?" His response, the article "Délicieux," describes a "moment of enchantment and weakness" in which the self experiences "neither memory of the past nor desire for the future, nor concern with the present." The suspension of time indicates a break in the continuity of exterior sensations, so that one advances "by an imperceptible movement from waking to sleeping."[59]

During this liminal state, reflection and memory no longer secure the possession of ideas that the mind exercises when awake. Rather, one under the sway of delight might return to a state of semiconsciousness, "if not to think of some distinct thing, then at least to feel all the sweetness of his existence." Yet, in hindsight, it becomes clear that this existence, while perceptible, remains impossible to call one's own, since the self "enjoyed the use [*jouissoit*] of it from an entirely passive possession [*jouissance*], without being attached to it, without reflecting upon it, without delight in it, without being pleased by it."[60] This valorization

of use without attachment recalls the mystical experience of self-abandonment. As Fénelon had once declared of spiritual goods, "one must do what one can to conserve these things, . . . without the wish to take pleasure in them or to place them in one's heart."[61] In a like manner, the existential stasis elaborated in the article "Délicieux" depends on indeterminacy and indifference: between past and future, slumber and wakefulness, being and nonbeing. Diderot further observes that, if one could "attach to this delightful Quietism the idea of immutability, one would form the greatest and purest happiness that humankind could imagine."[62]

For eighteenth-century readers, this allusion was far from innocent. Quietism referred almost exclusively to descriptions of the heretical doctrines professed by Fénelon, Guyon, and their acolytes.[63] That Diderot would employ so fraught a term, and in an article describing a state of altered consciousness in which the mind loses possession of itself, suggests that he did so for a specific purpose. The *Encyclopédie* declared the philosophe to be an autonomous, wakeful, self-owning subject, and the Enlightenment a bulwark against the tide of religious excess. Diderot's contributions, however, experiment with an alternative ideal, one steeped in the language of alienation, and even of Quietism, that reflects upon the revelations and pure pleasures to be gained from self-loss. In so doing, he dares to gesture not toward the disenchantment of dreams—as did his contemporaries, moderate theologians, physicians, and philosophers alike—but toward the significance of this state in a world where nature, rather than God, operates as the totalizing force that dictates the existence of all beings.

Diderot's engagement with mystical tropes, both in his *Encyclopédie* articles and in dialogues such as *Le Rêve de d'Alembert*, offers a semantic cue for the dispossessive nature of the experiences privileged by this stance. The latter work, composed in 1769, but unpublished until 1831, reflects on the precariousness of personal identity in a purely material universe. In the conversation prefacing the dialogue, the character D'Alembert spurns Diderot's claim that existence merely follows from physical organization and that memory alone makes self-awareness possible. The philosophe retires and endures a night of delirious sleep. During his ravings, it dawns on him that the human person is a mere assemblage of particles, adrift in the "immense ocean of matter." While these observations allude to John Turberville Needham's experiments with microscopic organisms, they also recall Guyon's description of mystical abandon as existing like a drop of water, engulfed by the sea.[64] What the waking d'Alembert had once believed to be "individuals" now appear as transitory compounds of shifting elements. "There is but one great individual," he realizes, "and that is the whole." In the

"general mass" that composes nature, every being is merely "the sum of a certain number of tendencies," which emerges from and then disintegrates into the constant flux of which it is a part.[65] To arrive at this radical conclusion, the slumbering d'Alembert must surrender control of himself, thereby offering a physical demonstration of the metaphysical insight his character ultimately embraces.

Deviating from the image of the attentive, observant, self-possessed philosophe, Diderot ruminated on the revelations to be gained from states of altered consciousness, when ideas stray, and darkness clouds the mind. The character d'Alembert's derangement reveals that one's thoughts, actions, and even identity are determined by overwhelming forces that reign both within and beyond oneself. The language and practice of abandon, refined by radical mystics, and now refitted for philosophical, aesthetic, and scientific purposes, captured the dynamics Diderot sought to evoke: nature's resacralization as an immanent, totalizing force, and the dream state, broadly conceived, as a means of charting its dispossessive impact within and against the self. In so doing, Diderot effectively revamped the philosophe's identity. The Enlightenment subject must be by turns a rational soul capable of self-governance and an intellectual vagabond whose lapses in self-mastery might reveal as much as the scrupulous application of empirical method. In particular, d'Alembert's epiphanies in the dialogue assume a performative function: if individualist existence has been rendered an illusion, rationality reveals itself as one state among others, to be conjured as much as possessed and employed. This aleatory character of Diderotian philosophical practice departed not only from the axioms of Enlightened moderates like Voltaire or the Lausanne physicians but also from the reasoned convictions of clerics such as Formey and Richard.

Enlightenment and Illuminism

It is now worth returning to Saint-Martin, the enigmatic figure with whom this chapter began, and whose errant thoughts run parallel but also intersect with those of Diderot. Even more adamantly than the author of *Le Rêve*, the *philosophe inconnu* insisted on the virtues of self-sacrifice—and, indeed, of literal dispossession. As he observed in *Le Nouvel homme*, it is only when one has "abandoned his own faculties to the direction and source of all thought" that truth comes into view and unity with God becomes possible. At last, "the divine soul of the new man receives an exuberant impulse." Saint-Martin compounds the metaphor with a reference to the alienation of "all the foreign substances in our being that we must sell if we wish to become perfect" and thus enter into "perfect abundance."[66] We do so, according to *L'Homme de désir* (1790), which recalls the language of

the character d'Alembert, with an awareness that "all is particular, and yet the whole is but one"—that is, tantamount to God, the singular source of being, and the ultimate object of devotion.[67]

At first glance, one seems to encounter in Diderot and Saint-Martin a related complex of ideas, from abandon to alienation, from longing to communion. Above all, the reduction of particularity to the unity of existence—be it in nature or God—draws them together. Nevertheless, significant differences persist. Saint-Martin would struggle to abide by Diderot's injunction against conflating theology and philosophy, notwithstanding the latter's own engagement with mysticism, a doctrinal tendency writ large in the former's Illuminist gospel.[68] Moreover, Diderot, even during his most ethereal speculations, remained grounded in a materialist theory of nature: consider, for instance, d'Alembert's allusions to Needham in *Le Rêve*. Perhaps most crucially, Diderot and Saint-Martin employ divergent means for arriving at their desired states. Saint-Martin approaches regeneration in avowedly spiritual terms, as resurrection—or a "complete passage from death to life, which the soul of man can physically feel in all his faculties when, in imitating the sweet and humble simplicity of the Word . . . , it succeeds in recovering its force, its heat, and its light."[69] The dream state does not pertain here; on the contrary, Saint-Martin likens the night world to a web of illusions and "obscurity," behind which "the crimes and vices of evildoers abound [*se déploient*]."[70]

Diderot, in contrast, exults in the wonders visited upon the slumbering mind. This leaves us with a seeming paradox: it is the philosophe, and coeditor of the *Encyclopédie*, who embraces the dream state, despite its associations with the prophetic tradition, and an Illuminist who rejects it as a source of error. What are we to make of this state of affairs? In response to such questions, Dan Edelstein has sought to map what he calls the "Super-Enlightenment," defined as an "epistemological no-man's-land between *Lumières* and *illuminisme*."[71] It is a most useful category of analysis, not least for allowing us to situate *un philosophe inconnu* such as Saint-Martin in a framework that more closely approximates his own present. What if, however, one extends its application beyond self-consciously marginal authors, to thinkers of Diderot's prominence? Does the latter then qualify as a super-philosophe, one willing to venture "into a speculative realm no longer grounded by empirical enquiry"?[72]

The Super-Enlightenment, for all its creative rigor, threatens to reinscribe the very binaries—between reason and enthusiasm, sense experience and baseless illusion, fanaticism and incredulity—traversed by its purported vanguard. The way out of this impasse may be found in acknowledging that the Enlightenment

stemmed not from a decline in or sequestering of belief, as scholars have so long maintained, but from its rapid, vertiginous proliferation. Even John Locke, that most sober of philosophers, engaged in daring thought experiments regarding the limits of personal identity.[73] Likewise, Diderot's speculations indicate to what extent seeming transgressions against Enlightenment epistemology proved deeply constitutive of the movement itself. His very turn to atheism proceeded from the resacralization of nature, not as a transcendent field but one that imposed immediate force on individual beings, including the human person. To be clear, this move did not involve a "'supernaturalisation' of the cosmos" that Edelstein identifies with the likes of Kepler and Newton.[74] Rather, it remained immanently grounded in matter, now infused with potentials for organization and agency once confined to spiritual entities alone. The dream state attracted Diderot, precisely yet paradoxically, because its structure and content—which drew on religious if not theological precursors—made it possible to reflect anew upon the nature of the thinking subject in a materially determined world.

NOTES

1. On Saint-Martin's life and work, see Elme-Marie Caro, *Du mysticisme au XVIIIe siècle: Essai sur la vie et la doctrine de Saint-Martin* (1852; repr., Geneva: Slatkine-Megariotis, 1975), 31–61; Nicole Jacques-Lefèvre, *Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, le philosophe inconnu (1743–1803): Un illuministe au siècle des lumières*, Bibliothèque de l'Hermétisme (Paris: Éditions Dervy, 2003); and Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, *Mon portrait historique et philosophique (1789–1803)*, ed. Robert Amadou (Paris: Julliard, 1961).

2. On Illuminism, see Robert Amadou, *Illuminisme et contre-illuminisme au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Carscript, 1989); Caro, *Du mysticisme au XVIIIe siècle*, 9–29; and Auguste Viatte, *Les sources occultes du romanticisme: Illuminisme, théosophie (1770–1820)*, 2 vols. (Paris: Champion, 1979), 1:1–268.

3. Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, *Des erreurs et de la vérité, ou les hommes rapellés au principe universel de la Science . . . Par un ph . . . inc . . .* , 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1782), 1:5. On the Enlightenment's opposition of *esprit systématique* to *esprit de système*, see Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), vii–viii, 8–27, and Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, 2 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 1:139–41.

4. Saint-Martin, *Des erreurs et de la vérité*, 1:193–94.

5. Ibid., 1:14–20.

6. "Philosophe," in *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres*, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, 35 vols. (1751–80; repr., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstat: F. Frommann, 1966–88), 12:509. On Saint-Martin's engagement with and appropriation of Enlightenment thought, see Caro, *Du*

mysticisme au XVIIIe siècle, 35–36, and Mieczysława Sekrecka, *Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, le philosophe inconnu: L'homme et l'oeuvre*, Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, 65 (Wrocław: Państwowe Wydawn Naukowe, 1968), 39–44.

7. Saint-Martin, *Des erreurs et de la vérité*, 11:8. On the secret rituals of Illuminism and Freemasonry in relation to the Enlightenment public sphere, see Dan Edelstein, "Introduction to the Super-Enlightenment," in *The Super-Enlightenment: Daring to Know Too Much*, ed. Dan Edelstein (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2010), 8–9.

8. Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire des éditeurs," in *Encyclopédie*, 1:xviii–xix, and Denis Diderot, "Encyclopédie," in *Encyclopédie*, 5:641A–642A.

9. Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, *Le nouvel homme*, in *Oeuvres majeures*, ed. Robert Amadou, 9 vols. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1975–2009), 4:14–15, 401.

10. Ibid., 56, 170.

11. Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, *Le ministère de l'homme-esprit* (Paris: Imprimerie de Migneret, 1802), 198–99, 350.

12. I explore the opposition and interplay between these cultures of personhood in *The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-Individualist History of the French Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

13. See, e.g., C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Louis Dumont, *Homo Aequalis I: Genèse et épanouissement de l'idéologie économique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1997); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and, more recently, Duncan Kelly, *The Propriety of Liberty: Persons, Passions and Judgement in Modern Political Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

14. Daniel Roche, *France in the Enlightenment*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 485–578 (quote on 517). Cf. René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, in *Oeuvres et lettres*, ed. André Bridoux (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 168.

15. Dror Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-Century England* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), and Jan Goldstein, *The Post-Revolutionary Self: Politics and Psyche in France, 1750–1850* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

16. See, e.g., John V. Fleming, *The Dark Side of the Enlightenment: Wizards, Alchemists, and Spiritual Seekers in the Age of Reason* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013); Paul Kléber Monod, *Solomon's Secret Arts: The Occult in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013); Euan Cameron, *Enchanted Europe: Superstition, Reason, and Religion, 1250–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Joshua Landy and Michael Saler, eds., *The Re-enchantment of the World: Secular Magic in a Rational Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); and the essays collected in Edelstein, *The Super-Enlightenment*. This theme also has a longer history. In addition to the works by Viatte and Caro, cited earlier, see also Antoine Faivre, *Access to Western Esotericism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

17. Fleming, *Dark Side of the Enlightenment*, 35–70, 107–31; quote on 1.

18. Monod, *Solomon's Secret Arts*, 16–19; cf. Viatte, *Les sources occultes du romanticisme*.

19. Cassirer, *Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, 134, and Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7.

20. Steven F. Kruger, *Dreaming in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 17–56.

21. On the status of dreams in eighteenth-century Christian thought and devotion, see Vesna Petrovich, *Connaissance et rêve(rie) dans le discours des Lumières* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 14–15, 50–51, and Kay S. Wilkins, "Some Aspects of the Irrational in 18th-Century France," in *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 140, ed. Theodore Bestman (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1975), 109–11.

22. *L'art de se rendre heureux par les songes* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1746), 161–62.

23. Ibid., 92.

24. Ibid., 108.

25. Augustine of Hippo, *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, trans. John Hammond Taylor, 2 vols. (New York: Newman, 1982), 2:197–98.

26. *L'art de se rendre heureux par les songes*, 120.

27. Jean-François Lavoisier, *Dictionnaire portatif de médecine, d'anatomie, de chirurgie, de pharmacie, de chymie, d'histoire naturelle, de botanique et de physique* (Paris: Didot le Jeune, 1764), s.vv. "Rêve" and "Délire," 2:13 and 1:194.

28. On the rise of and developments in Lockean sensationalism, see, among other works, John C. O'Neal, *The Authority of Experience: Sensationalist Theory in the French Enlightenment* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); David J. Denby, *Sentimental Narrative and the Social Order in France, 1760–1820* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Anne C. Vila, *Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Jessica Riskin, *Science in the Age of Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

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30. Voltaire, *Dictionnaire philosophique*, in *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, ed. Louis Moland, 52 vols. (Paris: Garnier, 1877–85), 20:434.

31. Louis Levade, Jean-Louis-Antoine Reynier, and Jacob Berthout van Berchem fils, *Rapport fait à la Société des Sciences Physiques de Lausanne sur un somnambule naturel* (Lausanne: H. Vincent, 1788), 52–53.

32. Ibid., 43.

33. Levade et al., *Rapport sur un somnambule naturel*, 49–50, 58–60 (quotations on 49 and 60). On Mesmerism, see Robert Darnton, *Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

34. P.F.L.M., *Du sommeil* (The Hague: Pierre-Frederic Gosse, 1779), 79, 130.

35. Ibid., 138, 140, 17.

36. Ibid., 141–42.

37. For a provocative overview of recent scholarship on modern enchantment, defined as "one which simultaneously enchants and disenchants, which delights but does not delude," see Joshua Landy and Michael Saler, "Introduction: The Varieties of Modern Enchantment," in Landy and Saler, *The Re-enchantment of the World*, 3. On resacralization, see Charly Coleman, "Resacralizing the World: The Fate of Secularization in Enlightenment Historiography," *Journal of Modern History* 82, no. 2 (2010): 368–95.

38. Diderot, "Encyclopédie," in *Encyclopédie*, 5:635–635A.

39. *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*, 4th ed., s.v. "Distraction." I have consulted ARTFL's electronic database of early French dictionaries, http://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/content/dictionnaires-dautrefois.

40. "Rêve," in *Encyclopédie*, 14:223.

41. *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*, 4th ed., s.v. "Aliénation."

42. Denis Diderot, "Distraction," in *Encyclopédie*, 4:1061.

43. Ibid.

44. Denis Diderot, "Rêver," in *Encyclopédie*, 14:228.

45. On the etymology and shifts in usage of *rêve*, *rêverie*, *songer*, and their linguistic relatives, see Robert Morrissey, *La rêverie jusqu'à Rousseau: Recherches sur un topos littéraire* (Lexington, KY: French Forum Publishers, 1984), 34–35, 104–7, and Petrovich, *Connaissance et rêve(rie)*, 6–7.

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48. For Jaucourt's position on prophetic dreams, see Louis de Jaucourt, "Songe (Critique sacrée)," in *Encyclopédie*, 15:357–58.

49. Jérôme Richard, *La théorie des songes* (Paris: Estienne frères, 1766), xv–xvi, 16–17, 50.

50. Ibid., 239–240.

51. On the Quietist affair, see Jean-Robert Argomathe, *Le quietisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973), and Louis Cognet, *Crépuscule des mystiques*, new ed., with preface by J. R. Armogathe (Paris: Desclée, 1991).

52. François de Fénelon, *Sentiments de piété, où il est traité de la necessité de connoître & d'aimer Dieu* (Paris: Babuty, 1713), 130, 133.

53. Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, *Instruction sur les estats d'oraison où sont exposées les erreurs des faux mystiques de nos jours. Avec les actes de leur condemnation* (Paris: J. Anisson, 1697), 107–8.

54. Richard, *Théorie des songes*, 241.

55. Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV*, in *Œuvres complètes*, 15:64, and Voltaire, "Imagination," in *Encyclopédie*, 8:561–62.

56. Denis Diderot, "Éclecticisme," in *Encyclopédie*, 5:281, 289.

57. Ibid., 281, 270.

58. Ibid., 289.

59. Denis Diderot, "Délicieux," in *Encyclopédie*, 4:784.

60. Ibid.

61. Fénelon, *Sentiments de piété*, 134.

62. Diderot, "Délicieux," 784.

63. See *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*, 4th ed., s.v. "Quiétisme," and Louis de Jaucourt, "Quiétisme," in *Encyclopédie*, 13:709–10. The ARTFL database contains records of thirty-nine occurrences of the term for the years 1689 to 1789. Most (thirty-one) refer explicitly either to the Quietist controversy in particular or, more generally, to heretical forms of Christian mysticism; the others allude to states of disinterestedness and abandon associated with the theology of Fénelon and Guyon.

64. Denis Diderot, *Le rêve de d'Alembert*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Herbert Dieckmann, Jacques Proust, and Jean Varloot, 25 vols. (Paris: Hermann, 1975–2004), 17:89–113, 127–28 (quotation on 128). For Guyon's metaphor, see Jean-Marie Guyon, *La vie de Madame J. M. B. de la Mothe-Guyon, écrite par elle-même*, new ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Librairies associés, 1791), 3:238–39.

65. Diderot, *Le rêve de d'Alembert*, 138–39.

66. Saint-Martin, *Le nouvel homme*, 17, 327, 328.

67. Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, *L'homme de désir* (Lyon, 1790), 79.

68. On Saint-Martin's relationship to mysticism, see Viatte, *Les sources occultes du romanticisme*, 1:274–79, 283–94, and Antoine Faivre, *Mystiques, théosophes et illuminés au siècle des lumières* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), 191–93.

69. Saint-Martin, *Le nouvel homme*, 20.

70. Saint-Martin, *Le ministère de l'homme-esprit*, 198.

71. Edelstein, "Introduction to the Super-Enlightenment," 33.

72. Ibid., 6.

73. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 109–13, 328–46. On the role of Enlightenment-era sensationalism in defining the contours of autonomous rational inquiry via its limits and thus revivifying the esoteric field as epistemological "other," see David Bates, "Super-Epistemology," in Edelstein, *Super-Enlightenment*, 53–74, and Caro, *Du mysticisme au XVIIIe siècle*, 9–10.

74. Edelstein, "Introduction to the Super-Enlightenment," 23.

JAMES SCHMIDT

Light, Truth, and the Counter-Enlightenment's Enlightenment

For Manfred Kuehn, colleague and friend

Late in 1797 the English caricaturist James Gillray became the recipient of a secret government pension amounting to approximately two hundred pounds per year. In exchange, he agreed to shift his attention from the satirical caricatures of William Pitt and George III that had established his reputation as the leading political caricaturist of his day and devote his talents instead to attacks on their radical opponents.[1] The arrangement had been negotiated by George Canning, a member of William Pitt's circle who had worked his way up to a position in the Foreign Office, and one of the first fruits of what ultimately would prove to be a rocky collaboration was the foldout print entitled "A Peep into the Cave of Jacobinism—Magna est Veritas et praevalebit" that graced the opening volume of Canning's *Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine*. Gillray's print provides a helpful point of departure for a consideration of some of the ways in which images of light, truth, and enlightenment were being contested at the moment when the movement we have become accustomed to calling "the Enlightenment" was commencing what some see as a protracted struggle with an opposing tendency known as "the Counter-Enlightenment."[2]

The concept "Counter-Enlightenment," however, tends to obscure rather than clarify the character of this struggle. A closer look at Gillray's engraving helps clarify the ways in which the metaphor of "light as truth" figured in the journal that it decorated. Images of lanterns and the sun in eighteenth-century German frontispieces perform a similar function by drawing a distinction between "true enlightenment" and "false enlightenment." Finally, a consideration of a few late eighteenth-century German attempts to answer the question "What is enlightenment?" drive home the ambiguities plaguing the concept "Counter-Enlightenment."

In Gillray's Cave: Light and Truth

While Gillray was willing to sell his services, he was—as Nicholas Robinson observed—"a dangerous man to choose."[3] His more audacious performances tended to make the figures he was supposedly defending appear at least as ridiculous as those he was allegedly attacking. For example, "Smelling out a Rat"—his

James Gillray, "A Peep into the Cave of Jacobinism—Magna est Veritas et praevalebit," *Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine* (1798). Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, Gift of Mr. and Mrs. Alvin S. Romansky.

famous attack on the dissenting clergyman and political radical Richard Price—depicts a monstrous Edmund Burke (reduced in a masterstroke of synecdoche to his nose and eyeglasses) interrupting the vulnerable Price in his midnight scribbling.[4]

In contrast, "A Peep into the Cave" was unambiguously didactic. The diagonal running from the upper left to the lower right neatly divides the children of darkness from the children of light. The monstrous cave-dwelling figure of Jacobinism belongs to the former. The luminous figure of "Truth," bearing a radiant torch and accompanied by cherubs, all too obviously belongs to the latter.[5]

As the rays of her torch enter the cave, they are transformed into lightning bolts, which assault the monster, causing it to drop both the human mask that had hidden its face and the quill with which it had been producing the pamphlets—entitled "Atheism," "Anarchy," "Sedition," "Defamation," "Libels"—that lie scattered on the floor. Unable to withstand the light of truth, these pamphlets burst into flames and the frogs (shifty creatures who move between land and water) that had been hiding under them take refuge in the adjacent stream. The Latin motto at


Reflections on the Revolution in France,
and on the Proceedings in certain Societies in London relative to that Event
Death of CHARLES I. & the Glory of Great Britain
Smelling out a Rat, — or The Atheistical-Revolutionist disturbed in his Midnight Calculations.

James Gillray, "Smelling Out a Rat,—or The Atheistical-Revolutionist disturbed in his Midnight Calculations" (1790).

the close of the title hammers home the message: *Magna est Veritas et praevalebit* (Truth is mighty and will prevail).

The subtitle is based on the Vulgate (Esdras 3:iv, xli) and had become a commonplace in eighteenth-century texts, decorating title pages or appearing in chapter headings.[6] During the opening decades of the eighteenth century, the phrase (typically in the King James translation: "Great is Truth, and mighty above all things") tended to appear in religious texts.[7] But, as the century wore on, the Latin text turns up in such decidedly secular works as a selection of documents chronicling the trials of John Wilkes, discussions of inoculation, and a survey of treatments for venereal diseases.[8] Though Gillray was far from pious, "A Peep into the Cave" marshaled the political-theological iconography associated with his employers: the cherubs fluttering behind Truth bear the Crown, the Cross, and the scales of justice.

What was being played out on the page was, in its own peculiar way, an allegory of enlightenment. As Hans Blumenberg noted, the image of the cave has long played an important role in the history of the metaphor of light as truth. From Plato onward, the cave figured not simply as the "natural" opposite of light but instead as "an 'artificial,' indeed perfectly violent underworld, relative to

the sphere of natural light and natural dark: a region of screening-off and forgetting."[9]

Plato depicted it as a site of bondage and constraint, a presentation that, as Blumenberg observed, inevitably forces the question of who or what might have been responsible for bringing about this state of affairs. Gillray's cave poses the same question but—because his cave differs markedly from Plato's—easily resolves the question that Plato had left unanswered. In the religious tradition that Gillray's employers presupposed, light and darkness did not confront each another as equals: light was a given, and darkness a riddle. The creation narrative posited a light that—fabricated on the first day by a Creator who transcended the division between light and darkness—preceded the fashioning, on the fourth day, of various assorted "lights." The Incarnation completes what the creation narrative had begun: a light has come into the world that is one in being with the Creator of all light.[10] While the Neoplatonic tradition—building on Plato's analogy between the sun (the source of the true light) and the good (a knowledge that was "beyond being")—had conceived the acquisition of the highest truth as an ascent from the darkness of the cave that, in good Platonic fashion, climaxes with a "seeing-into-the-light," from Augustine onward the Christian tradition operated with the metaphor of "seeing-in-the-light": the cave of the world had itself been illuminated, and hence transformed, by an act of grace.[11]

Which, of course, did not mean that there were not those who, like the creatures inhabiting Gillray's cave, stubbornly chose to remain in darkness. While the manacled denizens of Plato's cave were compelled to live there, those in Gillray's cave have chosen it as a site in which they can hatch their evil designs. And, while Plato's allegory of enlightenment involves an arduous ascent into the light, in Gillray's print illumination is brought into the cave from outside, thwarting a plot to enslave a people who, under the protection of the crown and the cross, had been securely and peacefully dwelling in that light since at least 1688. Confidently striding through a world that, with a few troublesome exceptions, has already seen the light, Truth shines her light into one of the few remaining places where the forces of darkness reside. Carrying the torch in her right hand, she gestures toward the heavens with her left, where a volume of the *Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine* hovers in the air. The juxtaposition of the torch and the journal echoes a phrase that turns up from time to time in eighteenth-century texts: "light and publicity." Over the course of the nineteenth century, it would be supplanted by a more familiar catchphrase: "the light of publicity."

The *Anti-Jacobin Review* was, like Gillray, the beneficiary of secret government support. Unlike Gillray, its campaign against those supporters of the "Regicides

of France" and "Traitors of Ireland" who had found a home "in the heart of our metropolis, and in the seats of our universities" would be carried out in words rather than images.[12] Confronting a world in which "the channels of criticism have long been corrupted" and "many of the Reviews have been rendered the mere instruments of faction," it sought to counter the "pernicious effects of this dangerous *system*" by seeking "to restore criticism to its original standard."[13] "At such a time, what friend of social order will deny, that *the Press* requires some strong controul? And what controul is more effectual than that which *the Press itself* can supply? Falsehood is best opposed by the promulgation of truth. MAGNA EST VERITAS ET PRAEVALEBIT."[14] In this context, the familiar motto from *Esdras* had obvious political ramifications: in the face of a perceived threat to the political order, the *Anti-Jacobin Review* was ready to lend a hand in policing the radical press.

In carrying out this task, it brought the weapons of critique to bear on both domestic and foreign enemies. The "Prospectus" that opened the first volume proposed that, since the "*daily* and *weekly* vehicles of Jacobinism" had already been "subjected to an *examination*," it would subject "*monthly* and *annual* publications to a similar process."[15] Drawing on the model provided by the *Weekly Examiner*, it promised to "*review* the *Monthly*, *criticise* the *Critical* and *analyse*, the *Analytic Reviews*."[16] And, since Jacobinism was an alien import, the *Review* also pledged to provide its readers with an appendix dealing with foreign literature, a "department of criticism" that had "long been monopolized by men who, favouring the views of the French Economists and Philosophists of modern times, have facilitated the propagation of principles, subversive of social order, and, consequently, destructive of social happiness."[17] Since the disease of Jacobinism had permeated the English body politic by "circulating through secret channels, disguised in various ways," the way to arrest its spread was to expose it, to examine it, or—to return to Gillray's image—to cast light on it.[18]

A letter to the editor in the December 1798 issue suggests that Gillray's imagery resonated with at least some of the journal's readers. Noting that it had been the practice of the supporters of Jacobinism to spread their views by monopolizing the discussion of politics in the periodical press, the correspondent praised the *Review* for taking up the strategy pioneered by the *British Critic*.

> The appearance of that work may be compared to a gleam of light darting through a foggy atmosphere. And, I flatter myself, that the pestilential vapours issuing from the cave of Jacobinism, will, through your assistance, be more and more dispelled, till that glorious day shall again appear, which our venerable ancestors (who are fools in the eyes of modern reformers) had illumined, not by the ignis-fatuus of

> philosophism, but by the steady lights of Revelation and real patriotism; in which were founded those establishments, which have secured rational freedom and public tranquility; and which the advocates of the Age of Reason, and the Rights of Man, are endeavouring to demolish.[19]

It is as if the author of the letter was confirming that he had mastered the lessons in rhetoric that the *Anti-Jacobin Review* (aided by Gillray's image) was teaching: the contest between the Jacobin and the anti-Jacobin press was framed as a battle between the "steady lights" of "Revelation and real patriotism" and the flickering, deceptive swamp gas issuing from the cave of Jacobinism.

The Fire and the Sun

While Gillray imagined the struggle between Jacobins and their opponents as a contest between darkness and light in which the ultimate victory of truth was a foregone conclusion, the battles in which the *Anti-Jacobin Review* was engaged tended to be considerably more labored. Its attempt to expose the duplicities of the Jacobins to the light of truth typically involved discussions that focused on the usage of terms (e.g., "philosophy") and the meanings of concepts. It would appear that the journal's contributors saw themselves as confronting a world in which the language in which political discourse was conducted had been corrupted—hence the need to coin new terms to counter the degraded argot employed by their opponents. What the Jacobins called "philosophy" was regularly described as "philosophism"—that is, not a love of wisdom but, instead, a love of sophistry.[20] What was being presented as an attempt "to enlighten the public" was characterized as an exercise in "illumination" or "illuminizing"—that is, a conspiracy against the established order that could ultimately be traced back to the machinations of the Bavarian Illuminati.[21]

The hold of the Illuminati on the anti-Jacobin imagination owed much to the publication of Robert Clifford's translation of the Abbe Barruel's *Mémoires pour server à l'histoire du Jacobinisme* (1797–98) and John Robison's *Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried on in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies* (1798). As Michael Taylor has noted, the reception of both works was shaped by their appropriation into ongoing discussions of the repercussions of the Irish rebellion of 1798 and ongoing debates over the role of women in British society.[22] Clifford had followed his translation of the *Mémoires* with an "application" of Barruel's account to the organization and activities of the United Irishmen.[23] And Germany (portrayed in the *Anti-Jacobin Review* as a land where "eight or ten thousand persons . . . derive

their livelihood entirely, or the greater part of it, from scribbling, or, as they call it, enlightening the public mind") served as an object lesson in the dangers of exposing young women to philosophical texts: the "fatal infusion of philosophical principles" had destroyed their "natural diffidence" and "innate modesty" with the result that they had come to regard "the age of puberty as the period of exemption from every social restraint, and sacrifice their virtue to the first candidate for their favor."[24] As might be expected, the anti-Jacobin press was quick to ferret out the various domestic agents of the German Illuminati and found them (among other places) in the pages of the *German Museum*, a short-lived publication edited by the German émigrés Peter Will, Constantin Geisweiler, and Anton Willich and dedicated to the dissemination of German literature and philosophy in English translation.

Barruel's characterization of Kant's "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim" as the inspiration for the "new species of Jacobins who are making an amazing progress in Germany" prompted a footnote in the *German Museum*'s review of Kant's *Anthropology* that dismissed Barruel as "a casuist rather than a logician, and consequently unqualified to write upon philosophical subjects."[25] Further exchanges between Willich and Barruel followed, with the latter charging that Kant's religious doctrines were "more impious than those of Robespierre" and the former arguing that the alleged impieties in Kant's text were the result of Barruel's incompetence as a translator.[26] Willich concluded that, while Kant's works would "descend to posterity," Barruel's "*polemical* sketches and *personal* invectives" would "be consigned to eternal oblivion" and, as a final flourish, closed his response with the familiar words: *Magna est veritas et praevalebit*. But, while Kant's works ultimately prevailed, the *German Museum* did not: it "quit the field" with the publication of its third volume and ceased publishing at the end of 1801.[27]

Had the contributors to the *Anti-Jacobin Review* gone to the trouble of actually reading German periodicals, they would have discovered that at least some of them shared their concern about the implications of an enlightenment run amok. Indeed, in Egid Verhelst's engravings for the first two volumes of Friedrich Carl von Moser's *Neues Patriotisches Archiv für Deutschland*, these anxieties found expression in an iconography that would have been familiar to Gillray.

Moser had served as a civil servant and, apart from a stint at the court of Joseph II Vienna, spent most of his time in smaller German courts (including service at the beginning and end of his life at Darmstadt). He also managed to secure a considerable reputation as a writer (Hamann and Herder were among his admirers) with a series of works on statecraft and politics (e.g., his 1759 *Lord and Servant* and a Montesquieu-inspired contribution to exchanges on the nature of the "Ger-

man national spirit" dating from 1765). The *Neues Patriotisches Archiv* (1792–94) was the successor to the *Patriotisches Archiv für Deutschland* (1784–92) and, like its predecessor, ranged across topics in "political morality" and history, seeking to combine the "good old with the good new."[28] The criteria for the "good" were defined by Christian belief and a commitment to a hierarchically ordered corporative social order. Verhelst was responsible for the images that appeared in both journals. With a few exceptions, those in the *Patriotisches Archiv* tended to be portraits (including a few of Moser), while the two that appeared in the *Neues Patriotisches Archiv* were allegorical.

The engraving for the first volume—an image of an oil lamp, resting on a small hill and illuminating the surrounding darkness—took its inspiration from Moser's

Egid Verhelst, "To Illuminate, Not to Inflame," frontispiece for *Neues Patriotisches Archiv für Deutschland*, vol. 1 (1792). Rare Book Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

Egid Verhelst, "I do my part," frontispiece for *Neues Patriotisches Archiv für Deutschland*, vol. 2 (1794). Rare Book Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

preface to the volume, which likened his launching of the new journal to the replenishing of the oil in his lamp and proclaimed the motto, which appears beneath the lamp: "Zum Leuchten, nicht zum Zünden"(To Illuminate, Not to Ignite).[29]

The engraving for the second volume is a good deal more enigmatic. In the foreground a night watchman with a lantern at his side surveys the empty street of a town. On the horizon, at an indeterminate distance beyond the orderly row of houses, a massive conflagration rages. The motto beneath the engraving reads: "Ich thue das Meinige" (I do my part).

Verhelst's engravings for the *Neues Patriotisches Archiv* stand in marked contrast to Gillray's flamboyant frontispiece for the inaugural issue of the *Anti-Jacobin*



Daniel Chodowiecki, "Enlightenment," engraving for the *Göttinger Taschenkalender* (1792). Rare Book Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

Review. Gillray's light both enlightens and ignites: the rays of light that stream from Truth's torch illuminate the dark interior of the cave and also cause the seditious pamphlets to burst into flames. In contrast, Verhelst depicts fire as something that must be carefully controlled, and the inferno raging on the horizon in his frontispiece for the second volume drives home the dangers of a flame that escapes the confines of the lantern. And while the starry sky above may still offer (as it had in Plato's allegory) a means of orientation, Verhelst's stars are beginning to be obscured by the clouds that pour from a conflagration (presumably begun in Paris) that threatens to consume the world.

Images of light and fire work in different ways: whereas fire appears as both scourge (for the wicked) and menace (even for the righteous), representations

of light tend to be unproblematically affirmative. To take but one of many possible examples, the image entitled "Aufklärung"—executed by the Berlin engraver Daniel Chodowiecki in the *Göttinger Tachenkalender* for 1792—depicts the morning sun rising over the hills behind a small village. In a discussion of the image, Chodowiecki observed that, since "enlightenment" was a relatively recent achievement, there was no generally accepted allegorical representation for this "supreme work of reason." In making a case for the appropriateness of the image of the rising sun, he noted that—though it might occasionally be concealed by the fog arising from "swamps, censers, and burnt offerings"—the steady ascent of the sun inevitably drives away whatever fog might temporarily obscure it.[30]

In a brief article in the *Teutsche Merkur* written shortly before the storming of the Bastille, the poet and literary critic Christoph Martin Wieland had quipped that—with the exception of "a single laudable and communally useful activity"—there was nothing that honest people could do in the darkness except sleep. Only those who had an interest in concealing their schemes had anything to fear "when it becomes brighter in the minds of men." Hence, there was every reason to be suspicious of their calls for limits on the spread of enlightenment. The enemies of enlightenment, who could be counted on to "do everything they can to obstruct, to nail shut, and to stop up all openings, windows, and crevices through which light can come into the world," were biding their time, waiting for the chance to "smash the lanterns which provide us and others with some light to see."[31]

But eighteenth-century city dwellers would have been well aware of the potential dangers of oil lamps and fires. And if Chodowiecki depicted the natural ascent of the sun as a blessing, Verhelst's engravings served as a reminder that the fires that had been brought into cities to illuminate the darkness needed to be used with care. In two short articles at the close of the inaugural issue of the *Neues Patriotisches Archiv* Moser reflected on the potential threat of too much or too rapid an enlightenment. The first, which was concerned with the newly popular concept of "publicity," began by observing, "The torrent of publicity, in the good and bad senses, can no longer be stopped. It has been allowed to go too far. It should have been dammed up long ago and diverted onto another course. No one took the embers seriously because they were covered with ashes. The inner fire was disregarded because no one saw flames, or thought they could be extinguished easily."[32] Since matters had gone too far to attempt to "shut out the light," it was important to determine "whether this light should only illuminate and enlighten or ignite and inflame." It was hopeless to try to extinguish fires by "mere commands." Instead, rulers must be aware that there are "flammable materials around and near them" and must take care not "leave it to pure chance

whether sparks will actually burst into flame."[33] He recommended that, rather than continuing their habit of rewarding the "flatterers, yes-men, day-laborers, and eye-servers" who filled their courts, they rely instead on the wisdom of those wise advisers who—"inflamed by the holy fire of patriotism"—could rise above "the babble of political frogs, the chatter of wandering charlatans."[34] While an attempt to stem the torrent of publications would be futile, it might still be possible to foster works that met the challenge of reforming the old patrimonial order in ways that would allow it to meet to the demands of the emerging society.

As he went on to argue in the short article that followed, in order to carry out this task it was necessary to distinguish between "true and false political enlightenment." "The business of the former is light, truth, the growth and dissemination of both, harmony, order, quiet and peace in and over the entire human race. The business of the latter is delusion instead of illumination, deception instead of instruction, disruption and discord instead of harmony, insolence instead of freedom, the malignant confusion of minds and seduction of human hearts." While granting the truth of the catchphrase "truth must be able to endure the light," he nevertheless pointed out that "all good police regulations prevent and prohibit bringing an open flame into flammable places, into hay and straw lofts, into stables and the like. Because of the mortal danger, taking a candle into a room where gunpowder is stored is permitted nowhere. It would be criminal, on the pretext of providing light, to bring so many candles into a room and to place them in such a way that the whole house would catch fire."[35] But when it came to explaining how this distinction might be drawn, Moser confessed that there were "rather more negative answers about what is not true enlightenment than general positive principles that can be set out as boundary stones as to how far and wide it may become light, where the day should cease and the night might begin and remain."[36] Though it was possible to look back into history to determine "when, where, how, and through whom light and illumination have begun," it would be impossible to decide when enlightenment had run its course until "the general transformation of things" had been completed. Moser was, however, convinced that any enlightenment that did not "grow out of the dependence of the created on its Creator" and which "leaves man to his own willfulness, vanity, and passions" could only culminate in the destruction of civil society and a war of all against all "that begins with philosophy and ends with scalping and cannibalism."[37]

One of the reasons why Moser was content to invoke—without offering much in the way of clarification—the distinction between true and false enlightenment was that the contrast had become a familiar move in the ongoing discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of enlightenment.[38] The origins of that discussion

can be traced back at least as far as the 1783 exchanges in the *Berlinische Manatsschift* between Johann Erich Biester and Johann Friedrich Zöllner on the advisability of no longer requiring that clergy participate in the solemnization of marriage vows.[39] Zöllner's famous request for an answer to the question "What is enlightenment?" was prompted by his sense that the myriad ways in which the term "enlightenment" had been employed threatened to breed much confusion. His request was, in other words, a demand that those who were employing the term "enlightenment" clarify what exactly they had in mind. The subsequent evolution of that debate proceeded in much the same way as arguments about the Jacobin threat had in England, with the deploying of various adjectival pejoratives (e.g., mistaken understandings of enlightenment could, depending on the tastes of the author, be characterized as "false," "shallow," "narrow," etc.) and the invention of disparaging neologism (e.g., *Aufklärerei*, which played a role similar to that of "philosophism" or "Illumination" in British debates).[40]

Indeed, Moser himself seemed to be aware that his effort to distinguish between "true" and "false" forms of enlightenment was a continuation of a struggle involving another term that had already been waged—and lost—in another place. He began his article by defining enlightenment as an "invisible power" that "provides a strong counterweight to despotism" and, eventually, shakes and topples the foundations on which despotic regimes rest. But he confessed that he "would have liked to use the word philosophy instead, if she were still the pure, chaste daughter of the heavens, come from the hand of the Creator through the godly gift of reason."[41] But, in French, the term *philosophie* had been assaulted by a similar proliferation of adjectival pejoratives (e.g., *fausse philosophie, nouvelle philosophie, prétendu philosophie, philosophie moderne*) and pejorative neologisms (e.g., *misophie, in-philosophie, philosophisme*).[42]

Whose Light? Which Counter-Enlightenment?

It is tempting to view Moser (along with his admirers Johann Georg Hamann and Johann Gottfried Herder) as part of a broader movement known as "the Counter-Enlightenment." But the temptation is worth resisting. As J. G. A. Pocock has observed, the term itself is ambiguous: it is unclear whether it is supposed to refer to "one brand of Enlightenment in opposition to another, or a fixed antipathy to Enlightenment in some final sense of the term."[43]

For Isaiah Berlin it denoted the latter, with his "final sense" of the Enlightenment defined by its alleged commitment to "universality, objectivity, rationality, and the capacity to provide permanent solutions to all genuine problems of life or thought, and (not less important) the accessibility of rational methods to any

thinker armed with adequate powers of observation and logical thinking."[44] Berlin's drastically simplified account of the Enlightenment—which is rooted in the now-discredited image of a relentlessly "rational" enlightenment—diverges markedly from recent scholarship.[45] But a less obvious, though no less telling, problem with his account resides in its assumption that, at the close of the eighteenth century, there was anything approximating a "final sense" of enlightenment for his counter-enlighteners to counter. Zöllner's question in *Berlinische Monatsschrift* was not simply rhetorical: he posed it at a moment when there was considerable disagreement (even within the limited circle of Berlin enlighteners) regarding what enlightenment might involve.[46]

The flood of responses sparked by Zöllner's question did little to resolve these disagreements: in 1790 an anonymous reviewer for the *Deutsche Monatsschrift* took stock of the various responses that had been offered and came up with twenty-one different meanings.[47] The labors of the reviewer suggest that, rather than a pitched battle between "the Enlightenment" and "the Counter-Enlightenment," late eighteenth-century German discussions of enlightenment took the form of multiple contests driven by differing criteria for what counts as "enlightenment." The one point of agreement in these discussions—a consensus that is all too often overlooked by those who, as Dan Edelstein quipped, turn to Kant's famous answer as "a one-stop shop for defining the Enlightenment"—was that "enlightenment" referred to a group of activities or processes in which individuals were engaged rather than an epoch in which they resided.[48]

While one can find invocations (most famously at the close of Kant's essay) to an "age of enlightenment," it should be noted that the phrase was applied both to the present (generally as an aspiration rather than accomplishment) and (at times nostalgically) to the past. The convention of employing *Aufklärung* as the name for a *specific* historical period was late in arriving. During his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel noted that some had attributed the origins of the French Revolution to the triumph of a "superficial" form to philosophy that bore the "infamous name 'enlightenment.'"[49] While this usage was subsequently taken up by Hegel's German followers, it was not until the 1880s that the formulation "the Enlightenment" began to appear in English. As late as 1861 the best that the English translator of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history could come up with as a translation *Aufklärung* was the French *éclaircissement*.[50]

Like others who distinguished between "true" and "false" enlightenment, Moser might better be viewed not as a critic of what we call "the Enlightenment" but as an advocate for a conception of enlightenment that we have lost. Toward the close of his discussion of true and false forms of "political enlightenment"

he insisted, "Every enlightenment—theological, philosophical, and political—is suspect which . . . does not go hand in hand with the temporal and eternal happiness of men. Any religious and political enlightenment that takes from man what he requires for comfort, light, support, and peace in the current state of education of this earthly life—or that wishes to give him more than he can use, employ, and manage according to his powers of intellect and understanding—is deception, fraud, fanaticism [*Schwärmerei*], treachery against man."[51] For those who remained committed to this conception, an enlightenment devoid of any role for religious faith was an imposter—a "false enlightenment" that had more in common with the fanaticism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it did with the more "rational" forms of Christian belief that emerged over the course of the eighteenth.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, this position was losing ground. The opening pages of Paul Leopold Haffner's *The German Enlightenment: A Historical Sketch* provide a glimpse of the difficulties that one Catholic clergyman had in defending the "true" (i.e., religious) enlightenment from the "false" (i.e., resolutely secular) one. Haffner began the book by observing, "Enlightenment is a sublime word, if one goes back to its meaning; it means illumination of the spirit through truth, liberation from the shadows of error, of uncertainty, of doubt. Enlightenment is, in its deepest meaning, the transfiguration [*Verklärung*] of reason."[52] But he went on to concede that he was "too much a child of the nineteenth century" to use the term in a way that diverged so drastically from the emerging convention. Resigning himself to speaking the language of his times, "which exchanges the meaning of light and darkness," which produces a literature that regards "the light of Christian centuries as dark gloom" and that "greets the shadows of doubt and the progress of religious barbarity as light," he steeled himself to narrate the history of a conception of enlightenment that would have little to do with religious faith. To speak of "enlightenment" in the middle of the nineteenth century was, he concluded, to invoke a concept that is "purely negative, destructive, empty; it has no positive content and no productive principle."[53]

Others, however, continued to wage a struggle that persisted longer than we sometimes assume. For example, Max Ettlinger's 1906 article on the "Dogmatism of the Free-Thinkers" in the journal *Hochland* remained faithful to a conception of enlightenment that was ultimately grounded in religion.[54] The journal had been founded by the Catholic publicist Carl Muth as a vehicle for the promotion of a revitalized Catholicism that—breaking with what Muth saw as the inward piety of ultramontanism—championed a vision of a "positive Christianity" that was wide-ranging in its focus and cross-confessional in its aspirations. While it

would later gain a measure of fame for its (necessarily covert) criticisms of the Nazi regime and for Muth's ties to Hans and Sophie Scholl and other members of the White Rose resistance, during the teens and twenties the journal was aggressively nationalist and frequently anti-Semitic, with praise for the work of Arthur de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain appearing side by side with woodcuts of robust country folk engaged in various outdoor activities.[55]

Ettlinger opened "Dogmatism of the Free-Thinkers" by observing that some readers would, no doubt, regard its title as self-contradictory. But, taking aim at Ernst Haeckel's relentless promotion of his idiosyncratic interpretation of Darwin, he went on to argue that efforts to ground a worldview on the "results of modern science" culminated in a "complete and closed" (and, hence, dogmatic) system of knowledge. Though concerned that Haeckel's attempt at a "radical popular 'enlightenment' [*Volks 'Aufklärung'* (sic)]" might have some initial success, Ettlinger held out the hope that an "energetic counter-enlightenment" (*Gegenaufklärung*), begun at the proper moment, could counter the threat.[56] In a peculiar formulation that echoed the distinction between "true" and "false" enlightenment, the term *Volksaufklärung*—which had been used in the eighteenth century to refer to treatises offering practical instruction to a broader public—appeared in the text with idiosyncratically positioned scare quotes around *Aufklärung*, perhaps betraying the author's reluctance to dignify Haeckel's "enlightenment" with a name that—when properly understood—designated the goal that the proposed "counter-enlightenment" sought to defend.[57]

Ettlinger's use of *Gegenaufklärung*—a term that does not appear to have gained much traction during the nineteenth century and, in its rare appearances, was not yet used in Berlin's sense[58]—was consistent with the way in which the term had been used at the close of the eighteenth century by the author of the article surveying the various meanings of the word *Aufklärung* that appeared in the *Deutsche Monatsschrift*.[59] That article noted that attempts by writers to lay their views before readers who were ignorant of their position (or had misunderstood it) were sometimes "designated by the name 'enlightenment.'"[60] It went on to observe that the greater part of the writers who engage in such efforts "make a distinction between true and false enlightenment."[61] Its author granted that, in the case of the "passive" sense of the word *Aufklärung* (i.e., *Augeklärtheit*—"the state of being enlightened"), this distinction would appear to be a contradiction in terms. But the article went on to argue that the distinction made sense when applied to the "active" sense of the term (i.e., when it is used to refer to the various activities that allegedly advance the process of enlightenment). In other words, the distinction between true and false enlightenment involves a judgment about

the effectiveness of various practices (i.e., *Aufklärung*) that purport to bring about a state of affairs known as "enlightenment" (i.e., *Augeklärtheit*).

As an example of how such contesting judgments play out, the review offered a brief discussion of the attack that Johann Georg Zimmermann (Frederick the Great's physician and a well-known critic of the alleged influence of French philosophes on the Berlin enlightenment) mounted against the Comte de Mirabeau's discussion of the Prussian court.[62] The discussion concluded with the observation, "What can the antidote [*Gegengift*] of enlightenment which Zimmermann dispenses to the reading public be other than a counter-enlightenment [*Gegenaufklärung*] against Mirabeau's enlightenment . . . ? In other words an exposition of Zimmermanian views, against the views which Count Mirabeau wishes to make known?"[63] What we find in this peculiar text from the close of the period that we have learned to call "the Enlightenment" is a usage of "counter-enlightenment" that—like the usage in *Hochland*—consistently employed the term in the first of Pocock's two senses: it refers to "one brand of Enlightenment in opposition to another."

It was not until the close of the nineteenth century that *Gegenaufklärung* came to be used as a label for those thinkers or tendencies (e.g., "romanticism") that had come to be seen as opponents of what was now understood as the "final sense" of Enlightenment. This usage may have had something to do with the success of the term *Gegenreformation*, which had been used as early as 1776 in Johann Stephan Pütter's edition of the Augsburg Confession and had been introduced into the historian's lexicon (albeit in the plural form) by Leopold von Ranke in 1843.[64] For example, in a striking passage in the first volume of his history of atheism, Fritz Mauthner projected both *Aufklärung* and *Gegenaufklärung* back into Greek antiquity and went on to draw parallels between Socrates's execution in the wake of the Greek *Gegenaufklärung* and Vanini's execution during the *Gegenreformation*.[65]

Like *Gegenreformation*, *Gegenaufklärung* was a term tailor-made for constructing partisan narratives in which—depending on the tastes of the narrator—it appears either as an "anti-enlightenment" that seeks to undo all of the achievements of the Age of Enlightenment or as a much-needed remedy for the baleful consequences of an age that cast its lot with a simple-minded conception of reason.[66] For those who see themselves as embattled defenders of the Enlightenment, it provides a handy rubric for patching together the collection of rogues (which, in the more ambitious exercises in this genre, spans space and time) who populate its gallery of enemies.[67] For those who position themselves as critics of the legacy of the Enlightenment, it serves as a way of invoking the complexity and nuance that, by sleight of hand, had been eliminated in their construction of the papier-mâché enlightenment that their counter-enlighteners proceed to

knock down.[68] And for those whose inclinations run toward attempting to make sense of the past (as opposed to refighting its battles), invocations of the Counter-Enlightenment provide little aid in understanding how the concept of enlightenment was being contested at the close of the eighteenth century.[69]

As John O'Malley observes, for Pütter the term *Gegenreformation* referred to "the forced return of Lutherans to the practice of Catholicism in areas that had once been Lutheran." Its meaning was "quite precise and narrow," and "the words meant exactly what they say—Anti-Reformation."[70] But, over the next two centuries, the meaning of the term would be reshaped by historians of religion who would use it to refer to a series of Catholic efforts at reform (i.e., the so-called Catholic Reformation) that stretched back into the Middle Ages and continued into the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, art historians began to use it as an alternative for "Baroque."[71]

Over the past several decades, something similar has begun to happen to the term "Enlightenment," as historians have gotten used to working with an understanding of the Enlightenment that is capacious enough to embrace a variety of different confessional enlightenments.[72] While enlightenments have been proliferating, the ranks of the Counter-Enlightenment have been thinning as a consequence of the recognition that at least some of its charter members had more in common with one or another of the available enlightenments than they did with some of their alleged fellow counter-enlighteners.[73] While it is unlikely that the increasingly useless concept "counter-enlightenment" will eventually fall into disuse (we are likely, after all, to remain stuck with "the Counter-Reformation"), it is possible to imagine a future in which "counter-enlightenment" is used in a way that approximates the way "Counter-Reformation" has come to be used: as a designation for a variety of efforts at clarifying what is involved in efforts at enlightenment. And such a usage, if we believe the anonymous reviewer for the *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, was one of the ways in which the term was used during the period that we call "the Enlightenment."

NOTES

1. Ian Haywood, *Romanticism and Caricature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 60–61. The classic resource for information about Gillray is Draper Hill, *Mr. Gillray the Caricaturist, a Biography* (Greenwich, CT: Phaidon Publishers, 1965). For what was known about Gillray during his own time, see Christiane Banerji and Diana Donald, eds. and trans., *Gillray Observed: The Earliest Account of His Caricatures in "London und Paris"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

2. See, e.g., Graeme Garrard, *Counter-Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

3. Nicholas K Robinson, *Edmund Burke: A Life in Caricature* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 144.

4. See my "'This New Conquering Empire of Light and Reason': Edmund Burke, James Gillray, and the Dangers of Enlightenment," *Diametros* 40 (2014): 126–48.

5. For a survey of the career of the image of the torch in the iconography of the Enlightenment, see Daniel Fulda, *"Die Geschichte trägt der Aufklärung die Fackel vor" eine deutsch-französische Bild-Geschichte* (Halle: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2017), and, for a brief sketch of various other iconographic options, Werner Schneiders, "Images of Light—before, during, and after the Age of Enlightenment," in *Visualisation: Concepts et symbols du dix-huitième siècle européen*, ed. Roland Mortier (Berlin: Spitz, 1999) 1–10.

6. The Vulgate employed the present tense (*praevalet*); by the eighteenth century the convention was to use the future tense (*praevalebit*).

7. See, e.g., the title page of S. D'Assigny, *Religion in a Trance; Or, the Groans of the Church* (Dublin, 1711); Benjamin Ibbot, *A Course of Sermons Preach'd for the Lecture Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle esq; at the Church of St. Mary le Bow, in the Years 1713 and 1714* (London: Wyat, 1727), 20; and Benjamin Andrewes Atkinson, *Scripture History, Precepts and Prophecy Vindicated* (London: Ford and Hett, 1731), 116.

8. See *English liberty; or, the British Lion Roused; Containing the Suffering of John Wilkes, Esq*, 2 vols. ([London]: Marsh, [1769]); William Baylies, *Facts and Observations Relative to Inoculation in Berlin* (Edinburgh: Dickson, 1781) title page; Doctor Grafton [pseud.], *On Vaccine Inoculation. Advertisement. Magna Est Veritas et Praevalebit* (London, 1790); and William Blair, *Essays on the Venereal Disease and Its Concomitant Affections*, 2 vols. (London: Symonds, Johnson, Murray, Highley, Holborn, Cox & Callow, 1798–1800), 2:207. It is possible that the popularity of the phrase may have something to do with its use as an example in John Holmes, *The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy; Or, the Elements of Oratory Briefly Stated, and Fitted for the Practice of the Studious Youth of Great-Britain and Ireland* (London: Parker, 1739), 94–96.

9. Hans Blumenberg, "Light as a Metaphor for Truth at the Preliminary Stage of Philosophical Concept Formation," trans. Joel Anderson, in *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*, ed. David Michael Levin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 36.

10. Ibid., 38–43.

11. Ibid., 40–44.

12. "Prospectus" in *Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine* 1 (July–Dec. 1798): 2.

13. Ibid., 4–5.

14. Ibid., 2.

15. Ibid., 4.

16. Ibid., 5.

17. Ibid., 4.

18. Ibid., 4–5.

19. Letter to the editor, *Anti-Jacobin Review* 1 (Dec. 1798): 697.

20. *Anti-Jacobin Review* 4 (Aug.–Dec. 1799): 560.

21. For a discussion of the *Anti-Jacobin Review*'s obsession with the Illuminati, see my "Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-Jacobins, British Hegelians, and the 'Oxford English Dictionary,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 64, no. 3 (2003): 421–43, and Michael Taylor,

"British Conservatism, the Illuminati, and the Conspiracy Theory of the French Revolution, 1797–1802," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 47, no. 3 (2014): 293–312.

22. Taylor, "British Conservatism," 298–302.

23. Robert Clifford, *Application of Barruel's Memoirs of Jacobinism to the Secret Societies of Great Britain and Ireland* (London, 1798).

24. *Anti-Jacobin Review* 5 (Jan.–Apr. 1800): 573.

25. Augustin Barruel, *Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism*, trans. Robert Clifford, 4 vols. (London: Burton, 1798), 4:523–28; review of Kant, *Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefasst*, *German Museum* 1 (Jan. 1800): 57. For the broader debate over Kant's alleged Jacobinism, see Taylor, "British Conservatism," 305–6.

26. "Original Correspondence," *German Museum* 1 (Apr. 1800): 353–58.

27. "Preface to the Third Volume," *German Museum* 3 (June 1801).

28. Friedrich Carl von Moser, "Vorrede," *Neues Patriotisches Archiv für Deutschland* 1 (1792): iii.

29. Ibid.

30. Quoted in Ulrich Im Hof, "Enlightenment—Lumieres—Illuminismo—Aufklaerung: Die Ausbreitung eines besseren Lichts im Zeitalter der Vernunft," in *"Und Es Ward Licht": Zur Kulturgeschichte des Lichts*, ed. Maja Svilar (Bern: Peter Lang, 1983), 115–35, 115–16.

31. Christoph Martin Wieland, "A Couple of Gold Nuggets from the . . . Wastepaper, or Six Answers to Six Questions," trans. Kevin Paul Geiman and James Schmidt, in *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 80–81.

32. Friedrich Carl von Moser, "Publicity," trans. John Christian Laursen, in Schmidt, *What Is Enlightenment?*, 114.

33. Ibid., 115.

34. Ibid., 116.

35. Friedrich Carl von Moser, "True and False Political Enlightenment," trans. John Christian Laursen, in Schmidt, *What Is Enlightenment?*, 213.

36. Ibid., 215.

37. Ibid.

38. On this distinction, see the classic study by Werner Schneiders, *Die wahre Aufklärung; Zum Selbstverständnis der Deutschen Aufklärung* (Freiburg: Alber, 1974).

39. For an overview of that discussion, see my "The Question of Enlightenment: Kant, Mendelssohn, and the Mittwochsgesellschaft," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50, no. 2 (1989): 269–91.

40. For an overview of the usage of these terms, see my "Tracking 'the Enlightenment' across the Nineteenth Century," in *Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference on the History of Concepts* (Bilbao, 2013), 33–41, http://www.iberconceptos.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/PROCEEDINGSHCGBILBAO2013.pdf.

41. Moser, "True and False Political Enlightenment," 213.

42. See the exhaustive discussion by Rolf Reichardt and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, "Philosophe, Philosophie," in *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680–1820*, vol. 3: *Philosophe, Philosophie. Terreur, Terroriste, Terrorisme*, ed. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Rolf Reichardt, and Gerd van den Heuvel (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1985).

43. J. G. A. Pocock, "Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: A Eurosceptical Enquiry," *History of Political Thought* 20, no. 1 (1999): 125–39.

44. Isaiah Berlin, "The Counter-Enlightenment," in *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Penguin, 1982) 19–20; see also 3–4, 5, 18. The same formula appears as early as Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx: His Life and Environment* (London: Butterworth, 1939), 44.

45. For criticisms of Berlin's concept, see the exchanges between Robert Norton and Steven Lestition: Robert Norton, "The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68, no. 4 (2007): 635–58; Steven Lestition, "Countering, Transposing, or Negating the Enlightenment? A Response to Robert Norton," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68, no. 4 (2007): 659–81; and Robert Norton, "'Isaiah Berlin's Expressionism," or: 'Ha! Du bist das Blökende!,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 69, no. 2 (2008): 339–47. For reservations about the applicability of the concept to Vico, see David L. Marshall, "The Current State of Vico Scholarship," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 72, no. 1 (2011): 141–60.

46. For one testimonial to that disagreement, see J. K. W. Möhnsen's lecture to his colleagues in the *Mittwochsgesellschaft* "What Is to Be Done toward the Enlightenment of the Citizenry?," trans. James Schmidt, in Schmidt, *What Is Enlightenment?*, 49–52.

47. "Kritischer Versuch über das Wort Aufklärung zur Endlichen Beilegung der darüber geführten Streitigkeiten," *Deutsche Monatsschrift* 3 (1790): 11–43, 205–37.

48. Dan Edelstein, *The Enlightenment: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 117.

49. The phrase "*verruchten Namen*" can be found in Friedrich Stieve's lecture note from the winter semester of 1826–27. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister and Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968), 915.

50. For a discussion of the delayed appropriation of the term in English, see my "Inventing the Enlightenment," 425–26, 437–42.

51. Moser, "True and False Political Enlightenment," 215.

52. P. L. Haffner, *Die deutsche Aufklärung. Eine historische Skizze* (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1864), 1.

53. Ibid., 4.

54. Max Ettlinger, "Dogmatismus bei 'Freidenkern,'" *Hochland* 3, no. 2 (1906): 229–36.

55. For a discussion of the journal's early history and its relationship to broader tendencies in Bavarian Catholicism, see Derek Hastings, *Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31–32, 39–44.

56. Ibid., 230–31.

57. There is a similar usage, deployed against a similar target in an article in the nationalist journal *Deutschlands Erneuerung*, which insisted that efforts at "scientific enlightenment" might better be described as a "counter-enlightenment." See Franz Haiser, "Der Widersruch der neuzeitlichen Enwicklung," *Deutschlands Erneuerung* 1 (1919): 5–6.

58. During the nineteenth century there are occasional usages of the word *Gegenaufklärung*, though in a sense they differ from the current meaning. The word was frequently used in military treatises. See, e.g., Wilhelm von Scherff, *Die Lehre vom Kriege: auf der Grundlage seiner neuzeitlichen Erscheinnungsformen* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1897), 168, where it functions as the equivalent of the English "counterintelligence." In other cases, its meaning seems to be closer to the English "counterexplanation." See Karl Hiller, "Zur Versuchslehre des österreichischen Strafrechts," *Zeitschrift für das*

Privat- und öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart 5 (1878): 703. Finally, Nietzsche used the term in a cryptic entry in a notebook that dates from the spring or summer of 1877.

59. "Kritischer Versuch über Das Wort Aufklärung," *Deutsche Monatsschrift* 3 (1790): 11–44, 205–37.

60. Ibid., 230–33. The title of the section is "Darlegung seiner Meinungen." The term *Darlegung* literally means a "laying out" of a position, but it is used more generally to refer to an exposition, demonstration, explanation, or statement.

61. Ibid., 231.

62. Johann Georg Zimmermann, *Vertheidigung Friedrichs des Grossen gegen den Grafen von Mirabeau* (Hannover: Helwingischen Hofbuchhandlung, 1788), Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München, Bor. 207e. For a discussion of Zimmermann's critique of Berlin enlighteners, see my "What Enlightenment Was, What It Still Might Be, and Why Kant May Have Been Right after All," *American Behavioral Scientist* 49, no. 5 (2006): 649–51.

63. "Kritischer Versuch," 233.

64. Leopold von Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, 6 vols. (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1843–47), 5:501. The passage in question reads, "Auf das Zeitalter der Reformation folgte das der Gegenreformationen." For a discussion of the history of the term, see John W. O'Malley, *Trent and All That: Renaming Catholicism in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 16–45. I am much indebted to my colleague Phillip Haberkern for suggestions about the history of the term.

65. Fritz Mauthner, *Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande*, 4 vols. (Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1920–23), 1:95.

66. For the former, see Zeev Sternhell, *The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). For the latter, Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder*, 2nd ed., ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

67. See, e.g., Mark Lilla's rather expansive definition: "To the Counter-Enlightenment belongs any thinker over the past three centuries who has claimed that the cause of the crisis of the age is to be found in the development of modern philosophy. To the Enlightenment belongs any thinker in this same period who has been made to answer for this crisis" and his subsequent invocation of an "eternal Counter-Enlightenment" that "can be heard in the myths of Prometheus and Daedalus, in the biblical accounts of Eden and Babel, and in the parable of the Golem." See Mark Lilla, "What Is Counter-Enlightenment?," in *Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment*, ed. Joseph Mali and Robert Wokler (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2003), 4, 11.

68. As Jonathan Knudsen observed, "Historicism originated by emptying the Enlightenment of a sense of history, which it then appropriated exclusively to itself"; see "The Historicist Enlightenment," in *What's Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question*, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001) 40. I owe the phrase "papier-mâché enlightenment" to Knud Haakonssen, "Natural Law and Natural Rights in the Enlightenment," in *Festskrift Tilegnet Professor Dr. Phil. Karsten Friis Johansen*, ed. Finn Collin et al. (Copenhagen: Københavns Universitet. Institut for Filosofi, Pædagogik og Retorik, Københavns Universitet, 1995), 126–35.

69. For a concise survey of some of the problems with the notion, see Theo Jung, "Multiple Counter-Enlightenments: The Genealogy of a Polemic from the Eighteenth

Century to the Present," in *Thinking about the Enlightenment: Modernity and Its Ramifications*, ed. Martin L. Davies (London: Routledge, 2016), 209–26.

70. O'Malley, *Trent and All That*, 20.

71. Ibid., 42. He traces this process as particularly influenced by Hubert Jedin's influential 1946 survey, Hubert Jedin, *Katholische Reformation oder Gegenreformation? Ein Versuch zur Klärung der Begriffe nebst einer Jubiläumsbetrachtung über das Trienter Konzil* (Lucerne: Josef Stocker, 1946). See also O'Malley's concluding assessment of the various proposed alternatives to "Counter-Reformation," in *Trent and All That*, 119–43. He recommends "Early Modern Catholicism."

72. See, among many possible examples, David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Michael Printy, *Enlightenment and the Creation of German Catholicism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, eds., *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

73. See, e.g., Robert Norton's reclaiming of Herder in *Herder's Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) and David Marshall's *Vico and the Transformation of Rhetoric in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Mention should also be made of Jonathan Knudsen, *Justus Möser and the German Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Finally, Ostwald Bayer has attempted the more difficult task of recruiting Hamann in *A Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as a Radical Enlightener* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011).

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